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ARCTRA('T 
This thesis will examine the tyrants that ruled Gela and Syracuse during the early fifth 
century BC. It will approach the subject in a thematic manner, considering several aspects of 
the tyrants' rule which warrant particular attention. 
The first chapter will be concerned with our sources of information on the subject, with 
particular focus on the Bibliotheke of Diodorus Siculus. Being our main source of information, 
it is crucial that we understand Diodorus' work, especially since it has provoked much criticism 
in modern scholarship. 
Chapter two will be concerned with the tyrants' foreign policy, in particular we will 
examine the tyrants' relationship with other Greeks in Sicily and Southern Italy, and then their 
brief encounter with the Carthaginians. 
Chapter three is concerned with the tyrants' recruitment of mercenaries, an important 
subject given the militaristic nature of the tyranny, as well as a dominant theme in Classical 
Sicilian history. 
Next, the unusual subject of the `refounding' of already existing cities will be 
discussed. A phenomenon peculiar to Sicily, the four case studies give many clues regarding 
the nature of the tyranny in general. 
The way in which the tyrants, particularly Hieron, were presented to the rest of the 
Greek world, and to their own citizens, will be discussed next, considering evidence provided 
by the tyrants themselves as well as others. 
Finally, the impact of the tyranny on Sicily during the next century will be considered, 
with emphasis on the subjects already discussed in previous chapters, in order to conclude on 
the importance of the tyrants of Sicily in antiquity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis will examine two dynasties of tyrants, the Pantarids and the Deinomenids, 
who ruled in the Sicilian cities of Gela and Syracuse between 505 and 466 BC. The period of 
concern to us is, of course, one of great significance in the wider context of Greek history, even 
of the history of the Western world as a whole, with the Persians' failed attempts at subjugating 
Greece in 490 and 480-79 having a pivotal role not only in preserving Greek freedom but also 
in aiding its cultural, intellectual and political development, most notably in Athens. It is for 
this reason that the subject of Sicily during this time is usually treated as a peripheral matter, 
even though this is one of the most critical periods in that region's history. Although there 
were cases of tyranny in Sicily before 505, it is only at this point, at the end of the Archaic 
period, when tyrants in Sicily start making an impact on the Greek historical record such as 
other tyrants had done before, for example Peisistratos in Athens, and the Cypselids at Corinth. 
Tyranny was certainly not an unknown phenomenon in Sicily; both Panaetius of Leontini and 
the infamous Phalaris of Acragas ruled their cities in the seventh and sixth centuries 
respectively', and sixty years following the fall of the Deinomenids, in 406 BC, Dionysius took 
control of Syracuse and held power there for 39 years, his son ruling for a further ten until 3572. 
Despite the fact that the phase of tyranny in the early fifth century occurred at a time of 
great importance, that they reigned for a long time and had a huge influence on the island of 
Sicily for a long time even after their downfall, and that there is a healthy amount of coverage 
of their reigns in the surviving ancient sources, there seems to be only a small amount of 
scholarly interest in this subject. This is especially the case when it comes to scholarship in the 
English language. General works on Sicilian history include Moses Finley's Ancient Sicily and 
Woodhead's The Greek Cities of the JVest, but by far the best known study of this period is T. J. 
Dunbabin's The Western Greeks, which covers the history of the Greeks in Italy and Sicily 
from the beginnings down to 480 BC. However, this does not consider the reigns of Hieron 
and Thrasybulus, who reigned after the cut-off point of the book, leaving several important 
1 Panaetius and Phalaris - Ar. Pol. 1310b; for Phalaris also see Pind. Pyth. 1.95-8, where we hear of the 
bronze bull in which the tyrant's enemies were placed and roasted alive. 
2 For more on fourth century Sicily, see the final chapter, 205ff. 
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issues such as propaganda and the foundation of Aetna untouched. Dunbabin's work, 
published in 1948, is also very dated in parts, especially in regard to the many excavations that 
have taken place since. Anthony Andrewes' The Greek Tyrants does of course cover the whole 
period, but with such a small amount of space one is only given a general impression of the two 
dynasties, and even this coverage is shared with that of Dionysius and his successors. Aside 
from these, and more extensive general works such as the Cambridge Ancient History, in which 
David Asheri deals with the subject of Sicily for this period, one is left only with more 
specialised studies on tyranny such as James McGlew's Tyranny and Political Culture in 
Ancient Greece, although this does not necessarily mean the Sicilian tyrants get equal coverage 
with others. Nino Luraghi's study Tirannidi arcaiche in Sicilia e Magna Grecia... is the only 
publication wholly devoted to the tyrants of Sicily from the earliest times, and is relatively 
recent, but of course this would present problems to anyone interested in the subject but without 
a knowledge of Italian, and similar problems could be encountered with Berve's Die Tyrannis 
bei den Griechen and Mosse's La tyranniie daps la Grece antique. There is, without a doubt, a 
need for a study of the Pantarid and Deinomenid tyrants in the English language, and this thesis 
aims to fill that gap, which does not seem to exist for any other major dynasty of tyrants in 
Greece3. 
Outline of the Thesis 
During the course of this thesis we will examine the most important features of the rule 
of the tyrants in Gela and Syracuse, with the broad aim of understanding the nature of the two 
dynasties in comparison with those in mainland Greece in the Archaic age, as well as with 
those that followed, particularly Dionysius I. This will be a thematic study rather than a 
narrative of this time in Sicily. The reasons for this are mainly that there is limited space in this 
thesis and it is therefore preferable to select several important aspects of the tyrannies: foreign 
policy, mercenary use, city refoundation and propaganda, rather than taking a chronological 
3 For example, Dionysius has been largely covered by Caven (1990); the Cypselids of Corinth in Salmon 
(1984); Polycrates of Samos in Shipley (1987); Theagenes of Megara in Legon (1981); the Peisistratids 
of Athens in Sancisi-Weerdenburg (2000) and Lavelle (2004); The Orthagorids of Sicyon in Griffin 
(1982); The Pheraean tyrants in Westlake (1935); and Pheidon of Argos in Kelly (1976) and Tomlinson 
(1972). 
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viewpoint in which the things that make the tyrants interesting and unusual may be lost in the 
narrative and left without being fully discussed. I have also chosen to focus on the Pantarid and 
Deinomenid dynasties alone, rather than on all the dynasties in the region at this time, so in 
particular the Emmenids of Acragas and Anaxilaids of Rhegium will not be major subjects of 
discussion, except in cases where they are closely involved in Pantarid/Deinomenid affairs, 
such as in the foreign policy chapter, or to provide further, contemporary, case studies that are 
important to put Pantarid/Deinomenid activity into context, particularly in the chapter on city 
refoundations. The reason for this omission is, again, due to the limits allowed for this thesis. 
The first chapter will look closely into the main problem encountered when studying 
ancient Sicilian history, our sources of information. In looking at the history of Sicily during 
the early fifth century BC, we often find that we are mostly dependent on information found in 
the Bibliotheke of Diodorus Siculus. The first obstacle to overcome when using Diodorus is not 
in fact the text itself, but rather the attitudes towards the Bibliotheke that we encounter in 
modern scholarship, which all too often have a disproportionate effect on how we ourselves 
view the work, particularly on the subject of Diodorus' sources. In order to tackle this problem, 
the first part of this chapter will focus on clarifying the different attitudes towards Diodorus' 
work, so that we can identify the different reasons for them, and pick up on any serious flaws in 
their arguments (particularly in their methodology) later on. It is also important to note that 
although attitudes towards the Bibliotheke have developed and changed radically over the 
years, old suspicions still remain and Diodorus is still approached with a degree of mistrust and 
cynicism. 
Before we look at the main problem of sources present in the Bibliotheke, the aims and 
objectives of Diodorus in writing his work are to be discussed, so as to introduce the work more 
fully and put criticisms of his work into context. This section will also help us in our main 
objective for this chapter, to see how far Diodorus' influence has coloured our own views of the 
tyrants of Gela and Syracuse. Since Diodorus is our most important source by some distance, it 
is naturally difficult to work out how much of what he tells us is accurate. Of course, tyranny 
can be an emotive subject for some writers, particularly if they have had personal experience of 
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it, but in the case of Diodorus there is an additional problem in that his views would no doubt 
be coloured by both contemporary (first century BC) ideas, and those of his sources. 
A large proportion of the first chapter will then be dedicated to discussion of Diodorus' 
sources, and this is a clear sign of how much this subject has dominated the study of Diodorus' 
Bibliotheke over the years. The main sources of concern to us here are Ephorus and Timaeus, 
and at this point each will be discussed to provide background information, such as evidence of 
bias in their texts, aims in writing, writing style and structure, their likely original contribution 
to the subject of the tyrants in Sicily, and modern scholarship on their work. This information 
will best equip us for dealing with the main problems at hand, Diodorus' own approach to using 
his sources, the extent to which he included their work in the Bibliotheke, and of course 
assessing his own personal input into his work. These matters have proved to be difficult to 
deal with in the past, the main problem being that only fragments of the works of Ephorus and 
Timaeus have survived to us. Here, efforts have been made to clarify the different positions 
held by scholars on how Diodorus employed his sources in writing the Bibliotheke, with the 
aim of answering the most important question of how much Diodorus himself is responsible for 
the presentation of the Sicilian tyrants in his own work. 
The final section of the first chapter will examine the input of our other sources, most 
notably Herodotus, Thucydides and Pindar. The subject of sources is not of as much concern to 
us in these cases, especially in the case of Pindar who was a contemporary of the tyrants, and 
even had first-hand contact with Hieron himself. Regarding Herodotus and Thucydides, the 
focus is mainly on their concern for Western matters, and in the case of Herodotus, the 
important issue of his attitude towards tyranny, which has been the subject of much debate, and 
how much he let such prejudices (if any) affect his work. 
Chapter two begins the main study of the tyrants themselves, and here we examine 
their approach to foreign policy, firstly concerning their relations with other Greeks, then with 
the Carthaginians. To start off, we will look at the issue of the straits of Messina, in particular 
the various struggles to control it. With the straits being so crucially important to trade between 
the Eastern and Western Mediterranean, this forms probably the longest standing problem in 
the period of concern to us, and would naturally be a high priority target for any expansion- 
12 
minded tyrant. This section also introduces the subject of how the tyrants Hippocrates, Gelon 
and Hieron dealt with other tyrants in the region, in this case Anaxilas. 
The theme of inter-tyrant relations is continued in the next section when we explore the 
alliance between the Deinomenid tyrants and those of Acragas, Theron and Thrasydaeus. This 
subject is particularly important for two reasons: firstly, because Theron was the primary ally of 
the Deinomenids, and secondly because it was this friendship with Theron that had caught 
Gelon up in the Himera campaign of 480, probably the most significant event of this era in the 
'Vest. We will also see how this special alliance was challenged by the succession of 
Thrasydaeus to the tyranny in Acragas, and how it was so important to the continuance of 
tyranny in Syracuse. 
Next, we move on to Hieron and his own particular concerns for the Greek cities in 
Italy, namely, his intervention in Sybaris in 476, and, more significantly, the battle at Cumae in 
474, which both provided the tyrant with much needed military triumphs. However, we will 
also find evidence that Hieron had interests in the region beyond gaining token successes in 
battle, and the Italian theme is continued with an examination of his own policy towards the 
problem of the Messina straits. There are two events of note here, an earlier event, the 
refoundation of Catana as Aetna in 476, and the death of Anaxilas of Rhegium in 472, in which 
Hieron's approach to the Anaxilaid successors seems to signify a rather unexpected change of 
tack. 
The focus switches for the second half of the chapter towards one particular episode in 
which Gelon clashes with a foreign force, the Carthaginians, at Himera in 480 BC. This is an 
event of huge significance, probably more than any event in the West up until the Athenians' 
doomed expedition to Syracuse in 415. During the course of this section, we will first examine 
the background to the conflict, starting with the relations between the Carthaginians and Greeks 
up until 480. This is so that we can put the Himera campaign into the context of any wider 
concerns that may have developed tensions between Carthage and the Western Greeks in 
general. 
Finally, we come to the conflict itself, and here we will examine in particular the dating 
of the war, which will have all sorts of implications as we will find, including the causes of the 
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war, which is the next and the most important focus of discussion in this section. These will 
have a profound effect on how we should view the Himera campaign as a whole, as well as 
how we should view Gelon himself. The traditional view of the conflict, mainly imposed on us 
by the views of Pindar and Diodorus, is that it was equal in importance to the Persians' attempt 
to subjugate Greece under Xerxes. The aim of this section is straightforward, to test whether 
this view of the Himera campaign is an accurate one. 
The third chapter will involve a shift of focus from the tyrants' policy regarding 
foreigners, towards the actual execution of that policy through military action. In particular, we 
will look into one of the main features that made the tyrants of Gela and Syracuse unusual and 
even innovative, the employment of mercenaries as a considerable section of their armed force. 
It is true that tyrants before the fifth century sometimes employed mercenaries and/or 
bodyguards, such as Peisistratos, and these other tyrants will be considered at length before the 
main discussion on the Sicilians, but what makes the Sicilian tyrants more unusual is their 
dependence on mercenaries for most of this period. Large scale recruitment did not otherwise 
take place until the fourth century, when there were specific circumstances which made soldiers 
want to become mercenaries, and made rulers need to recruit them. This chapter will discuss 
the reasons why the tyrants of Gela and Syracuse recruited mercenaries in large numbers long 
before anyone else. 
This chapter will deal with Hippocrates, Gelon, Hieron and Thrasybulus in turn, and 
naturally this involves some discussion of their military exploits, particularly in the case of 
Hippocrates. These will be dealt with at length, as it is important to put the recruitment of 
mercenaries into their correct context, and we notice this immediately when considering the use 
of Camarinaean forces by Hippocrates, as well as his use of a bodyguard, and the reasons 
behind the change from using citizen troops to non-citizens. The use of mercenaries becomes 
more important under the reign of Gelon, and it is at this time that the reasons behind the 
tyrants' sustained use of mercenaries become far clearer. As it turns out, the reasons that we 
will discover tell us an immense amount about the fundamental differences between the tyrants 
of Gela and Syracuse, and their earlier counterparts in Greece itself. Under Gelon, we also 
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discover for the first time a fair amount of information regarding the numbers of mercenaries 
employed, as well as Gelon's idea of settling mercenaries as a means of payment. 
Discussion of Hieron's use of mercenaries is dominated by the policy of evacuating the 
city of Catana, resettling it and renaming it as Aetna, as it is very likely that Hieron had adopted 
Gelon's policy of settling mercenaries as payment. This will recur as a major event throughout 
the remainder of this thesis, such are its many implications, but some additional issues more 
immediately relevant to this chapter will be discussed here, most notably the numerous clues 
regarding the origin of the mercenaries themselves, as well as the first signs of discontent 
regarding the policy of settling mercenaries and making them citizens. This discontent, which 
had probably started under Gelon's reign, was a great contributor towards the ultimate end of 
the Deinomenid dynasty during the 460's, and its effects were to linger in Sicily for decades 
afterwards. The final years of the dynasty are also to be discussed in this chapter, as 
Deinomenid dependence on mercenary troops had reached its zenith under the reign of 
Thrasybulus, the last Deinomenid tyrant of Syracuse. This is an important time for the study of 
the tyrants in many ways, most notably in that it was impossible for a tyrant to maintain power 
when there was mutual distrust, even utter hatred, between himself and his subjects, even with 
huge and loyal mercenary armies at his command. 
Understanding the tyrants' dependence on mercenaries is itself crucial to understanding 
another, even more unusual phenomenon that existed under the tyrants of Gela and Syracuse, 
the `refoundation' of already existing cities, which is the subject of the fourth chapter. There 
are four examples in Sicily during this period that require closer examination, at Camarina, 
Zancle, Catana and Himera. I do not think that there is a case to be made for naming Gelon's 
settlement of mercenaries, together with Megarians and Geloans, in Syracuse as a refoundation, 
as there is clearly no attempt to show Syracuse as a `different' city in our sources, although of 
course there was a huge population shift to the city. 
The chapter will start with a survey of colonial enterprises throughout the Archaic and 
Classical periods, so that it will be possible to make comparisons, for example, with the role of 
the founder in colonial myth, and also city foundation under the command of tyrants. The first 
example of refoundation in Sicily occurs in Camarina, around 492/1 BC, under Hippocrates. 
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Fully understanding this case can only be done when the history of Camarina is taken into 
account, as this produces clues regarding what really happened in 492/1. Hippocrates' motives 
in settling for Camarina instead of Syracuse are also discussed, as are those behind the actual 
refoundation itself. The actual changes that were made in the city also need close attention, 
particularly on the subject of who was actually settled in Camarina. The most important 
question, however, is quite simply whether Camarina can be regarded as a different city after it 
was refounded. Is `refoundation' even an accurate term in this case? 
The second example looks at the changes that took place in Zancle, particularly at the 
time of the Samians' expulsion from the city around 490/89, when Zancle was resettled and 
renamed Messana by the tyrant Anaxilas of Rhegium. Again, the history behind these events is 
crucial to our understanding of them, and once again it is dominated by the issue of controlling 
the straits of Messina that separated the cities of Zancle and Rhegium. The drifting apart of the 
two cities during the late Archaic period was complicated by the appearance of both 
Hippocrates, who briefly held Messana in the mid-490's, and the Samians who took over in 
494. Once Anaxilas had the Samians removed from Zancle, he repopulated it with settlers from 
Messenia and renamed it Messene (later Messana). The main section of this discussion will 
therefore determine how different Messana was from its days as Zancle, and consider 
outstanding issues such as Anaxilas' own intentions for the city (did he really mean to refound 
it as a different city? ) and the fate of the Zancleans themselves who had been caught at the 
centre of the whole episode. 
Thirdly, by far the best known case of refoundation will be discussed, Hieron's 
removal of the people of Catana to Leontini, his replacing them with 10,000 new settlers, and 
the renaming of the city as Aetna, in 476 BC. This episode is of course best known for its 
celebration in epinician poetry, particularly Pindar's first Pythian Ode, but that will be 
discussed as propaganda in the following chapter. Here, as with the other examples, the focus 
will be on Hieron's reasons for the whole enterprise, the question of the degree to which the 
city differed from its pre-refoundation state, and of course who actually settled it. This 
example of refoundation also gives us more opportunity to find out how much the oikist 
actually conformed to the norms of city-foundation, for example his role in choosing the 
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settlers themselves, and also the survival of a founder-cult in Aetna itself. Uniquely in the 
cases of refoundation, we even have evidence for a constitutional monarchy existing in the new 
city. Also to be examined in this section is the effect which this episode had on the nearby city 
of Naxos, which according to Diodorus was also depopulated at the same time as Catana, and 
this apparently minor detail will turn out have an effect on what we could possibly deduce 
about Hieron's reasons for the foundation of Aetna. Finally, the subject of `Doricisation' will 
be the subject of study, as it is a clear theme in Pindar that has had a great effect on how the 
episode as a whole has been viewed. 
Lastly in this chapter we will look at the comparatively minor case of Theron of 
Acragas' refoundation of Himera, also in 476. This has often been assumed to be a copycat 
action of Hieron's activity in Catana, especially because Diodorus mentions it immediately 
after his description of Aetna's foundation. Nevertheless, we will find that Theron had very 
clear reasons for taking action in Himera, reasons that are very different to those of Hieron. 
Two major events that had taken place in Himera in the immediate past, the revolt against 
Thrasydaeus and of course the Carthaginian invasion, had left such an impact on the city that it 
was left vulnerable to further misfortune, and needed to be reinforced. 
As has been said above, the next chapter in the thesis will be concerned with the 
propaganda produced during the rule of the tyrants, both by poets and by the tyrants 
themselves. The aim of this chapter is mainly to bring together all the various ways in which 
the tyrants were presented in that time, with particular interest in how the Deinomenids 
legitimised their own rule. 
Although Pindar is the best known example of a poet being patronised by Hieron, 
others were also present at times during his reign, most notably Bacchylides, Simonides and 
even the tragedian Aeschylus. We will examine the commissioning of poets by Hieron himself, 
in order to make comparisons with other examples of tyrant commissioners from earlier in 
Greek history, for example inAthens and Samos. However, these poets seem to be used simply 
for private enjoyment, whereas the employment of Pindar, whose work was very public, 
obviously had differing aims. Next we will look at the poems of Pindar himself, in order to 
find out how he seemed fit to celebrate Hieron's rule. 
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Of the techniques used by Pindar in writing his odes to Hieron, the most important and 
clear attempts to legitimise his rule seems to come in the form of allusions to kingship, 
particularly Homeric kingship. The aim appears quite obvious, to disguise the simple fact that 
Hieron was a tyrant by attributing to him certain attributes only found in kings. For example, in 
the first Olympian Ode, Hieron is found holding a sceptre awarded to him by Zeus himself. 
Naturally, if Hieron's reign is divinely backed, as Pindar makes quite clear in this ode, then his 
reign is perfectly justifiable. 
Pindar's odes are of course performed in the context of a victory at a Panhellenic 
games, and while the first section was mainly concerned with Hieron's wishes to justify his rule 
to his own subjects in Sicily, it was important also to ingratiate himself with the wider Greek 
world, in particular the so-called `Panhellenic elite'. The odes themselves would have been 
performed at the sanctuary itself, as well as at the victor's home town on his arrival back from 
the games, but it is true that Hieron would have made strides towards recognition across the 
Greek world by being a victor in the first place. The positive outcomes of being a Panhellenic 
victor will therefore also be discussed here in this section. 
As we move on to how the tyrants presented themselves towards the Greek world as a 
whole, we find that Pindar was also used for this very purpose, not only used to justify the 
tyranny to the Sicilians themselves. In particular, there is one passage where Hieron is likened 
to the king Croesus of Lydia, and contrasted to the tyrant Phalaris of Acragas, and while this 
can again be said to distance Hieron from tyranny, the passage can also be seen as an attempt to 
bridge the gulf between the tyrant and the Panhellenic elite. 
The remainder of this chapter will concentrate on the use of titles, perhaps the most 
fundamental aspect of the tyrants' presentation to the Greek world, and of course to their 
subjects. The first section will focus on the question of whether the tyrants officially had a title, 
such as basileus or ryrannos, and naturally this question is potentially of great importance as it 
can tell us much about contemporary Attitudes to tyranny, which has been a matter of some 
debate. In order to find out, we will examine our literary sources such as Diodorus, Herodotus 
and Pindar, but as we shall find, this is complicated by the nature of our sources themselves. 
Other questions that will be explored here involve events soon after the Himera campaign 
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according to Diodorus; in particular, was Gelon really made basileus of Syracuse following his 
success, and what about the other honorific - titles euergetes and soter attributed to him? 
Finally, the subject of dedications will be discussed, aiming to shed more light on the question 
of titular use. There are two main types of dedication, military and non-military (in the latter 
cases, the result of Panhellenic victories), but both are intended for Panhellenic audiences. The 
main question here is whether the Deinomenids went one step further than Pindar and actually 
proclaimed themselves king to the Greek world, or whether they deliberately avoided the use of 
titles in their dedications, as seems to be the norm in other Greek cities. 
The final chapter will consider how influential the tyrants were in Sicily during the 
century that followed their downfall. This will be done by considering four different themes 
that have been thought likely to have been due to the tyrants' legacy. 
The first of these will be the political situation at Syracuse immediately following the 
events of 466. Of course, the first priority for the Syracusans was to regain their city, both 
politically speaking, in that new institutions would have been established, and also in the sense 
that Syracuse had been settled with outsiders during the reign of Gelon. Here we will consider 
how the Syracusans dealt with both of these problems, and whether the tyrants' influence 
remained even despite the city's efforts to be rid of it. One of the biggest questions in this 
section will be how far the Syracusans went down the democratic route, and in particular, how 
much power was maintained by the Gamoroi. The position of the Gamoroi under the 
Deinomenids was a privileged one indeed, but they could also realistically claim much credit 
for bringing about the downfall of Thrasybulus, so we will therefore need to find out whether 
these points had an impact on the introduction of democracy. Also to be considered is the 
question of whether Syracuse tried to directly copy the Athenian system, as seems to be the 
case with the introduction of petalism in particular, and also to consider why the democracy in 
Syracuse essentially failed. 
Following this, we will study the impact of the battle of Himera on the Carthaginians 
during the fifth century BC. The common perception is that Carthage focused solely on 
internal affairs following their embarrassment in Sicily, at least up until their reappearance on 
the island much later on, and this is entirely due to the comments made by Diodorus in his 
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account. This section will challenge this idea by examining the evidence for Carthaginian 
activity during the remainder of the century, and in particular focus will be on this age as 
perhaps the most significant era of exploration in antiquity. In addition, of course, there will be 
some focus on Carthaginian relations with the Greek cities of Sicily, and also on the question of 
how much of an impact the defeat at Himera actually had on Carthage. 
The next section will consider the role played by mercenaries, particularly during the 
reign of Dionysius. The focus here will not only be on the dependence shown by this tyrant on 
hired troops, but also on tackling the question of why this is the case. Circumstances had 
indeed changed by the fourth century, with mercenaries becoming more readily available than 
they would have been during the reign of the Deinomenids, but were there any other factors 
which may be attributable to the earlier tyrants? Were there any parallels in the problems faced 
by Dionysius to those of the Deinomenids? Was the recruitment of mercenaries just standard 
practice in Sicily, even during the period between the Deinomenids and Dionysius? 
Finally, we will look at the ways in which the Dionysian tyrants presented themselves 
to the world, with particular focus on the use of titles. This subject has created a good degree 
of debate, with greater evidence for titular use by Dionysius than for the Deinomenids. Of 
course, there have also been attempts to show that Dionysius also preferred to be called 
basileus. However, we shall find that the Deinomenids, especially Gelon, did have influence in 
this matter in a far more straightforward way, and can be seen even with the most superficial 
readings of the history of fourth century Sicily. 
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Stemmata 
GELA /SYRACUSE 
DINOMENES I 
GELON HIERON POLYZELUS THRASYBULUS 
(1)=???? (1)???? (1)???? 
(2) _ (1) Demarete (2) =d of Anaxilas (2) _ (2) Demarete 
(3) = niece of Theron 
S DINOMENES II d 
_ (2) Theron 
ACRAGAS 
THERON 
(1) = ???? 
(2) =d of Polyzelus 
THRASYDAEUS Demarete 
(1) = (2) Gelon 
(2) = (2) Polyzelus 
RHEGIUM 
ANAXILAS 
(I)=???? 
(2) =d of Terillus 
SONS d 
_ (3) Hieron 
Figure 1- Stemmata of the Sicilian Tyrants - Rhodes (2006) 75. 
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TIMELINE 
c. 505 - Cleandrus, son of Pantares, becomes tyrant of Gela, city wall built. 
c. 498 - Cleandrus murdered by Sabyllus, his younger brother Hippocrates inherits the tyranny. 
498-4 - Hippocrates' campaigns in Sicily, in which Callipolis, Naxos, Leontini and Zancle are 
annexed; The site at Serra Orlando is destroyed, but Morgantina is unscathed, probably 
submitting to Hippocrates. 
c. 495 - Ionians who are fleeing the Persians are invited to settle Cale Acte on the Northern 
coast of Sicily; The Samians take up the offer, but are intercepted by Anaxilas of Rhegium, 
who persuades them to settle in Zancle. 
494 - Samians arrive at Zancle. Scythes, tyrant of Zancle is removed. 
492 - Hippocrates' army defeats the Syracusans at the Battle of the Helorus River; Intervention 
by Corinth and Corcyra persuades Hippocrates not to take control of Syracuse, Camarina is 
ceded to the tyrant. 
492/1 - Camarina refounded by Hippocrates. 
491 - Hippocrates' campaigns continue into Sicel territory, attacking Ergetium and Hybla, 
where he dies. Hippocrates is succeeded by his sons Eucleides and Cleandrus, and together 
with the cavalry commander Gelon they defeat a popular uprising. Following this victory 
Gelon in turn seizes power from Hippocrates' sons to become tyrant of Gela. Start of the 
Deinomenid dynasty, in place of the Pantarids. 
490/89 - Theron comes to power in Acragas. 
489 - Anaxilas expels the Samians from Zancle, taking control himself. Zancle is resettled 
with Messenian immigrants, and renamed Messene (later Messana). 
488 - Gelon wins the chariot race at Olympia. 
485 - Gamoroi expelled from Syracuse, but on appeal to Gelon they are returned to the city; 
Gelon takes advantage of stasis in Syracuse to take control. 
- Megara Hyblaea annexed by Gelon. 
c. 485-2 - Glaucus of Carystus made tyrant of Camarina. 
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- Camarina and Gela partly depopulated, with half the population of each city being relocated to 
Syracuse. 
c. 483 - Aristocracies of Megara Hyblaea and Euboea are removed and settled in Syracuse, with 
the demos of both cities sold into slavery. 
c. 482 - Terillus, tyrant of Himera, is expelled by Theron of Acragas; Terillus flees to his allies 
in Carthage, who start preparing to invade Sicily and reinstate Terillus. 
c. 481 - Greek embassy to Gelon. 
480 - The Carthaginians, led by Hamilcar, invade Sicily, landing at Himera; Theron, who is 
already at Himera, requests help from Gelon; Gelon arrives and tricks the Carthaginians into 
lett ing Syracusan soldiers into their camp, leading to a massacre, Hamilcar kills himself; Gelon 
pronounced basileus of Syracuse by an assembly of soldiers; Carthage agree to lopsided terms 
with Syracuse for peace. 
- Anaxilas of Rhegium wins the mule-cart race at Olympia. 
478 - Gelon dies, and is succeeded by his younger brother Hieron; Gelon is accorded heroic 
rites. 
478 or 474 - Polyzelus wins the chariot race at Delphi; the Charioteer statue dedicated at 
Delphi as a result. 
476 - Anaxilas of Rhegium dies, succeeded by his sons and their guardian, Micythus; Hieron 
builds relations with the Anaxilaids. 
- Hieron sends his younger brother Polyzelus on a campaign against Croton, to assist Sybaris; 
Polyzelus goes to Theron of Acragas to seek protection from Hieron; war between Syracuse 
and Acragas narrowly avoided through intervention of the poet Simonides; Polyzelus restored 
as tyrant of Gela. 
- The citizens of Himera ask Hieron to help them remove their tyrant Thrasydaeus, son of 
Theron; Hieron betrays the Himeraeans' trust and tells Theron of their plans, leading to the 
execution of Himera's leading citizens. 
- Catana refounded as Aetna by Hieron; the population of Catana and Naxos are moved to 
Leontini; 10,000 Peloponnesians and Syracusans settle in the new city. 
- Himera refounded by Theron of Acragas. 
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474 - Hieron wins at the Pythia. 
- Hieron's fleet victorious against the Etruscans at Cumae. 
473 - Rhegium helps Tarentum against the lapygians; Rhegium itself is invaded and occupied 
by the lapygians. 
472 - Theron of Acragas dies, succeeded by his son Thrasydaeus, tyrant of Himera. 
- Thrasydaeus prepares for war against Syracuse, but Hieron in anticipating this marches on 
Acragas first, winning convincingly; Thrasydaeus is deposed and exiled to Megara, where he is 
then executed; end of the Emmenid dynasty and beginnings of democracy at Acragas, leaving 
Hieron and Micythus as the only tyrants remaining in the region. 
471 - Hieron summons the Anaxilaid successors to Syracuse, to discuss the future course of the 
dynasty. 
470 - Hieron wins the chariot race at Delphi, inspiring Pindar's first Pythian Ode. 
467 - Micythus is honourably discharged from the guardianship of the young Anaxilaids. 
- Hieron dies at Aetna, and is accorded heroic rites, as oikist; heron is succeeded by his 
younger brother Thrasybulus; Popular revolt against Thrasybulus' misrule at Syracuse. 
466 - Thrasybulus allowed to go into voluntary exile in Locri. End of the Deinomenid dynasty. 
461 - Anaxilaids expelled from Rhegium. 
- Camarina resettled; The Aetnaeans are expelled from Catana and move to Inessa; the 
Catanaeans reclaim their city. 
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Figure 2 -1,: H of Sicily - Brock and Hodkinson (2000) 170. 
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-' ý3- Physical Map of Sicily -From the Cl_ , 
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CHAPTER ONE 
SOURCES FOR THE SICILIAN TYRANTS 
To anyone undertaking a study of the tyrants in. Sicily, or indeed any Sicilian history 
down to the Punic Wars, it becomes abundantly clear that the problem of literary sources is of 
the greatest concern, perhaps more so than for the study of the history of Greece proper during 
this period, and certainly more so than for later antiquity. Although many of the sources we 
have for early Sicilian history are much the same as what we find for the Greek mainland in the 
late Archaic period, (for example Herodotus is of great importance) these are naturally more 
focussed on the Eastern Mediterranean, and we only get comparatively brief, though extremely 
valuable, episodes of Western history. Sadly, any Histories that were written with Western 
Greece as their main focus, such as those by Timaeus and Philistus, are lost, aside from 
fragments that have survived from other, later authors'. Occasionally we find a reference to 
this period in other works, particularly the Politics of Aristotle, which often discusses tyranny 
as a form of government, or also in the form of other writings such as the Stategenaata of 
Polyaenus or the Varia Historia of Aelian, which may be considered less reliable because of 
their much later composition, their style of writing and also their own personal agendas. The 
Odes of Pindar and Bacchylides are of use, particularly for the study of how these tyrants 
wanted to be seen by others and to legitimise their rule, and even for learning about events 
during the tyrants' reign, although much of the detail again may prove to be unreliable due to 
its purpose of glorification of a victor. Pindar's contribution will be considered more fully in 
the chapter on Deinomenid propaganda. Also of great use are the scholia, comments found on 
the various manuscripts alongside the main body of the text. The scholia are almost always 
anonymous and therefore it is often difficult to judge their worth, indeed some examples can 
prove to be inaccurate, misleading or even nonsensical. However, the scholia for Pindar in 
particular prove to be particularly valuable and seem to be of a high quality, and these are 
sometimes useful for the purposes of this thesis. 
' Other than Diodorus himself, the most noteworthy example of this is Polybius, whose twelfth book 
seems almost entirely dedicated to criticising Timaeus personally as well as methodologically, which 
may well have an effect on how accurately Timaeus' work has been preserved, see below 40ff. 
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While these sources, particularly Herodotus and Pindar, often contribute much to our 
knowledge of the tyrants in Sicily, another major source, Diodorus Siculus, can often be found 
to be more useful, although his work is problematic and often criticised. However, the 
Bibliotheke is particularly useful as Diodorus, as his epithet suggests, was a Sicilian from 
Agyrium, and therefore gave far more coverage to Sicilian history than others had. The Himera 
campaign of 480, which is given coverage by both Diodorus and Herodotus, is a good example 
of this, although we will later discover that the accuracy of these accounts is a different matter 
altogether. The main part of Diodorus' work that covers this period, Book Eleven, also picks 
up more or less from where Herodotus leaves his account of Sicily, at the Battle of Himera, and 
is the only real indication of what actually happened after 480, since many of the main 
historians of the Classical Period whom Diodorus used as sources are now lost. 
This chapter will now consider more fully the historians themselves, starting with 
Diodorus, because he contributes more and is the most problematic to us. We will not only 
examine Diodorus' own Bibliotheke however, we shall also explore the contributions made by 
his mostly lost sources, Timaeus, Ephorus and Philistus. Finally the works of Herodotus and 
Thucydides will be considered for a sense of completeness. 
Diodorus Siculus 
The contribution of Diodorus to our knowledge of early fifth century Sicily is greater 
than any other authority available to us now. Even though we can learn little from him 
regarding events before the Himera campaign of 480, indeed there are only odd fragments of 
Book Ten surviving, his coverage of events during and after 480 are so important that if they 
did not exist we would be mostly unaware of the details of what happened at Himera, let alone 
the importance attached to it by the Greeks of Sicily. We would also have agonisingly little 
information on Hieron, despite his Panhellenic victories, and virtually nothing about 
Thrasybulus and the fall of the tyranny in 466, not to mention other tyrants such as Theron of 
Acragas. Yet despite the fact that Diodorus certainly has his uses to us, his contribution to our 
knowledge goes mostly unappreciated, and much of what has been written about the historian is 
really concerned with others, namely, his sources. Naturally, such an attitude towards Diodorus 
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is self-maintaining. Even if one were trying to write a more balanced account of his work, one 
would end up writing more on the subject of his sources because that is where all the research 
has been done before, and it is difficult to break free from the mould2. 
There is little known about Diodorus himself. We do know he was from Agyrium in 
Sicily, and after possibly a few years in Egypt, he moved to Rome at around 56 BC, 
presumably as an adult. It seems this is where he stayed until at least around 30 BC when his 
Bibliotheke was published; after this date his life, both in terms of events and length, is 
unknown3. What is known is that there was an almost insatiable hunger for books and higher 
education around this time in Rome, for example, Strabo tells us that for the first time, 
bookselling had become a real profit-making business4. Even figures of satire had been created 
later on, figures such as Petronius' Trimalchio who boasts of having not one but two libraries, 
one Greek, one Latin, and also a character described by Lucian who collects books simply to 
show them off to others5. It is this kind of atmosphere in Rome that allowed Diodorus to 
compile and successfully sell a work that, to many, is simply not of that high a quality. To 
make up for the lack of historical expertise that is sometimes apparent in the Bibliotheke, it 
seems that Diodorus relied on giving his work a didactic twist, in order to distinguish it from 
others, such as Timaeus, from whose work Diodorus is often accused of plagiarising. 
Although Diodorus was hardly the first historian to moralise, for example we shall find 
later that Ephorus also did so, few historians have let it form so much of what was written, and 
so strongly at that. At the very beginning of his work, Diodorus explains his utilitarian aims to 
us, and what he hopes to achieve through them: 
Tots t& Kotväs icTopias 1rpayµaT£vßaµtvots µ£y6cXas xäpttac änovE[mty 
Six(xtov nävTas 6tvop6mous, Ött 'roll iöIotS n6vou 6)(peXij6at TÖV KOLVÖV 
ßiov £cptXotit 0rlaav" äxivövvov yap S1SaßKaXiav Toi3 rn t pEpov'ros 
£iarly1l6äµ£vot KaA ic5'rfv iltnelpiav 8t6c 'rigs npayµ xtEicx 'raüiric 
2 To give an example, the introduction to Stylianou's 1998 commentary of Book Fifteen is 141 pages 
long, and of these 107 are on the subject of sources, including 48 on Ephorus' contribution. Sacks (1990) 
has a real attempt at studying Diodorus' own contribution to historical writing, concentrating in particular 
on the place of the work in its first century BC context, as well as the overall shape of the work itself, in 
terms of Diodorus' personal aims in writing. Instead of merely being a careless collection of other 
people's thoughts, Sacks describes the Bibliotheke as `a document substantially reflecting the intellectual 
and political attitudes of the late Hellenistic period' (1990) 5. 
3 Agyrium - Diod. Sic. 1.4.4. Travels - 1.83.8, also see Harm and (1967) 982 n. 5 and Homblower (1981) 
25. Stay in Rome - 1.4.3-4. ° Strabo 13 C 609. See also Kenyon (1951) 81 ff.; Reynolds and Wilson (1968) 22ff. 
5 Petronius Satyricon 48; Lucian Ind 1.8. 
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1tEptzzo1oü6t Tots ä vaytvc; Natcovßty. 
Diod. Sic. 1.1.1-2 
His aims seem simple enough, to write about good men and bad men so that the reader 
may learn lessons from them, making himself a better man and thus benefiting the world. 
Throughout the Bibliotheke Diodorus does indeed stick to this plan, picking up on themes such 
as divine justice in order to make his point more explicit6. Whether every instance of such 
moralising is down to Diodorus, or to his sources, we cannot tell, and Stylianou also notes that 
there are varying degrees of moralising throughout the Bibliotheke, for example it is greater in 
Books XI-XV than in XVII-XX. The contribution of Ephorus to Diodorus' work ends during 
Book XVI, and it therefore seems likely given Ephorus' own reputation, that the sources used 
by Diodorus had some influence on his use of moral philosophy. However, I think it is unwise 
to go down the same route as Barber and claim that even Diodorus' aims are taken directly 
from Ephorus' work 7. 
Attitudes towards Diodorus Siculus 
The study of the Western Greeks in modern times has been somewhat damaged by the 
reputation of Diodorus himself, in particular regarding his use of sources'. While things have 
recently changed so far as realising that Diodorus actually had his own beliefs and reasons for 
writing the Bibliotheke, rather than simply copying those of Ephorus in particular, there still 
seems to be an underlying belief in scholarship that Diodorus was really only as good as his 
sources, and that much of his work was literally taken word-for-word from historians such as 
Ephorus and Timaeus. This could be said to have reached a climax with Laqueur's extensive 
study of the entire surviving Bibliotheke9. Making the assumption that Diodorus directly lifted 
material from Ephorus' work, and simply added much smaller sections of Timaeus in order to 
make other points or arguments, Laqueur claims to prove that if one could positively identify 
the episodes in which Diodorus used Timaeus as a source, one would be left with `pure 
6 Diod. Sic. XIV. 63.1, XIV. 7.4, XV. 48.4, XVI. 61.1-64, XXI. 16.5, XXII. 11.2 are noted as examples by 
Stylianou (1998) 4. 
See below, 31ff. Barber (1935) 70. 
8A summary of how this treatment of Diodorus developed since the late 17`x' century has been provided 
by Hornblower (1981) 19-22. 
9 Laqueur RE s. v. Timaios (3) VIA (1936), col. 1076-1203. 
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Ephorus' and could therefore make huge advances in understanding both historians. Laqueur's 
work will be discussed more fully, along with other arguments on the subject, throughout this 
chapter. However, this brief description is sufficient, for the moment, to illustrate how little 
Diodorus was actually appreciated as a historian in his. own right, leading to an element of 
distrust regarding his reliability, and even competence (or lack of it). While questions certainly 
remain regarding Diodorus' ability as a historian, some attitudes have changed over the years in 
his favour, particularly due to the realisation that he actually had aims in writing that differed 
from those of his predecessors, and therefore must have had some kind of input, however 
historically sound it really was, into his own work. However, the existence of a mostly moral 
framework1° certainly does not inspire confidence in Diodorus' work as far as historical 
accuracy is concerned, and this is generally added to by the perceived inconsistencies, plain 
contradictions or wild exaggerations found in the text, which are still felt to be the legacy of his 
uncritical style and use of sources. It does still seem the general opinion that we would be far 
better informed if the works of Ephorus, Timaeus or Philistus had survived instead of 
Diodorus', at least in regard to Greek history before Alexander. 
We should now determine what Diodorus was hoping to achieve by writing his 
Bibliotheke, in the context of the whole work and not only on tyranny. Then we will consider 
the subject at the core of the whole problem, the sources that Diodorus actually used, and 
consider their own aims and methods. Finally we will go on to how Diodorus used his sources 
in order to construct his Bibliotheke, with the focus mainly on Book Eleven. 
Diodorus' aims 
The reputation of Diodorus as an uncritical compiler, as far as his sources were 
concerned, may also lead one to presume that he could not have had his own personal agenda 
while writing his Bibliotheke. There is a problem with this assumption in that we cannot expect 
Diodorus to be totally opinionless, as he would be, without a doubt, the first historian not to let 
personal bias affect his work, and this would indeed be contrary to human nature. We must 
assume that Diodorus had some kind of aim in writing his work, otherwise he would not have 
10 Diod. Sic. 1.2.2. 
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written it in the first place. For example if his aim was to entertain people, lie would have tried 
to make his work more enjoyable and easy to read. If his aim was to educate, he would have 
had several alternatives such as giving the Bibliotheke a moral or a didactic twist, or even 
aiming to achieve greater historical accuracy. In any case he would have had some kind of 
input. If Diodorus himself saw his work as an uncritical compilation of world history, he 
certainly would have been aware that it would be worth no more than the individual sources lie 
would have used in compiling it, and instead perhaps would have billed it as an updated or even 
`nerv and improved' Ephorus or Timaeus. This is contrary to how others in antiquity viewed 
the Bibliotheke. For example, one particular incident is mentioned in Diodorus' fortieth book, 
in which he tells us that some of his work had actually been pirated and published before he had 
properly revised it, and this certainly implies that his efforts were very much in demand in the 
late first century BC". 
Few scholars have broken free of the idea that Diodorus may actually show some 
independent thought in his work, despite stating his intentions near the start of the Bibliotheke. 
On a basic level, Diodorus states his aim of writing a concise, universal history that could be of 
use to both Greeks and Romans'2. This includes the use of a chronology which would be 
familiar to both peoples, which he maintains consistently throughout the narrative, noting the 
winner of the Stadion race in every Olympiad, as well as numbering each year of the four that 
made up the Olympic cycle, also the elected Athenian archons were mentioned, along with 
Roman consuls. Any well-known person who died in a given year would also normally be 
noted at the start of a year's narrative, for example Theron of Acragas in 472 BC13. However, 
as we have already found, Diodorus' aims are not totally restricted to wanting to recall past 
events: 
Eý änävTwv SE au A, 1povµeVic 'ri; Eüöatµovias, änoöoTEov Twv gnaivwv 
TÖ itpwTCtOV Tip TOÜTwV tiäXtaT' aitia iatOpia. iyllTEOV yäp Eivat TaüTrv 
cpüX. axa µEv T% Twv ägtoXöywv äpcTflg, µäpTVpa Se Tfis Twv cpaüX. wv xaxias, 
Ei pyETty SE Toi Kotvoü yEVOVs Twv 6v8p6)nwv. ä yäp i Tcov Ev 65o1) 
µvOoXoyia Tfiv incöOeßty IIEnX. aßµEV11v 9xo1jßa toX. Xä au 3 XXETat w% 
ävOpdwnotS [pö; svaEßEtav xai Stxatoa{ VflV, ltöaop µä2.2, ov vno2, lInTEOV Týv 
npocpünv rf axilo ias iaTopiav, Tns ö?, ils q Xoaocpias oiovEi µtltpönoXty 
11 Diod. Sic. XL. 8. 
12 Diod. Sic. 1.3. 
13 Diod. Sic. X1.53.1. 
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oiaav, £maKcuäaat Süva69at Tä i'jen gdtUov irp6g xaXoxäyaOiav. 
Diod. Sic. 1.2.1-2 
Here we find a clear moral objective in his work, with the aim of preserving the 
reputations of those who deserve them, good or bad. This statement is apparently not enough to 
satisfy modern scholars, particularly those who are adamant that there is no real objective 
behind Diodorus' work, and that he was incapable of thinking for himself. For example, 
Barber, in his book on Ephorus, assumes that even this passage has also been lifted directly 
from his historian's own prooemium, but with no real reason for doing so, other than, it seems, 
to further discredit Diodorus and accredit more of his work to Ephorus (Ephorus himself also 
moralised to his audience)t4. Some do manage to avoid such assumptions: for example, despite 
his belief that part of the beginning of Diodorus' narrative is heavily influenced by Posidonius, 
Nock does allow Diodorus at least to have his own opinions and credits his aims and objectives 
to the author rather than his sources". What is more, these intentions are repeated throughout 
the work, showing that his intentions were at least important to him, rather than showing the 
comments in Book One to be only of token value. In one such passage, Diodorus clearly feels 
it is important to name those who had betrayed Greece by siding with the Persians in the 
invasion16: 
Xpfjatµov SE 8topißat Twv `EXXijvwv Tovs t& rwv ßap(36cpwv EXoV9vou , iva wyxävov t£S öv£i ou; änotpEnwct rail OXac pilgicas 'tobG itpo66tas 
ysvtlaoµtVOV; tiý xotvfjc EXcvOspiaS. Aivtäves REV oüv xd A6xoTEEG Kai. 
Misteis Kai IlEppatßoi Kai Mäyviltec µs' ä 'rcov ßapßäpwv ETäxOrlßav, ETt 
ltapoIxnic Ti1S Ev Tois TEµztEat c uXaxns, 'AXatoi 8E'6tcwTat xai Aoxpoi 
xai OETTaXo't xa't Bot(t)Toi of 1rXEioug roinwv äJtEXoövTwv 6m KXtvav npös 
ToIS ßapßäpovs. 
Diod. Sic. XI. 3.1-2 
It has been suggested by Drews that it is Diodorus' own views on these matters that 
leads to the confusion and contradiction that has been noted by those scholars such as Laqueur 
who criticise him". It is Drews' belief that the sources that Diodorus chose, in order to form 
the bulk of his narrative, may have had opinions that clashed with Diodorus' own aim of 
making moral examples of past figures, or in the above case, entire nations who had sided with 
the barbarian enemy. Diodorus chose his sources depending on factors such as popularity, and 
14 Barber (1935) 70. 
15 Nock (1959) 4-5. 
16 In the first half of this chapter alone, there are two more examples of this in 38.6 and 46.1. 
17 This is the main conclusion that Drews gathers from his argument - Drews (1962) 392. 
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of course their historical ability, the latter of which may conflict with his own moral aims'8. 
Diodorus' representation of Epaminondas, who' is mentioned at other points in the Bibliotheke 
apart from the narrative of his life, also warrants attention 19: 
"On Kpo twvtäTns Ttq Ki Xwv övoµa, Tp oü6ia Kai 8641 itpwto5 Twv rroXtTwv, 
En£9üµrl6£ fIDOayöp£to; y£vE Ocu. wv SE xaX£nöc Kai ßiatos Töv rp6nov, i Tt 
SE ßTaßtc«rr ; Kai TupavvtK6;, 6n£8oxtµä6erl. 1rapol; vve£is oüv 'r 
(Yim1 j aTt Twv Ilv9ayop£iwv, &Tatp£iav µ£y6cA. t1v ßuv£6T1laatO, Kai Si£T. X£t 
ltävta Kai XEycwv Kai npäTrwv Ka2 (x), rcov. "OTt Avßts ö IiuGayöp£tos £i5 
Onßas Tfs Botwiia; y£vöµ£vos St&äaKaXo; 'Enaµtvd vSou, robrov µev 
TEX£LOV ÖCVSpa l1p6; Ö(p£ThV KaTE6T1j6£, Kai 1Iattp aÜTOÜ OETÖS EYEV£TO Sl 
£ÜVotav. Ö SE 'Eno: gtvci v&xS Tfls TE KapT£plac Kai XuT t iTo; Kai. r @v 60, G)v 
äp£Twv £K Tu; IIuBayop£iou cptkoßocpias EvaüaµaTa Xa(3thv, ob µövov 
Oilßaiwv, äA ,ä Kai nävIwv Twv Kar' abr6v 
Enpcwi£v£v. 
Diod. Sic. X. 11 
In this example we have a mention of the great Epaminondas, in what seems to be a 
blatant attempt to get the man and all his good virtues included into the narrative, even where 
he is chronologically so far away from the subject at hand, the character of Cylon to whom 
Epaminondas is contrasted. Therefore Diodorus clearly has his favourites, and this reaffirms 
the idea that he did indeed have his own agenda in the Bibliotheke. This can also be seen in the 
case of Gelon of course, and his praise of the tyrant need not be simply lifted from Timaeus' 
own work, as we do have evidence, which we shall come to later in this chapter, that Diodorus 
was not completely uncritical of Timaeus20. The final piece of evidence supplied by Drews 
comes in the form of Diodorus' confidence that his own form of history is better than those of 
others, by listing complaints of which at least one he claims can be applied to any historian 
before him21: 
KEtFthVfS yäp Tots 6CVaytvdw6xou6t Tiffs w(pE%£iaS EV 'r4) IEXEiGTas Kal. 
7cotK (OT&'rag is ptßTä6Etg XaµßävEtV, of itXEi6TOt [LL V Evös Eevouc f litt 
iröXEwS av'o'cxsIS TEU ous ävEypayrav, Wyot S' ättö Twv äpxaiwv 
xpövwv äp? &IievO1 c &S Kotv6c5 1tp& EtS iRExEiplj6av ävaypäcpcty µExpt 'rwv 
Kae' atTObq Katpthv, Kai TofT(wv of gi V ToÜS oiK£ious xpövouc ExäaTotS ob 
1CapEýEUl; av, of ft T&g Tchv ßapßäpwv npäl; £ts imEpEßrluav, £Tt S' of µEV Tag 
2taXat6[5 µuOoXoyias Stä Trly Svßx>rp£tav Tns ltpaypat£ia5 älESoxiµaßav, 
oL SE TT v 'Üir66Ta6ty T1j; E1CtßoXi ; oÜ 6uv£TEXE6aV, JIEao%. a4TjO£VTES TÖV 3ioV 
vtte TýS 7tEnpwJ1 vlg. 
Diod. Sic. 1.3.2 
18 See Alvarez de Miranda (1956) 60. 
19 Drews (1962) 388-9. 
20 See below 41, Diod. Sic. XXI. 17. 
21 Drews (1962) 384. See also Bury (1909) 236 and Croze (1923) 197 who, understandably, disagree 
with Diodorus' claim. 
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Importantly, Diodorus is not the only historian in antiquity who believed that the 
Bibliotheke was worthy of praise. Early Christian writers such as Eusebius and Justin cited his 
work as one of high morality, and much later on, by the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries, 
Diodorus was again in high demand for the same reason with the Bibliotheke being translated 
into French, German, Italian, English and Latin22. 
It may be possible to attribute some of the many apparent problems in Diodorus' text to 
the fact that his own beliefs and aims in writing, which he constantly reinforces, were in fact so 
strong that in the face of different views brought up by his sources, he stood by his own 
methods, with results that appear confused. It is where Diodorus is unable to reconcile his own 
beliefs with the historical records and anecdotes of others, that he gives the impression of a 
historian who is less capable than those he is using for information, and ultimately gets 
confused and contradicts himself as a result. 
Diodorus' sources 
Before we look at how Diodonis actually used his sources in his Bibliotheke, it is 
standard practice in Diodoran studies to consider his sources, whose works have survived only 
in fragments23. The historians of concern to us here are Timaeus of Tauromenium (c. 350-260), 
Ephorus of Cyme (c. 405-330), and to a lesser extent, Philistus of Syracuse (c. 430-356). 
Philistus 
The earliest of the three main sources of Diodorus, Philistus was a friend and adviser to 
the tyrant Dionysius I of Syracuse, and not surprisingly is more sympathetic towards the tyrants 
than many other historians, for which he is criticised heavily by Timaeus24. The only fragment 
of his work (an eleven book history of Sicily, split into two parts) that is to be used in this thesis 
concerns Hippocrates' refoundation of Camarina in 492, although this in itself is not found in 
22 Eusebius Praep. Evang. 1.6; Justin Cohort. 9. The British Museum Catalogue of Printed Books vol. 53 
(1960), s. v. Diodorus gives a full list of the various editions of the Bibliotheke during the Renaissance. 
23 Rutter (1993) 175-6, tells us how problematic the whole process of identifying sources can be, as it 
sometimes produces circular arguments and solid answers are a rarity. He also warns that even if a 
source can be identified with total accuracy, this does not mean all the detail in Diodorus is derived from 
the content of that source. 
24 Timaeus FGrH 566 F38. He is also called philotyrannos by Plutarch (Dion 36.3). See Pearson (1987) 
19-30 for more on Philistus (FGrH 556). 
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the fragments of Diodorus' lost tenth book25. He is known to be an able and knowledgeable 
historian, influenced heavily by Thucydides, and used frequently by Diodorus Siculus, but most 
importantly for our purposes he was put in charge of the colonial enterprises in the Adriatic 
during the reign of Dionysius I, and therefore would have a clear idea of what they entailed, as 
well as having at least an awareness of the history and politics of his native Sicily. 
Ephorus 
Ephorus has been thought to provide Diodorus with the bulk of his information up to 
340 BC26, although not so much for the chapters of concern to us which are thought to be of 
Timaean origin. This has mostly been assumed because of the historians' own backgrounds: 
Timaeus, being a Sicilian himself, is not only criticised by Polybius for favouring all things 
Western Greek and exaggerating their achievements, a trait often found in Diodorus' 
Bibliotheke, but Timaeus' main work of history was one of Sicily itself, the Sikelikai Historiai 
down to Agathocles' death in 289/827. Ephorus himself was from Cyme in Asia Minor, and 
therefore would have had no reason to give Western Greek affairs special attention as Timaeus 
did. However, it seems that the likes of Gelon and Dionysius I would still have received their 
fair share of coverage from Ephorus, though clearly not as much as Timaeus would have 
provided. Ephorus' work was an attempt at a `universal history' covering events not only in 
Greece and its vicinity, but of all parts of the known world, so it is probable that Diodorus also 
considered Ephorus' account of Western Greek history in addition to that of Timaeus. 
However, it is the way in which Ephorus wrote his histories that has become more 
controversial, in particular, Diodorus' reference to the work as being arranged Kat& yEvoS28. 
This method is said to be highly successful by Diodorus, but what does xaTä yEvos mean? 
There are three main arguments: firstly, Ephorus has written an episodic history, presumably 
with a broad chronological base; secondly, the books are divided by subject matter, so that each 
book has its own theme running through it; and lastly, the work has been divided so that each 
25 See the refoundations chapter, 138ff. 
26 E. g. Laqueur (1936). 
27 Timaeus FGrH 566 T6-8. 
28 Diod. Sic. V. 1.4. 
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book is focused on a geographical area, for example Sicily, Egypt or Greece itself-9. The idea 
that Ephorus' history was episodic is not without problems, the main one being that `episodes' 
of history are naturally going to be of varying length, and therefore divisions between the books 
may have been a difficult matter. Another problem is that some passages which are found in 
Diodorus, who employs an annalistic system, seem to be more `episodic' than others, and these 
are then assumed to be due to Ephoran influence by those who believe in the episodic theory, 
thus backing up their own argument in a circular fashion30. The theory seems to be over- 
dependent on the assumption that Diodorus' work is mostly derivative of Ephorus therefore, 
and since I think that this idea is not likely to be correct, it will be challenged later on in this 
chapter. 
The second theory, of Ephorus' books being unified in theme, is even more a result of 
the belief that anything found in Diodorus must come directly from someone else's work. In 
the preface to his fifth book, Diodorus criticises Timaeus for his digressions and recommends 
the `history by theme' approach instead. Since it is Barber's view that Diodorus' aims, and 
therefore the prefaces to each book, are directly taken from Ephorus' own work, he thinks it 
must follow that Ephorus too must have divided his work by theme31. 
The third theory, that Ephorus' work was divided so that each book focused on a 
particular geographical region, is supported above all by Jacoby and Drews32. Drews' belief is 
based on the fact that the history of one region never seems to fall in the same book as the 
history of another region, at least as far as the fragments we have of Ephorus are concerned. 
Also, the works of other historians are sometimes divided in a similar, though not so extreme, 
manner. The books of Diodorus' Bibliotheke are themselves split into chapters that deal with 
distinct regions of the Greek World, for example the narrative of the Persian invasion of Greece 
halts at one point in order to pick up on the Carthaginian invasion of Himera at XI. 20. Again, 
in the preface to Diodorus' fifth book, the historian says that he himself will construct the book 
29 There have been advocates for all three views; Bloch suggests it is episodic (1940) 308ff.; Barber 
(1935) translates it as `subject-system'; Jacoby FGrH IIc 26 rejects both views, saying it is divided 
geographically. 
° Busolt (1893) 707 picks up on the story of Brasidas (Diod. Sic. XII. 67-8), which is more episodic than 
most of Diodorus' work, and decides that this is a remnant of Ephorus' own account. 
31 Diod. Sic. V. I. Barber (1935) 70ff. 
32 Jacoby FGrH IIc 26; Drews (1963) 244-55. 
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xa2ä yývoq, and then goes on to give a treatment of each of the Greek islands in turn33. With a 
universal history, the switching from one place to another would be inevitable, whether from 
chapter to chapter or, as seems more likely in Ephorus' case, book to book. To conclude on 
this matter, it seems as if the final theory on the meaning of xat& yEvoq is most likely to be 
true of the three discussed, with the others appearing to be based only on presumptions 
regarding Diodorus' capability as a historian. It is possible that the meaning of xaTä yEvoq is 
connected with the fact that Ephorus was writing a universal history, and more specifically, 
with his switching between regions taking place at longer intervals in the text. 
There are other significant points to be made on Ephorus' work, in particular 
concerning his bias and aims. In Diodorus' own narrative there are several mentions of Cyme, 
Ephorus' home town, that seem to be completely unwarranted and have no known authority 
behind them34, however this is only likely to inflate Cyme's role in Greek history and may not 
have too much of an impact on the narrative as a whole. A bigger problem is the apparent 
favouring of certain individuals and larger cities in Greece, and it is noted by Barber that, 
combined with the didactic aims also held by Ephorus, as well as the rhetorical skills the 
historian picked up from Isocrates, it is this bias that is by far the most damaging to the 
historical accuracy of Ephorus' work35. The biggest example of this is the constant bias shown 
towards the Athenians during the Pentecontaetia and the Peloponnesian War, in comparison to 
Thucydides' own account. However, this entire chapter of Barber's work seems to be based on 
two great but unsafe assumptions: firstly, that since Ephorus seemed to be ready to exaggerate 
the role played by Cyme in such small ways noted above, then it must follow that he was ready 
to falsify information of far greater significance. Secondly, and more relevant to this chapter 
on our sources for Sicilian history, Barber is happy to assume that any example of bias shown 
by Diodorus, at least on the subject of mainland Greece in the second half of the fifth century, 
must necessarily be an example of Ephorus' own bias36. In fact there is not a single reference 
to Ephorus' own work in the entire chapter on his bias, a shortfall similar to that suffered by the 
33 Diod. Sic. V. 1.4. 
3; In Diodorus' narrative of the Persian invasion of 480, for example, there are three instances; in XI. 8 we 
find that Leonidas is informed of his being surrounded by the Persians at Thermopylae, by Tyrrastiades 
of Cyme; plus the Persian fleet had docked at Cyme both in the spring and the winter of 480 - XI. 2,27. 35 Barber (1935) 85-6. 
36 On falsification - Barber (1935) 87; on bias - ch. 6, pp. 84-105. 
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work of Laqueur which will be discussed later on in this chapter37. Barber's treatment of 
Isocratean influence on Ephorus suffers similar problems, with only two references to Ephorus' 
fragments and the rest based on Isocratean aspects of Diodorus' own work38. 
Regarding the known fragments of Ephorus' work which deal with the tyrants of early 
fifth century Sicily, there is not much material to discuss. We do know that Ephorus was 
known as cptXot-pavvöTatoq to Timaeus later on39, but this is only because Ephorus 
excessively praised Philistus, who was a close friend of the tyrants in Syracuse in the fourth 
century. There is one idea in Diodorus' work that is perhaps attributable to Ephorus, that of 
Persia and Carthage joining forces to attack the Greeks in 48040. The question of the causes of 
the Himera campaign are dealt with fully in a later chapter, but here it is only necessary to say 
that Ephorus' theory is unlikely to be true, and also that he was almost certainly the first major 
historian to have picked up on the legacy of Hieron's propaganda campaign in the 470's41. 
Diodorus clearly believes this version of the story (XI. 1.4; 20.1), and it seems likely that 
Timaeus would also have incorporated this small nugget of pro-Western propaganda into his 
own work. 
As far as the subject of the fifth century tyrannies in Sicily are concerned, it seems the 
case that Ephorus' importance is restricted to his being an authority for both Timaeus and 
Diodorus. This seems very likely considering Ephorus' position as perhaps the foremost Greek 
historian from the `old' world (Greece and the East) to write extensively about the Greek West, 
and as Pearson puts it, was simply a `standard authority'. We also know that Diodorus used 
Ephorus' work quite extensively, and he was probably his main source for many subjects, 
including Western Greek affairs42. 
37 See below, 47ff. 
38 Barber (1935) ch. 5. 
39 Timaeus FGrH 566 F115,154 (Plut. Dion 35-6). 
40 Ephorus FGrH 70 F1 86 (sch. Pind. Pyth. I. 146b). 
41 See below chapters on propaganda, 176ff. See also Pearson (1987) 133-4. In the same fragment 
Ephorus records the number of troops offered to the Greeks by Gelon, which are the same as in 
Herodotus' account (VII. 158) except the number of hoplites is, quite unusually, cut from 20,000 to 
10,000. 
42 For example, the accounts of Ephorus and Timaeus are compared when discussing the numbers of the 
invading Carthaginian army - Diod. Sic. XIlI. 54; 60; 80; XIV. 54. However it is possible that Diodorus 
did not check Ephorus' account itself, but rather Timaeus' criticisms of it, which may not have been 
totally accurate - Pearson (1987) 34. 
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Timaeus 
Of all the `lost' historians of the Greek West, Timaeus is certainly the most familiar to 
those studying the subject. This is a continuation of how the historian was considered in the 
Ancient World itself, although of course he was not `lost' to them as he is to us. Timaeus' 
popularity throughout this age certainly had an impact on what has survived to this day, as 
although we do not have the bulk of his work, there are many sizeable fragments that have been 
found in later sources, including Diodorus himself, as well as a good supply of comments made 
by these on the historian, most notably by Polybius43. 
The reputation that Timaeus had in the Ancient World, particularly Romeo4, seems to 
stem from the fact that he was the first Greek (c. 350-c. 260 BC) to give more extensive 
coverage of events in Rome's history45. He was therefore used extensively as a source for this 
period in the Roman Republic, including the wars against Pyrrhus of Epirus, and Carthaginian 
history before the Punic Wars. His interest in the Western Mediterranean is due to the fact that 
he was a Sicilian himself, from Tauromenium, perhaps born in nearby Naxos. The reason for 
this `perhaps' is that the year of Timaeus' birth is uncertain, and he may have been born under 
the reign of Dionysius II, who had had Timaeus' family removed from Naxos in 35846. At 
some point between 339-329, Timaeus was banished again, this time to Athens, where he 
became associated with the Academy and the Peripatetics, and then composed his histories. 
It is clear that Timaeus' life experiences and associates in Athens, where there was a 
strong anti-tyrannical sentiment, had an impact on his writing. There are passages in Diodorus 
which are strongly anti-Dionysius47, in particular a long speech occurring in Book Fourteen 
which is normally attributed to Timaeus, but only on the grounds that Timaeus was very well 
known for his inclusion of speeches in his Histories48, and also the assumption that Timaeus 
a' See Pearson (1987) 37ff., 270-1. 
4' For example, Cicero praises Timaeus as a historian - Ad. Q. F. 2.11.4; De Or. 2.57; Brut. 66; De Div. 
1.39. 
45 See Momigliano (1959), and Manni (1961) on Timaeus as a historian of Rome. 
46 For more references on Timaeus' life see Pearson (1987)7,37-9, and future reputation 1,7,38-9,264, 
270-1. 
4' Caven however, claims that in general Diodorus is not conspicuously biased against Dionysius in his 
Bibliotheke, as although there are several such passages that give that impression, they are offset by other 
passages which are in fact positive and even laudatory -(1990) 3ff. 48 Polyb. XIl. 25a, b. Diodorus himself admits that he sometimes added rhetorical material into his own 
work - XI V. 65-9, XX. 1-2. 
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was the main source for Diodorus' Sicilian material. We do know that Timaeus verbally 
attacked Agathocles49, and Diodorus himself makes it clear how unhappy he was with Timaeus' 
strong bias, and lack of consistency over such matters50. Of course this criticism in itself has 
implications regarding Diodorus' competence as a historian that we shall come to later. 
However, Diodorus' criticism of Timaeus is mild in comparison with that of Polybius, 
who was writing about a century after his subject. As Brown notes, virtually the entire twelfth 
book of Polybius' Histories is dedicated to attacking many aspects of Timaeus' work51. The 
biggest problem is Timaeus' criticism of others, in particular that aimed at other historians; for 
example his attack on Callisthenes in particular brought a strong reaction from Polybius, who 
states that Timaeus is guilty of hypocrisy, possessing himself the qualities for which he attacks 
Callisthenes52. Brown again notes that the rest of Polybius' criticism is based on three points: 
firstly Timaeus' use of speeches, which has been the subject of discussion since, secondly his 
lack of experience in the army and in politics, which Brown recognises as a result of Polybius' 
utilitarian view of historical writing, and thirdly the reputation which Timaeus' work later 
enjoyed, which was deemed to be unjustified by Polybius53. It is Walbank's view that Polybius 
has an unstated motive in attacking Timaeus, in that Timaeus is a rival to Polybius to be the 
primary Greek historian of Rome, and Polybius is jealous of his rival's popularity 54. In other 
words, his criticisms of Timaeus may be telling us more about Polybius himself than about 
Timaeus, and presumably the criticisms did not carry much weight with Diodorus55 
49 Timaeus FGrH 566 F124a, b; Polyb. VII1.10.12; XII. 15,23ff. 
so Diod. Sic. XXI. 17. Pearson (1987) 227 assumes that because Diodorus no longer could use Ephorus as 
a source at this point in the narrative, he was therefore still dependent on Timaeus for information despite 
obviously being unhappy with his account. In Diod. Sic. XIX. 9.2-4, the portrayal of Agathocles is far 
from favourable, Pearson describing him as `unscrupulous and treacherous', but Diodorus is forced to 
use Timaeus due to the lack of other sources. The same could be said for Polybius' own account, while 
Pearson recommends Polyaenus' account (V. 3.7-8) as the most likely to match Timaeus' original. 
Plutarch similarly attacks Timaeus' slandering of Philistus in his life of Dion, ch. 36. 
51 Brown (1958) 93ff. Other examples of criticism include that by Istrus (FGrH 334 F59) from the 3rd 
century BC, and the scholar Polemon of Ilium (fr. 45 - Book XII) from the 3rd/2nd centuries BC. 52 Polyb. XII. 12b. 2-3. Polybius later attacks Callisthenes himself, in a similar manner to Timaeus. 
53 See Pearson (1986) 350-68, on the use of speeches in Timaeus. 
S; Walbank (1968-9) 484. While Jacoby makes roughly the same point (FGrH 566, comm. p. 527), some 
disagree; for example Lehmann (1967) 352-4. 
55 Indeed this is the opinion of both Marincola (2001) 139, and Walbank (1985) 262-79, who believe that 
Polybius was eager to to prove himself better than Timaeus, who had become established as the principal 
historian of the Western Mediterranean. Sacks (1981) 66-78 also agrees, adding that Polybius is 
genuinely attempting to inform his audience about historical techniques. 
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It is another passage in Polybius that is of the greatest concern to us here, where he 
criticises Timaeus for his almost shameless promotion of the Western Greeks and their place in 
such areas as the arts, philosophy, and also their importance in history. 
60, ' 6µw; Tiµato; £i; EKao ra Twv irpo£tprljEVwv ToßoüTOVs EKT£iv£t Xöyov; 
Kai 'rolaütrly 7tot£ITat ßnovStly Ir£pi 'rob Thv µtv EtKEXiav µ£yaXoµ£p£aTEpav 
1totf c at c1g aw hh aii; 'EXXOo;, Täs S' Ev aitlj itpä cts Etncpav£aTepas Kai 
KaXXIOV; TCOV KaTÖC TTjv Ö(XXIIV O'iKOVFIEVTIV, TIAV S' ävSpwv Twv µEv 6oyPia 
8L£V1jVO(6TWV 6o (j)T&TOVS robg EV EtK£%t, la, TwV SE 1tpayµaTtKtV 
iiy toVn «otÖ tOV; Kai Octo tÖ tOUs TOYS EK EvpaK0v6G)V, öS to jn' KaT(X%. t1t£7tV 
')7C£pIOXhV 'tots It£tpaKlOtg TOLS EV 'Ca; 6taTpt ats Kal rag (itept) hhhTotG itp6g 
Täs 1rapa86ýovs Entx£tptla£ts, ö'rav i 0£pairov X y£tv EyK(bµlov ij fIrlv£Xönns 
np60c, )v, rat y 6yov j ctvo; ý'rEpov 'rwv 'totoüTwv. 
Polyb. XII. 26b. 4-5 
This is of obvious importance to us because it may have an impact on how he reported 
events in Sicily under the Deinomenids, particularly events such as the battles at Himera and 
Cumae, of which later comparisons were made with various battles during the Persian Wars. 
There is no actual evidence of this bias in our known fragments of Timaeus, but that does not 
mean that Polybius is wrong, as what we have is so little compared with what was available to 
Polybius himself, but we do know that Timaeus wrote about such famous figures as Gelon and 
Empedocles. As Pearson points out, there is little to be found on the subject of military history, 
and we are unable to compare his work on Himera with that on the Persian Wars, but the 
account of Aristodemus of Cumae's battle against an Etruscan army of 500,000 soldiers and 
18,000 cavalry recorded by Dionysius of Halicarnassus is very likely to be Timaean56, the 
exaggeration perhaps affirming the belief that Timaeus was prone to bias towards the Greeks of 
the West and their achievements, but probably not conclusive evidence in itself. 
Also of concern to us is Timaeus' apparent hatred of tyranny57, however it does not 
seem to be directed to all tyrants. There are fragments that clearly support and praise the 
actions of Gelon. In contrast to other tyrants, whom Timaeus normally portrays as sacrilegious 
men who are too hybristic and fall foul of the gods' wishes, Gelon is represented as an 
56 Dion. Hal. AR 7.3. See Pearson (1987) 41-2. 
57 For example his hatred of Agathocles - FGrH 566 F 124a, b. 
43 
honourable, pious man, who according to Herodotus is also descended from the priests of 
Demeter and Kore at Gela, the first of whom in Gelon's family was Telines58. 
I's Xo va E1)paxoü6tov Ka6' vttvouS Si ßowvTa (KEpavvoßlt g yäp ESo%£v 
övEipots yEyovEVat) ö Kücov 6opvßoüµ£vov äµETp o; yvovs EK£ivov, 
Kaev%aKTWV AK E%. Tj%EV, EWS £'yeip£t To'UTOV. TOÜtoV £ E6()6£ itOT£ Kal 
X1 Kos kK 9avaTou" ßxoXtjt ztpoaKa8rl1EVO1) yap i Tt nathiov övTOS, 11bKO 
EXBwv agApttaý£ Tfiv SEXTov Tljv i: KEivov" Toi) S£ SpaµövTOS itpös aütöv 
TöV XÜKOV Kai Týv SE%"TOV, KaTa6Et69Eiaa f 6xoX' ßaOpäoEv KaTaninTEt, 
Kai aij. tavtaS 611EKTEtV£ 1taI5aS 6i v 515a6K6Ä. W1. TCÜV 71ad&(JV SE Töv 
äptOµöv of 6vyypacp£i5 ßowßt, Tiµatot, Otovv6tot (-), Atö& opot Kai Aicwv 
7cÄ£ico TE%AÜVTa £KaTÖV" Tä 6' aKpißES AK ol6a. 
Timaeus FGrH 566 F95 (Tzetz. Chil. 4.266) 
This story, also mentioned in Diodorus59, affirms the belief that Gelon, even as a young 
child, was enjoying divine favour and was clearly destined for great things in the future. Gelon 
of course did not become tyrant of Gela through right of birth, but gained it as a result of 
becoming one of Hippocrates' favourites, and this rise through the ranks of the Geloan army is 
highlighted by another of Timaeus' surviving fragments: 
ßaOuKpf tvol6l Ei ' äµcp' äKTais 'E%, Wpou] 7L£pl TOÜTov r6v 7toT(xg6v auvE6TT1 
'I1L1[OKp6GT£L T(Ä1 I'£XÜ)Icov Tup6LVV(AL 7Cp6g EupaKO6irns 1C6X£pOs, ö SE I'EX ov, 
<ob> OÜTog ETaLpog, i Ithhhpx£L TÖTE cI7C7COKp6L'L£L' EV 6f TOÜT(U)1 TIJCYi TCot 
itoX. Eµcol £iK6 Töv Xpöµlov bEt6aI a«Oa1 noXX& Epya Kath 'rýv µäxtly. lc£pi 
Se TolbTou Tov noXEµou Tigatos £v 'rut t S£8r1XciK£" `KaO&1tCL yap' cpnßiv 6 
6ISuµos 'ov6£µiav äX?, iiv jt x1ly Exoµ£v £vp£iv i£pi Töv "E? copov Twv 
ßuVIJKµ(xKötcov TG)t Xpoµiwt 'rupävV(J)V, ÖTt [th 6l)V `I7ErtOKp&T£1 'roü F00G)VOs 
1tp6; Eupaxouaious. öTt µev ovv M(ova iitnapXcty KaTbyvjcr£v `Innoxpä is, 
aacpEs 6 Tiµalos 1toltj6£t ypäcpcov oinco; «`InttoKpäirls 6E µ£2ä 'r v 
K?, £äv8pou T£? £-'rhv äµa Av 'roü FOLCOvos Ev 'rilt'£TayµEVrlt µ£µ£vrlKÖTO;, 
äµa 8E Toi; IFOAIots xapi c«NOat ßoWLöµ£vos, µ£Tam£µyräµ£vo; aütöv Kai 
ltapaKaXE6as £1ri T6c5 iipäý£LS, äirävTCOV 'rwv iitrt£wv Thu EitµCX£lav £K£iv()t 
ztapC&OK£v»'. 
Timaeus FGrH566 F18 (sch. Pind. Nem. 9,95a) 
The bravery shown in the battle at the Helorus river had led Gelon to his promotion to 
the position of cavalry commander under Hippocrates, which would presumably have been the 
highest position, given the probable importance of the cavalry in this area60. As a man who was 
later heroised by the Syracusans, it is probably not surprising that Gelon should be treated as 
58 Hdt. VII. 153, also Timaeus fr. 96 (sch. Pind. Pyth. 1.6.158), who is actually referring to Hieron, Gelon's 
younger brother. 
59 Diod. Sic. X. 29. 
60 See later chapter on foreign policy, 66ff. Dunbabin (1948) 407-9, for a discussion of Timaeus FGrH 
566 Fl9a, b which concern the destruction and rebuilding of Camarina immediately following Helorus. 
To be brief, the difficulties arise firstly because of similarities between the names `Gelon' and `Gela', 
and secondly because Gelon later destroyed the city as tyrant himself, which leads to confusion regarding 
which destruction is being referred to, and whether Timaeus himself was confused between the two 
events. 
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such by Timaeus; how else should one treat a man who saved the whole of Sicily from 
barbarian subjection? It is also highly unlikely, given Gelon's later status, that Timaeus would 
have had much evidence of a darker side to Gelon's personality available to him. There are 
signs of exaggeration in Timacus' account of this time, for example his claim that Carthage was 
actually made subject to Syracuse following Himera, and was forced to pay tribute, is not 
something that is supported by other sources, not even Diodorus61. 
We can safely assume therefore that Timaeus had a liking for Gelon in particular, but 
can we gather any information on the other tyrants of the age? The fact that Gelon was such an 
extraordinary figure in Sicilian history may not mean that we rule out any dislike towards these 
tyrants on Timaeus' part62. On Gelon's predecessor, Hippocrates (for whom, unlike his 
successors, there is no evidence to suggest he was styled basileus63), there is very little by way 
of opinion that we can gather, unless the assumption is made that Diodorus used Timaeus as his 
main source on Sicilian history, in which case there is one fragment which is of interest: 
"OTt `Inrcoxp&'n ;ö FE?, C os Tvpuvvog Tows Evpaxovcio )S vevtxtlxws 
KaTfi6TpaToith6eoccV ei; Co Toi Otös iepöv. xaTE2, aße SE a'ÜTÖv Töv iep£a 
Kal TCOV E1, )paKOU6iwV TtV&S KaOatpoÜVTaS Ö vaOi iaTa XpuaÖ , Kai µä?, tata 
iµäTtov Toi) Ltös lEptatpovµEVOV; £K itoXXoü xaTEßx$vaßµEVOV xpvcoü. 
Kai To&rolS µEV s TEInx a; cb; iEpo6üXo1s s xele ev änEXOEi V Ei; AV nÖxty, 
aüTÖS SE TCOV ävaOljµäTwv dcnEGXETO, cpt%oSoi f cat O Xwv Kai vogigwv Ssiv 
Töv'riXtxoüTOV eitavatpovµEVOV itöXEµov µr16EV £Z; a tapTävsty Eis Tö Asiov, 
äµa SE voµi«wv Staß&k; ýEtv Toi )g ltpos&TwTas Twv Ev E1)paxoü6ats 
ltpayµä'rwv itpö; Tä iAi'iOrl Stä Tä Sox£iv avtotS 1tXsovsKTtxwS, äXX' oü 
SrlµoitKcüg ovö' {aaoS äpx£ty. 
Diod. Sic. X. 28.1-2 
There is a clear comparison to be made here with the portrayal of Gelon, as 
Hippocrates is also shown to be a very pious individual, but interestingly he shows great 
concern for how war itself is to be conducted regarding issues of despoiling sacred objects, as 
well as wishing to be considered as a good ruler himself. This point is of great importance as it 
is made clear that Hippocrates was by no means a typical tyrant, only caring for his own 
excessive needs, but one who was concerned with ruling fairly over his people and setting an 
example to them. However one point of real concern to us is the last section of this story, 
where Hippocrates wishes not to set the Syracusans against the rulers of the city, but to let them 
61 Timaeus FGrH 566 F20 (sch. Pind. Pyth. 11.2). 
62 Although there is a case to be put that they may even have referred to themselves as basileus, which 
may cause more difficulties. See the later chapter on self-presentation on this subject (191ff. ). 
63 See later chapter on propaganda (191 ff. ) 
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think that they ruled for all, not just for themselves. Oldfather dates this incident to the 
aftermath of the battle of the Helorus river around 491 BC64, and although Syracuse was indeed 
left to rule itself until 485, the city only retained its independence following the mediation of 
Corinth and Corcyra according to Herodotus, and Hippocrates had instigated the battle in order 
to gain Syracuse for his empire 65 
Immediately following this episode, there is reference to Theron, tyrant of Acragas: 
"Ott th pwv ö 'Axpayavtivos yEVEt xai irXoüTcw x(A Tlj npös 'tö nXf Oos 
cpiXavOpcatcia noXi) ztpo6Xcv ov g6vov Twv 1EAUCwv, äß, Xä Kai. 7tävtcov 'rwv 
Etxe?. twtwv. 
Diod. Sic. X. 28.3 
Although this is a short passage, it does allow tyrants from outside Gela/Syracuse to be 
considered as beneficial to their people, in fact even more so than his fellow tyrants in Eastern 
Sicily. 
Of course there is the point that Theron is also Sicilian, the group of people that 
Timaeus is most likely to praise excessively, according to Polybius, and also that Theron was a 
friend, ally and family member of Gelon, and therefore perhaps favoured by association. 
Brown also makes a brief study of Timaeus' treatment of Theron, in the context of the history 
of Acragas as recorded by Timaeus' fragments66. A kind of `rise and fall' storyline can be 
found within these fragments, as the decline of the tyranny of Phalaris (the ultimate stereotype 
of the `bad' tyrant) is replaced by a period of prosperity, then excess leading to a moral decline 
of the city as a whole, before Theron and his family rescue the city by `revitalizing' it with new 
blood from Rhodes. In other words, Theron's sole rule is seen as beneficial to the city rather 
than damaging, like that of Phalaris, and Brown contrasts this attitude to Polybius, who judges 
regimes by the type of constitution rather than the ruler(s)67. 
For Hieron and Thrasybulus, like Hippocrates, we have few fragments attributed to 
Timaeus, although we do have the entire eleventh book of Diodorus which contains the last 
years of the Deinomenid dynasty. Laqueur believes that Timaeus would almost certainly have 
64 Oldfather (1939) 97 n. 3. This episode is examined in the refoundations chapter (138ff. ). 
65 Hdt. VII. 154. 
66 Brown(1958)58. He is referring to Timaeus FGrH 566 F93a, b (sch. Pind. 01. II inscr., 29d). 
67 Polyb. 1.1.5; Polybius' sixth book is dedicated to a discussion of the Roman constitution, and in VI. 2.8- 
10 we are told of the importance of the type of constitution to how well a state was run. Polyb. VI. 2-9 is 
a discussion of the virtues and downfalls of the various constitutional forms. 
46 
disliked Hieron, as he was hardly a beneficial tyrant to his people and was guilty of many 
excesses typical of tyrants68. However, as much as Laqueur's feelings on the subject seem 
reasonable, there is little evidence to support them. The episode involving Polyzelus mentioned 
in Diodorus69, does appear as a fragment of Timaeus, and it does make the tyrant appear 
paranoid and fearful of potential challenges to his rule; but it hardly can be claimed as evidence 
of strong feelings against Hieron in the same mould as those against Agathocles and perhaps 
Dionysius. Another fragment refers to his chariot victory at Delphi70, but that is it as far as 
definite fragments on the Deinomenids are concerned. 
Overall, there is simply insufficient evidence to substantiate the claim that Timaeus 
was anti-tyranny in principle, but there are signs that he was concerned about the way in which 
these men actually ruled, whether the ruler was a tyrant or a constitutional king. It is made 
more difficult to determine by his alleged (but mainly unproven) bias in favour of all things 
Western, but this may be restricted to the key achievements he records rather than those who 
played a lesser part in the story. 
Diodorus' use of sources 
The biggest and most controversial problem in dealing with Diodorus' work is that of 
his use of these sources. Obviously the question of an historian's sources is an extremely 
important one, as it is not possible to construct a history without them, for even using one's 
own memory to recollect events can be considered a source in its own right71. It has long been 
felt that Diodorus' own sources for the majority of the Bibliotheke, but in particular those for 
the time of concern to us, were the Histories written by Ephorus of Cyme and Timaeus of 
Tauromenium'Z. However, Diodorus' own reputation as an uncritical compiler of information 
supplied by his sources, has led many to believe that it is possible to positively identify 
different passages and assign them more or less directly to a particular source. The most 
68 Laqueur (1936) col. 1088. 
69 Timaeus FGrH 566 F93b (sch. Pind. 0!. 11.29d), Diod. Sic. XI. 48. 
70 Timaeus FGrH 566 F141 (sch. Pind. Pyth. II inscr. ). Brown (1958) 64 is sure that he is also 
responsible for Diodorus' account of the refoundation of Catana (X1.49). 
71 Thucydides' recollection of speeches is probably the best example of this - 1.22. 72 Volquardsen (1868) was the first modern scholar to refer to various passages in Diodorus as `pure 
Timaeus'. 
47 
extreme example of scholarship taking this view is that of Laqueur73, who divided the 
Bibliotheke (at least up to Book Eighteen, from which point Ephorus could not have 
contributed) into Ephoran and Timaean fragments. This was a very brave and extensive 
attempt to answer the most basic questions concerning Diodorus' use of sources, for example 
how he balanced the views of more than one source, whether successfully or not, to what extent 
Diodorus actually used his own judgement when compiling his history, and of course who 
Diodorus' sources actually were, in the many cases where they are not cited. This would 
hopefully then leave us better informed on the subject of Timaeus and Ephorus themselves. In 
order to solve these problems, Laqueur decided to attack them at their very root, in other words 
the many apparent contradictions and confusions in Diodorus' narrative that hinder our 
understanding of the events concerned74. 
Laqueur's work, despite being an admirable effort to clarify the source question 
conclusively, has been heavily criticised by many scholars over the years, for example by 
Hammond75. This is mainly because of the shortcomings in Laqueur's method and also his 
attitude to Diodorus, which is really the most extreme example of the criticisms aimed at the 
historian. In regard to Laqueur's method, the worst aspect, as pointed out by Brown, is that 
there is no effort made to examine the already known fragments attributed to Timaeus and 
Ephorus, from sources other than Diodorus76. How can one possibly identify an unnamed 
source for an historical passage if much of the information we actually have on that source is 
simply ignored? The other problems lie in the dangerous assumptions made by Laqueur which 
render the rest of the work quite pointless, for example the old assumption that Diodorus was 
using select passages from one historian, and adding some interesting points made by others 
while never including his own thoughts on the subject. This is contrary to clear evidence 
indicating that Diodorus did have his own opinions and included them in the work". Finally, 
the whole work is done with the objective of proving that Diodorus used Ephorus as the main 
73 Laqueur, RE s. v. Timaios (3) VIA (1936), col. 1076-1203. 
'' Laqueur (1936) col. 1076. 
75 Hammond (1937) 79-81. 
76 Brown (1952) 340. 
" E. g. Diod. Sic. 1.22.4,83.8-9 (Egypt); XVI. 83.3 (on Agyrium, Diodorus' home-town); of course 
Diodorus does not always have to tell us when he is using his own opinion, so there are in all probability 
many more examples. See above, 31ff., on Diodorus' aims. 
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source for his work, using parts of Timaeus to illustrate other points that otherwise would not 
be made, or for other points of view, resulting in contradictions in the text. Trying to prove a 
point like this is certainly impossible when other positively attributed fragments were 
disregarded, as how can one identify, for example, the writing style of a historian if that style 
has never been established from known fragments? 
It is hardly necessary to discuss here the sources used by Diodorus in books other than 
Eleven, but one problem in particular does indicate others in Laqueur's work. The theory that 
if Ephorus' contribution was removed then we would be left with `pure Timaeus' certainly does 
not hold true for some sections of Diodorus' narrative, for example smaller sections such as 
11.55-60, where lambulus is named as the source, and V. 42-6 which mentions Euhemerus. 
While this does not rule out Ephorus as Diodorus' main source, it does open up the possibility 
that Diodorus was not restricted to Ephorus and Timaeus alone, but did indeed use other 
authors, although how much they were used cannot really be determined. 
Book Eleven itself is a problematic one. Described by Brown as a `miserable narrative 
of events' and as `inconsequential' and `careless' it does in a way epitomise what many see as 
wrong with Diodorus in general78. As regards sources, there is simply no mention of either 
Ephorus or Timaeus in the whole book, which survives in its entirety. However, this does not 
rule out their usage. Laqueur himself believed that Book Eleven was mainly the work of 
Ephorus, in keeping with his main theory. The reason for this is Ephorus fr. 186, which 
maintains that Persia and Carthage acted in unison in invading Greece and Sicily: 
oia Eupaxoc iv äpxwt Saµaa8 vTES itäOov, wxunöpcov änä vawv ö ßcpty Ev 
növTOn ßäa. Ev äX, txiav, `EXX. 65' £gE?, xwv ßap£ias SouXias] Evtot jEv `EXXä6a 
Ttly EtKEXiav AKOUßav, Ttv£S S£ `EXX66a 'c v 'ATTtxr V. Eixö; S£ Tail 'Ecpöpou 
iaTOpiatS Ev Zuxöv'ta Töv Hiv&apov E tlxokouOýqxývat aü'Öv afrr 7. is top£i 
yäp "Ecpopo; TotoüTOV, ÖTt 71apa6xEUacopEVOU E EpýOU TÖv E1ti, Tljt 'EXXX t 
aTÖXov, irp£aßEts 1rapayEVEaQat ltpö; F Xwva Töv TÜpavvOv iKET£üovTas Ei; 
Töv Twv 'EXXTjvwv 6ÜXXoyov EXOELV' EK SE II£p6COV Kai (DOLVLKO)V 1[p£aßEtc 
ltpös KapXilSovious tpoaT6c6aovTa; th; JEXEiaTOV SEot 6TÖXov £i; EtKEX. iav 
ßaßi Etv <Kai> KaTacTp£yfaµtvou; Tons Tä Tüwv `EXXfjvcov cppovoüvTas trXEiv 
£ni IZEXOn6VVTI Yov. äµcpOTEpcwV U Töv Xöyov S£gaµEVwv Kai Toe µEV `IEpwvo; 
6uµµaxn6at Toi; °EXXflct npo01)µougEvou, Twv SE Kapxr15oviwv EToiµcwv öv'rcwv 
auµnrpäýat Twt -Epýtlt, I'EXcwva StaxoaiaS £üTpErri(Yav'ra vaüs Kai StaxtXious 
imc l; Kai 1tEýoi)S µupious KaTaxoü6at a'töXov KapXTSoviwv Ka'ranXxiv Erri 
EtKEXiav, Kai Staµaxtlcäµ£vov µßj µövov Toüs EtK£Xtwtas £XE1)8Epwßat, äXX& 
78 Brown (1952) 343. 
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Kai ul tac av TIhv 'E?, X6c5a. £LKÖS OÜV Tal)Tllt Tl t l6TOplai EVT£TUX1jKEVat TÖV 
fliv&apov. 
Ephorus FGrH 70 F 186 (sch. Pindar Pyth. I 146b) 
This is consistent with Diodorus' own feelings on the subject79, but Laqueur neglects to 
mention two other perfectly reasonable possibilities; firstly that Timaeus also mentions this 
pact, although it does not appear in our extant fragments, or even that Diodorus used a third, 
unknown, source which Ephorus himself may also have used80. Laqueur does, as ever, attribute 
some small sections of Book Eleven to Timaeus, but most scholars are in agreement that he 
supplied far more of Diodorus' information, especially for his Sicilian chapters81. In particular, 
Brown and Pearson have done the most to substantiate the claim that Book Eleven is mostly 
Timaean, and although Pearson actually focuses on Book Thirteen in his criticism of Laqueur's 
theory, he does also bring Eleven into his own argument to prove it applies elsewhere82. 
The bulk of the Sicilian narrative in Book Eleven starts with chapter 20, where we hear 
of the vast array of troops gathered by Hamilcar of Carthage, in preparation for their invasion 
of Sicily: 
ovtoS SE itapaXaßwv 7tEýäs re Kai va Yrixäs 8vv6tµe1S jsyäX(xS EI; nxm)aev 
sK Tf KapxtlSövoc, £x(i)v itrl; rly pEv Svvaµly ovK £X&vre) 'rthv'rpuu ovrct 
µvplä& ov, vai S SE µaxpäS irXcious ni v 8l6xla. icov (amended by Dindorf to 
Slaxo6i(ov), Kai x(J)PIS iroXXäs vai S cpoptI&as 'räs Koµlýoü6(XS Trly äyopäv, 
i)n[ p r& Tplaxl%, las. 
Diod. Sic. XI. 20.2 
This account is consistent with the numbers given by the same author, in the first 
chapter of Book Eleven. 
79 Diod. Sic. XI. 1.4,20.1. 
80 Scherr (1933) 2, also omits this possibility. A candidate for an earlier source may be Antiochus of 
Syracuse (FGrH IIC, p. 88), as Brown (1952) 344 suggests, as well as noting that there is no verbal link 
between Diodorus' account and the Ephoran fragment. Pearson (1984) 16, points out the danger in 
assuming that Timaeus did not mention the pact simply because his account has not survived to us. 
$' Earlier scholars who held this belief included Volquardsen (1868), Meyer (1944) vol. 4 pp. 376-7 and 
Jacoby FGrH IIC, p. 88. However, Jacoby does succumb to many of the same assumptions as Laqueur, 
in his coverage of the fragments of Ephorus. For example in FGrH IIC, p. 88 Jacoby makes the 
`Diodorus - Ephorus = Timaeus' mistake, while also concluding that Diod. Sic. X. 33-4, where Gelon 
makes his promise of troops to the Greeks, must also come from Ephorus FGrH 70 F186, despite the 
existence of other sources who may well have recorded this, including Timaeus himself and perhaps even 
Herodotus VII. 158. In reference to the same fragment, where Ephorus records the number of Greek 
troops at Himera, Jacoby not only assumes that Ephorus clearly uses Herodotus as a source (although 
Herodotus refers only to the numbers of troops promised by Gelon to the Greeks, not for Himera itself) 
but also that Ephorus' figures should be amended as a result. 
82 Brown (1952) 337-55, Pearson (1984) 1-20. Pearson's main aim in this article is simply to show how 
Laqueur's own theories cannot be valid because of his technique in differentiating Ephoran passages in 
Diodorus from the Timaean. Pearson chooses to concentrate mostly on Book Thirteen as Laqueur feels 
this backs up his theory most effectively. 
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äKoXoü9ws oüv talc auvOI1Kats Kapxil vtot pv Xpilµävrwv itXi Oo; 
&OpolcavtE5 gtaeo(pÖpoug auvfyov £K TE 'LTIS 'ITaXias Kai Atyucnwd S, s it 
Sa i' xXmias Kai 'Ipilplas, npö; SE 'rob rots EK TfS At(3ür15 6m&aljS Kai 'rtj; 
KapxrlSövoc Kat ypacpov icoXutxäs Suva ictg" rEXog SE Tptc'rij xpövov IEEpi 
t&; irapaßKEVäs äaxoXIJOEVTE; ijOpotuav lrEýwv Rev vnFp 'räs rptäxovTa 
µvptä6as, vaOg SE Staxoaias. 
Diod. Sic. XI. 1.5 
The figures for infantry are quite consistent, not only with each other but also the 
numbers given by Herodotus83, although the second Diodorus passage does claim more than 
300,000 infantry went to Sicily. Although this may be a sign of subtle exaggeration on existing 
figures, it is not really enough to arouse great suspicion. As regards the number of ships, 
Brown claims that the later passage, XI. 20, is guiltier of exaggeration than the other, as the 
number of warships mentioned is suddenly ten times greater than the number mentioned in 
XI. I, as well as including the 3,000 supply ships84. However, this was amended by Dindorf 
from Staxt), üav, as it seems to read in the original manuscript, to a more consistent 
Staxocicnv, assuming that there was a mistake in the transmission of the text at some point85. 
However, rather than attributing XI. 20 directly to Timaeus, as others may have done, owing to 
that historian's criticism at the hands of Polybius for exaggerating the importance of Sicilian 
events, Brown decides to attribute it to an anonymous author he calls the "AjiiXi«ov' source (in 
reference to the unusual number of times this form of Hamilcar's name appears in Diodorus' 
narrative), noting that Timaeus, where compared to other sources, is usually more conservative 
with his figures than other historians and far less prone to exaggeration 86. Despite the initial 
problem of Brown and his ignorance of the work done by Dindorf 7, we will continue 
considering his "Ag XKWv' theory throughout this chapter, as his main argument does not rest 
solely on this passage, but concerns Book Eleven as a whole, as well as being a good example 
of how varied the theories are on the matter of Diodorus' sources. 
It seems as if Pearson does not want to comment on the listing of Carthaginian troops, 
but does, like Brown, emphasise the importance of allowing for other sources, in the context of 
83 Hdt. VII. 165. 
81 Brown (1952) 347-8. 
85 Dindorf(1878) 367. 
86 Ephorus actually halves the number of hoplites offered by Gelon to the Greeks, given by Herodotus 
(VII. 158), from 20,000 to 10,000 (Ephorus FGrH70 Fl 86 (sch. Pind. Pyth. 1.146b). 
87 The amendment has, in general, been quite uncontroversial except in this case. 
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the Persia-Carthage agreement in XI. 2088. Already it seems as if we are moving away, not only 
from Laqueur's Ephorus theory, but even from the idea that there was a single main source for 
Book Eleven. This is further realised when one is reminded that there is far more happening in 
this book than affairs in Sicily, in particular the Persian Wars, various conflicts within Greece 
proper, and events of note that occurred in the Persian Empire itself, and also in Rome. 
Contrary to Laqueur's view that the narrative is littered with contradictions89, both 
Brown and Pearson seem to find Diodorus' account of the Carthaginian invasion quite clear, 
with one section logically following another regardless of the source being used. It is Brown's 
opinion that the anonymous `Agi%K(ov' source is still in use when we come to the start of the 
invasion itself, noting that many key features are consistent, for example the theme of the 
importance of the cavalry, where the Carthaginians lose theirs at sea, the Greek cavalry take 
huge numbers (10,000) of prisoners in the early stages of the conflict, and of course Gelon's 
plan to sabotage Cartilage's use of Selinuntine cavalry which meant a comparatively easy 
victory for the tyrant90. Brown also points out the consistent use of xatan£nXrlyJ avow 
(dismay) throughout not only the Sicilian narrative, but also in terms of the Greeks in the face 
of the vast Persian force, and there is also the theme of the inadequacy of Theron of Acragas91. 
The dismay theme perhaps indicates the use of a particular source through both the Sicilian and 
Greek narratives, which further complicates matters, but the theme of Theron's inability is 
consistent with Herodotus' account, rather than in the main thread of Diodorus' narrative where 
the cause of the war is attributed to Persian and Carthaginian aggression, rather than the 
removal of Terillus of Himera by Theron, which is not mentioned at al192. We may get the 
impression from Diodorus that Theron was (understandably) unable to defend Himera himself, 
but not that the war was his responsibility to start with. However, Brown does seem correct 
regarding his main point of consistency. The use of the `AgiXxcov' source is thought to 
88 Pearson (1984) 16. 
89 Laqueur on Himera- (1936) col. 1083ff. 
90 Diod. Sic. X1.20.2,21.2,4-5 
91 Diod. Sic. XI. 16.1,21.1,23.2,33.4,41.4. A search for xutanc7<a, ijyµevous and its derivatives shows 
that Diodorus likes to use this word more than any other Greek author, particularly around books XI and 
XIV. 
92 See later chapter on foreign policy, 96ff. 
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continue until 21.3, which is recognised as a break by both Brown and Laqueur93, but the main 
difference between the two lies in the fact that Laqueur reckoned it to mark the end of a small 
break in the use of the main source, from 7IÄ, T16t&6ac TTl itÖXet tö v `IpEpaiwv ... 
(21.1) to the 
rejoining of the main narrative at ... EvOüs 
EýtjtEt, 
... 
(21.3). Brown sees mxM ou SE I'E?, wv 
arrpatrlyia xaI (Yt)V£6Et StacpEpwv EüOiu £ýfjtEt ... as the start of a new section where 
Diodorus is using a new source, until he resumes work with the "AgiXxuov' source at the start 
of 22.4. There seem to be two reasons why Brown sees this as a break in the text: firstly there 
is the use of Hamilcar's personal name, in that it is only mentioned once in the first "ApiXxcov' 
section (20-21.3), whereas it is mentioned at five separate occasions in the passage using the 
`new' source (21.3-22.3), including four in close proximity. The second reason involves the 
actual subject matter of the narrative, which involves the formulation of a plan by Gelon to gain 
entry into the Carthaginian camp, which is carried out to perfection. 
Ka06Xov Si 1'£X ov aTpaTrlyia Kai ßvv£6£t 81aq pcov EüOüs EýtjTEt, Si oü 
Tpöztov KaTa6TpaT1yijßac Toi; ßapßäpovs äKI V&üVws aüTwv 6(p6iv ävEXEi 
tV SvvaµtV. ßUVEßä?, £TO SE aüTw Kai Tö avT6gaTOV itpös rhv Ezrivotav 
REyäXa, Tota{ u; yEV%tEVrI; nEptctäcECi;. KpivavTOG aüTOÜ T&S Twv 
itoX£µüov vaüs eµtptj6at, Kai Tob 'AµiXKa StaTpißovTOG µEV KWC& 'r v 
VaUttKT1V GTpaTO1ts5EiaV, 1[apa6KCOcX Og1 VOV SE evctV T(O HOGEt&iVt 
1EyaXortpc Ui S, ý KOV ärtö TýG xcwpac iicn£is äyovt£S lrpOS Töv I'eXcova 
ßtß%. ta(PÖpov E1Ct6TO%&S KoJti ovta ltap& Wavouvticov, Ev ais iv 
yEypaµjEvov, Ott ztpös fv £ypc Ev iji pav 'ApiXKas änoaTEAat TObG 
innEIS, irpös avTýv £KrtEµyrovßty. oüarls SE Ttjs riiEpaq TavTrls KaO' fly 
£µ£X4 avvTEXEiv Ttjv Ovaiav 'ARiXKac, Ka'r& 'LOCÜT11V I'EXo v 6C7CEaTEt%£V 
iSiov' inn£is, ois fly npo6TETayft vov zc£ptEXOEiv Toils nXilaiov Tönovs 
Kai itpocrEXavvEty äµ' flµEpa npös Ttjv vavTtKtjv ßTpa'roitES£iav, wS övTas 
E£Xtvovv'ri ov nt tµ xovs, y£vopEVoug S' £v'ÖS Tof 4vXIvov TELxouc T6v 
JEv 'AgiXKav änOKTEivat, Täs SE Vavs E titptjßat. E4ertCµyJESE Kai aKOltOÜ; 
ELLS Toby ÜltEpK£tl hvovs X6(poi)q, otq 1Cpo6£Ta4Ev, 6Tav T&oat Toi q i7Ui£is 
y£v%t9vovs EvTÖc Tob T£ixovc, äpat Tö ßüßa1lµov. aüTÖs S' äµ' hft pa Trly 
SüvaµtV Stat£Taxws äv£µEVE Thv &itö Twv GKOrtwV E6oµEV11y StlXwßty. 
Diod. Sic. XI. 21.3-5 
The reason why this passage, as well as that which follows, describing the execution of 
the plan (22.1-3), is thought to be of a separate source is that this passage seems to attribute 
Gelon's victory ultimately to chance and Gelon's ability to use it to his advantage. The passage 
which seems to mark a return to the "AIIiX. xwv' source (22.4ff. ), is said by Brown to claim the 
victory was only due to Gelon's skilled generalship, with no reference to the good fortune he 
also enjoyed. Brown then goes on to make a suggestion that is the reverse of what is normally 
93 See Brown (1952) 352-3. 
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accepted, by proposing that Timaeus himself is the source for the story of Gelon's cavalry plan, 
and therefore is not forming the bulk of the narrative for the Carthaginian invasion, as is 
normally thought to be the case. The use of what Brown calls an `improbable device' by this 
source is apparently typical of the kind of historian that Timaeus was, who did not mind adding 
such stories to his narrative, as long as it helped to emphasise Gelon's (and the Siceliots') great 
achievement94. While this may indeed be the case, the theory that Timaeus only provided for 
this small section of the narrative on the Carthaginian invasion is by no means flawless. One 
could easily apply the same idea, that the more improbable events were a result of Timaeus' 
effort to enrich the tradition of Gelon's triumph and help immortalise his name, to the events of 
chapter 20, where the Carthaginian fleet carrying the cavalry and chariots were all destroyed in 
a storm, along with Hamilcar's supposed comments on how the war had been decided before 
the Carthaginians had even reached Sicily. 
o5toq iv ovv StavüßaS r6 Atßuxöv thXayos Kcd xEtµacYOc c äir 3aXe Twv 
ßxacpwv Tä KOgi OVta 'roils ilutEIS xai Tä äpµaTa. KaTanXsüaas Si 'E Is 
Etx£Mas cis r6v Ev 'rw Ilavöpµw XtµEVa StanEnO? EJU K vat T6v nöXeµov 
Ecpilac" nupo3faOat yäp µtjnoTS f OäXaTTa Tobg EtKEXtwYras e1; E? iitat Twv 
KtVÖüvwv. 
Diod. Sic. XI. 20.2 
Taking into account what we already know of Timaeus, it certainly would not be 
surprising if this was an extract from one of the speeches that he had liked to compose himself. 
Another problem with the account of the Carthaginian invasion that Diodorus has given us is 
that there still seem to be contradictions within the text which concern Laqueur. One of these 
occurs in a passage which is `cut out' by Laqueur to reveal the Ephoran material, 21.1-3, where 
he notes the sudden switch of Gelon's location from inside Himera's city walls, to the 
Syracusan camp when the battle starts later on (22). These passages have also been separated 
by Brown (see above - 20-21.3 ("AgiXxcwv' source), 21.3-22.3 (Timaeus? ), which may explain 
the difference, but Pearson has a different view, that this kind of `free movement' in 21.1 is 
typical of Timaeus' own style of writing, clearly conflicting with Brown's view of-more than 
9s one source being used here 
9; Brown (1952) 353. For the emphasis on Western Greek achievements, see above 42ff.. 
95 Pearson (1984) 17. Pearson claims that another example of this `free movement' is found in XI11.85ff., 
where Diodorus describes the siege of Acragas, another Sicilian episode, which is studied by Pearson 
himself earlier in this article, and is attributed to Timaeus as a result of the style. 
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Pearson finds different explanations for other contradictions discovered by Laqueur, for 
example in one instance (XI. 22.1) in Diodorus' description of the battle at Himera. 
Twv S' t tir ov äµa 2p Kath r6v f Xtov ävaToa, f npoatnnEVßävtwv 'ri vaunKlj 
Tühv Kapxtlöovicov ßTpa'roncSeia, Kai 7tpoc5EXO vtcov ünö 'rCov (pi)UcKwv cws 
auµµäxcrv, ovnot µEv ebOvs npoa5paµ6vteS 'rw 'A tIXKa nF-pi tihv Ouc iav 
ytvoµevq , 'roü'rov iv 
äv£IXov, Täq ft vaiS EvF-np1 av" eltst'ra 'cv 6xoncwv 
äpäv'rcov to ßüaat tov, ö FgX(v näcrl rfl Suväµst ßuv re'raygEvp Rpoýrsv £ni 
Tijv nap8 tI3oMiv Twv KapxtlSovicov. 
Diod. Sic. XI. 22.1 
Pearson thinks that Diodorus would have expected his audience to realise that there 
were two different series of events occurring simultaneously in the narrative, concerning the 
Greeks inside the city, and those outside, led by Gelon96. Diodorus intends his audience to 
understand that the Greeks outside the city were mobilised when the scouts raised the signal 
before they set fire to the ships, but Laqueur decides to take the narrative too literally, 
interpreting the passage as a clash between two sources, one saying the signal was raised as 
soon as the Greek cavalrymen entered the camp, the other saying that the signal was the smoke 
raised from the ships set on fire. 
There is a similar complaint by Pearson soon after, when describing XI. 38.2-6, on 
Gelon's burial. Laqueur thinks there is a contradiction between Diodorus saying that Gelon's 
wishes not to have an elaborate funerary monument were obeyed, and the following description 
of his burial which took place in the magnificent Nine Towers on land owned by his wife, and 
Laqueur comes to the usual conclusion that there are two sources (Ephorus, then Timaeus) 
stuck together97. Pearson notes that while Diodorus wants to show how Gelon's fame lived on 
despite his monument being destroyed by the Carthaginians, there is another point that goes 
unelaborated which means that Gelon's wishes were in fact met, because the Nine Towers 
complex already existed by the time he died and it is this rather than his personal monument 
that gains Diodorus' attention. Therefore it is possible that Diodorus is not contradicting 
himself here, it is only the case that Diodorus is emphasising the wrong point (Gelon's fame) 
rather than explicitly saying that his wishes were indeed met98. 
96 Pearson (1984) 17-8. 
97 Laqueur (1936) col. 1087. 
98 Pearson (1984) 18. 
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Returning to the Carthaginian invasion, there is, in conclusion, still much conflict in 
scholarship concerning the correct identification of Diodorus' sources for his narrative, plus 
that of the order in which they were used, and they are questions that may well remain 
unanswered unless the relevant passages of Timaeus, Ephorus or perhaps another historian such 
as Antiochus of Syracuse, ever come to light. Only in one part of Diodorus' account do we 
have positive evidence regarding identification of an original source, this is for Diodorus' 
statement that Himera occurred at the same time as Thermopylae, obviously connected with 
Ephorus' claim of a Persia/Carthage plot mentioned above99: 
auvEßtl yäp Tp wirf rl hpa Töv I vtKfj6at Kai toi ncpi. OEpµonüX. as 
µE2ä AEwvi ov Stay(j)vi aßOat np6g EEp4ilv, ddcnEp Enitf6Es Toi Satgoviov 
7tepi r6v afTÖv Kalpev Jiot l6avto; yEv c Oat 'ti v TE K(Axicy Cljv viKljv Kai. 'L11v 
Ev oýot 'niv T1TTav. 
Diod. Sic. XI. 24.1 
Herodotus himself differs on this matter, his (Sicilian) source informing him that it 
occurred on the same day as Salamis1°°. Brown suggests two reasons as to why this difference 
happens: firstly the author may be giving Himera `chronological priority', adding to its 
importance, or secondly that there was a naval conflict after Himera which led to Herodotus' 
comparison with Salamis1°'. The latter seems unlikely considering there is no mention of such 
an event in any of our sources. Another reason for choosing a comparison with Thermopylae 
may be related to the fairest victory/most honourable defeat comparison, as in both cases the 
defeated side suffered such severe losses only a few actually survived to report the loss102. 
There are further parallels pointed out by Brown, for instance the contempt held by Hamilcar 
and Xerxes for the Greeks, and the destruction of their fleets. The earliest known parallel made 
between Himera (plus Hieron's victory at Cumae) and the Persian Wars is found in Pindar's 
First Pythian Ode: 
Xic aoµat vsüßov, Kpovicov, ijjiepov 
öcppa KaT OTKOV 6 Ioivtý 6 Tvpßa- 
vcOv T' ä? 'a? 'atÖS Exrl, vav- 
c Ic tovov i 3pty i&CJv T6ty irpö Kitas, 
ota Xopaxociwv äpX@ SaµaaO£vTes näOov, 
cbxunöpc, Iv 6t cö vawv ö acpty Ev ztöv- 
Tw I3 XCO' &Xtxiav, 
99 See above, 39. 
10° Hdt. VII. 166. 
101 Brown (1952) 351. 
102 Himera - Diod. Sic. XI. 24.2, Thermopylae - Hdt. VII. 229-32. 
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'ED AB' B EXKwv ßapEic SouXias. äp£oµat 
näp jv Z(AagIvoq 'AOavaiwv xäpty 
[tto06v, Ev E1t6cprQ S' <äztö> räv irpö KtOatpw- 
vo5 µaxäv, 
Taut MffiStot Käµov q'KuMTo ot, 
zcap<ä> & thy ei. w pov äKTäv 
`IjEpa 1taiösßaty i Lvov &tvoji vcos uAft atq, 
Töv ESE avT äjup' 6(p£2ä, noXEµiwv äv6pwv Kaµövtwv. 
Pind. Pyth. I. 71-80 
The context of this ode was to celebrate Hieron's victory in the chariot race at Delphi, 
probably in 470 BC. This would place it very early as a potential source for the history of 
Deinomenid Sicily, only being composed ten years after Himera and four years after Cumae. 
Here the comparison is made between these two Western battles and those at Plataea and 
Salamis. It is therefore possible that this ode, or at least people's memories of it, may have 
acted as the root source for the various accounts of Herodotus (who claims to use a Sicilian 
source 103) and as the original authority used by Ephorus, and therefore also Diodorus. 
Overall, it can hardly be said that Diodorus excels as a historian. It is true that, at 
times, the Bibliotheke can be very muddled and even plain contradictory, however, it has 
clearly been shown that Diodorus was more than a compiler of stories, cutting out passages 
from Ephorus and Timaeus and pasting them into a very extensive scrapbook. Some of the 
harsher criticisms that have been levelled at the Bibliotheke have been shown to be without any 
grounding in actual fact, in particular those of Barber and Laqueur. The flaws evident in these 
criticisms make them, in themselves, worth criticising at the most fundamental level. To put it 
simply, it is not possible to examine the contributions of Ephorus and Timaeus to the 
Bibliotheke if the fragments that actually survive from these historians are totally ignored, as 
they are by Barber and Laqueur. Sadly, the book of concern to us, Book Eleven of the 
Bibliotheke, suffers from a similar problem with no references to either Ephorus or Timaeus 
evident, and this makes the task of deciding whether a passage is `Ephoran', `Timaean' or even 
`Diodoran' so difficult, as to almost make it futile without further evidence. Yet, Ephorus and 
103 It is worth noting that there is another synchronisation later on in Herodotus' work, that of the battles 
of Mycale and Plataea - IX. 90. Marincola notes this occurrence as `suspiciously similar' to the claim 
that Himera and Salamis were synchronised (see his notes on De Selincourt's translation of the Histories, 
p. 600 n. 40). See also the foreign policy chapter below, 92. 
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Timaeus are still assumed to make the greatest contribution to Book Eleven, such is the way 
that they dominate Diodoran studies. 
On a more positive note, we have found how Diodorus himself had an impact on his 
work, for better or for worse, through his very definite moral aims in writing the Bibliotheke. 
At least in this case of criticism of Diodorus, his bias towards those who set a good example for 
others to follow, allows for his own contribution to the work, and tells us something 
constructive about Diodorus as a historian. Nevertheless, such is the reputation of Diodorus 
and the course that Diodoran studies has taken, some have even tried to attribute his very aims 
to other authors. 
Herodotus and Thucvdides 
While Diodorus certainly provides us with most of our information (and also problems) 
on the subject of the Sicilian tyrants, it is also worth emphasising the importance of the 
contribution from earlier historians, particularly Herodotus, towards our knowledge of the reign 
of Hippocrates and of Gelon up until the Himera campaign. This will be noticed in the chapter 
on foreign policy in particular, as without Herodotus we would be left with only a very 
confused version of events from Diodorus, without knowing the crucial events before the 
1°4 Carthaginian invasion, especially involving Theron of Acragas' annexation of Himera. 
It is also worth saying a few words about Herodotus himself at this point, although it 
would be impossible to make a summary of Herodotean scholarship in general that would not 
take up too much space and leave many important questions unconsidered as a result. Instead 
we will concentrate only on the questions of Herodotus' approach to tyranny, and both his and 
Thucydides' treatment of Western Greek history, these being the most central and obvious 
problems for our purposes. 
Herodotus has traditionally been viewed as a democrat in the past, for example von 
Fritz wrote an article about Herodotus' pre-occupation with `freedom', especially as a 
contrasting concept to the yoke of tyranny and oriental despotism that was often borne by 
104 See below 92ff. 
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peoples in the Persian Empire105. Such freedom was of course enjoyed by the citizens of 
Athens following the fall of the Peisistratid tyranny, a point often emphasised by Herodotus106 
Of course this point has usually been backed up by the general belief, at least in the modern, 
Western world, that democracy is very much a desirable thing and autocracy is necessarily a 
terrible form of government, not surprising considering the historical background of the 20`h 
century. Surely therefore, Herodotus must have favoured democratic government, how could 
he, or anyone, not prefer it to tyranny? Unfortunately for us, it is just not this simple. The 
democracy in Athens was, of course, a far more extreme form than we are used to, and was 
prone to problems more acute, for example demagogy and ostracism. 
Even our preconceptions about tyranny are unsafe, and we must come to the terms with 
the idea that at least for a time in Greece, the word tyrannos was not a term that caused 
revulsion as it would now107. However, the use of tyrannos did gradually become less neutral 
in Greece as the Classical Period progressed, though it seems that feelings towards tyranny 
varied depending on a particular city's own experiences with it, for example, Corinth seems to 
be amongst the earliest to denounce it as a terrible phenomenon due to its own suffering in the 
hands of the Cypselid dynasty1°8. Parker has shown that the word tyrannos itself had developed 
its negative connotations in Athens first, so that when considering the work of historians, 
Thucydides (being the first to write history in the Attic dialect) was the first to fully distinguish 
tyrannos from basileus109. But what about Herodotus' own feelings on the subject, even if he 
was not filly aware of the differences between tyrants and kings, was there any kind of 
distinction made, and can we learn anything from his Histories that may affect his account of 
the reigns of Hippocrates and Gelon? 
The question has been raised on a number of occasions, but with differing answers 
depending on how one chooses to go about finding it. The most successful effort at trying to 
105 Von Fritz (1965) 5ff. 
106 Hdt. V. 78. 
107 For perhaps the best example of this see the later chapter on propaganda, particularly on the use of 
tyrannos by Pindar, 193ff., where the term is clearly interchangeable with basileus. 
108 Hdt. V. 92. The speech of Sosicles is in the context of a debate on whether to reinstate Hippias as 
tyrant of Athens. Of course the question of how much of Sosicles' speech is genuine, and how much 
input Herodotus himself had into it, would carry great weight in the debate on Herodotus' own approach 
to tyranny. 
109 Parker (1998) 164. 
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prove that Herodotus was not anti-tyranny in principle, or at least that he did not let his 
prejudices affect his work, is that by Waters11°. In general, his work is based on the careful 
study of 15 `core' tyrants, those who play the greatest part in Herodotus' narrative, though not 
necessarily those who are involved in the main thread of the story, the expansion of the Persian 
Empire and its attempt at subjugation of the Greeks. However, before Waters goes into this 
discussion of individual tyrants he also considers the two main passages often used as evidence 
for Herodotean views on types of government, the constitutional debate in Persia and the 
speech of Sosicles on why Hippias should not be restored as tyrant in Athens". In the case of 
the constitutional debate, Waters is of the opinion that if Herodotus wanted an opportunity to 
express his thoughts on why monarchy/tyranny was a bad form of government, then contrary to 
what one may initially think, this is not an ideal point in the narrative. Why would it be ideal 
when a monarchical style of government wins the day? It seems even less likely when one 
considers that the arguments made against monarchy are hardly upheld by the rule of Darius 
which follows the debate. While these are valid points, and Waters is also correct in saying that 
it is only with the preconception that Herodotus was anti-tyranny (as opposed to anti- 
democracy or anti-oligarchy) that one could come to this conclusion regarding this passage, the 
constitutional debate was an excellent opportunity for Herodotus to voice his own opinions, 
whether he was in favour of monarchy or not, and a similar opportunity presents itself in 
Sosicles' speech. 
Waters points out that although the context of the speech is meant to point out the evils 
of tyranny, this is never actually done in the speech itself. The first half, especially the part 
concerning the early life of Cypselus, is distinctly anti-oligarchic. It is clear that the prophecies 
from the Delphic oracle spell the end of Bacchiad rule in Corinth and that this is certainly not 
made out to be a bad thing for the city itself, and the actions of the Bacchiadae in trying to 
destroy Labda's baby certainly do not arouse any sympathy for them from the audience. The 
rule of Cypselus is treated very briefly indeed, although what is said is enough to give a very 
bad impression of him, being a violent man who exiled many and killed even more, and this is 
110 Waters (1971), also (1985). 
111 Waters (1971) 11-15. Hdt. 111.80ff. (Persian debate), V. 92 (Sosicles' speech). 
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not mentioned by Waters. In the account of Periander's life there is only one instance of `bad 
rule', this being the tyrant's trickery in robbing the women of Corinth of their clothes and 
jewellery, in order to dedicate it to his late wife, Melissa. Waters feels that this passage is 
distinctly `tongue-in-cheek' on Herodotus' part, it is a massive anti-climax to what is supposed 
to be a harrowing account of the evils of tyranny, brought to us by a citizen of a country that 
had all too much experience of them. This episode of Periander's reign is more cheeky than 
evil, although his committing necrophilia (again with his dead wife, and again conveniently 
ignored by Waters) is indeed disturbing. While Waters seems to be right about the under- 
emphasis of the Cypselids' bad rule, he himself is guilty of being selective in his search for 
relevant material. 
On the other side of the argument, we have an article by Ferrill which examines the use 
of the terms tyrannos, basileus and monarchos in Herodotus' work"Z. Ferrill argues against the 
more conventional idea that these three terms were interchangeable to Herodotus, which has 
been argued by scholars such as Andrewes and White in the past 13, by considering the 
circumstances in which these alternative titles were used. It appears that the term basileus was 
far the most commonly used title in the Histories, being found 860 times compared with 128 
mentions of tyrannos and 19 of monarchos, but Greek tyrants are only called basileus 8 times, 
and in each case, bar the last, convincing arguments are put forward explaining why the title is 
used' 4. Likewise, there are around 20 cases in Herodotus' work in which the constitutional 
112 Ferrill (1978) 385-98. 
113 Andrewes (1956) 27 argued that although the Greek tyrants were mostly named as tyrannos, and 
Eastern kings as basileus, there are cases where tyrants are called basileus, the most famous example 
being that of Telys of Sybaris where he is called both tyrannos and basileus in the same chapter. White 
(1955) 1-18 noted that although the term tyrannos had indeed become more derogatory in the Attic use of 
the word, historians such as Herodotus continued with using it as interchangeable with basileus. More 
recently Parker (1998) 161-5 has also advocated the idea of interchangeability in Herodotus. 
114 Ferrill (1978) 388-91. Of the eight instances, two are in direct speech to a tyrant (fisherman to 
Polycrates, 111.42; ambassador to Gelon, VII. 161), one in direct speech from a tyrant to his son (Periander 
to Lycophron, 111.52), implying that the use of basileus was preferred to ryrannos. Scythes of Zancle 
(VI. 24) is clearly favoured by Herodotus, perhaps explaining his use of basileus to describe him rather 
than the more accurate tyrannos, whereas Cypselus is called basileus by the Delphic oracle (V. 92), 
whose utterances were recorded and so this was unlikely to be Herodotus' own words. Aristophilides of 
Tarentum (111.136) has not been positively identified as a tyrant, and little is known about him, but it is 
not inconceivable that as a Spartan colony, Tarentum may have had a constitutional monarchy. In the 
case of Telys of Sybaris (V. 44), where he is clearly named as both tyrannos and basileus in the same 
passage, Ferrill argues that the use of two sources, as is clearly stated by Herodotus, leads to this apparent 
contradiction because one account is clearly favourable to both Sybaris and Telys, in which he is called 
basileus, and the other is clearly unfavourable, which includes the word tyrannos. Finally, Aristagoras is 
described as fearing the loss of his kingship at Miletus (V. 37), and Ferrill suggests that Herodotus was 
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monarchs of the East are described as tyrannos or a derivative, however, in these cases the king 
(or satrap in one case, Artayctes - IX. 116) is shown to be ruling despotically, and even 
cruelly"'. In the famous constitutional debate in Persia, Darius, the advocate for monarchy, 
uses the word basileus while making his case, while his opponents prefer to use tyrannos to 
describe the situations in which the monarchy begins to abuse its power' 16. The term 
monarchos, at least according to Ferrill, is the only term of the three which is actually 
interchangeable with either tyrannos or basileus, and this is because of its truly neutral meaning 
of sole ruler' 17. 
Taking both the work of 'Vaters and Ferrill into account, we come to the seemingly 
contradictory conclusion that Herodotus did indeed abhor tyranny, even using tyrannos as a 
derogatory term for non-tyrants, but was not necessarily disgusted with all tyrants themselves, 
and was even ready to applaud some whose legacy had positive aspects. However, anticipating 
this, Ferrill notes at the end of his article that the recording of such achievements, for example 
Gelon's victory at Himera, should not be allowed to hide the fact that Herodotus found their 
rule despicable, giving a more familiar example of the construction of autobahns in Germany 
under the Third Reich to illustrate this"8. Great achievements do not necessarily equate to 
good rule. 
Herodotus and Thucvdides on Western Greek Affairs 
It is true of course that we are hardly overwhelmed with information concerning the 
Western Mediterranean, that is if we only take note of the greatest of the early writers to 
concern themselves with history, Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon. Herodotus, whose 
main concern was the rise of Persia up to and including their invasions of Greece in 490 and 
recording what he imagined may have been the thoughts of Aristagoras himself, though also admitting 
that no strong argument could be made otherwise, as Aristagoras was clearly unpopular and could not be 
described as ruling as a basileus. 
115 See Ferrill (1978) 391-7. Examples include Astyages and his plot to murder Cyrus (1.109) and 
Cyaxares' treatment of some unsuccessful Scythian hunters (1.73). One additional example of 
interchangeability of titles is shown by Parker (1998) 162, in the case of Philocyprus king of Soli, whom 
is said to have been praised by Solon but yet is described by Herodotus as a tyrant - V. 113. This 
example is apparently unknown to Ferrill. 
116 Hdt. 111.80ff. 
117 Ferrill (1978) 397 n. 38 considers all 19 cases of the use of monarchos in Herodotus. 
118 Ferrill (1978) 397 n. 38. 
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480-79, may be expected never to give much coverage because the Greeks of the West were not 
involved in the war. We find that the Vest is only mentioned if it is relevant to the narrative, 
the most notable case being the Greek envoys sent to Syracuse in order to convince Gelon to 
help with the war effort19. Therefore Herodotus' own personal circumstances which led to his 
moving to Thurioi in Italy, does not seem to have influenced his work. 
Xenophon is, naturally, the least useful for our period, as his Hellenica is wholly 
focused on 411-362 BC, but even so his coverage of major events in the West during this 
period is virtually non-existent. This point is made all the more significant by the fact that one 
of the major figures of this age, Dionysius, is almost absent, and the city he ruled, Syracuse, 
was arguably the most powerful state in the Mediterranean basin120. Thucydides gives far more 
coverage, but his narrative, being centred on the Peloponnesian War, treats Western affairs as a 
peripheral matter, of importance only when the Sicilians become involved in the war 
themselves, from Book Six onwards. A brief history of Sicily starts Book Six, from the first 
mythical inhabitants (the Cyclopes and the Laestrygonians), through the settlement of the 
Sicans, Elymians, Sicels and Phoenicians, to the founding of the Greek colonies, along with 
about a paragraph on the history of each major city'21. The last of these cities, Camarina, is 
discussed at length later on, and we find that Thucydides is certainly a significant source in this 
case and provides us with useful information not found elsewhere'22. However, it must also be 
119 Hdt. VII. 153-67. See also the chapter on foreign policy WE 120 Hansen and Nielsen (2004) 72, list Syracuse during the fourth century BC as the largest Greek polis 
that ever existed, at least during the Archaic and Classical periods. The size of the polis is estimated at 
around 12,000 km2, almost 50% larger than Sparta's territory at the height of its power (c. 8,400 kmz). 
See also Fischer-Hansen, Nielsen and Ampolo (in Hansen and Nielsen (2004)) 225 and Karlsson (1992) 
map 2. a. 
121 Thuc. V1.1-5. Hornblower (2004), in his recent study of the relationship between the odes of Pindar 
and the works of Thucydides, makes much of the common interest in colonial myths between the poet 
and the historian, 103-7. The point is also made that Sicily (and also Magna Graecia to an extent) formed 
the core of interest in both cases, with Thucydides including colonial myths in the context of his brief 
history of Sicily, which introduced the involvement of the various Siceliot cities in the Peloponnesian 
War, and many of Pindar's odes dedicated to Western Greeks, including many of the tyrants in Sicily. 
On the odes dedicated to the Deinomenids, see the later chapter on propaganda, 181 if. 
122 See the refoundations chapter below - 138ff. Dover (1965) 2-5 comes to the conclusion that 
Thucydides' source for his treatment of the foundation of Greek cities in Sicily is Antiochus of Syracuse, 
being preferred over the other possible candidates Hellanicus of Lesbos and Hippys of Rhegion. The 
reasons for this are firstly, because Hellanicus' work was criticised by Thucydides as inaccurate (1.97.2, 
although this is in reference to Hellanicus' Attic Chronicle, rather than his other chronological work 
Priestesses of Hera at Argos which would have been used in this case) and since Hellanicus' work was 
well known, it is unlikely Thucydides would have risked using it for fear of being criticised for repeating 
the same inaccuracies himself. Hippys is ruled out because of Thucydides' omission of the foundations 
of Zancle and Himera in his account. It seems extremely unlikely that a Rhegian historian would have 
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pointed out that Thucydides' contribution to the history of Camarina, as we shall find, is not 
without very great problems, leading one to assume that the historian did not have such matters 
very high on his agenda regarding historical accuracy. 
Conclusion 
In addition to the conclusions made at the end of the Diodorus section above' 23, a 
possible problem with how modem scholarship has approached the Bibliotheke is that it is not 
viewed as a work of its time, in other words, a time when it would have been easy to find a 
copy of Ephorus or Timaeus' work, which would render Diodorus' vast work utterly pointless 
if it were, say, chunks of Ephorus, Timaeus and Hieronymus simply glued together to form one 
book and paraded as his own. There is also the point that it took Diodorus around 30 years to 
compile the Bibliotheke, in other words, plenty of time to produce a decent work, and too long a 
time to spend doing something so completely useless. Diodorus would certainly not have been 
writing his Bibliotheke for a future age, say 2000 years later, when his own work would be 
available to read but when his sources were not, he would have written it for his own age, and 
this fact may possibly have been forgotten by the scholars who criticise the historian, often so 
viciously. 
In the case of Herodotus, it seems that the main problem in judging his approach to the 
subject of tyranny, is of what question we are actually asking ourselves. Although it may not 
seem an obvious concern when at the outset, we must consider whether we are looking at 
Herodotus' treatment of tyrants in general, which does on the whole seem quite stereotyped 
with numerous themes reappearing throughout the Histories, indicating that Herodotus did have 
certain negative preconceptions about these rulers. On the other hand, his treatment of 
left these out of his own work, and since it is also Dover's opinion that Thucydides was following his 
source extremely closely, so much so that it compromised his own normal use of vocabulary, then it 
follows that Thucydides could not have used this source. Dover's preferred option is Antiochus of 
Syracuse, who wrote a history of Sicily down to 424 BC, and whose known opinions tend to coincide 
with those of Thucydides. Antiochus was little known in Greece itself, so Thucydides could have safely 
summarised his material, presenting it as his own, with the additional point that as a Syracusan, 
Antiochus would have been more aware of the histories of Syracusan sub-colonies such as Camarina. 
The problems regarding Thucydides' accuracy on Camarinaean matters may be put down to careless 
research, a poor understanding of comparatively insignificant affairs in a faraway place, or even a 
zealous need to over-summarise his source's material, some of which is duplicated in Herodotus 
(VII. 154). 
123 See above, 56. 
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particular tyrants seems to produce different results, with many certainly getting a far better 
press than others, seeming to imply that Herodotus accepted that there were, simply, good and 
bad monarchs, and his favourable portrayal of Gelon is one such example. Finally, on the 
subject of the coverage of Western Greek affairs given by the major historians of the Classical 
age, it seems that the subject suffered from the same Hellenocentricity (in this case referring to 
the land of Greece itself, not its people) as it has in modern scholarship. In the case of 
Xenophon, this neglect of Western Greek history is total, whereas in the works of Herodotus 
and Thucydides the Greeks of Italy and Sicily only appear when relevant to the narrative, and is 
sometimes treated without proper care. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE TYRANTS' FOREIGN POLICY 
As we now move on from our sources to their contents, we will examine many of the 
most prominent features 'of the tyrannies in Gela and Syracuse in the early fifth century BC. 
Clearly, given the rapid expansion of the tyrants' territory in Eastern Sicily, not only during this 
time but also during the reign of Dionysius Ia century later, it makes sense to start with the 
tyrants' policy towards the other Greek states in Sicily. Also, since as we shall find out the two 
are clearly linked in both ages, the relations between the tyrants and the other superpower in the 
Western Mediterranean, Carthage, will also be examined. The main event of concern to us here, 
the Himera campaign of 480 BC, is of such great significance that it is necessary to examine it 
nearer the beginning of this thesis, so that much of the relevant background information is 
already provided for later chapters. 
Relations with other Greeks 
As we always discover, the relationship between one Greek polis and another is 
absolutely crucial to its well-being, not only with those neighbouring states who were often 
regarded as a threat at their own boundaries, but also those further away, with whom important 
commercial and political links may have been held. We can be sure that these would have 
applied to the Greek colonies as much as in the Greek mainland, and perhaps were even more 
important when a region, say Spain or North Africa, had been colonised for the first time and a 
new Greek city found itself surrounded by foreign peoples. Many colonial ventures were even 
undertaken by citizens of more than one Greek city, for example Gela was settled by both 
Rhodians and Cretans. We also know that it was possible for an individual Greek to foster links 
with other individuals abroad, in particular through guest-friendship (i; cvia)' and marriage, and 
this is naturally more common amongst the more prominent figures in society2. These two main 
points of inter-state relations and guest-friendship naturally come together in cases where such 
'See Mitchell (1997) 12-4 for a brief description of the nature and development of xenia. 
2 Mitchell (1997) 13, also Herman (1987) 34-40. 
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an individual is a monarch, whether as a constitutional king or as a tyrant. One might expect a 
monarchic state's policy to be less consistent, particularly when passing from one king to the 
next, but this would especially have been the case when a state is under a tyranny, a type of 
government which often turns out to be a relatively short interlude rather than an established 
constitutional office3, and is best shown when a tyrant chooses to ally himself with other tyrants, 
which is hardly an unknown occurrence at this time. This chapter will examine the relationships 
that existed between the tyrants of Gela/Syracuse, and the other Greeks of Sicily and Italy; in 
particular the focus will be on the other tyrants in cities such as Acragas and Rhegium, and also 
on the Greek cities of the Campania region in Italy. 
The Tyrants of Gela 
The earlier period of tyranny in Gela gives us little information regarding their 
relationship with other tyrants in Sicily, mainly because the tyranny of the period that is most 
associated with Gelon and others, the Emmenid dynasty in Acragas, was not yet established, and 
Anaxilas was only tyrant of Rhegium later on in the rule of Hippocrates. The only other tyranny 
of the period we know of is that in Selinus, which existed just before Cleandrus' rise to power in 
Gela. Firstly there is Peithagoras, who is known only for being killed and replaced by Euryleon, 
a Spartan who had gathered the troops of the now dead Heraclid Dorieus4. Dunbabin thinks that 
the presence of Euryleon at Selinus may have influenced Cleandrus' own successful attempt at 
tyranny in Gela; his reasons for believing this mainly involve the likely concerns about the old 
trade routes from Sicily to Greece being disturbed by the Carthaginians5. However this is 
simply speculation, with no positive evidence to support the claim, and in any case it is far from 
being evidence of any relations between Cleandrus and Euryleon. 
We are already heading towards the end of Hippocrates' reign in Gela before we find 
any more information regarding policy towards other Greeks, which beforehand we can only 
assume was very aggressive (given that most of Eastern Sicily was now under the tyrant's 
3 This is simply because we cannot use standard models as examples, as we can for other institutions that 
may be found in a Greek polis. 
4 Hdt. V. 46. On Dorieus see Von Stauffenberg (1960) 181ff., Dunbabin (1948) 326ff. 
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control), and apparently without concern for ethnicity, whether Dorian or Chalcidian, or indeed 
Greek or native Sicel. Up until this point the only tyrants encountered are those set up by 
Hippocrates himself, in particular the Coan Scythes in Zancle6, but with Hippocrates' taking of 
Zancle (at an uncertain date before 494 BC) we find that his interests come into conflict with 
those of another tyrant, Anaxilas of Rhegium. 
Zancle had been a focus of conflict from the beginning of the fifth century onwards. 
Earlier in its history the city had had a close relationship with Rhegium, the city it had probably 
founded itself. The co-operation between the two cities may have lasted down to the start of the 
fifth century, and ended not long before Hippocrates built up his empire in Eastern Sicily. The 
first signs of change came in the coinage of Zancle, which were firstly of an artistic nature, and 
rather than being consistent with typical Italian designs, started to become more `Sicilian', 
perhaps indicating a change in political allegiance, though not necessarily so. A change of 
standard also followed, from the Aeginetic standard to the Euboic-Attic standard, and this was 
the case in both Rhegium and Zancle, but there also seems to be evidence for a brief spell of 
experimentation on Zancle's part'. Having no natural port of its own, Rhegium was more or less 
wholly dependent on the co-operation of its mother-city across the straits of Messina, so it was 
naturally a matter of great concern to Rhegium when Zancle broke away to form new links. A 
quarrel between the Zancleans and Rhegium is also noted by Pausanias, and although his 
account does arouse suspicion of confusion with the Samian episodes, it is in agreement with the 
basic theory of strained relations between the two cities9. There is further evidence in the form 
of a dedicatory bronze greave at Olympia inscribed iavKXaiot 'PEy'tvov, indicating hostilities at 
least before Zancle's change of name to Messana at around 489 BC1°. The importance of Zancle 
cannot be understated; not only was Rhegium dependent on Zancle's co-operation for 
survival, but control of the straits of Messina had enormous economic advantages, since they 
5 Dunbabin (1948) 377. Gela, being on the south coast of Sicily, would have shared such concerns with 
Acragas and sometimes Selinus, although Syracuse would have had easier access eastwards to Greece. 
6 Hdt. VI. 23. 
See Dunbabin (1948) 386, who suggests an attempt at forging closer links with other Italiot cities, and 
Dodd (1908) 56ff. for discussion of the numismatic evidence. 
8 Hdt. VI. 22ff. 
9 Paus. IV. 23.6-7. 
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were the primary trade route connecting the Eastern Mediterranean with the Vest. Rhegium's 
control of the straits was only possible with the co-operation of Zancle, who, having a large 
sickle-shaped harbour, combined with the location, was the perfect trading post. For a few 
years, Zancle was part of the large empire in Eastern Sicily formed by Hippocrates, and 
remained under his influence during the period of Saurian occupation that followed, at least until 
Hippocrates' death". The ensuing power-struggle and the continuing interest in the Straits of 
Messina held by the Deinomenids after Hippocrates does become a major yet perhaps 
understated theme, which certainly does have an effect on many decisions made throughout the 
Deinomenid dynasty. 
One of the most significant developments of this period is the rise of the tyrant Theron 
in Acragas, around 489 BC, who became the primary ally of Gelon. The city of Acragas itself 
almost certainly had links with Gela before Theron, not only because one of Acragas' founders 
in 580 was a Geloan (the other being Rhodian)12, but also because of their both being on the 
south coast of Sicily, they shared similar concerns, for example the native Sicilians further 
inland, and also their maritime trade links with the Rhodians13. Later on, during the reign of 
Hippocrates, there is a case to be made for identifying Aenesidemos, a prominent member of 
Hippocrates' bodyguard and later tyrant of Leontini, as an Acragantine and perhaps even as an 
Emmenid (sharing his name with the father of Theron himself)14. If this is true then it would be 
evidence not only of a close relationship between the Emmenids and Pantarids, but also between 
Acragas and Gela as a whole, since these would have been two of the foremost families in their 
respective cities even before the tyranny in Acragas was established15. Another positive sign of 
good relations between the two cities was the fact that the Western boundary of Hippocrates' 
empire where Gela's territory met directly with Acragas, is never mentioned in our sources as a 
10 SEG 15.246. It should also be noted that the name Zancle seems to have been briefly restored to the 
city at some point in the mid-5"' century, going by numismatic evidence - Head (1911) 154 inc. fig. 82. 
See later chapter (146) on refoundations for the renaming of Zancle. 
" See later chapter on refoundations (147) for more on the Cale Acte enterprise and Samian episode. 
Also see below (91) for Carthaginian policy, which considers the importance of the Cale Acte enterprise 
and of gaining Zancle, in terms of breaking up the pro-Punic bloc. 
12 Thuc. VI. 4. 
13 See Dunbabin (1948) 235ff. 
14 See Dunbabin (1948) 383-4. 
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concern to the tyrant. Considering Hippocrates' very aggressive foreign policy, this would seem 
very surprising indeed if Acragas was not supposed to be an ally of Gela's. It seems likely that 
when Theron came to power in 490 or 489 BC16, there were already friendly relations between 
the two cities, and therefore the later relationship between Theron and Gelon need not simply be 
considered as tyrants looking after their own kind. This new personal alliance between the two 
tyrants was cemented by the marriage of Gelon and Demarete (Theron's daughter) and also of 
Theron and the daughter of Polyzelus'7. However, it seems that this new alliance simply 
strengthened the older one between the two cities. As significant as this agreement must have 
been to the tyrants, there is little other than the marriage alliance that informs us about the nature 
of the pact itself. Presumably there was a non-aggression pact which allowed the tyrants to 
build up their own empires without having to concern themselves about the boundary that 
divided them, but there also seems to be an agreement by which one tyrant is obliged to assist 
the other in times of crisis. However, the only evidence we have for this is the build up to the 
Himera campaign in 480 BC18. Of course this may not have been the only reason for Gelon's 
intervention at Himera, as although it is probable that the Carthaginians were only concerned 
with returning Terillus to power in Himera, and not about conquering all of Sicily, Gelon may 
have viewed the Carthaginian presence on the North coast as a threat nonetheless. 
Following Himera 
After the events of 480 BC, circumstances had changed greatly regarding Gelon's 
standing in Sicily, and this was not restricted to greater respect. The apparent collapse of 
Carthage as a Mediterranean power (if some of our sources are to be believed), along with its 
reversion to African affairs, maritime exploration19 and the rebuilding of its military powerbase, 
meant that her allies were significantly weakened, despite their virtual non-involvement in the 
15 Theron's brother, Xenocrates won the chariot race at the Pythian Games in 490, a victory celebrated by 
Pindar in his Sixth Pythian Ode. It is probable that Theron had not yet come to power in Acragas since 
there is no mention of him in the ode, but it would have been very soon before the start of the tyranny. 
16 The only account we have of the rise to power of Theron is in Polyaenus (Strat. VI. 51) but this is too 
similar to the rise of Phalaris and therefore arouses suspicion of inaccuracy. 
" Sch. Pind. Ol. II inscr. 
'$ Theron as cause of the conflict - Hdt. VII. 165, Theron requests help - Diod. Sic. XI. 20.5, Gelon obliges 
- Diod. Sic. XI. 21.1 ff. 
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conflict in 480. Himera itself was now part of the Acragantine empire, which would have 
further weakened relations between the allies of Carthage, as the chain of pro-Punic cities 
running from Carthage to Rhegium had been broken, isolating Rhegium and Zancle (now known 
as Messana20) from the others. This now meant that Anaxilas was forced into reconciling with 
the Deinomenids. 
Moißa, Kai näp DetvoµtVEt: w Moüaa, itciOov [tot xopEVaat Kai napä Tw 
'IEpc, )vos Ui &1. VOJEV£t, 1tOtVýV Kai Ö VTEKTlcIV 'C(D VtKi Ip pp ÖLpgaTt TÖ 
EyKdJuov napsxoJEVll. Ob yäp äXXotpia h8ovr1 Tw 1tauöi t Toi natpös vutKtl. 
Aelvoµsrvils SE vies `IEpwvos EK T>1S NtKoKX£oDS Toü EvpaKouaiov OoyaTp6q 
Kath (I)IXtaTov Kai Tljtatov' EK y&Lp ti ; 'Aval; tXäov OuyaTp6g Kai tu ; 
Orlpwvos ävgynäs oüK srltat5o7toiT16EV ö 'IEpwv 1tpOY(X[I aas TaüTnv" 69EV 
EGTi Kai ö ztai5 öµwvvµos Tw näztnw" i tvoµtviis yap ö natilp 'IEpwvos. 
Sch. Pind. Pyth. I. 112 
This marriage between Hieron and the daughter of Anaxilas meant that further links 
were established between the various dynasties of tyrants in Sicily, in a similar fashion to the 
earlier marriages between the Deinomenid and Emmenid families. Dunbabin notes other 
developments in the relationship between Rhegium and Syracuse in the coinage, as Rhegium 
had adopted the Eubofc-Attic weight standard soon after 480, therefore harmonising its standard 
with that used all over Sicily rather than in Italy, but also that the control exercised over 
Messana by Anaxilas is seemingly unaffected by the aftermath of Himera21. We can probably 
infer from this that Gelon may have realised the usefulness of having Rhegium and Messana 
ruled by one government, and that there was no need to win control of the straits of Messina as 
Anaxilas was powerless to assert himself in that area. It may also have been the case that in the 
years immediately following Himera, Gelon may not have wished to risk his high position in 
Syracuse by campaigning even further, and may have settled for strong influence in the straits 
rather than direct control. 
Selinus, Carthage's other Greek ally, does not feature in Sicilian affairs until long after 
Himera, and we may assume that links with Carthage had been either weakened or severed 
altogether as a result of Carthage's withdrawal from Sicilian affairs. 
19 On Carthaginian activities in (and around) Africa, see the final chapter on the aftermath of the tyranny 
(217). 
20 See later chapter on refoundations for Zancle's renaming - 146ff. 
71 
With Gelon's death in 478 BC, there is a very real (although theoretical). possibility that 
his policy towards these other Greek states was overhauled by the wishes of his successor 
Hieron, such is the problem when dealing with monarchic states (see the beginning of this 
chapter). There are many episodes within the reign of Hieron that may inform us about his own 
plans, but none immediately following the death of Gelon. The earliest information that we 
have is for the year 476, two years after, at least according to the chronology of Diodorus 
Siculus. This turns out to be one of the more eventful years in this region's history, with three 
events being of interest to us, and although they may all seem unrelated to each other at first 
glance, this may not actually be the case. 
The first of these events to occur, at least in Diodorus' narrative, is the death of Anaxilas 
of Rhegium. 
ETE?, EÜTrl6E SE Kai 'AvaýiXaS 6 'Prlyiou Kai ZäyKXrls TüpavvoS, 6uv(Xatei aas 
ETij UKa 6KT6), TýV S£ 'ri paVVISa 5164=0 MLKUAos, 7C16TEUOEis 61YTE 
oto6oüVal TO-IS TEKVOIS TOO TEX£UTh6aVTOS oÜ6l V£olS ThV 1iXuKlaV. 
Diod. Sic. XI. 48.2 
The end of Anaxilas' reign may be far more significant than this short reference by 
Diodorus may suggest. The tyrant's rule had become an established fact during the eighteen 
years of its duration, and this no doubt brought a degree of stability in Rhegium itself, and even 
in Messana, which was crucial for the interests of everyone, especially following Himera. A 
change of ruler at Rhegium, as at Syracuse, could easily destabilise the region, and this 
uncertainty would probably have been enough to figure as one of Hieron's main concerns at this 
time. At this point in time Hieron's plans for the region seem unclear, as there was a choice to 
be made of either attempting to recapture Messana for his own empire, as Hippocrates had done, 
which would leave Rhegium powerless and itself vulnerable to Syracusan aggression, or to 
assist Micythus and Anaxilas' sons in securing their position in Rhegium, and maintaining 
stability in the region. The rewards for taking control of the Straits of Messina, a major trade 
route, would be massive, and would be of great assistance to Hieron in securing his own 
21 Dunbabin (1948) 431. Rutter (2001) notes that these `mule-car and hare' types (no. 's 2472-6,187-8) 
were Anaxilas' second issue of coinage, and the mule-car legend is a reference to Anaxilas' victory in that 
event in Olympia in 480 (Pollux 5.15). 
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position, but this had to be weighed against the costs of war, and possibly the creation of 
problems abroad, especially with Rhegium's own Italian neighbours. 
The second episode, which concerns the younger brother of Hieron, Polyzelus, will be 
discussed in a moment, as the third incident may have possible connections to Hieron's policy 
towards Rhegium and Messana. This is the refoundation of Catana, which was later celebrated 
by Pindar in his First Pythian Ode, and is the focus of further discussion later on in this thesis22. 
`IEpwv SE Toüs TE Na4ious Kai Tob; Ka'ravaious £x 'r& v n6XEC. wv äva6Tijaas, 
iöiou; oixijTOpas a TCt?. EV, EK iiEV HEXoirovv aOU 7IEVTaKl6xiXL0US 
äepoiaas, EK SE Y-upaKOU6(ÄV Ö(XXoU Toaoi tou; ? ipo OeIL ' Kai 'E' V REV 
KaTävily RETwv6µa6Ev A1'rvtly, 'r v SE xcbpav ob µövov Ttjv KaTavaiav, 
ä%. %6C IM! 1C0%, XhV Ttls ÖgÖpou Jipo OEls KaTEKX 1pOÜXT16£, p pious ItX11p6haac 
OLKi1TOpas. TOVTO S' Enpa4£ an£v&wv äµa µ£v Ex£ty (3oý8Elav E 0igl v 
ä4t6Xoyov ltpös TäS £ntoi aaS xp£iac, äµa SE Kai £K Tits yEVOjEVr1S 
µuptävöpou ztöXEco; 'rtµäS Ex£ty ilpcotxä5. Tons SE Nal; ious Kai Tob; 
Katavaious £K T(ÄV 1CaTpISGJV Ö va6TaOEV'C(Xs ýtET6)Kt6EV ELS TOÜS AeovtIvOUS, 
Kai [tET& T 6)V Eyx(ApIci v 7CpO6ETaýE KaTOlKELV 'r1 v TE6Xly. 
Diod. Sic. XI. 49.1-2 
It would have become apparent to Hieron that there was still room for expansion in 
Sicily, as Messana, in the North-Eastern corner of the island, remained the only city in Eastern 
or Central Sicily outside the influence of Syracuse or her ally Acragas23. Since 476 was also the 
year of Anaxilas' death, and whether he was already gone, or was ailing, by the time of the 
decision to remove the Naxians, it certainly would have made Hieron's (possible) ambitions 
achievable. The reasons for the refoundation of Catana are, fortunately, spelt out very clearly by 
Diodorus. 
Toi to 5'971P(XýE 6rtgü8wv äµa µßv Excty ßoIj9Etav E2oijgv ä?; tökoyov np6g t&g 
E1ttoüßac xpEias, äµa 6E xai £x Tits ycv%t9vi µvptävöpov it Xews 2tp6Excty 
hpwtxä5. 
Diod. Sic. XI. 49.2 
The first reason is said to be to provide a base for loyal soldiers who could be used for 
campaigning, or in the event of attack from other Greeks, or, though highly unlikely, the 
Carthaginians, while the second reason is that Hieron founded Aetna as a means of being 
remembered as a hero after his death. We can also now examine the question of why Hieron 
chose Catana as the site of his new settlement in the first place rather than, for example, Leontini 
22 See the following chapters on city refoundations, mercenary usage, and propaganda and self- 
Eresentation. 
See figure 2, p. 24. 
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or Gela, for it does seem that Messana would almost certainly have been Hieron's ultimate 
target for expansion, and Catana, being far closer to Messana, would be an obvious place from 
which to base an attack. 
An intended attack on Messana would also explain two unanswered questions - Firstly 
why did Hieron chose Catana to refound in the first place, and secondly, why were the Naxians 
also removed? The first answer may be fairly straightforward; Catana would have been the 
nearest major city, although it was still quite a distance, to Messana, and also would have lain, 
as it does now, on the main route from Syracuse to Messana24. Hieron may also have considered 
it safer to have a friendly base to retreat to in times of danger, rather than having to pass through 
the territory of a potentially hostile city as Catana may have been. The other advantage was that 
Catana was situated with easy access to the rich Eastern plain, so therefore would have been a 
fine reward to soldiers settled there. 
Another point of interest in this episode is the expulsion of the Naxians. Their removal 
is curious, as it surely could not have been carried out to free up land for the new colonists, as 
Diodorus may be seen to imply - not only was Naxos too far away from Catana, but it would 
also have been cut off from the main settlement by Mount Etna itself. Although it is very fertile, 
as is the entire plain in Eastern Sicily, the land used by the Naxians would not have been very 
much in addition to the more easily accessible land to the south, as Naxos was a very minor city 
in size, its fame coming only from its status as Sicily's first Greek colony and as a mother city to 
others. Like Catana, Naxos was also situated on the main route along the East coast. Removing 
Naxos would clear the way for the advance north to Messana, but most importantly, it would 
also provide a friendly harbour from which to attack25, just as Hieron would have used Catana as 
an infantry base. In fact, Naxos may have been the best harbour available to Hieron, aside from 
Syracuse itself, and being far closer to Messana than the capital, it would have been ideally 
placed for shelter on a day-to-day basis. 
Unfortunately for the purposes of this theory, even though Messana may have seemed 
an obvious target for expansion, there is no record of such an attempt on gaining the city. It may 
24 See figure 3, p. 25. 
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be that the victory in Cumae provided Hieron with his moment of glory 26, and events in 473 
culminated in the fall of Rhegium to the lapygians, which may have changed the circumstances 
in the area significantly 27. 
The Polyzelus episode is a particularly important one in regard to this chapter, as it 
directly involves Hieron's closest ally, Theron, and almost results in a break in relations between 
Syracuse and Acragas in 476. 
`Iepcov SE ö ßaßtX£vs Twv Evpaxocicov µ£Tä Trly Toi I'EXcovog T£x£nnrly 
Töv IEv äS£Xcpöv IIOXIKi ov öpwv £ü5oKtµoüvTa napä Toi; EvpaKoaiots, 
Kal vogi cov aÜTÖv E(£Spov im px£ty cT q ßac t? xiaS, Eaircufty EKito&hv 
itoujaaaOal, ar 6G SE 4£vo%oy(Jv Kal ? C£pl aiTÖv 6v6Tlj}la 4Ev(wv 
ztapaaK£th ov vn£Xäµßav£v & paXw; KaOE4£ty Ttly ßaatWav. 
Diod. Sic. XI. 48.3 
Hieron's jealousy towards his brother is blamed here for the temporary break in the 
relationship between the two tyrants, which soon follows. We also find that Hieron is worried 
that his brother may even usurp the tyranny from him, hence the bodyguard. While Diodorus 
seems to want us to think that this is purely paranoia on Hieron's part, Polyzelus' popularity 
could have been a real danger to the tyrant's position in Syracuse. It is very likely that 
Polyzelus was already the ruler over Gela at this time, just as Hieron was during Gelon's reign, 
due to the inscription found on the base of the Charioteer statue in Delphi, commemorating 
Polyzelus' victory in Delphi in 478 or 474. 
[µvä[ta flokl4cc ; µE I']EXas ävE[O]£x$[v] 6c[v]6c66[ov]28 
This was later amended (perhaps following the fall of the Deinomenids) so that there 
was no mention of Polyzelus as ruler of Gela, but it is safe to assume that he did hold the same 
position there as Hieron did before. The inscription is interpreted by Asheri as meaning that 
Polyzelus was resentful at his secondary position in the Syracusan empire, and therefore wanted 
to make himself appear more important than he actually was29. Hieron was probably aware of 
the Delphi inscription and would have been in contact with Polyzelus himself, and an excuse 
25 The existence of a good harbour at Naxos is considered most probable by Dunbabin (1948) 8-9, based 
mainly on the topography of modern Giardini-Naxos. 
26 See following chapter on propaganda. 
27 See below, 80. 
28 CEG 397. See also following chapter on propaganda. 
29 Asheri (1988) 149. 
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may not have been needed for Hieron to take action against his brother if there seemed to be a 
threat posed to his position. 
Hieron was soon presented with an opportunity to be rid of this threat. 
Siö Kai EvßaptTwv no%IOPKovµevwv nth KpoicwviaTwv Kai SEoµhvcwv ßorl9faat, 
cTpatunas noXXoi KaT£ypayrsv Eis titly 6tpaitäv, fiv ltapESI ou n0x'uýi Xw 
TäSE?, cpw voµii; uiv aütöv vnö Twv KpotcovtaT&)v ävatpF- ftFEcOat. Toü SE 
f10%1); ß X. ov ltpöS Ttly aTpaT£iav oüx vnaxo1b6avtO; && ' hV 01l9E71cav vnoyriav, 
St öpyis Ei)E Töv ä EXcpöv, xai q yövTOS zcpOS Oijpcova i6v 'AKpayavtivaov 
Tüpavvov, KaTatoXeµfjaat ToOTOV 1tap£TK£v6ýE'ro. 
Diod. Sic. X1.48.4-5 
This sudden reverse in the relationship between Acragas and Syracuse, although it is 
salvaged again soon after, is the first sign of difficulty with Hieron's primary ally in Sicily, and 
without the support of Theron it was possible that Hieron's position as tyrant of Syracuse might 
have become precarious, especially since it was still the early years of his reign. Diodorus' 
account tells us that Polyzelus, on hearing of his assigned task in Italy, refused and went instead 
to Acragas where he took refuge, whereas Timaeus' own account says that Polyzelus actually 
went to Sybaris and won an unexpected victory, and then went on to Acragas30. This account 
also claims that peace was eventually secured by the intervention of the poet Simonides. 
However Diodorus claims that it was in fact another episode which had given Hieron 
the opportunity to make peace with Theron. 
µF-Tä SE TaüTa OpaavSaiov Tov Orlpcwvos Entatatobvtos Tits TciV `IREpaiwv 
ic6XEw; ßapÜT£pov Tob Ka01 Kovtos, ai)VEßij robS 'Ijt paious 6CnaXXotpt0)0ývat 
icavt£XtS än aütob. np6q µev oüv c6v naTEpa nop£vEcOai re Kai KaTrlyopEty 
6C1tE5oKI Iat; ov, voJtI ovTES ovx i etv ißov äKo) r v" ttpög ft T6V 'I£pwva 
7tpE6ßatc 61ih6TElXaV KatflyopoiVie; rob Opacu3alo-o Kai Enayy£),?, JLevot 
'ri v TE n6Xty EKELVw 7t(Xp(X66)aetV Kal 61)V£llt0Tl6£60at TOLS 1t£pl T6v ®hpwva. 
6 SE 'IEpwv Kpivac £iprvtK ; 5taXüßaa0at ltp6q T6v Oilpwva, 1tpoüSwKE Tob; 
'I tEpaiovS Kai 'E 6C Va Xa0paiws £µtjvua£v. &61mp ®fipwv £?; ETä(Yas 
r& KaTä TTIV ßovXTIV, Kai 't1 V 11hVI)MV &XTlOtvi v EbpißKcwv, itp6q µEv Töv `I£pwva 
St£%, 'ÜaaTo Kal T6v I1oXi4ij%. ov ei; chv 1ipobn6cpxovaav cbvotav 6CnoKaTEa'Tl6£, 
Twv SE 'I, £paiwv Tob; EvavTious noXXobq 6v'ras 61)?, Xaß6)v äneacpaý£v. 
Diod. Sic XI. 48.6-8 
Once again the city of Himera, now fully under Acragantine control following the battle 
of 480, had become the focus of attention from the tyrant of Syracuse, and also became a tool by 
which that tyrant would secure his position in Eastern Sicily. It was again to involve the ruler of 
Himera itself, this time Thrasydaeus the son of Theron, only this time his position was not 
30 Timaeus FGrH 566 F93 
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threatened by an invading force, but rather the discontent of his subjects. We will encounter 
Thrasydaeus again later31, but he is already showing the negative qualities so often associated 
with the final tyrant of a dynasty, in the form of his harsh and oppressive rule, which we also see 
later in the rule of Thrasybulus at Syracuse32. Hieron decided against helping the desperate 
Himeraeans, instead choosing to take the opportunity to save his most important alliance, by 
betraying Himera to Theron and regaining his trust. This is probably one of the most extreme 
examples of unscrupulousness displayed by one of the tyrants of the period, on a par with 
Hippocrates' treatment of the people of Zancle and their leader Scythes33, but was just as 
effective in that Hieron's friendship with Theron was restored, with or without Simonides' aid, 
just as Hippocrates retained his influence in Zancle by helping the Samian settlers. Polyzelus 
himself seems to have been restored to his position in Gela, which may be equivalent to being 
Hieron's primary heir to the Syracusan leadership, although Diodorus is vague in telling us that 
he was restored to Gela by Theron rather than Hieron himself 4. It may be the case that Hieron 
was willing to settle for taking Polyzelus back, as a minor drawback in aid of peace with 
Theron, and it is also likely that Polyzelus would have felt more comfortable himself, being on 
good terms with Theron and also, being in Gela, in close proximity to his friend in Acragas. 
The intention to intervene at Sybaris in 476 is the first example of Hieron taking an 
interest in the affairs of Southern Italy, at least aside from Rhegium, which would have been of 
direct importance to Sicily itself. It is possible that Sybaris had some sort of link with the 
Deinomenids, although it is not possible to speculate on what kind of relationship there was, or 
even if Hieron may have had his reasons for making war against Croton itself. Sybaris had 
already been destroyed by Croton around 511-10 BC35, and was not rebuilt by the Sybarite 
31 Thrasydaeus succeeds Theron as tyrant of Acragas in 472 - Diod. Sic. XI. 53, see below 81. 32 Diod. Sic. XI. 67.5-6. Of course it is difficult to tell to what extent these portrayals are simply 
caricatures of `the last tyrant' and how much is actually true. 
33 Hdt. VI. 23-4. See later chapter on refoundations, 148. 
3; By Hieron's death nine years later, Thrasybulus becomes tyrant of Syracuse, leaving the question open 
of whether Polyzelus was really restored to his position in Gela, and of whether the tyranny at Gela was 
the place of the primary heir, similar to the role of the Prince of Wales in modern Britain. The fact that 
we hear nothing of Polyzelus following 476 may also be interpreted as meaning that he had died before 
Hieron, since if it had been the case that Polyzelus simply fell out of favour with the tyrant, especially 
following the death of Theron in 472, one might expect that he fought Thrasybulus for the succession in 
467, of which there is no evidence, and which is unlikely since Thrasybulus only ruled for eleven months, 
most of which seems to have been spent in conflict with the Syracusans themselves. 
35 Diod. Sic. XI. 90, Aelian NA XVI. 23. See also Dunbabin (1948) 362ff. 
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exiles from Posidonia until 453, but it may be that a small settlement of the ý: _ e name 
had 
existed between these dates36. Croton itself woLl'u have been in control of .:. ge sections of 
Southern Italy by the time of the Deinomenids, be the case that Croton was 
attempting to reassert its authority in the area. This may also have been perceived as a threat to 
Heron's own territory in Sicily. 
P3 
----- - ---- ------------------- - 
ror 
ri 
Figure 5 -. Map of So_.. ', _-r .ty, from rock and Ho so.: {::;. , 171 
As well as the Sybarites ýi , ci . l,: ir colonies in Italy, i: may a so 
be the case that other 
cities in the region sought friendship with Abe Deinomeniäs in the face of Crotoniate aggression, 
in particular Locri, w sic , later received Thrasvbulus following his exp sinn from Syracuse''; 
and R. peg... -: r, as Anaxilas' -ositio n had been weakened following the fall of the Carthaginian 
force at 1- imera, and -perhaps also Cu ae, further north in the Bay of Maples. The C urnae 
episode in 474 is known primarily as 1-ieron's greatest military achievement, a naval one, which 
Coins be-L-', - g .ý.... 
'1 of Sybaris and tripod of Croton, that can be dated to after Sybaris' estrtictian, 
have be --. i : 
';: 
. c, - 
(1911) no. 95. 
37 D od. Sic. X1.68.4. 
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along with the battle of Himera was celebrated by Pindar in his First Pythian Ode, being 
compared to the battles of Salamis and Plataea38. 
Eni SE TofTCOV `IEpcov Jt vö ßa6tXsbS Twv EvpaKoaicov, itapayavo t vcov 
lip6q aÜTÖV 1ipEa3EWV EK KÜItil; Tf1S 'ITaXlas at SEoJiI vci v PoTjOf acct 
no?. Eµovgevot5 ünö Tvppnvwv 6aXatToKpato1bvTC0v, E4EZcgtyEv aütoIS 
avµµaxiav Tptý pets imxv&q. of SE rwv vswv To{TCOV 11(Eg6vE; EIEEtSil 
KaTEiXEV6av Eis Ttly Küµrly, ji t& TCov sryxcopio v gEv Evavµäxrlßav 
ztpös Tons Tvpprlvovs, noXX&s 8E vaüs aüTwv StacpoEipavTES Kai µcyä? 
vavµaxia vtKtlaavTEs, robq VEv Tvppnvoüs ETancivcx av, robq SE 
Kvµaiovc hXEV9tpcoßav Twv cpößcov, Kai änýnXEVaav £m. EvpaKovaas. 
Diod. Sic. XI. 51 
What is often understated is that this seems to be part of a wider effort by Hieron to 
either control or influence the Greek cities of Southern Italy, which had so far been more or less 
confined to the toe. With the Carthaginians no longer a threat, and no longer able to assist their 
other main allies in the Mediterranean, the Etruscans39, it seems that Hieron was now attempting 
to gain control of the sea along the western coast of Italy, as Dionysius I was to achieve a 
century later, while this was still possible. Syracusan control had probably only reached as far 
north as Posidonia, the Sybarite colony, but it is likely that there was contact with Cumae itself, 
if not actual Syracusan influence40. There is also some evidence of the Syracusans' presence 
elsewhere in the region, this time in Lipara. 
Kcd of pt v Ev lu XIa 'A6rlvaiot Kai `Prlyivot rob avrrov xst to voc rpt6KovTcc 
v(xi)al atpaTEÜoi atv Etci r&q Ai6Xou vflaoDS KaXov t vas" 0£pouS yep St' 
6tvu6piav Olbva'ra i'v EntaTpaTEi tv. v£µovtat SE Attapatot av'täS, Kvt6icov 
änotxot övtEs. obcoüat 6' Ev µtä Twv vrlßwv ob REyä?, rl, Ka?, EITat SE Atnäpa" 
... KEivtat 
U (A of aot aütat Kath 'rhv EtxeXwv Kai MEßanvicov yf v, 41bµµaxot 
S' ij6av EvpaKoalcoV. 
Thuc. 111.88 
Although this passage of Thucydides refers to the mid 420's, it is a possibility that 
Syracuse had been in control of Lipara and the surrounding islands since Hieron's time, 
especially if he did want to take control of the coastal area41. In the bay of Naples itself, it is 
clear that Hieron maintained a Syracusan presence even following the defeat of the Etruscans, 
38 Pind. Pyth. 1.71-80 - see below, 92. 39 See later section on Carthaginian policy, 92. 
40 This is argued by Schwabacher (1952) 5, and De Sensi Sestito (1981) 617, who claim that there was 
such influence before the battle of Cumae, probably through Posidonia, as a result of the aid given to 
Sybaris in 476. 
41 See also Diod. Sic. XI1.54.4, and Antiochus - FGrH 555 Fl. Frederiksen (1984) 93, also believes in the 
Syracusans' presence at Lipara. 
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and the most clear attempt was the establishment of a garrison on the nearby island of 
Pithecusae. 
Exel yäp TotaüTaS äiocpopä5 i výaos, ixp' wv Kai of it t poEVTeS itapä 'IEpcovog 
Toi) tivpävvou Twv Evpaxo6iwv E4ýX, utov Tä KaTaaxsuaßOev vcp' EatTwv TEixog 
Kai 'rh y vijßov" Este? 9@ vzes & NEalro? ITat KaT£axov. 
Strabo V. 4.9 
These fortifications lasted after the fall of the Deinomenid dynasty when they were 
abandoned following a volcanic eruption on the island42. Syracusan influence in the bay of 
Naples can also be found, or at least assumed, in other aspects of life in the area. The first, for 
which we have positive evidence, is the coinage of Neapolis (Naples) a polls founded by the 
Cumaeans following the fall of the Deinomenids. Silver didrachms produced at Naples around 
the mid-fifth century bear a representation of Athene wearing a Corinthian helmet, which seem 
to imitate those of Syracuse which had been minted since around Hieron's reign, plus others 
with a representation of a figure with her hair in a bun, thought to be connected with the cult of 
Parthenope, also copying those of Syracuse43. The cults of Demeter Thesmophoros and Athene 
Sicula also seem to be importations from Sicily44. 
Following the fall of Thrasybulus in 466, Frederiksen points out that Syracusan control, 
or perhaps only influence, was maintained for a short while. The main occurrence was the 
intervention of Syracuse against the Etruscans at the island of Elba in 453 BC, mainly being 
concerned with the piracy that was being practised in the area at the time, quickly followed by 
their attacks on the Etruscan coast itself, implying that even the democratic government in 
Syracuse had certain ambitions for the region and it was not a strictly Deinomenid policy45 
Hieron had therefore made great advances as far as controlling affairs in Italy were concerned. 
Not only had he gained valuable allies such as Locri and the Sybarite cities, as well as being on 
good terms with Rhegium, he also now had the standing to influence events on the coast of Italy, 
as well as proving that the threats posed by Croton and the Etruscans would come to nothing. 
42 Frederiksen (1984) 94 places the garrison on Monte Vico, where the Aragonese castle now stands, as 
this position has commanding views of the Italian coastline, and is also very secure from attack itself. 
43 See Rutter (2001) nos. 27-33 -Athene type, and Rutter (2001) nos. 37-41- `Parthenope' type. °; IG XIV 756a; NS (1892) 202. 
45 Frederiksen (1984) 94, Diod. Sic. XI. 88. Frederiksen also here tries to connect the constant Syracusan 
interference in the bay of Naples with the foundation of Naples itself by Cumae. 
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A year after Hieron's expedition to Cumae, in 473, Rhegium had been further weakened 
following its giving of aid to Tarentum, which was warring with the lapygians. As a result of 
the Tarentines' loss in this conflict, Diodorus tells us that the lapygians actually took control of 
Rhegium themselves46, but this is almost certainly an exaggeration on Diodorus' part, as soon 
after we find that Micythus is still in control by 467 when he is honourably discharged from 
office by Hieron. Herodotus says that this episode was the main example of Tarentum's failed 
attempts at gaining control of the lapygians of South Eastern Italy, and while Rhegium had lost 
3,000 men in this one battle, the number of those Tarentines lost was never recorded, being so 
large it was thought incalculable 47. While this may not have damaged the relations between 
Syracuse and Rhegium at the time, or perhaps even made it easier for Hieron to assert himself in 
the Straits of Messina, a major diplomatic setback in the tyrant's reign came in 472, with the 
death of Theron of Acragas: 
Eni SE Tolbum Ka'rä µEv Tr v Eti e?. iav Oýpcwv ö 'AKpayavTivwv Svväonns 
£T£XEi)T1j6EV ÖLpi; aS ETTl SEKa Kal £4, Trly SE äpxi v StESE1; aTO OpaßvSaioc; 
ö viög. ö µ£v oüv Otlpwv tv äpxtly i ntEtK6S 5t(pKt1K6)S, Kai ýüwv µ£y0ols 
ato oxfs ETÜyxavE Jtapä Toic 1toXITanS Kai TEXE1)TT16as T1PwtK(JV ETUXE 
Ttµü)V, ö SE i iö5 aütoI Kai ýCOVTOs ETt Toü taTpös i3iatoc AV Kai cpOVtKös 
Kai TE%EVTl aavToq Tlpx£ Tllq 1taTpi8oc itapavöµ(ws Kai TvpavvuKCQS. Ste Kai 
Tax>rwc 6mav OcIS vnö Twv vnoT£TayREVwv St£TS X£6£v Entpo )X, EVÖµ£vog 
Kai ßioV ExwV µt6o'ÜREVOV" 60EV Tax£(w; TT q i6iaS itapavojlias oiK£iaV Faxe 
'r v Toe j3iov Kataa rpoyp v. 
Diod. Sic. XI. 53.1-3 
One of the reasons why Hieron had enjoyed much success overseas was that he had 
little to concern him on the home front. As Diodorus tells us, the stability brought to Acragas, 
and therefore much of Sicily, by Theron's sixteen-year reign meant that the Deinomenids did 
not need to concern themselves about their western border, with the odd exception of the 
Polyzelus episode 18. The problems in Acragas soon became apparent as Theron's rather 
beneficial rule in the city was replaced almost predictably by the despotic rule of Thrasydaeus, 
who had already displayed his leadership style when he was a `sub-tyrant' in Himera, again 
during the Polyzelus episode. Diodorus deliberately contrasts the reigns of both men, describing 
46 Diod. Sic. X1.52. 
47 Hdt. VI1.170. 
49 See above, 78. 
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Theron as Svv&ar jc, and Thrasydaeus as ruling Tupavvu th; 49. While the first example of 
Thrasydaeus' rule in Himera turned out to be to Hieron's advantage, the second in Acragas most 
certainly was not. 
µ£tä yäp Tpv cob Tca tpOS ®1 pwvos T£X£v crly itoXXoüs µu66op6pou; ä9poißas 
xai Twv 'AKpayavtivwv Kc i 'Iµ£paiwv 1rpoc KwraXei; aS, Tots ättavTas 
ijOpota£v vrrEp Toi; 816µ1)pioDS i trc£is Kai 1r£ýoüS. µ£Tä SE ToüTwv OXXovtos 
Wk Ob zcoX£µ£iv ToTS EvpaKo iOo , 
`IEpwv ö [iaßtX£vs itapaßx£vaßäµ£vog 
SÜvaglty &C Xoyov &FTp&TEU6£v Eiti TÖv 'AKpäyavTa. y£vojEVi1s SE µäxl1S 
iaxupäs itX£iaTot [Twv] napavral; aµevwv 'EilXi vwv np6; `E? Xivag En£6ov. 
Diod. Sic. XI. 3-4 
There seems to be no real reason given for this conflict, in which Thrasydaeus lost 
heavily. The only real clue may be that Hieron seems to have anticipated this problem well in 
advance, and actually marched on Acragas before Thrasydaeus could mobilise his army. This 
could imply either that there was a quarrel involving the two tyrants beforehand, or even that 
Diodorus is trying to hide a conflict instigated by Hieron himself. It is also reasonable to 
assume that Diodorus is showing Hieron to possess the same leadership qualities as Gelon did at 
Himera, in acting quickly and decisively, in marked contrast to the more `tyrannical' tyrant. As 
a result, Thrasydaeus was exiled and executed at Megara in mainland Greece, democracy was 
introduced to Acragas, and its empire dissolved. Representatives were sent to Syracuse to 
secure peace, which was granted, but there is a marked change in Hieron's rule following the 
events of 472 BC. The collapse of the tyranny at Acragas meant that now only Micythus at 
Rhegium remained as a tyrant in the region aside from Hieron himself, and the rise of 
democracy in those cities formerly subject to Acragas provided a fresh threat to Hieron's 
position in Syracuse. This threat potentially came from two sources, either from cities now 
liberated from the Emmenid dynasty (including Acragas itself50) or from democratic factions 
from within Syracuse itself. Hence we find Hieron taking radical measures to protect his 
position in the city: 
49 It may also have been the case that Diodorus himself viewed this change from Suväßiris to 
Tupavvtlc@; as a predictable one, and as a result it may be difficult to figure out whether Diodorus has 
exaggerated his account as a result. 
so The evidence also seems to imply that Gela itself, where the Deinomenids came from and originally 
ruled, was under the control of Acragas by the end of the Emmenid dynasty, as the city is actually 
summoned to help the democrats in Syracuse in their war against Thrasybulus in 467/6 - Diod. Sic. 
XI. 68. I. Gela is summoned along with Acragas, Selinus, Himera and the Sicels. The apparent change in 
Gela from Syracusan rule to that of Acragas may be connected to the Polyzelus episode, and may explain 
why it was Theron himself that restores Polyzelus to his former position, as Diodorus tells us (XI. 48.8). 
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Kai TäXXa ößa TotavTa IIEpcnKä Kai ßäpßapa Tupavvtth E6nv (tävta yap 
TafTÖv SvvaT(Xt)" Kai Tö jt XavOävEty iEtpäaOat öaa 2uyxävet Tts XEywv ij 
lrpäTTwV Twv äpxoJEVwv, äß. X, ' ELVat KaT(X6K6lio1)S, oloV 7LEpi E'Up(XKOl)6as al 
lroiaywyiöEc KaXoI tEVat, xai ob; tTaKo1)6TäS Ei; EThE[MEV 'IEpwv, önou uc 
Ertl 61)vou6ia Kai avXXoyoc (itapprl6t6ýovt(Xi TE yäp ijtTOV, cpoßoüµcvot Tovg 
Totoi)TOUS, Käv Icapprl6täýcovTat, XavO(Xvouaty f TTOV) 
Arist. Pol. 1313b11 
The eavesdroppers (thtaxov6T(Xi) that were employed by Hieron to ensure against 
those who are plotting against him, are likely to be the inspiration behind the iccpücoXot who are 
mentioned in a fragment of one of Epicharmus' plays as Persian style night-watchmen who are 
shown to be beating up a vagabond51. Although this is perhaps not the most reliable picture we 
may have of Syracuse under Hieron, it may give us an idea of the kind of situation the tyrant 
now found himself in, with his primary ally dead and the threat of a democratic movement ever 
present. 
It is clear that Hieron still had influence in Rhegium, however, and in 471 he summons 
the sons of Anaxilas to Syracuse in order to make sure that they would succeed to the tyranny, 
having now come of age52. Under Hieron's instruction, they were to hold their guardian 
Micythus to account for his nine-year reign, take any action against him if necessary, then 
assume control themselves. This they did, reluctantly, and Micythus himself retired to Tegea, 
despite the sons' realisation that he was more suited to the job than they were. This is quite 
indicative of the good relations shared between Syracuse and Rhegium, at least after Himera, 
and Hieron himself never needed to concern himself with a city that had previously been a 
threat. It is unclear what Diodorus means at the beginning of this passage, as he seems to imply 
that Gelon had shown great kindness towards Anaxilas during his reign, although this may be in 
reference to the aftermath of Himera, when the tyrant was quite well-disposed to his enemies. 
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51 Epicharmus fr. 35 (Kaibel). 
52 Diod. Sic. X1.66. 
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Although there is no reason given, the sons of Anaxilas were expelled from Rhegium 
and Zancle in 461 BC53. This may simply be because they were the only tyrants left in the 
region and were left isolated, especially since there was plenty of anti-tyranny sentiment around 
Sicily at the time, the Catanaeans had finally reclaimed what had become Aetna for themselves, 
and the mercenaries settled by the tyrants, particularly in cities such as Acragas and Gela, were 
expelled. By this time the Deinomenid dynasty had already been finished for five years. The 
last Deinomenid tyrant, Thrasybulus, did not seem to care much for foreign support, and seemed 
to be content with using his mercenaries and Aetnaeans as a bodyguard54. Most of the rest of the 
Sicilian Greeks however seemed to oppose him, at least when asked to do so, and this isolation 
could only have one result, as at Rhegium. The Syracusan empire, at least according to Asheri, 
was now split into five new states, Syracuse, Aetna (then Catana in 461), Naxos, Leontini and 
Camarinass 
The Tyrants and Carthage 
While there are far fewer episodes of concern to us regarding the relations between the 
tyrants of Gela and Syracuse and the Carthaginians, the fact is that there is far more to this 
aspect of Sicilian history than the Himera campaign of 480 BC. Only by taking into 
consideration the relationship between the Greeks of Sicily and the Carthaginians and Punic 
Sicilians before the tyrants' own era, can we identify issues which are continued into the fifth 
century and also therefore determine those which are peculiar to our own period. The events 
that we do know of are all datable to the sixth century BC, and as we shall see, they are 
dominated by the issue of trade in the Western Mediterranean, even more so than the Greek 
colonisation movement which also features strongly. 
53 Diod. Sic. XI. 76.5. 
5; Diod. Sic. XI. 67.5-68.4. See below chapter on mercenaries, 133. 
ss Asheri (1988) 156ff. However this does not mean that Syracuse had no influence over its neighbours at 
all, and we will also find that Syracusan influence survived to some extent in the Bay of Naples (see 78 
above) , even to the time of Dionysius I. See the 
final chapter, 214. 
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Greeks and Carthaginians before 500 BC 
The earliest event which may be seen to involve a clash between the Greeks and the 
Punics was the settlement of the Cnidians, led by Pentathlus, at Cape Lilybaeum on the western 
end of Sicily at around 580 BC. Although Lilybaeum was not yet settled by either the 
Phoenicians or the Carthaginians, this would clearly have been of concern to them as a potential 
threat, either economically or otherwise, to the other Punic cities of Western Sicily, Motya, 
Panormus and Soloeis. This enterprise was opposed by the Punics and their native Elymian 
allies, and the Cnidians were forced to move on, eventually settling at Lipari. 
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Paus. X. 11.3 (Antiochus of Syracuse fr. 2) 
This episode is viewed by Warmington as part of a larger Greek effort to remove the 
Punic cities from Sicily altogether56, coupling it with the foundation of Acragas in 580 as a 
further example. This may seem to be a bit of a generalisation on Warmington's part, as lie 
seems to imply some kind of united effort by all of the Greeks to remove the Punics, even 
though in this case it is not even made clear that the Cnidians were being aggressive, it is 
possible to interpret their actions as such. Diodorus also mentions Pentathlus, this time allying 
the Cnidians with Selinus against the Elymians of Segesta, and omits the Punics of either Sicily 
or North Africa, although it must be noted that these Elymians had a close relationship with the 
Punics, and Asheri notes the settlement at Lilybaeum would most likely affect Punic affairs 
rather than Elymian57. Although Diodorus mentions the arrival of the Cnidians at Lilybaeum, 
56 Warmington (1969) 41. He cites Thuc. VI. 2.6 as further evidence, although here Thucydides is referring 
to an idea that the Phoenicians once occupied a greater part of Sicily and were pushed westward by the 
Greeks, with no mention of an effort to completely remove them from the island. The leading state in this 
`effort' is said to be Selinus, probably because of its proximity to the Punic cities. 
57 Asheri (1988) 749. 
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there is no mention of any settlement, and he goes straight to their helping the Selinuntines, and 
ensuing expulsion to Lipara. 
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Diod. Sic. V. 9 
Pentathlus may have been the original inspiration behind the idea of the Heraclids 
returning to reclaim land that should have formed part of their inheritance. This is a theme that I 
shall return to at the end of this section, and although it is certainly not proof of Greek unity, 
there was a strengthening of unity amongst the Punic cities, as we shall see later on. 
The Phoenician Silver Trade 
As anyone who is familiar with the Phoenicians and their colonies would accept, the 
dominant features of that civilisation were its trade activities in the Mediterranean, and their 
reputation for seamanship which was second to none at the time. It is also known that the 
Phoenicians had knowledge of far-flung places such as the far side of the Iberian peninsula, 
Britain, and perhaps even the islands of the Atlantic as far as the Azores, before anyone else58. 
According to Velleius Paterculus, Phoenician activity in the Mediterranean existed even when 
the Heraclids were returning to Greece, and the foundation of Gades (modern Cadiz), situated 
beyond the straits of Gibraltar, occurred eighty years after the fall of Troy, at around 1104 BC59 
Although there was much confusion amongst the ancient sources, especially with the kingdom 
of Tartessus which had disappeared by Velleius Paterculus' time60, it is clear that the 
Phoenicians were active in this region long before the Greeks were. Other achievements 
58 The Azores claim is based on a find of eight Punic coins from the third century BC on Corvo Island in 
1749. See Pfeiler (1965) 53. Diodorus may also record the discovery of Madeira by the Phoenicians, and 
it is very likely that they also knew of the Canary Islands, due to their close proximity to the African 
mainland. 
59 Velleius Paterculus Hist. Rom. 1.2.3. 
60 Aubet (1987) 220. 
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probably included the first circumnavigation of Africa itself, apparently under the orders of the 
Egyptian Pharaoh Necho around 600 BC61. These events occurred mainly because of the tireless 
desire for profit amongst the Phoenician merchants, particularly those of Tyre, and it is the 
Tyrian exploration of the Southern Iberian peninsula that. is of concern to us here. The great 
success enjoyed by the Phoenicians and their trade activities seems to have been instigated by 
their dominance of the metals trade in the Mediterranean; for example their initial reasons for 
appearing in North Africa were to exploit deposits of gold, whereas the rich sources of tin in the 
West Country would have been the reason behind their likely visits to Britain. However it 
seems that the mines in Spain and Portugal were the most rewarding, for example the mines at 
Rio Tinto produced gold, copper, lead, iron, and in particular, silver62. Tyrian investment in the 
area was huge, and Cadiz became the centre of the Western silver trade63. The archaeological 
evidence for mining activity in the area is very rich, and we know of techniques of extraction 
from the silver ore that were advanced for its time, such as the adding of lead, as well as mining 
implements that have survived to us64. The immediate success at Tartessus led to the foundation 
of more colonies and trading posts in the area, in spite of the unusually long distance between 
Cadiz and Tyre, and must be considered as the city's primary overseas interest. This was due 
not only to the huge wealth of silver ore in that area, but also the comparative rarity of silver, 
compared with gold, in the East itself. 
The Western Mediterranean had now become of great importance to the Phoenicians, 
and likewise it was only the Phoenicians who had ventured so far West on a regular basis, 
helping to ensure that trade routes were safer perhaps than normal, at least between the far west 
and Carthage. However, the situation was about to be changed both in the Western and far 
Eastern Mediterranean, by the arrival of two different foreign peoples who also posed different 
61 Hdt. IV. 42. 
62 Aubet (1987) gives a very useful survey of the Phoenician silver trade and mining, 236ff. The 
discovery of silver in the Tartessus area is described by Diodorus (V. 35), where we learn that following a 
forest fire the Iberian natives found rivulets of silver originating from the main source of ore. After the 
Phoenicians learned of this, they bought the potential mines from the natives in exchange for exotic, yet 
ultimately worthless objects. The mines at Rio Tinto were said to be exploited around 750-570 BC. 
63 Diod. Sic. V. 35. 
6' See Aubet (1987) 238. This evidence dates back to around the 8t' or 7`h centuries BC, as does the 
archaeological evidence for Cadiz itself, and therefore seems inconsistent with the traditional foundation 
date of Cadiz in the late 12th century, as the link between the two would be understandably strong 
considering the Tyrians' reasons for settling the area. 
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threats to Phoenician stability. The fall of Tyre at the hands of Nebuchadnezzar and the 
Babylonians after a siege of thirteen years (586-73)65, along with the rest of the country, would 
have brought the Phoenicians' involvement in the Western Mediterranean to a quite abrupt end, 
and this would have been due to the highly centralised nature of the silver trade, with Cadiz and 
other Iberian colonies directly under Tyrian control. This event had a clear effect on both 
mining and economic activity in the peninsula, with mines sometimes being abandoned early in 
the 6t' century, such as that at Rio Tinto. Another reason behind the end of Tyrian control was 
the appearance of Phocaean traders, not only in Spain but also settling the Western 
Mediterranean in general, for example at Massilia in Southern France and Alalia in Corsica. 
There is an example of a related occurrence in Herodotus, where the Phocaeans are invited to 
settle permanently in Tartessus by King Arganthonius himself, although this offer was declined 
and instead the king donated a large sum to Phocaea in order to build a magnificent city wall66. 
This episode may indicate that while the appearance of the Phocaeans in Spain was clearly a 
problem to the Tyrians, they were welcomed with open arms by the Tartessians themselves, 
relieved at the Phoenicians' departure. Aubet also notices a development in the nature of the 
settlements that were not abandoned, but instead had become "thoroughly Punic" rather than 
Phoenician, plus the appearance of new, larger urban centres such as that at Ibiza67. This 
particular development was the result of a strengthened relationship amongst the Punic cities in 
the West following the fall of Tyre, in particular the rise to prominence of Carthage, who would 
have been the obvious successor as a major centre of the Punic world. 
It is at this point, at around 580 BC, that we find the first instance of a clash of interests 
between the Greeks and Punics in the Western Mediterranean, this being the Pentathius episode. 
It seems unlikely that it is simply a coincidence that the first recorded clash should happen at the 
same time as both Tyrian withdrawal and the first Phocaean settlements in the same region. 
Although we are dealing with Sicily and not Spain, and the Cnidians and not the Phocaeans, it is 
a time when the Phoenician colonies were likely to be far more sensitive to any such perceived 
65 Josephus Contra. Ap. 1.156. 
66 Hdt. 1.163. 
67 Aubet (1987) 273. 
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threat to their prosperity or even existence, having already viewed the failure of the venture in 
Iberia. 
However the changes that had occurred in the West following the fall of Tyre were 
certainly not restricted to population movements, or cultural or economic changes and 
developments. It has generally been noted in modem scholarship on the Phoenician West that 
there was a significant and necessary change in policy, both in defence of their economic 
interests and of the colonies themselves, mainly instigated by the Carthaginians who had begun 
building what is usually referred to as a Punic empire, although it may be the case that unity was 
in fact a popular move amongst those 'conquered '68. Carthaginian trading policy was more 
aggressive than that of Tyre, and the most detailed and accurate summary of this policy is that of 
Gsell, who describes it as having four main features. Firstly, new markets were to be opened at 
any realistic opportunity, and this included the founding of new colonies, the formation of 
treaties, and, where needed, force. Secondly, any areas lacking in foreign competition would be 
exploited fully, thirdly, agreements would be made with areas not fully in the control of 
Phoenician colonies in order to regulate trade with them, and lastly, piracy was to be stopped in 
order to protect trading ships, posts and cities69. 
It is most likely therefore that the Carthaginians were eager to preserve Punic influences 
in the region closest to it - Western Sicily, and this would no doubt have been even more 
important when the Pentathlus episode, and the later Dorieus episode, is taken into 
consideration. The reasons for wanting to maintain a grip on Western Sicily were dominated by 
trade with the West, especially Spain and its resources of metal, since if control of the Western 
point and Northern coast of Sicily were lost, especially to the Greeks, trade routes would be 
severely disrupted from the Punic point of view70. Relations between the Greeks and the Punics 
would have been further strained by the foundation of Himera on the North coast of Sicily, 
68 E. g. Asheri (1988) 749-50, Warmington (1969) 42ff. The building of this empire is mostly dominated 
by the appearance of Malchus in our sources, who led campaigns in Sardinia and Sicily itself (Justin 
18.7). The nature and purpose of these campaigns are quite unclear, as although he is described as 
attacking Acragas and Selinus, these are found to be flourishing according to the archaeological record at 
this time. Attacks against native Sicilians and also Punics are also possible, and Malchus is eventually 
banished from Carthage, only going on to attack his Own hometown. See Krings (1998) 33-92 for a 
source-based approach to this character. 
69 Gsell (1921-4) vol. IV 113. 
70 Dunbabin (1948) 329. 
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which was not only well placed to disrupt trade but also menacingly close to the Punic cities 
themselves. Dunbabin suggests that the foundation of Soloeis, just to the East of Panormus, was 
a deliberate effort by the Punics to safeguard the city by using a sort of advance guard against 
further Greek expansion westwards'. The other Greek neighbour, Selinus, had soon become an 
ally of the Carthaginians, perhaps as a result of close trade relations or Carthage's military 
prowess, or both. Another development in Western Sicily was the growth of the Punic island- 
city of Motya to cover the whole of the island72, as well as the defensive wall built around the 
perimeter. Despite its growth into the most important of the Punic-Sicilian cities, excavations 
have shown that Greek imports from the seventh to the sixth centuries were in a steady and fast 
73 decline, suggesting further breakdown in already strained relations. 
While we know that the Carthaginians certainly had an aggressive economic policy, it 
also seems that they were unable to trade without regular disruption from pirates, particularly 
those Greeks that had settled at Lipara who blocked the most direct routes to the West coast of 
Italy, and especially to the Etruscans and Rome itself. Diodorus mentions this being a problem 
when Pentathlus and the Cnidians settled Lipara and the surrounding islands, which gives the 
impression that they were an indiscriminate menace to Greeks and non-Greeks alike74. 
Two steps were taken in order to bring a halt to the pirates' activities in the Western 
Mediterranean, the first being the strengthening of the Carthaginian military presence, in 
particular the navy for this specific purpose75. It is however the diplomacy between Carthage 
and others, in particular the Etruscans and also Rome, that has gained most attention, as this was 
part of the overall plan not only for protection of trade, but also for its expansion. These treaties 
normally set out specific areas where the participating cities were allowed a strong economic 
71 Dunbabin (1948) 327. 
72 Whitaker (1921) - expansion of Motya over cemetery, and relocation of cemetery to Sicilian mainland 
314, plus figs. 88,90; city wall 142ff., 208. Also Dunbabin (1948) 332. 
73 See Whitaker (1921) figs. 84-7. This idea of decline is based on the volume of Proto-Corinthian ware 
which is greater in comparison to Corinthian ware, and Early Corinthian which is greater than both 
Middle and Late Corinthian ware combined. 
74 Diod. Sic. V. 9. 
75 The wealth of the city, as a result of the success of the metals trade, meant that Carthage was also able 
to recruit mercenaries, particularly from Africa itself. This was much needed as the size of the population 
of Carthage was by no means the equal of its monetary resources, explaining the prominence of 
mercenaries in the city's armed forces in battle. 
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presence, and areas where they were not76. However, these treaties must not be understood to 
exclude other people, such as the Greeks, from the Carthaginian trade network, as they only 
emphasise special agreements that were deemed necessary. The Carthaginian treaty with Rome 
that was (apparently) made in 507 BC, has been recorded by Polybius". 
This treaty has been the subject of much debate, especially on the question of its date78, 
but it is clear from this account, quoted directly from the tablets found at the Treasury of the 
Aediles, that it is intended to protect Carthaginian trade interests (as well as Carthage itself, as is 
probably meant by the reference to the `Fair Promontory'), as well as ensuring Rome's own 
territory in Latium against Carthaginian attack79. This promise is also extended to parts of 
Latium not under Rome's control, although such an eventuality is prepared for by saying that 
any land in Latium taken by Carthage would immediately be transferred to Roman rule. 
Another region that is covered in the treaty is Sardinia, where restrictions are put on Rome's 
influence on the island, particularly economic influence, and this region's importance is more 
fully appreciated when the Carthage-Etruscan alliance and also the Phocaean settlers at Alalia in 
nearby Corsica are taken into consideration. Herodotus records events caused by increasing 
piracy on the part of the Phocaeans of Corsica, which culminated in the Battle of Alalia at 
around 535 BC80. Despite a Phocaean victory, the loss of two-thirds of the Greek fleet and 
damage caused to the rest meant that they had to flee to Rhegium, and Corsica was claimed by 
the allies. Even though Sardinia itself was not under Greek influence, the Alalia episode shows 
how important this area of the Western Mediterranean was to the Carthaginians' trade interests. 
76 Ashen i (1968) p. 750. For more on relations between Carthage and the peoples of Italy, see Gras (1980- 
1) and Colonna (1980-1). 
" Polyb. 111.22-3. 
'$ See Cornell (1995) 210-4, which provides a good summary of the problems of dating this treaty and 
how scholars have attempted to prove/disprove the date of 507 BC, the first year of the Republic at Rome. 
Polybius dates it to the consulship of L. Junius Brutus and M. Horatius, and takes it directly from bronze 
tablets stored in the Treasury of the Aediles, on the Capitol. The problem arises from the fact that the first 
treaty between the Romans and Carthaginians was said by Diodorus (taken from Fabius Pictor) to have 
taken place in 348 (16.69.1), and this is also Livy's first mention of contact between the two (7.27.2). 
However, Livy also states that the treaty was renewed for the third time in 306 (9.43.13), meaning there 
were two previous renewals phis the original treaty. As it happens, it is thought that Fabius Pictor would 
not have known about the tablets on the Capitol, as they were only discovered at around 152 BC (see 
Walbank (1957) on Polyb. 3.21.9-10). The discovery of Etruscan-Phoenician inscriptions at Pyrgi, dated 
to around 500 BC, further supported Polybius' own account by showing that there were at least good 
relations between the two, as does Aristotle's recording of similar Carthaginian trading agreements 
(Politics I280a36). 
79 See Walbank (1957) on Polyb. 3.22, Scardigli (1991) 47-87. 
80 Hdt. I. 166-7. See also Thuc. 1.13, who mentions a battle following the foundation of Massilia. 
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As a result of the securing of the Punic trade network in the Western Mediterranean, 
Carthage had probably rivalled Tyre itself in its wealth, and used this wealth to further secure 
itself through the recruitment of mercenaries. Such a move, as well as the other developments 
discussed above, seems justified given the rise of the Greeks in the Nestern Mediterranean and 
the perceived threat, both military and economic, that they posed81. 
As we move on to the era of tyranny in the Greek cities of Sicily, we find that there is 
one episode during Hippocrates' reign that may give an indication of a policy towards the 
Carthaginians, or more broadly speaking, the Western Mediterranean as a whole. 
ZayKXaiot yäp of änä EtKe? Ii Töv aüTÖv xpövov ToüTOV nEgnovug ES 'ri v 
'IwvIliv äyyEXoDS EnEKaXEOVTO Toi) '"Iwvas ýS KulAv 'AKtirly, ßouX, JtEvot 
aÜTÖOI irÖA. ty KTL6(xc 'Ici)vwv" iI S£ Kalý aüTil 'AK'r Ka2, EOµevil Ecm µEv 
EtxcX, wv, ltpöc U Topailvinv T£Tpaµµhvn tf; EiK£lirlS. 
Hdt. VI. 22 
Although the point is not made in this particular passage, it is almost certainly the case 
that Zancle was under the control of Hippocrates himsele2, with the tyrant Scythes being 
subordinate to him. Therefore, when the Samians were invited to Cale Acte by the Zancleans, 
Hippocrates would almost certainly have had a say on this matter and perhaps even suggested it 
in the first place. This would seem less surprising when we realise a reinforcement of the area 
would help ensure it remained under the tyrant's control. While the main threat to the north- 
eastern extremity of Sicily was presented by Anaxilas of Rhegium, who did indeed take control 
of Zancle after its abandonment by the Samians around 489, it is also possible that Hippocrates 
had intended to disturb the chain of pro-Punic cities that stretched from Motya and the other 
Phoenician colonies in the western end of Sicily, through Himera which dominated the north 
coast, to Rhegium. Even if this chain did not physically threaten Zancle itself, it was certainly 
capable of disrupting Greek trade on the northern side of the straits of Messina, which was of 
course the main advantage of holding Zancle in the first place. In stretching his control of the 
north coast just a little further westwards, Hippocrates' access to the Western Mediterranean via 
$ý Narmington (1969) 41-6, Asheri (1988) 750-2. 
82 A successful siege of the town is listed by Herodotus himself in VII. 154, and this can only precede the 
appearance of the Samians at Zancle, as following the five years of Samian domination the city falls under 
the control of Anaxilas of Rhegium at around 488 BC. 
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the straits would have been opened up to him, and the Carthaginians would have had one more 
potential trading rival in the region. 
However, this did not happen, as the Samians were persuaded to take Zancle, and five 
years later Anaxilas expelled them and took control of the straits for himself. Therefore it is not 
possible to ascertain whether Hippocrates had a wider agenda in inviting the Samians to Sicily, 
and we must move on instead to the reign of Gelon and his campaign against the Carthaginian 
invasion of Himera around 480 BC. 
The Himera Campaign 
Before going on to details such as why the Battle of Himera took place, a preliminary 
question of some importance is that of the date of the conflict. This is because the only real clue 
(aside from the possibility that it occurred before the Greek embassy to Syracuse, see below) is 
the idea expressed in many sources that the battle took place on the same day as either 
Thermopylae or Salamis/Plataea83. This idea almost certainly originated in the court of Gelon or 
of Hieron afterwards, but for the idea to spread as it did we must surely rule out the Battle of 
Himera occurring before the embassy to Gelon, as unless the battle took place at roughly the 
same time as Thermopylae, etc., the idea would surely have seemed implausible. Asheri 
describes the synchronicity theory as a myth, but although it almost certainly did not take place 
on the same day as one of the battles in Greece, there is a feeling amongst some scholars that it 
may be at a similar time if there was a joint Persian/Carthaginian venture as is said by 
Diodorus8;. Another argument in our sources is that the `alliance' between Persia and Carthage 
was a result of the Greek embassy to Syracuse, although this is unlikely as Carthage would have 
been left with too little time to prepare, if the date for the Greek embassy can be correctly put at 
481 BC85. However, there is also a strong case to be made that Diodorus' sources for this 
episode, Ephorus or Timaeus, are less than reliable, as we shall see later. 
83 Thermopylae - Diod. Sic. X1.24.1, Salamis/Plataea - Pind. Pyth. 1.72-80. These are often also referred 
to in other sources such as Arist. Poetics 1459a24, and Herodotus also mentions the possibility of Himera 
coinciding with Salamis. 
84 Diod. Sic. X1.1.4. Diodorus probably used Ephorus (fr. 186) or perhaps Timaeus, see chapter one 
above, 55. 
85 Ephorus FGrH 70 F 186. 
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Relations between the Sicilian tyrants and the Carthaginians are brought into focus 
rather suddenly in our sources, with virtually no indication of any trouble between the two under 
Hippocrates, or earlier in the reign of Theron, other than possibly strained relations in the sphere 
of Western trade. Under the reign of Gelon we apparently find positive evidence for earlier 
conflict in Herodotus. 
Oi p E v Taüta EXEyov, F Xwv SE ico?, Xös Ev£KEtto Xýywv Totä6E' «"Av6pES 
"EXX1lvEc, XÖyov ExoVTES 7CXEOVEKT7jV kAg CYCCTC EµE 6vgµaxoV £irt TÖV 
jiäpßapov ztapaxaXEovtcs ? XOEiv. Aütoi U £µEo ltpöTEpov 8Er1O vTOS 
ßap(3aptKoü aTpaToü auv£n6yraß9at, ötE got ltpös KapxrjSoviovs vEIKo; 
auvfitto, ElIt6Ki nTovTÖs TE T6v Owptho; Tob 'Avaýav6pi8Ew ltpös 'EyE6Taiwv 
(pövov EKmpf aGOat, ünoTEivovT6q TE Tä £µröpta 6uveX£v6Epoüv än wv 
üµiv µEyäXat bq sA. iat TE Kai Eiravp£atEs y£yövaat, oiTE £µEO ELVEKa 1jit, e£TE 
ßoTjOf aovTEs oiT£ TÖV iwpt£oq (P vov £KipijýÖµEvot, TÖ TE Ka'r {jx. aS TÖ(S£ 
änavTa bite ßap(3äpotat v£µ£Tat. 'AXX& £v yap fµiv Kai EIt . To äµ£tvov 
Ka'LE6TT1' vi v ft, En£t8h itEpi6XhXoO6 ö n6X, Eµo; Kai äzcIKTat ES üµEas, oiTw 
6F Xwvos µvijatit5 yayovE. 
Hdt. VII. 158 
In Herodotus we find that Gelon had already been at war with Carthage, in the course of 
which he asked the Greeks for assistance, and this does seem to be a different episode from his 
request to them to avenge the death of Dorieus, where the Segestans are blamed, and also to free 
the emporia86. Asheri finds it inconceivable that any great conflicts between Gelon and 
Carthage should have occurred before Himera, and puts it down to propaganda, typical of the 
sort later produced in Hieron's reign. He also says that any conflicts that may have occurred 
before were most likely boundary disputes involving Theron of Acragas and the Punic 
cities/Elymians87. I also believe this to be the case, as it is difficult to imagine any great efforts 
on Gelon's part to challenge the Carthaginians' presence in the Central/Western Mediterranean 
without a navy (before he assumed control of Syracuse in 485), or indeed during the early years 
in Syracuse when he was building up his naval forces. 
The impression is given in the above passage that there are no longer any problems 
existing in Sicily, and that Gelon is therefore free to help if he wanted to. What this could mean 
86 There are a number of differing views on what is meant by the `freeing' of the emporia e. g. the 
guarding of commercial routes - Luraghi (1994) 310-2, and even where the emporia of concern to Gelon 
were situated e. g. Sicily - Macan (1908) 221, recently Kufofka (1993-4) 225 n. 22, Rouillard (1995) 106; 
Africa - e. g. Dunbabin (1948) 412, n. 2. See also Zahrnt (1993) 370, Ameling (1993) 20, Sartori (1992) 
90-1, Mafodda (1992) 267 - on the similarities with the `freeing' of Greece in Pythian I; also Krings 313 
(1998), Luraghi (1994), 311-2. 
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is that the famous Battle of Himera had already happened, if this is the previous war against 
Carthage mentioned by Gelon. The battle does not seem to involve any great naval element, and 
therefore could realistically count as the earlier conflict with the Carthaginians, if it were not for 
the claim that Himera coincided with the battle of Salamis. Herodotus later tells us (giving an 
unnamed Sicilian source) of another account which says there was trouble brewing in Sicily at 
the time, in the form of Terillus of Himera's plea for help to the Carthaginians, following the 
tyrant's expulsion by Theron of Acragas which directly led to the battle of Himera in 480: 
AEyctat SE xai TOE vita 'twv Ev 'C j EtxEXI of ii vwv, wS öµws Ka't gtXXo v 
äpXcc Aat ün6 AaKESatµoviwv 6 I'Ouav £ßoýOriaE äv 'rolat "EXXi at, £i µßj vn6 
Onpwvos to% Aivrlßtötjµou 'Axpayavtiivcov µovväpxou E e? cxaOciS E4 `IgEpljS 
Tf ptXXoS 6 Kptvinnou, Tvpavvos e by `Iµepric, E1tilyE bit' aütÖv 'rev xpövov 
'ro rrov (Dotvücwv xai Atßvwv xa% 'Iphpwv Kai Atyüwv xai 'EXtaüxwv Kai 
EapSoviwv Kai Kvpviwv Tpthlcovta µvptä&aS Kai a tPWtTIyöv aütici v 'ARiXxav 
Töv "Avvwvos, KapXij5oviwv e6v'ra ßaatXEa, xa'r ýEtvbjv TE Ei v Ewu'roü 6 
Tf ptXXos ävayvühaas Kai µä?, tata Stä tv 'Ava4iXEw tob KpnTivEw 
npoüvµirly, 8S, 'Pilyiou Ecdv Tüpavvo;, Tä Ewutov 'r xva Sous öju pous 'AµiXxa, 
E7tf yE ýiti 'div Etx$XiTlv ctµcwpkov Tw nevOEpw" TipiUou yäp gixs Ouya'r pa 
'AvaýIXEw;, 'r ovvoµa Av Kvö' tttn. Oütw 8ý oüx oiöv TE yevöµEVOV ßotlOEEty 
Töv I'EXcwva coi(yt "EUilat änoit µutety ES AEXcpoüs Tä xpnµata. IIpe; SE Kai. 
TOE Xeyoußt, ws auv£ßn 'rI; at. tf; itEpis Ev 'rE 'rfi EtKEXi I'EXwva xai. 
Oijpwva vtxäv 'ApiXKav c6v Kapxtl56vtov xai Ev EaXaµivt uobq "EXXrlvaS 16v 
rMpally. 
Hdt. VII. 165-6 
Since in the first account it is made clear that there was no current threat to the Greeks 
in Sicily, it therefore seems as if there are two distinct possibilities regarding the date of the 
battle. The first is that it occurred before the embassy sent to Syracuse and therefore also the 
Persian invasion, meaning that Gelon was free to help but chose not to, and the source for this 
may originate from the ambassadors themselves. The other, Sicilian, source says the battle 
came after the embassy's visit, therefore defending Gelon's actions, and the tyrant's subsequent 
popularity amongst the Sicilians following the battle means that this chronology is indeed 
plausible. The tradition that the battle occurred on the same day as that of Thermopylae, or 
Salamis, may stem from the comparisons made by Pindar in Pythiari One, and Herodotus' 
source in Sicily may well have been influenced by the propaganda of the age. So it seems that 
both sources used by Herodotus would have had strong agendas, one pro-embassy which would 
have wanted to make Gelon seem as selfish and disagreeable as possible, and the other 
87 Asheri (1988) 767. 
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defending Gelon, clearly linked to the tradition that the battle occurred on the same -day as 
Thermopylae or Salamis. 
The question of the cause of the war also seems to warrant discussion, as there are two 
very different accounts given by Herodotus and Diodorus, which attribute the war to different 
causes. However, there seems to be very little question regarding which of the two is actually 
closer to the truth. 
ö SE Eeptrls T[ElaO8i aüt4 Kai po-A6gFvos TtävTaS robg "EUilvac ävaaTäioi q 
itotf al, 6tcitpE6ßs'Üc wro 7cp6q KapxtlSovio g 1TEpl Kolvo7Cpa'Ylas Kal auv£e£To 
itp6; aürro4s, 6S6TE aüTÖV pay Etti Toüs -Thy `E?,?, ä&a KaTolxoüvTas "EXXrlvas 
atpatci alv, KapxrjSoviovc ft Toil aüTois xpövolc µEyä?, a; ltapaaKEväaaaOal 
SuväµEtq Kai KatawtoXEµilßal Twv 'EXXfivwv Toüs imp! ElxeMav Kai ITaxiav 
OiKOf vTas. 
Diod. Sic. XI. 1.4 
Diodorus' account is quite plain and straightforward, stating that it was the Persians who 
had approached the Carthaginians, and persuaded them to attack Sicily at the same time as they 
invaded Greece itself. This idea has been mostly discredited by modern scholarship, mostly 
because the idea of co-operation between the two seems for some reason implausible: in other 
words, why would Carthage co-operate with an empire which had annexed its own mother city, 
Tyre? While of course this is certainly not enough to rule out a joint venture between the two, 
and doesn't take into account the Phoenicians' reaction to being controlled from Persia, 
Diodorus' account can still be shown to be unreliable, mainly because of the sources that the 
historian is likely to have used, in particular Timaeus88. 
It does seem that Diodorus used a source with a strong bias towards the Sicilian Greeks, 
such as Timaeus89, although it probably cannot be ascertained given the state of the whole 
debate on Diodorus' sources90. Firstly, the Greeks of Sicily are totally absolved of blame for the 
invasion. There is not even the slightest hint of why Carthage may want to conquer the whole of 
the island, in addition to the Greeks of Italy, other than because the Persians had convinced them 
to. As we shall see later, Herodotus does attribute the cause of the war to the Greeks. Another 
point to be made, is that this passage can be taken as yet another example of the importance 
88 For Polybius' criticisms of Timaeus, see previous chapter 41-2. 
89 Diodorus' own account of the embassy to Gelon (X. 33) bears similarities to the problems discussed by 
Polybius, such as whether the Greeks would consider having Gelon as a commander, that exist in 
Timaeus' account. 
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attributed to the Battle of Himera, as equal to that of Salamis or Plataea, in that it was part of the 
greater Panhellenic struggle versus aggressive barbarians, and even happened at the same time. 
Again this idea can be traced all the way back to contemporary propaganda, in particular 
Pindar's First Pythian Ode91, and judging by Polybius' comments is also typical of the bias 
shown by Timaeus. Diodorus himself seems to agree with his source, perhaps also allowing 
pro-Sicilian bias to colour his judgment. 
The account given by Herodotus (quoted above, p. 94) is far more detailed, and far more 
reliable than that of Diodorus. We learn that the Battle of Himera was the direct result of the 
expansion of Acragantine territory to include Himera, which was previously under the control of 
Terillus. We cannot know for sure how popular Terillus actually was in Himera, but it is likely 
that, as with many of the tyrants that came to power in Greek cities, there were those who 
immediately suffered, in particular the aristocracies, and it is possible that the invasion was the 
result of a plea for help from the Himeraeans themselves92. The tyrant of Himera was also the 
father-in-law of Anaxilas of Rhegium, who gave Terillus his support, as well as convincing 
Hamilcar of Carthage93 to join in recapturing Himera by offering his own family as hostages. 
Asheri suggests a date of 482 BC for the expulsion of Terillus, which is based mainly on the 
appearance of Acragantine-style coinage in the city at this time94. The involvement of Rhegium 
in these events is normally understated, even ignored, even though this could hold the key to 
figuring out why exactly the war happened, particularly when considering Diodorus' claim that 
the Carthaginians wanted to conquer the Greeks of both Sicily and Italy. Being allied with 
Terillus and Anaxilas does seem to conflict with the idea that the war was aimed against all 
Greeks in the area. 
As I have already said above, this story is given by Herodotus as a sort of counter 
against the claim that Gelon was able to send troops to Greece. It therefore seems as if there are 
three different versions of the general story of Himera, firstly that it happened before the Persian 
90 See above chapter on sources, 35. 
91 See chapter on propaganda below, 177. 
92 An epitaph containing Himeraean names was found at Ravanusa, which would, at the time, have been 
under the control of Acragas. This is reckoned to date to the early fifth century. See Jeffery (1961) 278 
n. 58, Mingazzini (1938) 662ff. This probably indicates the existence of Himeraeans exiled under Terillus. 
93 To whom Terillus was a guest-friend - Hdt. VII. 165. 
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invasion, for whatever reason, and Gelon chose not to assist the Greeks even though he was able 
to, secondly, the more propagandistic view that Gelon could not assist due to the impending 
invasion by Carthage, which deliberately happened at the same time as the Persian invasion, 
being a joint effort against all Greeks. Thirdly, Gelon was unable to assist the Greeks because 
he either was preparing for, or was expecting to prepare for, the assistance Theron of Acragas 
would have needed against the Carthaginians. This last version of events seems the most likely, 
being the one with the least obvious bias. The first is probably a version originating from the 
account given by the ambassadors of mainland Greece, although it is difficult to tell how much 
it had been corrupted by Herodotus' time, the second coming from Deinomenid and pro-Siceliot 
propaganda. The view that the war was started by the appearance of Acragantine troops at 
Himera is also backed up by the fact that even in Diodorus' account, we find that Gelon in fact 
kept his troops at standby in Syracuse itself, and they were only sent once Theron, already at 
Himera, had requested assistance: 
Stö im! Ot pcwv ö 'AKpayav Eivwv SuväaTric, Exwv Süvaµty iKavhv xai 
IcapacpvX. äTTwv Tily `Iµtpav, (po(3t18sis E )Oi)S äztEatctXav EiS TäS Evpaxov6a;, 
äi; twv 26v I'EX. wva ßorlOdty rhv Taxkrniv. ö SE I Wov K(A a )T6g i1tOtµax6)c 
iv tihjv Svvaµty, in)06g6voS SE 'Thy 2wv `IµEpaiwv äOu tIav äveýEVýev Ex Twv 
Evpaxovawv Kt( ß7101)3rly, Exwv IE Oi s JEV abK EXättou Twv 
7tEVTaKUUµvpiwv, t t£is SE biti p Toüs ltEVTaxtßxtXiovs. 
Diod. Sic. XI. 20.5-21.1 
This certainly does not suggest any previous part played by Gelon in the events leading 
up to Himera. In fact, it suggests that the Carthaginian invasion took Theron himself by 
surprise, no matter how long the enemy had actually been preparing for it. What this means is 
that, as Herodotus suggests, the Battle of Himera was initially caused by a collapse in relations 
between Greek cities in Sicily, in this case between Acragas and Himera. Rhegium, Carthage, 
Syracuse, and also Selinus (allied with Carthage: Diod. Sic. XI. 21.4ff. ) entered the war as allies 
(on one side or the other), not as the main protagonists, and therefore the battle is not the 
Western front of the famous struggle between Greek and barbarian, as many sources, ancient 
and modern, would have us believe, but rather a squabble for power between two Greek tyrants 
which results in a war between their more powerful allies. 
94 Asheri (1988) p. 771, fig. 83. The Acragantine style simply refers to the appearance of the crab on one 
side of the coinage, as well as the Himeraean cock. See Head (1911) 144. 
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From this point until much later on in the fifth century95 Carthage simply disappears 
from Greek affairs. The shock of the heavy defeat as well as the conclusion of a peace 
agreement meant that Carthage was unlikely to be of concern to the Greeks in Sicily for a long 
time. This is made explicit by the account of Diodorus, who describes the Carthaginian envoys 
as begging for forgiveness as well as asking for mercy, fearing a Greek invasion of their own 
city. Although it is likely that the Carthaginians were all too ready to make peace with Gelon, 
one is left wondering whether the plea for forgiveness is a deliberate addition by Diodorus 
himself, who is so concerned with showing that it was the Carthaginians who were to blame for 
the conflict, rather than the original conquest of Himera by Theron, which goes by unmentioned 
in Diodorus' account. 
Conclusion 
While much of the military activity in Sicily during this time occurred under the reigns 
of Hippocrates and Gelon in the early fifth century, it is the reign of Hieron that tells us most 
about the relations between the tyrants of Gela and Syracuse, and the other Greeks of the 
Western Mediterranean. Several important points have emerged during the course of this 
chapter, the first of which is the importance attached to the straits of Messina, which seems to 
dominate Deinomenid policy in particular throughout this time, and this is not only found in 
events which clearly involve the cities of Rhegium and Zancle/Messana, such as during the 
aftermath of Himera, and the Cale Acte enterprise, but we have also found that Hieron's 
refoundation of Catana in 476 is indicative of that tyrant's policy of regaining control of the 
straits. 
Relations between the tyrants of Syracuse and those of Acragas are also of great 
importance, and the degree of co-dependency between the two cities is shown up in several 
episodes, usually involving younger members of the Deinomenid and Emmenid dynasties. 
Hieron's attempts at reconciling with Theron following the Polyzelus episode speak volumes 
95 See final chapter for the re-appearance of Carthage in Greek affairs, and their other activities in the 
Mediterranean during the fifth century BC. 
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about the critical nature of their relationship as allies, as do the problems faced by Hieron 
following the death of Theron himself in 472. 
The dealings with Theron following the Polyzelus episode also mark some of the first 
real efforts at diplomacy between the tyrants of Gela and. Syracuse and a Western neighbour, 
and an even greater example is the appearance of Hieron in affairs in Rhegium. The tyrant's 
dealings with the young sons of Anaxilas show how important it was that Hieron had some allies 
in the region who were, like Hieron himself, tyrants, especially following the conversion of 
Acragas from tyranny to democracy. These dealings also mark a significant shift in the tyrant's 
policy towards the straits, from the aim of conquest to one of co-operation. Finally, regarding 
the Greeks in the West, we find that Hieron was also interested in Central Italy for various 
reasons, and that the appearance of the Deinomenids in that region would have a long-lasting 
effect. 
On the matter of Deinomenid relations with the Carthaginians, we have found that far 
from being a one-off in Punic-Greek relations at this early time, the Himera campaign was in 
fact a climax of events, in more ways than one. The reason why this is important is that the 
events of 480 need to be put into the wider context of both Punic and Greek activity in the 
Western Mediterranean, especially during the preceding sixth century. Carthaginian trade in this 
region had come under much pressure from other Greeks such as the Phocaeans, so we should 
not be surprised that relations between the Greeks and Punics should boil over at some point, 
particularly with the impact that Phocaean interference in Spain would have had. We must 
remember that the Carthaginian way of life itself was at stake during this time. However, 
despite all the efforts made to prove otherwise, we have also found that the reasons for the 
Himera campaign were markedly different to those recorded by Diodorus. Instead, it is the 
much briefer account of Herodotus which proves to be most useful to us, although strangely, 
Diodorus' account does also give hints, in the form of slight inconsistencies, that it is Herodotus 
telling the truth in this matter. The main point to be made here is that the Carthaginians were 
certainly not the aggressors in this case, but rather it was Theron, tyrant of Acragas and ally of 
Gelon, who held ambitions for the city of Himera. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE TYRANTS' USE OF MERCENARIES 
In the last chapter we examined the tyrants' approach to foreign relations, both Greek 
and Carthaginian, and broadly speaking this chapter aims to do the same, only instead of 
looking at the Sicilian tyrants' political approach to dealing with other cities, we will now turn 
to the tyrants' military approach, in particular the strategies employed for increasing and 
maintaining their power in Sicily. Much of the tyrants' military activity from Cleandrus down 
to Thrasybulus will be considered and discussed, but we will focus on only one particular 
aspect of it, the hiring and use of mercenary troops. There are several reasons for this: firstly, 
the use of mercenaries either in war or as a private bodyguard is something that is frequently 
associated with the tyrants of Greece in general, as we shall find in the first part of this chapter, 
but the sheer scale of mercenary recruitment by the tyrants of Gela and Syracuse make it 
especially worthy of consideration. Elsewhere, we only find such vast numbers of mercenaries 
appearing much later on in the fourth century; thus the tyrants of early fifth century Sicily can 
truly be considered ahead of their time. The second reason is the impact of the tyrants' mass- 
recruitment, to be discovered only when the tyranny had ended in 466 and the various peoples 
of the Deinomenid empire were trying to re-establish themselves in their own cities, as well as 
their own identity as citizens of these cities. This will be seen in the final chapter of this thesis 
where we consider the aftermath of the tyranny in Syracuse. Finally, connected to this last 
point, we can only fully understand the next chapter on the phenomenon of the refoundation of 
cities in Sicily, if we understand how central the recruitment of mercenaries was to the Sicilian 
tyrants' military policy, as we will soon discover. 
Tyranny, Mercenaries and Bodyguards 
The employment of mercenaries is, as is stated by Aristotle in the example below, a 
theme commonly associated with the Greek tyrants. Here a clear distinction is made between 
the rule of a king, who concerns himself with issues affecting the people and therefore can 
count on them for military aid, and the tyrant, who in looking after his own interests alone, 
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finds himself having to recruit help from elsewhere, not being able to trust the people he rules 
over. 
ßoUETat 6'6 ßacnXstS Eivat cplAal;, önwS of jEV KsKTrlµhvot Täs ovc ias 
µt)OEv ä&txov täßxwaty, 6 SE Slµos µßj vppiýrlTat µr10Ev "i S£ Tvpavviq, 
wanEp £ipilt(xt toXXX Kts, npös oi)kv ältopkEnst. Kotvöv, el µr1 Tf q i6ic 
wcpeXeiaS xäpty. EaTt SE aKO76s TupavvtK6g µEv Tö i I, ßarnXtKÖc SE T6 
Ka?, öv. Stö Kai Twv nXEOVeKn u twv T& pv xp`11µ6CTwv Tupavvtxä, Tä S' eis 
Ttµýv ßact? tKä }tä. Xov' Kai cpuXaKý (3a19tXtKfj µEV ztO21. tLK1j, TupavvtKtj U 
Stä E Vwv. 
Aristotle Politics 1310b40-11 a8 
It is easy to see why such perceptions would be so common. The use of mercenaries in 
battle would have appeared as a sort of intrusion by foreigners into the military duties of a 
citizen, just as a tyranny appeared to invade their political duties. The difference most strongly 
expressed in this passage is that of the tyrant's lack of concern for the people, and therefore his 
unpopularity, hence the dependence on mercenary support. This alludes to an earlier point 
made by Aristotle concerning the deviations from standard forms of government; in this case 
tyranny is a deviation from monarchy, and as with the other deviations (oligarchy from 
aristocracy, democracy from polity), it only benefits those in power as opposed to the common 
interest of all citizens'. Aristotle's generalisation does not seem to be supported by our sources 
in general; in fact the practice of employing mercenaries seems mostly restricted to those 
tyrants from the late Archaic Period and afterwards, and does not become standard practice 
until the fourth century, i. e. Aristotle's own time. Evidence for this is found in the Panegyrikos 
of Isocrates. 
HOUC v yap xaxwv tf cp{ ct Tlj Twv ävOpwnwv »tapxövrwv atu ro nWco 
Twv ävayxaiwv ltpo6sl; avprlxaµEV, noX£µovs Kai. Gthc Sh tIv aütoi5 
EµltotrlaavtEs, ci aTe -rob; gLv Ev tat; aüTwv ävöµws ä 6W)CYOat, 'tob; 8' 
Enl l; evrls µ8'tä nai&wv Kai. yvvatxwv äX&OA(Xt, ltOXXOi) 8 Si ärvöEtav Tciv 
Ka8' riµ£pav Entxoupsiv ävayxaýoµhvou; i hhp Twv * Opwv Toi; cpiXot; 
µaxoµEVOVc änoOvpaxsty. 
Isocrates Paniegyrikos 168 
The numbers of mercenaries are said to be due to the continuing warfare and civil strife 
in Greece, not only because many found themselves impoverished by the pitiful economic 
situation and therefore were desperate for employment, but also because their employment 
simply maintained a vicious circle - people were poor, many of these became mercenaries, the 
Arist. Po1.1279a32-b11. 
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mercenaries enabled their employer to continue with their warring, and those affected by the 
wars became poor2. 
During and following the prolonged Peloponnesian War, specialisation in military 
disciplines became necessary on the battlefield as warfare became more complex and 
demanding. The use of mercenaries became more widespread generally, especially with 
auxiliary troops such as slingers and peltasts3. The reasons behind the more common use of 
mercenaries in the fourth century were therefore not only social and economic, although these 
would have been the overriding factors behind these people's decision to become mercenaries, 
but also because there was a huge demand for them in military terms. Aristotle's statement 
concerning the tyrants' dependence on mercenaries seems to be fairly accurate, at least in his 
own time, for those of Pherae in Thessaly, and of Syracuse, during the fourth century were 
prime examples of mercenary employers. However in this chapter we will look at how the 
Sicilian tyrants prior to this period made use of their mercenaries, and the circumstances in 
which they were employed. To do this it is also necessary to examine how tyrants before and 
after used them. 
I will include some discussion of bodyguards, as well as mercenary forces, that had 
been granted to various tyrants of the Archaic age, such as Peisistratos of Athens and 
Theagenes of Megara. The reasons for this are firstly that they are armed forces intended for 
the tyrant's personal use, even when they are employees of the state itself. Secondly, the act of 
granting the bodyguards in the first place can tell us much about what certain groups of people 
thought of these individuals, in other words whether they were popular with the hoplite classes, 
or with the aristocracy. The significance of the tyrants' popularity will be made clear during 
the course of this chapter. 
The history of Greek warfare sees many noticeable changes in character, and there are 
many reasons for this; for example, there is a close link between the rise of hoplite warfare and 
the spread of political influence amongst the hoplite classes around 700 BC, for example in 
2 Fuks (1972) 26-31 elaborates on this theme, particularly emphasising poverty as the reason for the 
problem of the `floating' population. 
There are countless examples of the use of slingers from abroad, see Pritchett (1991) 54-5 for the full 
range of nationalities represented (including non-Greeks) most notably the Rhodians and Balearic 
103 
Argos, probably the earliest example in Greeced. War itself can also bring about permanent 
changes, but in the case of the prolonged Peloponnesian war it was the peace afterwards that is 
sometimes said to have forced changes5, when soldiers returned home to find their land 
ravaged, or even neglected to the point of uselessness,. a result of decades of continuous 
fighting. However, the area that seems to have produced the majority of mercenaries, the 
Peloponnese6, particularly Arcadia, was less affected by the war, and Attica itself seems to 
have recovered fairly quickly with less damage done than has been imagined7. 
Parke has also suggested the apparent decline of the polls in Greece during the fifth 
century BC8, with many of these being unable to provide employment to its citizens, but this 
argument is found to suffer from the over-generalisation that the polls system was dominant, 
whereas much of Greece was still based on a tribal system, again including much of the 
Peloponnese, and was only turning towards the polls system during the fifth century. More 
recent studies into the political systems prevalent in Arcadian communities have shown that 
much of the area was either in a stage of transition or was still dominated by a tribal system9. 
The likely effects of the tribal system on military service in Arcadia have been described by 
Rawlings, and to summarize, the point is made that rather than finding a situation where the 
armed forces have a clear and defined loyalty to their state, as one would expect in apolis, in a 
tribal system the obligation is towards a chieftain, whose intentions may conflict with his own 
armed force1°. In situations such as this, it is possible that wealthy mercenary employers could 
easily exploit a rich source of frustrated and impoverished soldiers, without too much risk of 
becoming embroiled in Arcadian political affairs". 
The best known employer was Cyrus, a Persian who failed in attempting to usurp the 
throne using 10,000 Greek mercenaries, who had to return to Greece under the leadership of 
Xenophon, who later wrote an account of the expedition, the Anabasis. The tyrants of the 4th 
Islanders. Peltast warfare famously originates from Thrace - Eur. Alc. 498, Erechtheus fr. 370; Xen. 
Men:. 111.9.2; POxyX. 1241.18-9, see Best (1969). 
4 See Andrewes (1956) ch. 3, Kelly (1976) ch. 7, Tomlinson (1972) ch. 7 on Pheidon's tyranny in Argos. 
5 Parke (1933) 20. 
6 On the demand for Peloponnesian, especially Arcadian, mercenaries, see Trundle (2004) 75-6. 
See Strauss (1986) 43-5 and Hanson (1998) 131-73. 
8 Parke (1933) 20. 
9 See Roy (1996) 110-1; Nielsen (1996) 117-63 and (1999) 16-79. 
10 Rawlings (1996) 81-2. 
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century, such as those of Pherae, also exploited their opportunity to establish themselves with 
the help of mercenaries, being wealthy enough to support a private force. 
Tyrants and the Hoplite revolution 
In the many cases in the Archaic Period where a tyrant appears in a given city-state, it 
is usually the result of some sort of class-conflict, where the general population rally around an 
individual who at least appears to promise changes, and this usually occurs in states where 
there is a realistic hope of breaking the aristocracy's dominance of political life. This 
dominance was traditionally based on the exclusive role of the aristocracy in warfare, but with 
the so-called `hoplite revolution', where the benefits of the heavy infantry had been realised, 
the classes that formed the hoplite force demanded more influence in government, now that 
they were dominant on the battlefield, a development discussed by Aristotle'2. Here the future 
tyrant (sometimes an aristocrat himself) can take advantage of the unrest by becoming allied 
with the masses, assuming a position as leader, and seizing power. The first tyrant to do this 
seems to have been Pheidon of Argos13, who according to Aristotle was originally king but was 
later classified as a tyrant14, possibly because of his association with the hoplites, with whose 
help he gained control of a sizeable proportion of the Peloponnese. It may at first seem 
doubtful that a person in the highest of constitutional offices would risk his own position by 
giving the hoplite classes military influence, but we do not know the exact circumstances 
surrounding this decision, and it is the case that his reign in the early 7th century became the last 
time at which Argos would be in such a powerful position in the Peloponnese. It may also be 
the case that Pheidon was not in a strong position to begin with, as Pausanias tells us that 
Argive laws reduced the king's power so it perhaps was only of symbolic value15. If this was 
so then Pheidon may have secured his influence in Argos by allowing the hoplite classes to 
" For more detail on the reasons behind Greeks serving as a mercenaries, see Trundle (2004) 40-79. 
12 Arist. Pol. 1297b. 
13 See Kelly (1976) 112 n. 1 on Pheidon as the `innovator', for example being the first tyrant and first to 
use hoplite warfare. 
"Pol. 1310b25-28,39ff. This has been explained by both Kelly (1976) 113-4 and Tomlinson (1972) 81 
as meaning that Pheidon had extended his powers beyond those which he had inherited as part of the 
constitutional kingship, into those powers held by the aristocracy. 
15 Paus. I1.19.2. 
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fulfil their potential 16, and in this way both Pheidon and the hoplites would pose a threat to the 
aristocracy who dominated affairs in Argos. 
Tyrants' Bodyguards 
There are many examples in Greek history of tyrants coming to power with the aid of a 
bodyguard, the most famous being Peisistratos, who gained a bodyguard by pretending he had 
been attacked". There are several sources that deal with Peisistratos and his rise to power, in 
particular Herodotus and the Athenaion Politeia, but also Plutarch's life of Solon which adds a 
few interesting details to the story18. 
Kwrc«ppovýaas TTIv 'CUpavvi&a 1jy£tp£ Tpiviv 6T6C6ty, au%I. X£ýas SE 6Taat taS 
Kai r« Xöyw TCov ünEpaKpiwv irpoatä ju aväTat Tot6c8£", rpwµaTiaas EwuTÖv 
TE Kai fµtövous iiXaß£ ES Tt}v äyopýv Tö ýEÜyog wS bKItECpsuywS Tob; EXApo- , 
o{ Itty EXaivvovta £s äypöv h6EXrlaav äno?, Eaat SiiO£v, ESEETÖ T£ Tob 8f you 
cpuXaKijs TtvoS 71p6G aütoV Kupij6at, 7tp6T£pov Ei) oKtµfj6as b TIj Tcpös 
MEyap£a5 yEvoJt vrl aTpati yi , 
Niaatäv TE Wrv Kai &%XCC 6cito3Eý6cµ£vos 
µ£yäXa £pya. `O äE Slµoc 6r @v 'AO vaicwv e4a7tatrj6£IS 98w1E of Twv äaTG)v 
KaTaXEýaßOat ävöpas TptrlKo6iouc of 5opucp6pot µEv oüK EyEvovTo 
Ilstat6Tp6CTOU, KopuvTjcpöpot SE " ýi Xwv yap Kopvvas ExovTES EinovTÖ of ömaOE. 
EvvEltavaaTävTES SE ovTOt äµa HEtcRcTp&Tw 9axov Tijv äxpöitoXty. 
Hdt. 1.59 
Here we learn that Peisistratos had appealed directly to the people of Athens for 
protection, heading towards the agora, where it was likely that there were many of the lower 
classes present and which perhaps would have had the same effect as appearing at the popular 
assembly with a realistic cross-section of Athenian society. The bodyguard itself (xopuvrl(pöpot 
- `club-bearers') was provided by the state, and therefore probably consisted of Athenian 
citizens. Also of significance is Peisistratos' reputation from a previous expedition to Nisaea, 
where it is likely that he would have endeared himself not only to the troops he was 
commanding but also the general population of Athens. Plutarch in his account tells us that it 
16 It is thought that Pheidon's standardisation of weights and measures may have been of greatest help to 
the poorer citizens of Argos, in that they were no longer being shortchanged by wealthy traders at the 
marketplace, as this kind of exploitation was certainly possible beforehand. The benefits to Argive trade 
and commerce (for example see Ure (1922) 154-83) are considered to be of secondary importance by 
Kelly (1976) 113-4. 
17 We will also find later on that Dionysius I of Syracuse used a similar trick in obtaining a personal 
bodyguard - Diod. Sic. XIII. 96.1 ff., Ar. Pol. 1286b40. 18 Hdt. 1.59, Ath. Pol. 14.1 Plut. Sol. 30. 
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was the popular Assembly at Athens that had granted the bodyguard19, and the series of events 
does seem to be directed against the aristocracy in genera120. 
Ex 'rolTou Tö pEv nXij6oq ijv ärtotµov ünepµaxeiv Tob IIstßt6Tp&Tov, xai 
6uvýX6sv Eic E1 X11ßiav ö Siµos. 'ApiaTwvos SE ypäyravroc önwS SoOwat 
1tEVt 1KOVTa KopuvrlT6pot TG) Ilst6t6Tp6CTw cpvXaid 'oi c tc tog, ... Plut. Solon 30.2-3 
So popular was this decision in fact that it seems the people themselves were as 
effective a weapon as the bodyguards they granted. The Athenaion Polileia gives a similar 
description, and at the start of the chapter where these events are described, we are told that 
Peisistratos was inclined to democracy, further emphasising the public's support 21. In 
Herodotus' account we are told of when Peisistratos had finally secured the tyranny at the third 
attempt. 
IIEiOojEvwv ft rCov 'AOrlvaiwv, obTw 6 HELaIcr pccros r6 rpi'rov c» by 'AOiva; 
EppI w6E ThV tDpcxVVi a Eft KO1)POl6l TE icokko-kFt Kal xpgg6tTwV rnvÖ o1at, Twv 
! Ev aüTÖBEv, Twv SE ätze E'rpuµövos ito caTµob avvtövTwv, ... Hdt. 1.64 
It is noticeable that when Peisistratos gathers support in this case, they are referred to 
as imiKovpot ('helpers'), a commonly used term for mercenaries, rather than xopuvrlcpöpot, 
probably meaning that either Peisistratos' original bodyguard was removed by the state itself, 
or they had become absorbed into his army of supporters. We do know that he still had a 
number of supporters in Athens and Attica, who joined him in his march against the city, and 
according to Herodotus was away for ten years gathering support elsewhere, after his second 
attempt failed. 
It is also clear that Peisistratos was not a one-off case of a tyrant gaining power through 
popular support. Another case that is very similar is that of Theagenes of Megara, who 
according to the Politics of Aristotle, gained public support by going out into the countryside 
and destroying any livestock that belonged to the aristocracy grazing on public land. In his 
Rhetoric, Aristotle includes Theagenes in a short list of tyrants who gained power by being 
19 Plut. Sol. 30. 
20 Kelly (1976) 113-4, and Tomlinson (1972) 81, both explain that it was Pheidon's extension of his own 
constitutional powers by usurping those of the aristocracy, that constitutes his own transition in status 
from king to tyrant. 
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given a bodyguard by the people, almost certainly for protection from the aristocracy2Z. Social 
unrest is the crucial element in the making of a tyrant, and the degree of military capability 
within the hoplite classes, in contrast with that of the aristocracy, would therefore be the 
indicator of whether there was any attempt at gaining political power, and whether or not they 
enjoyed any success. It is probably for this reason that we rarely find tyrants in such 
strongholds of cavalry warfare as Boeotia, or, at least until the 4`h century, in Thessaly. This is 
also consistent with Aristotle's comments on the share of power in a city23, mentioned earlier in 
discussion of the hoplite revolution. Another region where cavalry warfare was dominant was 
Sicily itself, so the obvious question that springs to mind is why there were tyrants in Sicily or 
in Thessaly at all. Unfortunately there is no known account of the rise to power of Cleandrus, 
the first of the tyrants of Gela, a fact which means we may never know the answer for certain, 
but we may be able to find some clues in the rise of the tyrants of Pherae. 
We find Pherae to be a prosperous coastal town, enriched by the sale of corn grown in 
Larisa, particularly since Greece was, generally speaking, impoverished by the Peloponnesian 
war. Wealthier than most in Pherae Evas Lycophron, the eventual founder of the dynasty, who 
also made many in the lower classes considerably richer and therefore gained their support. 
Lycophron used his immense wealth to full advantage by hiring mercenaries, (we do not know 
how many, though we find that his successor Jason had a force of about 6,000). With a large 
number of mercenaries Lycophron was able to take Pherae by force, and perhaps with little real 
opposition, firstly since he enjoyed the support of the masses, but also probably because the 
local aristocratic families and their horses were unlikely to pose a threat to the mercenaries, 
who being far more experienced after the Peloponnesian War would have been likely to cope 
even in the face of a very large cavalry force. If control over Thessaly increased as gradually 
as our sources indicate, and the major cities were taken one by one, it seems unlikely that 
Lycophron at any time would have had to face the fill Thessalian cavalry force of 6,00024 and 
he therefore may not have encountered many problems, especially considering the difficulties 
21 Ath. Pol. 14.1. 
22 Ar. Pol. 1305a24, Rhet 1357b. 
23 Arist. Pol. 1297b. 
24 Xen. Hell. VI. 1.8-9. 
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suffered by the Thessalians of facing a strong hoplite force without having effective infantry 
oneself. It does seem that Lycophron would have been very fortunate indeed to have been 
given his chance just as the Peloponnesian war had finished, and when there were plenty of 
poverty-stricken, but also hugely experienced soldiers all desperate to earn money by any 
means. By Jason's reign the tyranny had actually gained in popularity at Pherae, and the 
mercenaries had been used to take control of most of Thessaly, largely due to the fact that local 
hoplites were hardly renowned for their abilities, being dependant on the cavalry for defending 
their open and flat territory. Combining popular support with wealth, the Pheraean tyrants used 
mercenary forces with great success. This extract from Xenophon's Hellenica perhaps best 
illustrates the importance of mercenaries to the Pheraean tyrants, and probably also to 
Xenophon himself. 
icai Ri v oiaO& ys ött ýEvouq Exo µtaOo(pöpouc ci ýýaxtaxt? Iouc, cis, wS ýyd) 
oiµat, oü6Eµia itöXtq Süvatti äv Patios µäxEß9at. äpteµös hey yap, £cpil, Kai 
EcUoOcv oüx äv eMmwv £4Exeot " 60A& t& JEV CK Twv irA ov aTpatEi taTa 
2obq gCv npoc%ij%uOöTar fjÖilTalc tjatxi. aiS EXEt, Toi S' ovnw äxµäcov'rct 
ßcwµaßxoüßi. y£ µtly µäß. a 6%iyot itvCS 8v Exä6Tr1 itöXct " nap' Eµoi SE oüSBis 
µtmOocpopcl, öaTt; µßj ixavös £6ity Eµot ißa TrovEly. 
Xen. Hell. VI. 1.5 
In Sicily, it can be argued that there is a similar dependence on mercenary forces 
during the early 5`h century, and the Pherae model seems especially relevant, as has been said 
above25 because of the similarities between Sicily and Thessaly, both falling under tyrannies 
despite very strong and influential aristocracies and also therefore strong cavalry forces. 
Before looking at the examples of mercenary use in Sicily, the conquest of the Greek and Sicel 
cities in Eastern Sicily itself will be considered, in order to construct the background to a period 
of great military advancement. 
Mercenaries in Sicily 
Gela before the fifth century 
Under the tyrants, the territory controlled by the Geloans had grown outwards from the 
plain surrounding the city, to roughly a third of the island of Sicily by the middle of Gelon's 
reign in 485. We cannot be sure when this expansion had started, but it is clear that the bulk of 
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the conquests came under the reign of Hippocrates (498-1), who with the aid of Gelon's 
generalship of the cavalry, had taken control of the major Chalcidian cities (including Zancle 
until 494/3), the Etna region and plain, including the Sicel towns, and part of the Syracusan 
territory. As pointed out by Dunbabin, it is not certain that the expansion began with 
Hippocrates26, for we do not know whether his predecessor and founder of the dynasty, 
Cleandrus (505-498), had any such plans himself. Asheri suggests that it was Cleandrus who 
had built Gela's first city wall27, probably indicative of earlier conflict with the Sicels who 
occupied the Heraian hills surrounding the Geloan plain. 
It does seem that problems had existed in Gela before the tyrants had come to power. 
The Geloans held a fairly large territory consisting of the plain in which the city was situated, 
along with several passes running through the hills nearby. Sjögvist's own impression of 
Gela's early history resembles that of Syracuse, in other words, a difficult time in which the 
colony was isolated, being surrounded by hostile native Sicels28. Whether the Greeks 
instigated the problems (as seems to be the case in Syracuse) is not clear, but the example of a 
large Sicel town situated at Butera, overlooking Gela, where there seems to be a break in 
habitation from around 600 to 300, suggests that we have evidence of possible earlier conflict 
in which Gela had successfully asserted itself 9. Therefore, in consideration of Gela's situation, 
it seems probable that the city wall may have been built even prior to Cleandrus' rule. 
By 580, Acragas was founded by Geloans, probably in conjunction with the 
Rhodians30, and the new city, under its tyrant Phalaris (from around 570), had a policy of 
expansion very soon in its history, including the infamous story of the conquest of the Sican 
town of Vessa by dishonourable means31. It seems that Gela and Acragas held similar views on 
dealing with the Sicels and Sicans respectively, especially with the appearance of Geloan-style 
fortifications in Acragantine controlled Sican territory 32. The evidence conflicts with 
Dunbabin's idea that the invasion of Sicel territory began with Hippocrates, or perhaps 
25 See above, 107. 
26 Dunbabin (1948) 380. 
27 Asheri (1988) 759. 
28 Sjögvist (1973) ch. 4. 
29 Sjögvist (1973) 39, see Adamesteanu (1958) for reports on the excavations at Butera. 
30 Dunbabin (1948) 310, Rhodians - Polybius IX. 27, sch. Pind. Ol. II. 82d. 31 Polyaen. V. 1.4. 
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Cleandrus33. He dismisses the idea that the conquests were made under the Geloan oligarchy, 
regarding it as too strong a change of policy for such a type of government to make, being far 
more likely to be a result of the change of government from oligarchy to tyranny, or from 
tyrant to tyrant. While this may be true when considering the conquest of other Greek cities 
under Hippocrates, it seems that the conflict with the Sicels was a constant problem throughout 
Geloan history, rather than one that was started under the tyrants. In other words, there was 
never any major change in policy in the oligarchic period, because the hostile atmosphere was 
present from Gela's earliest days. 
It seems therefore that by the time that Hippocrates had succeeded his brother, Gela 
was already in a fairly strong position, and any conflict in the region was the result of Sicel 
uprisings against Geloan rule. However, the achievements of Hippocrates and his generals 
cannot be allowed to be understated by this, as even aside from maintaining control over the 
local Sicels, the conquest of the Greek and Sicel cities in Eastern Sicily stands as one of the 
great, although often unrecognised, military achievements in Greek history. 
Hippocrates 
The chronology of the earlier stages of Hippocrates' career is unclear, but Dunbabin 
suggests that one of the first incidents of his reign somehow involved the destruction of two 
sites, those at Mte. Bubbonia, a Sicel `palace' and at Mte. San Mauro, a Geloan outpost34. 
Dunbabin also tells us that the destructions took place at roughly the same time, and comes to 
the conclusion that despite a previously amicable relationship, Hippocrates led the Geloans to 
destroy the `palace' at Mte. Bubbonia, after which the undefended Mte. San Mauro was 
attacked and destroyed in revenge. However, Asheri prefers to date the destructions to the late 
6th century, and Sjögvist seems to imply that Mte. Bubbonia was in fact already Hellenised by 
the mid-6`h century35. Asheri and Sjögvist were writing at a time following the further 
excavations at the sites by Adamesteanu, and therefore with the benefit of new evidence not 
32 For Acragantine expansion, see Adamesteanu (1961) and De Miro (1962). 
33 Dunbabin (1948) 380. 
33 Dunbabin (1948) 379. 
35 Asheri (1988) 758, Sjögvist (1973) 40-3. 
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available to Dunbabin, so it seems likely that the sites were destroyed before the time of 
Cleandrus and Hippocrates, thus confirming that Gela did indeed have an aggressive Sicel 
policy before 50536 
Following his brother's murder by Sabyllus in 49837, the first step Hippocrates would 
have needed to take would be to secure his own position as tyrant. The possibilities concerning 
the political climate in Gela are endless, as the events and character of Cleandrus' reign are 
totally unknown, but we do have a fragment of Timaeus which seems to tell of difficulties38. 
ßaOUKp1J. I. VOtat S' CJ1p ÖCKTaLS'EX dpov] 1i£pt To rrov TÖv 1COTagl6v auvE6Tlj 
I1t1toKp&T£t Twt 1'£X6)twv Tup(xvvwtTlp6q Evpaxoaiovs ltöX£µo;, ö SE I'eXwv, 
<o ü> ofTo; ETaipoS, iiriräpx£t T6T£ 'InnoKp6cT£t' £v 5T ToibTwt (pilal rCot 1io%£[lwt 
sixö Töv Xpöµtov Erttö£ii; aaOat icoXXX ä pya KaT6c Thv j. u v. lt£pi S£ TovTov 
Toi itoXs gov TIgato; Ev rý tt S£8r1?, we "'KaOäzcai; yap' cprlaiv ö Mövµoc 
'obö£µiav äX, X, rly µäxrly exoµ£v £üp£iv It£pi T6v "EXwpov Tcöv avvrlKµaKÖTwv 
'Ein Xpoµiwt Tupävvcov, 6Tt µßj aüv `Imitoxp&t£t Toi MWVOs itpös EvpaKovaiovS. 
ÖTt I. LEV oÜV r'£XwVa Lliltapx£LV KaTE6Tlja£V `InttoKpä'rrS, aacp£S ö TiµatoS 
Ttotrla£t ypäcpwv oiTws " «'InnoxpäTljs SE µ£Tä tii v KX£ävSpov T£X£vThV äµa µEv 
Toe r Xcwvos ýv Týt T£Tayft6vi t µ£µ£vipcko;, äµa SE Toil FeXwtots Xapiaaa9at 
(3oi)MgEvog, µ£Ta7c£µW6cpEvoc aüTÖV Kai 7tapamxXEaas Ertl Täs itpät; £tS, 
änävT(OvTG)V iitlEtwv Tily bttJAX£taV EK£ivwt 1tap£5wK£v»'. 
Sch. Pind. Nein. IX. 95 (Timaeus fr. 18) 
It does also seem likely that the old land-owning aristocracy would have wanted to 
recover power, if the transitional periods of other Greek states are anything to go by. To gain 
power for himself, Hippocrates would require the aid of a Geloan citizen force (this would of 
course be subject to popular feeling towards Hippocrates, Cleandrus' murder and tyranny in 
general, but it is probable that the return of oligarchic government would have been even less 
popular, as is usually the case in the Greek colonies, e. g. Syracuse pre-485). This citizen force 
may have taken the form of the bodyguard mentioned by Herodotus, of which Gelon was a 
member39. 
The first concrete information we have on Hippocrates' reign is that concerning his 
conquest of Eastern Sicily. Herodotus produces a list of Geloan activities after telling of 
Hippocrates' accession, but there is debate over whether we can take it for granted that the list 
is chronological. 
36 Adamesteanu (1957). 
" Hdt. VII. 154. 
38 Schol. Pind. Nem. IX. 95 (Timaeus) 
39 Hdt. VII. 154 
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... 
EvOaüta ävaXaµ 3 v8l Tijv µouvapxitly `I ucoxpäTr1S, KX. Eävöpou Ewv 
6c8cXT 
. 
"ExovToc SE `Imtoxpä rEos tihv cupavvi5a ö Mew, ýwv T1 ivEw 
Tob ipocpäv rEw äitöyovos, zroX? Sov JET &XXwv xai AivqutSýµou 'rob Ilandicou 
[öS] by Sopu(pöpoS `InnoxpätEos. MEth SE ob no),?, öv xpövov St' äpsti}v 
6c7uESEx6r1 täaijS ifs iicnou Eivat innapxos" noXtopKEOVTOS yäp `Innoxp62EOs 
KaX2 tco?, ITas to Kai Na4iouq Kai ZayKXaious Te Kai AeovtIvouS Kai npös 
Evprlxoaious Te Kai Twv ßapßäpwv ßuxvoüs ävl1p EcpaivETO £v 'roITotßt to1Ot 
icoXEµotat Ewv ö M(Ov XaµzrpötaTOS. 
Hdt. VII. 154 
Although it is not certain, Callipolis, being a sub-colony of Naxos, is reckoned to be 
situated in the region of Mt. Etna, and if this is true and the list is chronological, it proves to be 
a strange route for Hippocrates to take. One would naturally expect Leontini, being just 
beyond the Heraian hills, to be Hippocrates' first target for expansion, and this is the stance 
taken by Asheri40, who prefers the more logical approach to taking Herodotus' account too 
literally. However there are several other theories concerning the route taken and also 
therefore, the intentions of Herodotus. If we look firstly at the literary account, there are two 
main theories. Firstly there is Macan's idea that Herodotus has paired the cities together 
because each pair formed a separate campaign", but while the first pair (Callipolis and Naxos) 
seems likely considering their size and probable proximity to one another, the others (Zancle 
and Leontini; Syracuse and the Sicels) are more doubtful, in particular the last. The main 
problem with the last line is that the campaign against the Sicels was likely to be a constant 
problem, requiring several battles and sieges over a large area, rather than a single campaign. 
Pareti prefers to see Herodotus' account as building up the campaign as a whole, starting with 
the smaller conquests such as Naxos, through the larger cities like Leontini, to the ultimate 
prize of Syracuse42. Although there is a sense of belief in a chronological order by Pareti, it is 
not as strong as in Dunbabin's account, who takes the view that it makes more sense to attack 
weaker opponents first, if possible, leaving the stronger enemies isolated and without allies. 
There are several problems encountered if this approach is taken, the first involving Leontini; 
in other words, would Gela be under threat from a Leontine attack if left unguarded? This 
seems increasingly likely if Hippocrates is attacking Leontini's own mother-city (Naxos), and 
sister-city (Callipolis). My own opinion is that the Leontines would not have known of 
40 Asheri (1988) 759. 
41 Macan (1908). 
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Hippocrates' intentions regarding the Chalcidian cities until lie had attacked one of them, by 
which time he would have been close enough to Leontini for them to concern themselves more 
with protecting their own city rather than leaving it unprotected and attacking the Geloan plain. 
Therefore a chronological approach by Herodotus is still a strong possibility43 
A different approach to the question of Hippocrates' early campaigns was made by 
Adamesteanu, who chose to use aerial photography as a tool for discovering the most likely 
route taken by Hippocrates' army 44. The results of the research indicated that a route towards 
the Etna region, ignoring Leontini, was certainly possible, if a pass situated near modern 
Caltagirone was taken, en route to Morgantina, another Chalcidian settlement. Extensions to 
the city of Morgantina were made at Serra Orlando, the excavations of which had shown signs 
of destruction around the start of the 5th century`s, although Morgantina itself was left 
apparently unharmed. Sjögvist concludes that Morgantina must have submitted to Hippocrates 
in the face of destruction, and takes the use of the Doric form of the name in local inscriptions 
to mean that the town was made a Dorian power base46 
It seems increasingly likely in view of this evidence that the sequence of conflicts 
given by Herodotus enables us to reconstruct the route taken by Hippocrates, and the mention 
of the barbarians probably refers to the campaign in which Hippocrates was killed. However, I 
feel it is necessary to cast doubt over whether Zancle was taken by the tyrant before Leontini, 
as seems to be reckoned by all those mentioned so far, apart from Asheri. While it is 
understandable that Hippocrates would prefer to eliminate the weaker Chalcidian cities before 
attacking the larger Leontini, it does not make sense to risk approaching an even larger, more 
distant, and more difficult city to besiege such as Zancle, at least when he had the choice of 
taking Leontini while he had easier access to the city through its north gate. Such a move 
against Zancle would also have caused tensions with Rhegium, which was already losing its 
precious contacts with Zancle47, so an attempt on the city by Hippocrates would only 
42 Pareti (1914) 43. 
43 See figure 3, p. 25 
°; Adamesteanu (1962a, b; 1963). 
45 Sjögvist (1962a, b; 1964), Stillwell (1963). 
46 Sjögvist (1973) 45-7. 
47 See previous chapter, 67. 
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complicate matters by presenting the tyrant with enemies (Rhegium and Leontini) on two 
fronts. 
The sources covering these events unfortunately give virtually no details on how each 
city was taken near the end of Hippocrates' reign (except for Polyaenus' dubious description of 
Ergetium's downfall48), or details of any battles that had taken place, except perhaps at the 
Helorus river49. 
Unfortunately it seems that Hippocrates' primary motive in attacking the Chalcidian 
cities in Sicily is unknown, and there has not been much discussion regarding the subject, 
probably because it is a question that can never have a definite answer. However we can 
probably rule out prejudice against a particular group, as the empire consisted of Sicel, 
Chalcidian, and Dorian elements; thus it may be understood as an attempt on gaining the whole 
of Sicily, with the territorial gains of its ally Acragas being taken into account. One interesting 
suggestion is that of Sjögvist, as although he expresses doubt as to the real motives behind the 
expansion, he puts forward the idea that it may have been a joint effort by Gela (co-founded by 
the Cretans, along with Rhodes) and Acragas (co-founded by Gela itself, again, along with 
Rhodes) to bring Sicily under the control of the descendants of Minos, legendary king of Crete, 
although Sjögvist's view is based on the need for some kind of motivation from Crete's 
mythological past50. This idea seems more credible when considering the possible motives of 
Hieron in founding Aetna, in particular Pindar's allusion to the restoration of Heraclid rule in 
Sicily, showing that such motivations as these were not unknowns. However the question of 
Hippocrates' ultimate motive, if there was one other than a simple greed for power, will remain 
unanswered unless there is more evidence to assess. 
48 Polyaen. V. 6, for the passage see below, 114. 
49 See refoundations chapter, 141. 
50 Sjögvist (1973) 47-8. 
51 See later chapters on refoundations and propaganda, 163 and 183. 
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Hippocrates' Mercenaries 
As we now start looking at evidence for the use of mercenaries by Hippocrates, we 
have already found evidence of some kind of private force above52. Whether the bodyguard 
mentioned by Herodotus was granted to him, as were those of other tyrants beforehand, we 
cannot say, but it may indicate that the tyranny in Gela was initially a popular one, at least 
during the reign of Cleandrus and for the early part of Hippocrates' reign. Judging by Gelon's 
appearance, it was a citizen force; there is no doubt that Gelon Evas of a Geloan family, 
however the other figure mentioned, Ainesidemos, is more obscure. It is possible he was from 
Leontini, as he was later made a sub-tyrant of that city in the style of Scythes of Zancle53. This 
may be more likely according to Dunbabin, who says that Aenesidemos may have been related 
to the Emmenid tyrants of Acragas54, and tells us that he may have been the individual who 
embodied the good relationship between the two dynasties, though Dunbabin does not produce 
any real evidence to support this claim. Whether Ainesidemos Evas Leontine, Acragantine, or 
neither, he is surely an example of a personal ally of Hippocrates' (perhaps even a volunteer), 
rather than a mercenary. The only mention we have of mercenaries being employed by 
Hippocrates is in a passage from the Strategemata, a work by the 2°d century AD rhetorician 
Polyaenus. 
'InnoKpätTl Kpatrlaat Tits 'EpyETivwv n6X&x, E6nou8ax6)s, ößous 'Epyctivous 
EIXE µtßOocpöpous, TO{)TOtS EVEgEV Ö c't 'rf g Xeiag to ItXEIOV g pOS Kal ju Oovs 
µEiýov(Xc i) tEpEnatvwv aüTObg ws npoOuµoTä'rous Kai µäA, taTa xaptýöµevos, 
ws ItXEiovas iK TijS rc6XEcou TaIrni; exot avµ tä ou;. TaOTa hyyMe'CO ToIS Ev 
Tlj 7c6Xct" of SE ýiIXG)6(xvTES dv 6#4tav T6)v 6tpaTEtloJEv(Av E8£? ovTES 
näv ce; E Mov KaTaA, tnövtES 9pilµov Ttly itö? tv. 'InnoKp&'t1 cpt? ocppövo 
SEl; äµsvoc Tons ävöpas, a tfic vuKT6g ävaXa(3äiv Tr v Svvaµty Stä Toi 
Aata'rpuyoviou nc6iou npoýyE, Toils JEv 'Epyctivous Täl; as np6q Thjv 
96(XaTTav, Thv SE 6CXXrly ßTpattäv np6G Trly ijnctpov. Enci SE 6cnECppLXAt16aV 
np6G Tats Paxiatc Twv Kuµäro v of 'EpyETivot, Toils Inneis npontµytas 
'InnoKp6ct11S TT v lt ÄXty aüT(. 6V Epljltov o xiav KatcXL lETO Kai Töv dip Ica 
n6XEµov aüTotg npoEtneiv EKeXe cie Kai ßvvetlµa FEX ots Kai Kaµaptvaiotc 
ES(oKE KTE'tVEtV Ö(6eth; 'EpyETLVo'u; Ö(navTas. 
Polyaenus Strategemata V. 6 
This interesting story is typical of what is contained in Polyaenus' work, in that it can 
sometimes be fairly useful, but its main aim was to educate on the subject of military strategy, 
52 Hdt. VII. 154; see also 111 above. 
53 See 148 in the Refoundations chapter. 
54 Dunbabin (1948) 383 
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especially for those involved in the Roman expeditions to Parthia, rather than to provide an 
accurate record of military history for its own sake. This is made more vivid by the inclusion 
of mythical stratagems alongside those from historical events. In the text itself, we find 
another example of the unscrupulousness of the tyrant, which begs the question of whether it is 
actually true (it does seem to be consistent with Hippocrates' character from episodes in 
Herodotus, in particular the Cale Acte enterprise) or if it is simply a fabrication, a result of 
Hippocrates' own legacy. The mention of the Laestrygonians, a Homeric people, in the 
passage does nothing to aid the credibility of the account. Dunbabin views the text as being 
more informative rather than simply being an example of storytelling, especially regarding 
some of the detail given on Ergetium itself, but in view of the difficulties of using Polyaenus, it 
is unlikely that this account contributes as much as Dunbabin reckons". Also, going back to 
the main point of the composition of Hippocrates' force, although there is a mention of 
mercenaries near the start of this passage, the Geloans and Camarinaeans at the end of the text 
may suggest that at this time it was still citizen forces and allies that formed the bulk of 
Hippocrates' armed force. 
However this suggestion is challenged by another piece of evidence which may 
indicate a mercenary element in Hippocrates' army connected to the tyrant's refoundation of 
the city of Camarina, a source of troops for the Ergetium campaign around 492/156. This 
occurred around the end of Hippocrates' reign, following his victory against the Syracusans at 
the Helorus river. It is very possible that many of those settled at the city (probably more of a 
reinforcement than a refoundation) were soldiers who had served Hippocrates in his conquest 
of Eastern Sicily. This would aid Hippocrates if he were to attack Syracusan territory again, 
and also create a useful buffer zone between Gela and Syracuse. An epigram from the 
Appendix to the Palatine Anthology helps us to discover where Hippocrates' settlers originally 
came from: 
flpa@i't Xi5 ävEGrJic Evpaxöatos T65' äya?, µa 
Kai Kaµapi, vaios" icpöc O' äp' £v Mav ttvEa 
Kpiviog t iös Evatsv Ev 'ApxaMia noX-ogn kw 
EGX65 Ecbv Kai. Fot µväµa T65' ýa r' äpETäs. 
ss Dunbabin (1948) 403. 
56 See later chapter on Refoundations 143ff.. 
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Anth. Pal. Appendix - Ded. Epigram 43 
This is dated by Dunbabins' to the time following the Camarinaeans' forced move to 
Syracuse under Gelon, but what is more important is Praxiteles' three-fold identity, particular 
his claim to be a Mantinean from Arcadia. This area of Greece is one of the more likely to 
produce mercenaries, in particular because of its relative poverty in comparison with the rest of 
Greece, as despite the impression of Arcadia given in the text itself, it is a mountainous region 
much of which is unsuited to cultivation58. This epigram may identify Praxiteles as a 
mercenary recruited and settled by Hippocrates. 
Gelon 
The first real glimpse we have into the whole force used by the Sicilian tyrants is under 
the reign of Gelon, who had usurped the tyranny from Hippocrates' sons after crushing a 
citizen uprising. It is possible that the uprising took place because the Geloans were simply fed 
up of campaigning, which is certainly possible if Hippocrates' force did consist mainly of 
citizens. The extent of Hippocrates' conquests may indicate that while the initial campaigns 
against the Sicels may have been necessary for Gela's own security, those that followed such as 
at the Chalcidian cities and the battle at the Helorus river, may simply have been viewed as 
indicative of Hippocrates' greed for power and influence throughout Eastern Sicily, rather than 
to the benefit of Gela itself. It is my opinion that it was from Gelon's reign onwards that we 
find the mass-recruitment of mercenaries, due to the lack of support shown from the Geloan 
citizens themselves. 
Here we are already seeing differences between the example of the Sicilian tyrants and 
that of the Pheraeans. Rather than progressively gaining the support of the masses, the 
impression we get from the account of Herodotus was that the tyranny in Gela may have 
become less popular59, particularly by the later stages of Hippocrates' conquest of Eastern 
Sicily, where the citizen forces may have started to tire from continuous campaigning that only 
57 Dunbabin (1948) 416 - also Olympia V, 389 if., Pace (1927) 41. 58 See the introduction to Roy (1999) 320ff. for a general survey of the economy in Arcadia, the rest of 
the article going into more detail. 
59 Hdt. VII. 155. 
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served the tyrant's lust for power rather than benefiting the Geloans in general. From the time 
of the establishment of Gelon's rule over Syracuse in 485, it becomes clearer that the tyrant is 
eager to gain the support of the wealthy, by his re-establishment of the Gamoroi, or the land- 
owning classes, in Syracuse, after they had been expelled by the commoners in a long-awaited 
revolt: 
ME'r& SE 'roüto Tö süprlto roi g yaµöpous KaXEoµevoug 'r v EvpilKoaiwv 
£KtE66vtaS ünö Ts cob fttou Kai Twv ßcpEThpwv 5016X(L)V, K(AE%1 Vwv SE 
KDX? picwv, ö MOW KaTayayc)v To{ toD; Ex KaßµEv% nöXtos ES r xs 
EvprlKOÜaas EaxE Kai TaüTas" ö yap Sfµos ö T&wv EvprlKO6iwv ýmövTt 
I'Excovt itapaSthoi Ti v irAtV Kai EwuTÖv. 
Hdt. VII. 155 
It may be the case here that the Syracusans were ready to accept the return of the 
Gamoroi if it meant they were kept in check by the tyranny of Gelon, although it may have 
been puzzling to them as to why Gelon was bringing the Gamoroi back to the city. This 
behaviour continues when the wealthier classes from the cities of Megara Hyblaea and Euboea 
are transplanted into the new capital whereas the commoners are sold into slavery: 
MeyapEaS TE toi; £v EtxEMý, wS icAtopKE61iEvot eS öµo? oyIiiv 
ztpoßsxwprl6av, Toils IEV afTCiöv 1raxbxG, äpaµevovs TE nöXgiov afT4 xai 
7Epo65oxwvTas änoXEEaOat 6u -roü'ro, äyaythv eq Täs EvprlxoüßaS itoXu tas 
e7to'u - 'röv 6E 6fµov Twv MEyaphov, 05K EövTa µETai'nov Toil itoAEµov 
Toürrov o1ME npoß8£x6µsvov KaKÖv oü8Ev n£i6EaOat, äyaycbv xai Tovtovs 
ES Täs Evprlxoüßas ärtESoTO Ei aycoyfi ýK EtKEA, itls" 2wuT6 SE ToOTO Kai. 
EvßoEaS Toils iv Eucc? irl Enoui cic StaxpivaS. 'EnoiEE Se Tai to Toi rows 
ä t(poT£povs voµi6as Sfjµov sivat 6vVOi. K µa & apvrw raTOV. TotoüTw µev 
Tpönw Tlbpavvoq iy£yövEE µ£yas ö I'EXcov. 
Hdt. VII. 156 
It may be that in the cases of Megara and Euboea, Gelon has found a way of appeasing 
the aristocracies in those cities he had fought by making them citizens, and assuring their 
loyalty towards him, just as he had done with the Syracusan aristocracy. Herodotus makes it 
clear in his account that the conflict was the business of the aristocracy in Megara, rather than 
one that concerned the lower classes too much, but this probably does not rule out their 
participation if it was a state matter, and they were presumably dragged into the conflict to help 
provide hoplites and light-armed troops. This makes Gelon's treatment of these classes seem 
all the more vicious, and it is made perfectly clear by Herodotus that Gelon held the people of 
these cities in very low regard, through his use of the word äxapi, uii tc tov. 
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In the case of population movement, the Megarian and Euboean aristocrats had been 
put in a position where they would probably pose little threat to Gelon himself; their position in 
Syracuse would probably have been similar to that of any other new arrivals to the city, and 
they would have no privileges aside from those awarded to a normal citizen, the full privileges 
normally being reserved (at least in Syracuse) to the descendants of the original settlers of the 
8`h century - the Gamotrotb°. In this case they would hardly be expected to fight for their 
ancestral rights if placed in a city where they effectively had none; any privileges which they 
may have enjoyed beforehand would only have marked their position in their own city and not 
elsewhere, so being new arrivals and having different heritage, albeit probably with more 
wealth, they would not have enjoyed any special status in Syracuse. Nevertheless, the 
impression gained from this passage is that these aristocrats were lucky to be given a second 
chance in Syracuse, in contrast to the treatment shown to the commons, and perhaps even owed 
their allegiance to Gelon in return for his leniency. 
This unusual situation of a tyrant being at least agreeable to the aristocracy, does turn 
out to be to Gelon's advantage. A cavalry force would be far more difficult and more 
expensive to hire than an infantry force would be. This is because the main driving force 
behind those who wanted to be mercenaries would be poverty, and it is unlikely that a man 
capable of rearing a horse would be so desperate as to become a mercenary. However, there 
are cases, especially in the 4`h century, of mercenary cavalrymen being employed, for example 
by the Phocians in the Third Sacred War in 355-4661, also in some bodyguards of the age, 
including that of Philip II of Macedon62 and also the Scythian i2tltorot6tat in Athens. Trundle 
does inform us that most of those mercenaries found in the Greek mainland were either light- 
armed troops or cavalrymen, but I think that the circumstances present during most examples of 
mercenary usage in Greece were quite different to those in Sicily63. As has been discussed 
already in this chapter64, there was a far greater demand for specialised troops by the fourth 
century, and it would only be under particular circumstances in which a professional cavalry 
60 See Whibley (1913) 115-6. 
61 Diod. Sic. XVI. 30.1-3. 
62 Demosthenes 9.49. 
63 Trundle (1999) 33. 
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force would have been necessary, for example when one is faced with opponents with a strong 
cavalry themselves, such as the Macedonians or the Persians, rather than in early fifth-century 
Sicily. Further to this, it does seem likely that virtually all of Gelon's cavalry would have been 
taken from the aristocrats of Sicily itself, that being a major horse-breeding area and 
comparable in numbers and strength even to Thessaly65. In addition to having access to the 
strong cavalry forces available in Eastern Sicily, it would now also be possible to raise 
revenues and therefore recruit large numbers of mercenaries. As the coverage of events during 
and following Gelon's reign becomes fuller, we can get some idea of the numbers involved in 
Gelon's forces. When Gelon appears to offer his services to the Greeks as they prepared for 
the Persian invasion, Herodotus tells us of the numbers offered, and although it is not entirely 
reliable, it is useful. 
'Ailµttls SE 7cp65 it cov Kupljßac oiK ö toi dxroµat vµiv, äXX' E'totµ65 £iµl 
Pot O etv 7Cap£X6Jl£Vos-8LTrKOaiaS rE Tpu p£as Kal 5t(TRvpiovS 67CXi'ras Kai 
Slc X Xi iv Lititov Kai &axtMovc roI 6Ta; Kal Sl(YxtMOI)q 6(P£V80ViýTaS Kai 
8taxiT. ioOS iltno8p6µous iVtXoü; ... 
Hdt. VII. 158 
The numbers themselves are large, when combined with other figures given concerning 
the number of mercenaries employed by the Sicilian tyrants66, and we realise that a significant 
proportion of the 20,000 hoplites would have consisted of mercenaries. As for the light-armed 
troops, when one thinks of the highly skilled light-armed forces under Iphicrates during the 
early fourth century 67, one might assume that a similar proportion of the 4,000 troops under 
Gelon were also mercenary. However, it is probable that these roles were mainly taken up by 
poorer soldiers who could not afford armour; specialisation in these fields, just as in Greek 
warfare in general, did not become commonplace until the 4t' century, so even though one 
64 See above, 102. 
65 See Spence (1993) 30-2, and Worley (1994) 107 on the strength of the cavalry in Sicily and Magna 
Graecia. Examples of this strength are usually in reference to the Sicilian Expedition of415, (Thuc. VI. 
70.2-3, VII. 4.6,6.2-4,11.2,13.2,44.8), but also in the Carthaginian invasion of 480 BC (Diod. Sic. 
X1.21.5-22.1) and as allies to the Spartans against the Boeotian invasion of the Peloponnese in 369, of 
which the Syracusan cavalry numbered only 50 (Xen. Hell. VII. 1.20-2), though this was probably due to 
the difficulties of transporting the horses by sea. The importance of the horse in Magna Graecia is also 
manifest in Cumae, where according to Frederiksen it is a favoured motif in pottery, see (1984) 74, n. 
133-4, and also (1968) 3 where he discusses the fame later enjoyed by the Campanians as a whole for 
their cavalry. 
66 E. g. Gelon's enrolment of 10,000 - Diod. Sic. X1.72.3; Hieron's settlement of 10,000 probable 
mercenaries at Aetna - Diod. Sic. XI. 49.1; Thrasybulus' enrolment of 15,000 (up to 10,000 were 
Aetnaeans) - Diod. Sic. X1.67.7. 
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could not rule out foreigners (in particular the native Sicels) who wished to become light-armed 
mercenaries, there was not necessarily a demand for unspecialised troops in the early 5`h 
century. It may be a coincidence, but it happens to be the case that the main centres for 
specialisation in the arts of slinging and archery also happen to be the co-mother countries of 
Gela - Rhodes and Crete respectively. With these points in mind, it seems likely that most of 
the light-armed infantry were citizen troops. Also interesting is the large fleet offered of 200 
ships, for if we are to compare the numbers to those provided by Herodotus for Salamis for 
example, they would have provided the largest contingent, even more than the Athenian 
contribution of 18068.200 triremes would equal 40,000 men required as rowers and other 
crewmembers, but it is also unlikely to have consisted of many, if any, mercenaries: again, 
mercenary rowers do not appear in our sources until the 4`h century, as according to Casson, 
with increased specialisation and a shortage of skilled, or even willing rowers, many Greek 
states were forced to recruit professional rowers69. It also seems as if these ships were crewed 
by citizen forces, perhaps with some Kyllyrioi, free native Sicels, and other allies mixed in, 
with slave crews (according to Casson) being far rarer than is often assumed70. 
It is probable, therefore, that the vast bulk of Gelon's mercenaries would have been 
active on foot, and heavily armed. As regards numbers of mercenaries, we do have a few 
indicators from different points in the Deinomenid dynasty. For example, 10,000 mercenaries 
were enrolled as Syracusan citizens by Gelon, and at the end of the dynasty in 466, we find that 
Thrasybulus used a force of 15,000 - comprising of mercenaries and allies from Aetna -a city 
that may have been populated in part by mercenaries settled there by Hieron 10 years earlier". 
There is one particular problem that affects what we can gather from the Herodotus 
passage, namely the context of the account, which is Gelon's reply to the request for help from 
the Greeks who were about to face the Persian invasion of 480 BC. Taking into account the 
67 In particular their famous victory over the Spartans at Corinth in 390 BC. Xen. Hell. IV. 5.1. 
68 Hdt. VI11.42-8 (Salamis), other numbers - VIII. 1-2 (Artemisium), VI. 8-9 (Lade). 69 Casson (1971) 323-4, for examples see Demosthenes 50.7-16,18,51.6. 
70 Casson (1971) ch. 13 (appendix). 
71 See above n. 66. Gelon apparently leads 50,000 infantry and over 5,000 cavalry to Himera (Diod. Sic. 
XI. 21.1), a very large force even compared to those offered by Gelon to the Greeks, and that presumably 
contains a number of allied troops. If Gelon were to use his whole mercenary force, as would seem 
reasonable given the circumstances as well as the expendability of mercenaries, they would form a large 
proportion of the total force available to Gelon. 
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similar position that the Greeks in Sicily were in, with the Carthaginian invasion likely to have 
been imminent, it would not have been feasible for Gelon to supply much, if any, help to the 
Greeks. The fact that his forces would be unavailable means that Gelon could afford to `offer' 
whatever he liked, as long as it was paired with the unacceptable prospect of the tyrant being 
the supreme commander of the Greeks. On the other hand, would he `offer' the entire forces at 
his disposal, or only part? If Gelon was unlikely to be able to help the Greeks, it is possible 
that he may be overstating how much help he could give, so the tyrant could be taunting the 
Greeks by showing how large his own force is. This is possible if Gelon feels that the needs of 
his own country were ignored by the Greeks of the East (the forthcoming invasion, vengeance 
for the death of Doreius, and the freeing of the Western emporia - as stated in Gelon's 
speech72) and therefore Gelon may also feel justified in rejecting their requests in return. 
A possibility when reading into the large proportion of mercenaries in Gelon's army is 
a reduction in dependence on citizens themselves, and perhaps this is because they were 
deemed potentially less trustworthy by the tyrant, who preferred to enlist those who he felt to 
be either dependent on him for pay, in the case of the mercenaries, or fairly well-disposed to 
him in the case of the aristocracy, Syracusan and otherwise. The idea that Gelon may have 
been unpopular with many of the Syracusans is hardly an absurd one, especially since we are 
considering the time before the Himera campaign, and only a few years after Gelon had taken 
their city and reinstated the Gamoroi against their wishes73. 
This resentment amongst the citizens of Syracuse would have grown further as a result 
of Gelon's policy of settling his mercenaries in the city and even making them citizens 
themselves. It is likely that those who were resident in Syracuse beforehand would have seen 
their own identity `diluted' as a result of the new settlers, in other words, if the new settlers are 
now Syracusan citizens, then how are the old Syracusans going to be distinguished from them, 
and would they all enjoy the same rights regardless of family origins? This leads us to a 
problem which has been highlighted by several scholars, that of the distrust shown to 
foreigners, and the polarisation of native and foreigner, `insider' and `outsider', that can be said 
72 See previous chapter on foreign policy, 93. 
73 Hdt. VII. 155. 
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to be typical of the construction of identities (of many kinds) in Greece74. Mercenaries were 
very much the `outsiders' in Greek thinking, but there is a danger of attributing this attitude 
simply to xenophobia, as although distrust of those outside one's own city-state (never mind 
those outside Greece itself) is commonly found, the situation with mercenaries is more 
complex. It must be remembered that during the period of concern to us, the late Archaic/early 
Classical period, the norm in Greek inter-state warfare was simply to find two masses of highly 
organised hoplites/citizens/farmers pitched against each other. The fact that they have been 
described here as hoplites/citizens/farmers is of great importance, as firstly, the armies 
concerned consisted solely of those fighting for the sake of their own city, home, and family, 
and secondly, they were not subjected to what they considered the slavery of dependence upon 
others for their livelihood on a day-to-day basis. Trundle explains that this would bring a clash 
with the ideas of eleutheria (freedom) and also autarkeia (self-sufficiency), and even makes the 
point that in Athens paid jury-service or military service (for citizens) only avoided being 
similarly attacked because there was no individual employer, as such75. Mercenaries (whether 
foreigners in Greece, Greeks serving abroad or Greeks serving in another Greek polls) were 
therefore contrasted with the hoplite/citizen/farmer as stateless and slaves to their employers. 
Although, as Nussbaum points out in reference to Xenophon's 10,000, mercenary armies could 
even be considered mobile city-states, especially when one takes into consideration the 
'hangers-on 76, and Dalby even goes so far to compare such examples to colonial enterprises77, 
this opinion was still widespread in Greece. Therefore when the mercenaries, who had already 
invaded the citizens' privileges (or obligations) in military terms, had then claimed equal 
political rights in Syracuse, the `insiders' would have undoubtedly felt that they had been done 
a great injustice, by a tyrant who may also be seen as an `outsider' in political terms. In view of 
all this, one should not be surprised at the reaction shown towards the settled mercenaries after 
the end of the Deinomenid dynasty, when firstly they were expelled from Catana, then 
74 In particular Finley (1956) 109, McKechnie (1989), Hornblower (1991) 11, Cartledge (1993) whose 
focus is mainly on the subject of polarisation, and Hall (1997). 
75 Trundle (1998) 11-2; an example given of such an attack is Demosthenes XIX. 287, and a defence 
seems to have been made against an attack in Isaeus 11.6. 
76 Nussbaum (1967) 9. 
77 Dalby (1992) 17-20, in reference to Thuc. VII. 77.4-5. 
124 
excluded from holding public office in Syracuse, and following the mercenaries' violent 
reaction to this they were besieged at Ortygia and exiled to Messenia78. 
Nevertheless, following Gelon's success in thwarting the Carthaginian invasion, by 
winning the battle at Himera in 480 BC, the tyrant had become immensely popular in Syracuse, 
therefore making his position in the city safe, and after his death in 478 he was accorded heroic 
rites79. Although Diodorus Siculus tells us that Gelon's reputation ensured the continuance of 
the tyranny until the expulsion of Thrasybulus in 466, in reality it only secured the succession 
of his brother Hieron. 
Hieron 
While Hieron's predecessors both achieved much on the battlefield, whether against 
fellow Greeks, native Sicels or the Carthaginians, there seems to be little evidence to suggest 
that Hieron himself was too concerned with military affairs in Sicily itself, the only major 
military action being the naval expedition to assist Cumae against the Etruscans in 474 BC80. 
The main reason for this was that much of Sicily was already under the control of the tyrant or 
one of his allies, and the Carthaginian threat had been eliminated, at least for the time being, at 
Himera in 480. This situation, rather than benefiting Hieron, actually seems to have damaged 
his chances of ruling successfully. The primary reason for this was Gelon's victory at Himera, 
and his popularity as a result. On his succession, Hieron found himself in the position of 
having to legitimise his own rule as tyrant, a task made far harder by the standards set by his 
brother. Since the Carthaginians were now ruled out as a threat, it seemed as if Hieron could 
not gain a reputation through military means, and therefore his refoundation of Catana as Aetna 
in 476 is generally thought to be the method by which the tyrant would try to win himself fame 
throughout the Greek world. Even though one might expect the Cumaean expedition to give us 
more information on mercenary use, it turns out in fact to be the opposite. The expedition to 
Cumae was a naval one, and aside from the probable use of marine infantry in the sea-battle 
78 Diod. Sic. X1.72-3,76. This episode, along with the political circumstances in Syracuse following the 
fall of the Deinomenids, is discussed far more fully in the final chapter, 206. 
79 Diod. Sic. XI. 38.5. 
80 Diod. Sic. XI. 51. 
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that ensued, there is absolutely no evidence of mercenary use in Diodorus' account, which is 
brief. 
£7CL SE Tovtwv `IEpwv jtv ö ßaßtxCbq 'rwv Evpaxoaiwv, ztapayevoµEvwv 
npös avTöv ttpEßlEwv Ex Kvµrl; Tf; 'IT(xMccq xai SaoJEvwv ßoriOilaat 
noXE tovhhvots bnö Tuppilvthv 8aXarroxpato1bvtwv, EýErteµyr£v ab, rotS 
a }i taxiav Tptilpstc ixav&S. of SE r @v v$cihv rob'wv ijyEµövc CnmBi 
xarrCnXEVaav Eis cfly Küµrly, p th Twv Eyxcwpiwv jCv Evavµäxrlaav npös 
TovS Tuppivovs, icoW SE vaOS aütwv StacpOeipavT£S xai µsyäX7. j 
vauµaxia vtKf avTes, Toüs JEv Tvpprlvovs s tattsivw6av, 'rots SC 
Kv taious ýW)6epwaav TCov cpößwv, xai än97tX6uaav £ni Evpaxoüßas. 
Diod. Sic. XI. 51 
The Aetna episode is one that has received a lot of attention in modem scholarship, and 
has mainly been restricted to studies of the methods in which the new foundation was 
celebrated, for example by the poets who were visiting Sicily at the time, especially Pindar. 
However, for our purposes, the sequence of events during the foundation itself, in particular 
Hieron's real motives and the ethnic make-up of the new city, will turn out to be of more 
relevance. The account of Diodorus tells us that the Catanaeans and Naxians were expelled and 
replaced with 5,000 settlers from the Peloponnese and the same number of Syracusans, the 
reasoning being that Hieron might have a force ready if he needed it, as well as to receive 
honours after death81. The first point that will prove to be of concern to us is that the 
population of the new city was deliberately split between Syracusans and Peloponnesians. We 
are given a little more detail in a scholion to Pindar's first Pythian Ode, where we find that 
there were also settlers from Gela and Megara Hyblaea82. It is possible that many of these were 
Geloans or Megarians who had already been moved to Syracuse under Gelon, especially when 
one realises that Megara had been completely depopulated in 483, according to Herodotus83. 
The reasoning behind this has often been explained in reference to Pindar's First Pythian Ode, 
in particular the `Hyllos' passage. 
äy' EiEtti Aitivas ßaßt? Et cpi? tov c pcuµsv iS tvov 
Tw itöXty KEivav 6EOSµ&TCp aüv EXcoOEpia 
`YXXi6os ß266µa; `I£pcov Ev vöµot5 E- 
KT166E "O Aovtt Se Ucgxq üý ov 
Kai µäv HpaKXctöcxv Exyovot 
ö Oats üno Taüy£Tou vaiovtE; ai- 
gi REVEty 2E8µoißty Ev Aiytpioü 
81 See later chapter on refoundations, 158. Diod. Sic. XI. 49.1-2. 
82 Schol. Pind. Pyth. 1.62 (120)b. 
83 Hdt. VII. 156. 
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OQ)ptEls. £6Xov S"AFLÜKXas UPIOL 
fltv860Ev 6pvüµ£vot, ?, EUKOIE bXmv 
Tuv&apthäv ßaOI oýot 
yELTov£S, cwv KXEos ävO11aEv aixµäs. 
Pind. Pyth. I. 60-6 
This explanation is not without its problems; in particular it must be pointed out that 
neither the populations of the Peloponnese, nor that of Syracuse, from where the settlers were 
taken, were entirely of Dorian stock. In particular it is the identity of the 5,000 Peloponnesians 
that must be put into question, and it is here that the mercenary question comes into focus. 
Firstly, it is known that mercenaries were given plots of land and settled in the Greek world, 
whether for strategic purposes or payment or even both, and there are examples in Sicily, two 
of which occurred before the foundation of Aetna, and may be taken into account as certain 
precedents. These examples are the refoundation of Camarina by Hippocrates in 492/184, the 
first case of refoundation known to us, which was possibly a strategic move to protect his 
capital Gela from Syracusan forces, and then the settlement of 10,000 mercenaries in Syracuse 
itself by Gelon, probably as a means of payment". In the case of Camarina86, we have already 
found the Arcadian from Mantinea called Praxiteles, who claims to be a Camarinaean and 
Syracusan87. 
There is a likelihood in the cases of Camarina, Aetna, and in other evidence, that a 
number of mercenaries from Arcadia in particular were to be found on the island. Having 
origins in one of the more impoverished regions in Greece, one might expect that the Arcadians 
were more likely than most to seek employment as mercenaries, and their appearance is even 
less surprising in consideration of other evidence88. Later on in the fifth century, but mainly in 
the fourth, we find many references to Arcadian mercenaries, and one's attention is 
immediately drawn to the works of Xenophon. The Anabasis provides us with perhaps the 
largest single group of Arcadian mercenaries, estimated by Roy to number 4,000 in alI89. If this 
$; See later chapter on refoundations, 138. 
85 Camarina-Thuc. VI. 5.3, Schol. Pind. Ol. V. 19 (Philistus fr. 17c), Hdt. VII. 154; Syracuse - Diod. Sic. 
XI. 72.3. 
86 See above 116ff. 
$' Anth. Pal. Appendix - Dedicatory Epigram 43 - see above 116. 88 Roy (1999) 320ff., Lewis (1994) 150, Trundle (2004) 53-4, also Guarducci (1953), (1959-60). The 
political reasons for the large number of Arcadian mercenaries have already been discussed above, see 
116. 
89 Roy (1967) 308. 
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is correct, it is a startlingly massive group which can only affirm the belief that Arcadia 
provided more mercenaries (in general, not just in the Anabasis) than any other region in 
Greece. Further supporting this view is a fragment of the (Dopgocpöpot, a play by the comic 
poet Hermippus dated to 430-20 BC. 
Eanetc vvv µot Moüaat 'O?, üµnta 56)µa2 exovßat, 
Ei; ov vau1Xtipsi Atövvßos Eit oivona irövtov, 
&a' äyä6' ävop(bnot5 SEVp' rjyayE vii REAaivn. 
ix ji v Kvpflvrlq KccU v xai SEpµa ßöetov 
EK S"E?, Xrlßitöviou ax6µ43pou; Kai nävTa Tapixil... 
äv5päito8' irK (Dpvyias, 6(n6 S"ApxaSias Entxobpo1 . 
Hermippus fr. 63 It. 1-5,18 (Kock) 
This passage certainly implies that it was Arcadia that provided the bulk of mercenaries 
to Hermippus' home city, Athens, and it must be considered a valuable reference in that it 
shows mercenary service to be a typically Arcadian occupation, just as it shows the Hellespont 
to be the typical origin of tunnyfish. This evidence has led some to believe that the link was 
made also in Arcadia itself, in particular in Cooper's study of the temple of Apollo Epikotorios 
at Bassae90. Here it is put forward that the epithet Epikourios does not refer to the meaning 
`saviour' (in reference to the Athenian plague of 430), but rather `mercenary', which, as 
Trundle points out, appears reasonable because the term Enbcoupos was still being used to 
describe mercenaries by this time, the 420's BC91. 
Returning to Xenophon, in his Hellenica we learn more about the traditions of 
Arcadian warfare. The appearance of Lycomedes, a nobleman from Mantinea, into the 
narrative is greeted by Xenophon with a description of the quality of Arcadian soldiering. 
Eyy£vöµ£vos SE TtS AuKoI1 nc MavTtvEV;;, yAVEt TE oüS£vös evÖErls xpýtcwi 
T£ 1TPOTIKWV Kal ? XXCOS 90,6Ttiloc, oÜTOS EV£7LX1j6E (ppovIl . 
tacos Toffs 'ApKÖCsas, 
XEywv (bG µövotq µev avtois ztaTpi IIEXon6vvrlco5 Eirl, µövot yap avTÖxOovE; 
Ev WbTf oiKOtEV, TC%l£LaTOV SE T(. ov 'EXXrlvtxwv cphXwv Tö 'ApKaStKöv E'irl 1«X1 
66µaTa EyxpaTe6Tata Exot. Kai äXKtµcwtäTOVS SE aüTOÜS äITESEiKVUE, 
TEKgý pta ltap£xöµ£voc, th EntKoüpwv önö tE 8E11AEtEV TtvEs, oüS£vaS InpoüvTo 
&v, 'Apxä&wv. ETt SE oiTE AaKESatµoviovm n6moT£ ävEV agqwv EµßaXEiv Eis 
, rä; 'Ae ivac oiT£ vüv OrlßaioDS £XOEiv ävEV 'ApKä&ov Eis AaKESaiµova. 
Xen. Hell. VII. 1.23 
It is the speaker's opinion that the Arcadians are physically the strongest race in 
Greece, and they are favoured as mercenaries or allies over any other people, a fact which 
90 Cooper (1978) 20-8. 
91 Trundle (1998) 3-4. See also 106 above, where the term is used to describe Peisistratos' `helpers'. 
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appears to be a source of immense pride to Lycomedes, and gives an impression that his people 
have long been the best, not just at that time. This arrogance is crushed, in a manner that seems 
very satisfying to Xenophon, by the Spartans and their allies in what became known as the 
`Tearless battle' of 368 BC, where not one soldier of the victorious army was killed92. The 
Arcadians' pride is nonetheless clear to see from this passage. A point that according to Parke 
contributed to many Arcadians becoming mercenaries may also be alluded to here - for a 
region with poor resources such as Arcadia, it was very overpopulated 93. This episode 
immediately follows an event of great regional importance - the formation of the Arcadian 
League in 369 BC94. This is seen as the point where Arcadian mercenaries literally disappear 
from the scene, and this is explained by Trundle as marking the point where the Arcadians 
became a united and powerful force in the Greek world, rather than being swallowed up in the 
Spartan-controlled Peloponnesian League95. In other words the Arcadians became identifiable 
as a force in their own right, at least in military terms, in contrast with being known as paid 
mercenaries in foreign service. The perceived lack of influence in overseas affairs before 369 
may also be partly attributed to Arcadia being a landlocked region, hindering attempts at 
foreign trade or colonisation, also its relative poverty in comparison to other regions in Greece, 
and of course there was the fact that Arcadia was politically fragmented into poleis, but the new 
League provided Arcadia with an opportunity previously unavailable to it, to flex their muscles 
as a united force in Greece96. 
To return to fifth-century Sicily, the appearance of Hagesias, subject of Pindar's Sixth 
Olympian Ode, whose family was from Stymphalos but who was himself a prominent 
Syracusan, and victor at Olympia late in Hieron's reign, shows that the Arcadians may have 
been considered fine professional soldiers a hundred years before Xenophon. There is also 
Phormis of Maenalus, whom Pausanias records as having made a dedication at Olympia, as 
92 Xen. Hell. VII. 1.27ff. 
93 Parke (1933) 11. 
94 Xen. Hell. VI. 5.6ff. 
95 Trundle (1999) 3 7-8. 
96 Presumably in a similar fashion to the successful Achaean League under Aratus in the third century 
BC. See Larsen( 196 8) for more on these confederacies in Greece. However, a strong self-identification 
as Arcadian (alongside that of being from a particular city, for example, Tegea) seems to have come 
much earlier, probably around the late sixth century, see Nielsen (1999) 16-79, Morgan (2003) 38ff. 
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Praxiteles had done, and also served in the armies of Gelon and Hieron97. This evidence 
indicates that Arcadians were being employed not only in the rank and file of the army, but also 
in posts of command. These are described by Parke as becoming hetairoi to the tyrants, in 
particular those of distinguished Arcadian families98. 
It is quite feasible therefore that many of Hieron's settlers were mercenaries, being 
hired in exchange for being settled, and of the same nationality as those in Camarina, if 
Diodorus is correct when stating that half of the new inhabitants of Aetna were of 
Peloponnesian origin. It is an accepted fact that where there is firstly, a demand for 
mercenaries, secondly, sufficient capital for use as payment, and thirdly, poverty-stricken men 
of military capability, the conditions are correct for the appearance of mercenaries in the 
historical record. There is a strong likelihood, as we shall see, that these three criteria would 
apply to Hieron and the Arcadians in fifth-century Sicily, and perhaps earlier. 
Firstly there is the question of why exactly Hieron would need to create a new ultra- 
loyal city, of which a substantial part would be populated by professional soldiers. It is true 
that Hieron was hardly enjoying the safest position in Sicily: being a tyrant he was always at 
risk of losing his power to a popular revolt as had happened to many before, the situation 
accentuated by the reputation of his brother Gelon and the pressures of having to legitimise his 
rule to his subjects. For this purpose the new city turned out to be entirely useful, at least to 
Hieron's own successor Thrasybulus, who found himself reliant on his supporters in Catana 
when the Syracusans had finally grown tired of tyranny in 466. But rather than simply waiting 
for the Syracusans to revolt, it seems likely that Hieron may have had plans to prove to his 
subjects that they were better off under his rule. It seems unlikely that this would have been 
achieved simply through the foundation of Aetna and the fame it brought. In fact glorifying the 
new city may have had the effect of taking prestige away from the city of Syracuse rather than 
bringing glory to it. It is therefore possible that Hieron had greater intentions. 
97 Paus. V. 27.1. 
98 See above n. 97. 
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These possible intentions, the re-inclusion of Messana into the Deinomenid empire, 
have already been discussed above99. To briefly remind ourselves, Messana (previously 
Zancle) once formed part of Hippocrates' empire, but following the city's settlement by the 
Samians (c. 494-89 BC), Anaxilas of Rhegium took control and re-named the city Messana. 
Once Rhegium had seized control of the city it became difficult to recapture, especially since 
the city was an ally of the Carthaginians, but following the events at Himera in 480, where the 
Carthaginians and their allies were heavily defeated, the Deinomenids would no longer have 
been threatened militarily. Anaxilas' death in 476 would also have made Hieron's possible 
ambitions seem achievable, and the refoundation of Catana as an infantry base settled by 
mercenaries, as well as clearing the port of Naxos to be a naval base, would have provided a 
platform from which to attack and regain Messana. However, as has also already been stated in 
the second chapter above, no move towards Messana during Hieron's reign is recorded by our 
sources. It may be that the victory in Cumae provided Hieron with his moment of glory, and 
events in 473 culminated in the fall of Rhegium to the lapygians, which may have changed the 
circumstances in the area significantly. These events were followed up with Hieron's victory 
in the chariot race in Delphi in 470, and in 467 we find Hieron encouraging the sons of 
Anaxilas to take control of Messana from their guardian Micythus, which confirms to us that 
Hieron continued to have interests in the region, though now with a different approach. This 
seems to be the last major event of Hieron's reign before his death that same year. 
It is beyond doubt therefore that the straits of Messina were always a focal point for 
Hieron's ambitions. Fortunately for both the tyrant and for our own purposes, the actual 
payment of the mercenaries is an issue far less problematic, as it would have come in the form 
of a plot of land in the extremely fertile volcanic plain around Catana, a method that was 
certainly the safest way of ensuring a mercenary got paid for his service, rather than relying 
solely on booty won through plunder, and therefore almost guaranteeing the mercenaries' 
loyalty to their paymaster1°°. This would be considered a great reward to most mercenaries, but 
one cannot imagine what it may have meant for an Arcadian, who was used to living in a 
99 See previous chapter on foreign policy, 73. 
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mountainous region which was not likely to see much agricultural produce, and also provided 
little opportunity for trade and even less for a chance to join a colonial enterprise. 
This lack of opportunity would have been the factor which made many Arcadians 
choose the adventurous and rewarding job of professional soldiery - the third of the criteria 
necessary for the existence of mercenaries mentioned above. The Peloponnesian League, 
which would only have been recently founded at this time (in 506 BC), may already have 
brought to the fore the problems regarding Arcadia's identity abroad and the wish to express 
it1°', and therefore it is likely that the seemingly rich tradition of mercenary service in Arcadia 
alluded to by Lycomedes may have stretched back to this time. 
The study of the refoundation of Catana has usually revolved around the propaganda 
produced to promote it, and discussions of Hieron's motives for it do seem to favour such 
evidence, especially Pindar's First Pythian Ode, ahead of the account of Diodorus Siculus. 
When Diodorus has been used, it has been done to support the idea of the creation of a new 
centre of the Dorian way of life, as seems to be implied by Pindar, or to focus on Hieron's wish 
to be given heroic rites after death. However, they do not seem to take into account the various 
political and military events of the age, and certain details given in Diodorus' account are left 
unexplained by these ideas, in particular the reasons for choosing Catana as the site for the new 
city, and the depopulation of Naxos. The idea that Hieron may have targeted Messana does 
explain these problems that are concerned with the foundation itself, and perhaps will also help 
in understanding the phenomenon of the Arcadian mercenaries in Greek history. 
The new inhabitants of Aetna, together with those settled in Syracuse, would now have 
become objects of hatred in much of Greek Sicily. Although this would have been expected at 
the outset by all involved at the time, this only becomes clear to us through our sources' 
coverage of the tyranny's aftermath. Such policies of settling mercenaries in already existing 
cities would have caused great resentment, and this problem arose for more than one reason. 
Firstly there is the anger of those displaced by the new settlers, namely the Catanaeans and 
100 For more on payment of mercenaries (and all paid soldiers) see Pritchett (1971) ch. l; also, on booty 
and its legal ownership, normally a crucial source of mercenary pay, see ibid. ch. 3 and 4. 
101 These problems are mentioned above (117 n. 58) but on the subject of mercenaries see also Trundle 
(1999) 37-8. 
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Naxians, of which we hear little until after the end of the tyranny. Secondly there would have 
been a far more widespread resentment that mercenaries should be allowed equal political 
rights as the existing inhabitants of Eastern Sicily. The reasons for this have already been 
discussed in the context of Gelon's mass-settlement and therefore they will not be discussed 
again here' 02 . 
Finally there is one point yet to be discussed, that is whether it is still accurate to 
describe Hieron's settlers as mercenaries, given that they were now citizens of a city under the 
tyrant's rule. This may depend on which term we think would have been applied to them in the 
eyes of their contemporaries, as these terms do not all simply mean `mercenary'. The subject 
of the Greek terms for mercenary has been the focus of some discussion103, and the 
contemporary term EniKoupoq, which simply means `helper' or `ally', a term also used in 
Homer, may not have been deemed accurate in describing the new settlers, although it is also 
viewed as a dated term which was barely accurate anyway1°4. The later term gto0ocp6pos 
which simply refers to payment or hire, would have been more accurate as the settlers could be 
seen to be being paid continually by being allowed to stay in Aetna, and the term did not refer 
directly to being a foreigner, but since the term was not yet used in Greece in Hieron's time, it 
cannot be considered in this context. I therefore think that because of the fact that the Greek 
word Enixoupos is not a precise term and is therefore quite flexible, it would not be that 
inaccurate to use it to describe the settlers of Aetna at this time. 
The foundation of Aetna can in general be seen as both a success and a failure, 
depending on which of Hieron's motives behind the foundation is examined. While the new 
city did provide a new base of ultra-loyal citizens who proved their worth after Hieron's death, 
it did not endear him to the Sicilian public as lie may have hoped, because they were not used 
for any military campaigns which would have brought him a reasonable amount of credibility. 
In fact it seems as if the new foundation would have been an unpopular move, alienating his 
citizens by cheapening their citizen status, and no doubt upsetting the Catanaeans and Naxians 
expelled from their homes. 
102 See above 117ff. See also the final chapter on the aftermath of the tyranny, 222ff. 
103 See Trundle (1998) 1-12 for a general overview. Individual studies include Lavelle (1989). 
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Thrasybulus and the fall of the Deinomenids 
The recurrence of popularity for the tyranny in Syracuse itself was therefore short- 
lived, as Hieron tried desperately to emulate Gelon with little success. By the time Thrasybulus 
succeeded Hieron after his death in 467, popular support had seemed to decline rapidly, but 
again we are mostly dependent on Diodorus for this period in the history of the dynasty. 
Hieron himself is described as a fairly unpleasant character, being described by Diodorus as 
greedy, violent and ignoble. It may be that this idea of decline in Sicily is simply a product of 
Diodorus' views on tyranny, but when one bears in mind the difficulties Hieron must have 
found when succeeding a brother who was accorded heroic rites in Syracuse, and the effort he 
made to continue the Deinomenids' reputation, some sort of decline was almost inevitable. 
is'r& SE rý v `IEpc. )voc TEXEv Er v ItapaXaßcibv 't V äpXhv Opa6vpoUXos ö 6c8EX(p6G 
'Ü1CEpEßa%£ 'Cll KaKiOC r6v 1[p6 (Xi)toi ßa6tXE'Ü6aVTa. ßlatos yap WV K(A (povtK6g 
zcoXXoüs µev Tüwv IEo), tTCi)v ävljpEt ltap& Tö ÖIKUtoV, obK 6%iyovs SE cpvyaöc&ov 
Etd IVEVS£at 8ta(3oXaIS Täs oüßias Eis Tö ßa6nXtx6v 6CVEX6CµpaVE" KaOAO-u SE 
µt6üOV Kai µtßoüJEVOS bite rCov äStxovµEvwv, µtaüocpöpwv itXiOog i4EvoX6yiiaEV, 
ävTiTayµa KataaxcväcuUV Talg itoXtTtxalg SuväjEßty. äEi SE µäXXov Toig 
iroXiTatg ätrEX06gEVOg, Kai 7EOXXObq µEV vßpI fflV, Toius S£ ävatpthv, ýVäyxaaE 
Tons ä&KovµEvoug 6rro6Tývat. 
Diod. Sic. XI. 67.5-6 
The reign of Thrasybulus may never have stood a chance of being a success, but the 
situation was made even worse by the harsh nature of his rule, which Diodorus emphasises by 
referring to how many of the Syracusans were wronged by the tyrant, and how Thrasybulus 
then opposed the people themselves with his own mercenary army. There follows a siege of 
the island of Ortygia, part of the city of Syracuse, in which Thrasybulus is finally defeated and 
forced into exile, and democracy is introduced in the various cities that made up the tyrant's 
empire. The first point to be made is that the good relationship between the tyrants of Syracuse 
and the aristocracy is finally broken, and in some ways we have a situation similar to those we 
sometimes find just as a tyranny is being established. However, Thrasybulus is left without any 
allies in the city itself, and is forced to recruit even more mercenaries, using the confiscated 
properties to fund his forces. The tyrant, despite all his efforts, is doomed to failure, being 
104 Trundle (1998) 3-4,7-8. 
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besieged on the island with few allies and with both the commoners and the aristocracy 
opposing him'os 
Conclusion 
The situation we find in Sicily is therefore similar in some respects to that we find in 
Pherae, especially in the degree of dependence on mercenaries shown by the tyrants, and also 
the ambitious, yet mainly fulfilled plans of conquering the surrounding area. However the 
differences between the Sicilians and the Pheraeans, and for that matter most of the other Greek 
tyrants, whether they employed mercenaries or not, are striking. As was said earlier, virtually 
all tyrants come into power through class-conflict, and the way Gelon gained Syracuse is no 
exception, yet he was the only tyrant to champion the aristocratic cause as opposed to the 
common cause. Knowing that the aristocrats owed their return back to Syracuse to Gelon, he 
was assured of their support, and therefore had the advantage of having a strong cavalry force 
together with the wealth to actually buy an infantry force. 
However, the Thrasybulus episode does remind us that a tyrant cannot be completely 
dependent on mercenaries, for support from either the commons or the aristocracy is ultimately 
the factor that decides whether a tyrant is successful. 
Following the end of the tyranny, the Greek cities of Eastern Sicily took a long time to 
recover from the heavy influx of mercenaries. It is recorded by Diodorus that of the 10,000 
mercenaries settled in Syracuse by Gelon, 7,000 were still there when democracy was 
introduced' 06. When the original Syracusans decided to exclude these ex-mercenaries from 
office, the mercenaries seized parts of the city, but were finally defeated in battle. Similar 
problems also existed in Catana, and once again it was the original inhabitants, allied with the 
native Sicels1°7, who succeeded in driving the mercenaries out of the city. In fact, all 
mercenaries who had been settled in Greek cities were driven out, but were allowed to settle in 
105 Again, there is a close parallel with the siege of Dionysius I, also set on Ortygia, only in that case 
Dionysius is returned to power by his Campanian cavalry force. See final chapter, 224. 
106 Diod. Sic. XI. 72.3. 
107 This factor gives a vital clue as to how unpopular the tyranny, and also the city of Aetna, was with the 
Sicels at this time, in that they are actually allied with other Greeks in order to get the Aetnaeans , 
removed. See Sjögvist (1973) ch. 4 for more on the good relations between the Sicels and the various 
Chalcidian cities in Sicily. 
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Messana. It is possible that the mercenaries were suspected of supporting tyranny and wanting 
to reinstall Thrasybulus. It is significant that in Sicily mercenaries were always associated with 
tyranny following their expulsion, to the point that there is no evidence for mercenary use on 
the island for about fifty years after, until the Athenians' expedition in 415. 108 
108 Thuc. VII. 48.5. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
EARLY CASES OF REFOUNDATION IN SICILY 
Having considered the tyrants' use of mercenaries and found them to be ahead of their 
time in many ways, we now turn to a more unusual, yet related, phenomenon in the Greek 
world, the mass removal and mass settlement of people. We have already encountered two 
examples quite briefly, those of Zancle/Messana and Catana/Aetna', as these are clearly major 
events during the era of tyranny in Sicily that have major implications. Following this chapter 
we will encounter the refoundation of Catana again, in the context of the propaganda produced 
in celebration of Hieron's `nerv' city, Aetna, so these events can tell us a great deal about the 
tyrants' domestic and foreign policies. The focus of this chapter however will be to view the 
refoundations in the wider context of Greek colonisation and the foundation of cities, both in the 
Archaic and Classical periods. 
By the fourth century BC the `refounding' of cities in Sicily had become a strangely 
familiar occurrence on the island, proving to be particularly popular with Syracusan rulers such 
as Dionysius I, but if we are to look solely to the reigns of the tyrants in the early fifth century 
BC, there are several examples to be found which seem to be the very first of their kind. The 
refoundation and renaming of Catana by Hieron in 476 is celebrated by Pindar in his first 
Pythian Ode, and is emulated by Theron of Acragas during the same year, at Himera on the 
north coast. Before these, there is the example mentioned in Herodotus, concerning Anaxilas of 
Rhegium's refoundation of Zancle in the north-eastern corner of the island, at around 489. In a 
similar vein, there were movements of population from Gela, Camarina, Megara Hyblaea and 
Euboea (a so far unlocated city) to Syracuse under Gelon during the 480's, with all but Gela 
being completely depopulated2. This episode however will not be discussed here, as it is clearly 
a case of the strengthening of the city of Syracuse rather than a refoundation. The earliest 
known example of a refoundation is that undertaken by Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, at nearby 
Camarina. 
1 See above chapters on foreign policy and mercenaries, ch. 2 and 3. 
2 Hdt. VII. 156. 
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Tyranny and City foundation 
The subject of colonisation and city-foundation is one of the most misunderstood 
aspects of Greek history; many who do not specialise in the subject, but let it form a part of their 
work, often fall into inaccurate presumptions, usually based on perceptions shaped by modern 
colonialism. Therefore it is necessary to discuss briefly the nature of Greek colonial enterprises, 
in order to form more accurate models to compare with the examples in Sicily. 
According to Graham, there are three basic types of founder present in our sources, 
types that reflect the political climate of the period very closely indeed, but also tell us much 
about how the role of founder was viewed by those who ruled the mother-city 3. First we have 
the earliest cases of Greek colonisation, often private enterprises which seem to have little in 
common with state affairs, largely typical of the often self-seeking character of aristocratic rule. 
These founders act independently of the mother-city in virtually every manner, from the initial 
stages of planning and settlement down to their often monarchical rule. After death the founder 
was normally accorded the rites of a hero-cult and burial in the agora. It is during this period, 
starting with the 8`h century BC, that most of the Greek cities in Sicily were founded, and these 
are typical examples of early Archaic colonisation. Much later on, in the fifth century, we find 
examples of colonies planned and established by the mother-cities themselves, protecting state 
interests. We usually find the founder undertaking a temporary role of overseeing the 
foundation and returning home afterwards. Several examples of this type of colonisation were 
carried out by the Athenians (including Amphipolis), and one example by the Spartans at 
Heracleia in central Greece, usually to consolidate their presence in regions already controlled 
by them, and to protect their allies and fellow colonies4. Usually a form of government based on 
that of the mother-city was adopted, for example Athens would wish for democracy to be 
installed in its colonies, immediately lessening the responsibilities traditionally placed on the 
founder, due to a clash with the founding city's political interests. 
The age of tyranny in Greece, which is sandwiched in between these two periods, 
provides us with examples of another type of colonial activity, where a family member of the 
3 Graham (1964) 29-39. 
4 Amphipolis - Thuc. IV. 102ff., Heracleia-Thuc. III. 92ff., Diod. Sic. XII. 59.5. 
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tyrant was sent as founder under strong influence from the ruler. The Peisistratids in Athens and 
the Cypselids of Corinth in particular provide us with evidences, and they tend to reflect more 
imperial ambitions, satisfied by overseas acquisitions, with loyalties clearly with the tyrants, 
rather than the leader of the enterprise or the mother-city. The foundation of colonies on the 
order of tyrants is therefore by no means a unique occurrence confined to Sicily. The three 
stages of colonisation were formed by changes in the colony's intended allegiance - firstly the 
oikist, then the ruler of the mother-city, and finally the mother-city itself. Therefore the tyrants 
can be seen to form a sort of intermediary stage between colonisation being a wholly private 
affair, to becoming an imperialistic, state enterprise, although of course the chronological 
framework would be far less clear cut than this summary suggests. 
Camarina 
Following its foundation by the Syracusans around 599/8, Camarina is said to have been 
depopulated by its own mother-city following a revolt in 552/16. We hear little of Camarina 
until the events of 492, where the defeat at Helorus resulted in the Syracusan forfeit of its 
dependent colony to Hippocrates, who proceeded to refound it7. This lasted until another revolt 
against its ruler Glaucus (from Carystus in Euboea and therefore not a local ruler of the city)8, 
who had been placed in power following Gelon's conquest of Syracuse in 485. The city was 
destroyed, and its inhabitants placed in Syracuse, only for the city to be refounded again by the 
Geloans in 4619: 
x zl Kaµäptva Tö itpwTov iuitö Eupaxoaiwv 6)xißOT1, ETEaty EyyÜTata ? [ENTE Kai 
TpläxovTa Kai EKWtÖV J1ETä Evpaxov6CÜV KTi6tV " oixl6Tai ft £yEvovto a Yrf; 
D6C6KwV Kai MEV£xwXos. ävaaTäTwv SE Kaµaptvaicwv yevop vwv 1toX, £µw ünö 
Evpaxoaüwv Si änöaTa6ty, xpövw `I1t7toxpätlS ücTEpov F' XaS tiibpavvoG, XüTpa 
ävSp@V Evpaxoßiwv ai. xµ(xX6)Twv Xaßchv Tr v yýv rv Kaµapivaiwv, a nT 
oiKtßttS yEvölEvoc Ka'rc)Ktcs Kaµäptvav. Kai avOts ivnö I'EXwvos ävä( tacos 
yEVOµevn TO TpITOV KatwKicYO lü tO FEXwwv. 
Thuc. VI. 5.3 
5 Peisistratids - recolonisation of Sigeum (Hdt. V. 94ff. ); Cypselus - Ambracia (Ps. Scymnus 435f, Strabo 
X. 452), Leucas (Strabo loc. cit., Nic. Dam. fr. 57.7, FGrH IIA 357), Anactorium (Strabo loc. cit., Nic. Dam 
loc. cit. ); Periander - Potidaea (Nic. Dam. fr. 59, FGrH IIA 358). See Graham (1964) 29ff. 6 Thuc. VI. 5.3. 
Thuc. Vl. 5.3, Hdt. VII. 154, Schol. Pind. OI. V. 19 (Philistus fr. 17c). 
8 The revolt occurred at an unknown date, though it almost certainly fell between 485 and 482. 
9 Thuc. VI. 5.5, Hdt. 7.156, Diod. Sic. XI. 76.5, schol. Pind. O1. V. 16, schol. Aeschin. Ctes. 186. 
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The first case of depopulation in 552/1 is sometimes assumed to be one of destruction, 
for example by Woodhead1°, but Dunbabin admits that the term ävaß rätcov can be used simply 
to mean exile", which seems more likely when considering the evidence to be discussed. 
Dunbabin's suggestion comes in the context of a discussion concerning the continuation of 
settlement after the 550s, an idea supported in particular by rich grave evidence discovered at 
excavations made in the 1950's, indicating a period of prosperity and not just mere existence 12 . 
As well as the mention of a `Parmenides of Camarina' noted by Diodorus as the victor of the 
Olympic foot-race in 52813, there is also the scholion to the fifth Olympian ode of Pindar, 
referring to Philistus' account of the episode 14 
(MXi toO SE £v Tý TPl rT1 spi c Iv, 8Tt F' Xwv Kaµapivav KaTS atpai Jev 
`Inoxp&Trl; SE, 2IoXEµwv Evpaxou6iois xai ztoX?. oiu ai tci Xwtovs Xaßiwv, 
i irEp roü änoSovvat cobTou; 9X(4 a Tflv Kaµapivav Kai cmvwx16Ev ab'n v. 
Schol. Pind. O1. V. 19 (Philistus fr. 17c) 
The word avvoticiat ; in the final line has been examined by Asheri, where it is found 
in the context of the resettlement of Gela by Timoleon, and he notes that acts of reinforcement 
of a colony were often regarded as those of a co-founder 15, perhaps indicating that after 
Hippocrates had gained the city, he had placed settlers there to dwell together with those 
Camarinaeans remaining. While this idea is certainly disputed, together with the other evidence 
it suggests that Thucydides' belief in a long period at Camarina without inhabitation is almost 
certainly erroneous, though we can only guess at whether any of the original Camarinaeans 
remained after 552/1, or if it was completely repopulated by Syracuse soon after the revolt. 
The rather brief reference of Thucydides to 6cva6T6cto v in the description of Syracusan 
dealings at Camarina following 552/1 may be treated in a similar fashion to an initial statement 
of Herodotus, concerning the depopulation of Miletus by the Persians during the Ionian revolt 16 
As noted by Graham'7, the Milesians' fate is expanded upon, so that by the end of the account 
our first assumptions concerning this episode are proven wrong. Although in this case it is true 
10 Woodhead (1962) 46. 
11 Dunbabin (1948) 107. 
12 Pace (1927) 37,99ff., Richter (1949) 188, Dunbabin (1948) 106 n. 3. 
13 Parmenides of Camarina - Diod. Sic. 1.68.6. 14 Schol. Pind. OI. V. 19 (Philistus fr. 17c). 
15 Asheri (1970) 621. 
16 Hdt. VI. 18-22. 
17 Graham (1992) 310-2. 
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that Miletus was totally abandoned by its Greek inhabitants (this has been supported by 
archaeological evidence), we find that many Milesians escaped, but the majority were captured 
and resettled by the Red Sea, rather than being killed or enslaved, as we would naturally believe 
if Herodotus had not expanded further on events at the time. We even find that those resettled 
were employed in the Persian army, though with little success18. We are not told of the fate of 
those Camarinaeans exiled, suggesting a fairly small number, most probably the instigators of 
the revolt, and it is likely that any spare land would have been settled by Syracusan 
reinforcements, a very common practice particularly where the mother-city and colony were in 
close proximity. It also seems that Camarina was still considered a Syracusan possession, hence 
the revolts and its later forfeiture, thus it would be unlikely that the Syracusans would leave this 
land free and unexploited and, more importantly, vulnerable to attack. Westen-nark and Jenkins 
suggest that Camarina would have been virtually independent of 'Syracuse by this time, 
believing that evidence uncovered at the Rito necropolis near Ragusa (site of the Sicel 
settlement of Hybla Heraia) shows signs of strong Camarinaean influence'9, but it does still 
seem that Syracuse felt it had a right to control Camarina. 
The position of Camarina as a Syracusan possession also eased the problems often 
posed by reinforcing a colony, most importantly the new colonists' political, religious and 
economic status. In other cases this could be done through isopolity (shared citizenship - at 
least to an extent), such as in the case of Miletus and its colony, Olbia2", but this may have not 
been necessary in the Camarinaean case, and it is likely that Syracusan citizens would have been 
free to settle at the colony21: 
Twv 5E Einov noA. iwv lta3Ewv II?. nv EvpflKO) 5 O)V Oi) Eµia 6ME(PUyE SovAoßüvrly 
np65 'I7i1LOKpaT£OS. E1)pipcoc Ioug 5E KopivOtoi T8 Kal KEpicupalol Eppiaavzo 
µäxp E6aci)Oavzag std notatw 'EXwpcp " Eppvaav to 5E oütot ýnl roltafs 
KaTaXX6C4avTES, En E Tg `Innoicpä'td Kaµäptvav Evpi o iovs rrapaSoüvat 
EvptlKoaic1v Sa iv Kaµäptva cö äpxaiov. 
Hdt. VII. 154 
18 Hdt. IX. 99.3,104. 
19 Westermark and Jenkins (1980) 12, excavation report for Rito necropolis - di Vita (1956) 198. 20 Graham (1964) ch. 6, Rhodes and Osborne (2003) no. 93. 
21 The Praxiteles epigram, see below 143ff., may also be considered evidence for the idea of shared 
citizenship between Syracuse and Camarina, although Praxiteles does also mention himself as a 
Mantinean, so it may reflect more the idea of multiple identities than of shared citizenship. 
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The events at Camarina in 492/1 are not documented much better by our sources than 
those of the sixth century. Following the battle of Helorus, and probably intervention from the 
mother and sister-cities of Syracuse, Corinth and Corcyra, Camarina was added to Hippocrates' 
empire as a means of ending the conflict. The exact nature of this intervention is not well 
known, as to whether it merely took the form of mediation or of arbitration, but it has been 
suggested that Corinth and Corcyra would have had their trade interests at heart, being the only 
Greek naval powers with Western interests22. It is probably more useful to look at the position 
of Hippocrates immediately following Helorus, as despite the victory he still did not enjoy 
control of Syracuse itself. One way in which he could gain control was by taking advantage of 
an uprising in the city, an event which did not take place until after Hippocrates' death although 
it was a possibility at the time. To take Syracuse by force would have been extremely difficult - 
no siege put upon the city ever succeeded until the Roman conquest and nevertheless would 
have required a strong navy (we must remember that the heart of the city lay not on the Sicilian 
mainland, but the heavily fortified island of Ortygia), not possessed by Hippocrates at the time. 
We must also take into account that an attempt to take Syracuse by sea would not only be 
defeated, but probably the Geloan fleet would be totally wiped out by the Corinthian and 
Corcyraean contingents, who had already expressed their interests in preserving Syracusan 
autonomy. If this happened, Hippocrates and his successors would stand little chance of ever 
gaining Syracuse, barring a revolt from the native Kyllyrioi. It was therefore in the interests of 
both sides, and the mediators themselves, to come to an agreement. 
The scholion mentioned above (p. 139) tells us that this event followed a destruction of 
the city by Gelon, but there are problems in taking the statement at face value. Pareti23 believes 
the scholion to be reliable, for Gelon was indeed a general serving under Hippocrates and could 
have been in charge of the destruction. Dunbabin disagrees, preferring to explain the scholion's 
account simply as a mistake, where the scholiast has himself confused the the events of 492/1 
with the evacuation of Camarina during Gelon's reign in the 480's, and therefore accidentally 
22 Dunbabin (1948) 401-2, Macan I. 1.214. 
23 Pareti (1914) 38-9. 
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attributes the earlier events to Gelon24. If the destruction by Gelon was indeed misplaced, it may 
be possible that Camarina was not completely destroyed, or even harmed as much as we may 
think25. This may seem increasingly plausible given that, as we shall find, Hippocrates clearly 
had plans for the city. 
Of the actual refoundation by Hippocrates we have very little information. The scholion 
seems to be telling us of a co-existence of Camarinaeans with new settlers of Hippocrates, and 
omits the crucial element of its possible rebuilding. Thucydides is the only source of any 
substance, explaining that the city was given in exchange for Syracusan prisoners of war, and 
that Hippocrates acted as the oikist of the repopulated city26. This latter point is of the greatest 
concern to us here, and despite the lack of any sort of detail regarding what his duties were, we 
have an example of how uniquely, as in many cases, the tyrants in Sicily operated in such 
matters. Even compared to those in Greece itself, the Sicilian tyrants exercised their power in an 
extremely totalitarian manner, shown here in the refoundation of Camarina through the presence 
of the first tyrant-founder. This was to become a consistent trend amongst the Sicilian tyrants of 
this period, with Anaxilas of Rhegium becoming founder of Messene after Hippocrates' death, 
Hieron at Aetna, and Theron of Acragas at Himera, all to be discussed later, as well as the more 
general trend of mass population movement. 
The case of Hippocrates at Camarina, as with the other examples of refoundation in 
Sicily, is clearly different from other examples of city-foundation in the Greek world, in that the 
founder is also the head of state of the mother-city. The situation may simply imply a more 
hurried and unceremonious version of a foundation, in which the tyrant chose to act as founder 
himself because of the close proximity to Gela, though it would be natural to assume that 
Hippocrates would have had very clear reasons for carrying out this costly project. No such 
reasons are explicitly mentioned in our sources; for example we have no evidence of any sort of 
hero cult celebrating Hippocrates as founder of Camarina. This may be, as Malkin suggests, that 
Hippocrates may not have had the time to establish one27, or perhaps it is due to the fact that the 
24 Dunbabin (1948) 408-9. 
25 Unfortunately the excavations at Camarina have not shed much light on this problem. 
26 Thuc. loc. cit. 
27 Malkin (1987) 239, although also admitting that such cults in Sicily were posthumous anyway, until 
that of Dion, established in 356. 
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inhabitants were exiled during the reign of Gelon, and any traces of evidence for a founder-cult 
in Camarina would therefore be slight. If the settlement was simply a co-existence as the 
scholion may be telling us, a founder-cult would be far less likely to be established, even if the 
enterprise was planned and led by Hippocrates himself. We must also remember that it is only 
Thucydides who notes the changes at Camarina as an actual foundation, and if he was to be 
mistaken (as he clearly is on the subject of continuation of city life after 552/1), then it would 
obviously not be good evidence for the view that Hippocrates himself must have taken, 
especially since there was no precedent available for comparison and emulation. 
It seems probable that Camarina would have been used to settle Hippocrates' army, in 
particular the mercenaries who would have been requiring payment, while providing a base for 
continuing hostilities against Syracuse and those Sicels who retained independence 28. Syracusan 
territory would have immediately bordered the territory of the capital at Gela, and thus 
Camarina provided a sort of buffer zone to it in the East of the island. There is also an epigram 
found in the Appendix to the Palatine Anthology: 
Hpaýt'Calls äVE6fKE EvpaKöatos r6S' äyaO'µa 
" Kai Kaµaptvaio5" ltp&YO' äp' iv Mavtitv£a 
Kpivtoc, vies EvatEv iv 'Apxa5ia ito? ujtf 
p 
&YXös ewv Kai Fot pväµa 'rö ' £aT äpe'raS. 
Anth. Pal., Appendix - Dedicatory epigrams 43 
This is dated by Dunbabin29 to the time following the Camarinaeans' forced move to 
Syracuse under Gelon, perhaps identifying him as one of the many Arcadian mercenaries used 
by the tyrants of this era, and more precisely as one settled at Camarina by Hippocrates 30 
Further evidence suggesting a military motive for the settlement is found in Polyaenus, 
concerning his account of the final military campaigns of Hippocrates. 
Enai SE äIE(pp&XOrlßav ltp6; talg paxiatg 'r v KW twv of 'EpyE'rivot, Toüs 
inRElg itpORt [tXiag `I1cnoxp6MJ; 't v 7c6Xty avtwv Epil tov oüc av KaTCX6c(3cto 
Kai Töv 1cfpuxa nöXcgov aürrotg ltpostltEiv kr Cvßc xa't avvOr to I'£Xwotg 
Kai Kaµaptva"totg &OKC K'rcivaty &6 i; 'Epyetivoug ättavtag. 
28 It seems that Camarina would have been an ideal base from which Hippocrates could maintain control 
over the Sicels in the far south of Sicily - see above chapter on foreign policy. Close contacts seem to 
have been established between Camarina and the Sicels of Hybla Heraia (modern Ragusa) before 
Hippocrates, as the finds at the Rito necropolis show (di Vita [1956] 158), so we could assume that the 
Sicels would have been within fairly easy reach from Camarina. It is worth pointing out that Hybla 
Heraia is almost certainly not the Hybla later attacked by Hippocrates with Camarinaean forces; this city 
is more likely to be Hybla Geleatis in the Etna region - see Stauffenberg (1963) 176. 29 Dunbabin (1948) 416 - Olympia, V, 389 if., Pace (1927) 41. 30 See previous chapter, 115 if. on Arcadian mercenaries. 
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Polyaen. Shrategemata V. 6 
This campaign was directed against the Sicel city of Ergetium around 491, and included 
amongst the tyrant's ranks at this time were a number of Camarinaeans. It seems more likely to 
me that these forces were taken from those settled at Camarina a year earlier, rather from those 
remaining from the original settlement31. 
The issue of motive is representative of the difficulties we have in comparing the 
refoundation of Camarina with the norms of founding Greek colonies in general. Other themes 
that are unapproachable include the role of oracles and divine participation, which are so often 
crucial components of the foundation myths32, but are completely absent in the case of 
Camarina, perhaps indicating a new `foundation' was never the intention, and thus was never 
regarded as such. 
Our ideas of how much the population of Camarina changed, as far as the proportions of 
ethnics in the city are concerned, can be looked at through the defixio mentioned by Dunbabin, 
probably from after the refoundation of Hippocrates33: 
MEvwv &qt a Ev[ipäcpgt EiKX}Ei xv `ApXESäµov 
`Apt6T6Saµov Xatpt r6cly i]E OaXcS Xipovos HEpaKXi6a 
`ApxvTav (or `ApK W(xv) Eo6ias `ApXia Evµapia 
Etxaväs TtµoxpätStav HoXoµaivc, rov HpoSöl; o 
It is Dunbabin's opinion that the population was not changed much in that way, the names being 
almost all of the Doric type, particularly of Syracusan origin, concluding that many of the new 
settlers were Syracusan by descent34. We do not know, however, the circumstances of this 
defixio's writing (or even the date for sure) and therefore it may not be representative of the 
population as a whole. We have also seen possible evidence for the settlement of mercenaries at 
Camarina, and the names listed could be partly explained by the presence of settlers from other 
parts of Doric Greece (including outside Sicily), in particular from Gela itself. One possibility is 
the continued existence of many of the original Camarinaeans in the refounded city, and also 
therefore following the earlier events of 552/1 BC. 
31 See mercenaries chapter above, 116. 
32 For example the case of Eryx, see Malkin (1994) 203-17. 
33 Pace (1927) 161, no. 12. 
34 Dunbabin (1948) 402. 
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Whether the Geloans, Camarinaeans, or even Hippocrates himself even considered this 
event to be a foundation of sorts, we do not know; this idea we owe entirely to Thucydides, 
whose knowledge of the matter has already been put to doubt. There seems to be no clear 
change in the city's character, identity or institutions to support such a theory. We do know, 
however, that we are dealing with a case of mass settlement akin to colonisation, and one that is 
clearly significant enough to be recorded as such. As for the events in Camarina that followed 
its `refoundation' of 492, they are at least worth mentioning here not only for the sake of the 
story's own completeness, but also because they are clearly connected to the events already 
discussed. 
Camarina was completely depopulated by Gelon after he had taken control of Syracuse, 
before his preparations for war with the Carthaginians, so therefore around 485-482 BC. The 
population, along with half of the Geloans and a select number from Euboea and Megara 
Hyblaea (the rest of whom were sold into slavery) were settled in Syracuse itself. 
Ai SE lcapavtIKa ävä if ESpaµov Kai 9pXaßTOV. TobTo µev yap Kaµaptvcdovs 
äicavTaq £S r&q EvptlKoi c as äyaywv noXu tas EnoiijaE, Kaµapivtls U Tö 
&OTU KaTE6KalVE, TOÜTO SE r£? xoV b7rEp%dCFEas 'CWV &CFT V TW'UT6 T016t 
Kaµaptvaiotat ýnoiiac" M£yapEas TEE Toüs ýv EtK£X't 1, cbS toXtopK£öµ£vot iS 
öµoX. oyiiiv tpoaEX6)ptlßav, ... Hdt. VII. 156 
This was almost certainly done with the aim of boosting not only the wealth of 
Syracuse, explaining why the more `useful' citizens of Megara and Euboea were retained, but 
also strengthening it. As we have seen in previous chapters, the recruitment of mercenaries 
formed a central component of the tyrants' military force, and while it is clear that the wealthier 
the city of Syracuse was, the more mercenaries it could support; it is also possible that it was 
those mercenaries originally settled in Camarina who provided the extra military strength, and 
Praxiteles the Mantinean was an example of this. The next thing to happen to Camarina was, 
naturally, its rebirth in 461 BC, 
µs2ä S£ TabTa Kaµäptvav µev I'E2 of xaTOtxißavtcs Eý 6(pxf1S 
xaT£xý, rlpoüxtlaav 
Diod. Sic. XI. 76.5 
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Although there is a mistake by Diodorus, who tells us that Camarina was originally 
settled by Geloans35, we can nevertheless see what is going on in this passage, as the 
Camarinaeans of old are reclaiming their land and re-apportioning it between themselves. These 
are of course the most central components of a `foundation', but this does not mean it was 
considered as such at the time; we are quite simply unable to say whether the population were 
likely to view Camarina as a new city or simply as a continuation of the old one. 
The Camarinaean story down to 461 BC seems to be of great importance when 
considering the other examples of `refoundation' and mass-movement in Sicily, in particular the 
higher profile case of Hieron's refoundation of Catana as Aetna. The events at Camarina may 
have provided a crucial precedent, and therefore a justification for actions, including the 
unpopular process of shifting the entire populations of Catana and Naxos to Leontini, one by 
which Hieron can be seen to emulate the activity of his popular brother Gelon. 
Zancle/Messana 
The episodes concerning Zancle in Herodotus, in particular the Hippocrates/Scythes 
episode could easily be used as a prime example of Herodotus' disgust with many of the 
tyrants36: 
ZayKXaiot yäp of 67tä EIKEX'n1c Töv aüTÖV xpövov ToüTOV 1thµnovTES ýS 'r v 
'I0)vi1v äyyEXouS EnEK(XXEOVTO Toi)S "Icovas kS KaX v 'AKT V, ßovXöJEVOt aüTÖet 
irÖXty KTL6at 'Iwvwv "i SE KalM ai ni 'AK'd KaXEoJt VII EcTt j. IEV EtKEXG]V, 1tpäg 
SE Tupaflvitly T£TpaµIEvil Tr15 EuKEXiiic. Tot to v cov E1ttxa? Eoµtvwv of Eäµtot 
µovvot 'I( vwv ECYT&ITjaav, at v SE G(PL MLXTj6i(AV Ol EK1CE(pE'UyÖTES. 'Ev cit Totöv&E 
STI Tt 6UVTjVEtKE yEVE6eat' lä1uoi TE Ko lt JEvol ES EtKEÄ. LT1v EyivovTO EV 
AOKpolat Titat 'E7CtýE(pDpiotal Kalt ZayKXa ol. aÜToi TE Kai Ö ßa6tXEÜS afTGhv, 
'r& oüvoµa AV EKÜ6fs, zteptKaTEa'to 7lÖkty Twv EtKEX6)v £g£X£iv ßovXöµ£vot. 
MaOwv SE Taü'a Ö `Prlyiov Ti)pavvog 'AvaýiXEws, TÖTE Ewv Stäcpopos Tout 
ZayKXaiotat, ajiEI as Total Eaµiotat ävanEi6Et wS xpEÖv Eire KaX v µEv 
'AK'r lv, Wijv £mX£ov, Eäv xaip£ty, Tnv SE ZäyK? v axEiv, Eoüaav Epr111ov ävSpwv. 
IIEteoµ£V(AV SE T(Äv 1aµio v Ka! axÖVT(J)V Trf v ZÖCyKX1V, £VO(ATa OL Z(XyKXaLOt, 
(. bS EitVAOVTO £xOp£V1IV Tijv nälIv £()UTÜJV, £3ol OEOV aÜTf Kai E7[EKaÄ£OVT0 
'I1t1toKpäTEa Töv Tüpavvov "iv 'yap Sri acpt oü'ros 6üµµaxoc. 'ER£iTE SE 
aüTOißt Kai Ö `InnoKp6T11; aüv Tp aTpaTtlj tjx£ßorl8£wv, EKÜenv µEV Töv 
µoüvapxov Tci v ZayKXaiwv ws äicoßaXövTa 'ri v iröXty ö `InnoKP6c clIg nE5ý0( 
Kai Töv 65£2, cp£öv (ATOÜ Ill)OoyEVEa ýS "Ivuxa itöXiv änEnE tlJE, Tot; SE 
3s There is of course an alternative, and that is that Hippocrates' own settlers in Camarina are reclaiming 
the land, and that these are naturally called `Geloans' by Diodorus as a general term despite the likely mix 
of ethnicities. This would be just the same as saying that the original settlers of Syracuse were Corinthian, 
even though there is a likelihood that some settlers were not from Corinth. 
36 Hdt. VI. 22-3. 
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Xottovs ZayKXaiov5 KotvoXoyr166µ£vos Tout Eaµiotat Kai öpxou; Soig x(A 
8EI; ä1EVOs 1tpoESwKE. MtGO6q SE of hv EipnIEvos 68E üttö Tci v Eaµiwv, nävTwv 
T(wv inin). wv Kai 6tv6pa7[6&wv Tä Tlgi(YEa µEta%aIEiv T(iv £V TT n6Xt,, c6C Vin! 
Twv äypwv tävTa Innoxp&TEa Xayxäv£ty. Toils µEv 8f1 iXEovas 'rwv ZayKXaiwv 
ai rös Ev &v5pa1t6&wv Xöyw ET XE SrlaaS, Toils SE xopucpaious aütwv Tptrlxoßious 
95(j)Kp- To cn EaJtlotat KaTaa pc at' ob p vtot of yE Thjnot EitoiiI6av 'LaiTa. 
Hdt. VI. 22-3 
However, as an example of mass exile and repopulation in the West, it is often looked 
over briefly before moving on to the subject of Hieron at Catana. Considering the notoriety of 
the Hippocrates and Scythes episode, the importance of the straits of Messina, and the 
significance of the city's renaming as Messana, this is wholly unjustified. 
Like Camarina, Zancle was the focus of more than one incident of concern to us, both 
involving Anaxilas of Rhegium and his determination to gain full control of the straits of 
Messina. The background of this issue has already been discussed in the foreign policy chapter 
and it is not necessary to repeat it here37, and neither is it necessary, in consideration of the great 
opportunity handed to Anaxilas, and undoubtedly support from the tyrant's subjects, to discuss 
his principal motives in convincing the refugees from Samos to take Zancle, and to take it 
himself later when relations with Zancle had not improved. 
The first case of resettlement at Zancle, involving the Samians, does not involve a 
change of the city's name, but it is clear from the evidence available to us that the Samians were 
in firm control when the coinage of Zancle is considered (see below p. 149). There is 
disagreement, however, concerning the fate of the Zancleans themselves. It seems to have been 
the opinion of both Thucydides and Aristotle38 that the Chalcidian Zancleans were completely 
driven out, although under differing circumstances, as Aristotle tells us that a number of 
Samians were accepted into the city by the inhabitants first, although this could be a reference to 
the earlier presence of Samians in Zancle and Rhegium. 
Now it is probable that a number of Zancleans remained in the city after the influx of 
Samians - it is possible that many were sold into slavery as Herodotus tells us39, but it is difficult 
to account for the 300 Zancleans handed over by Hippocrates to the Samians, whom he says 
were spared from execution. There are references made by Pausanias to victories by 
37 See chapter two, 67. 
38 Thuc. V1.4.5-6, Arist. Pol. 1303a35-6. 
148 
Messenians of Sicily, Leontiscus and Symmachus, who are said to be of the old Zanclean stock 
rather than of the Peloponnesian sort40. The re-adoption of the name Zancle after the reign of 
the Anaxilaids also indicates the survival and continued presence in the city of Chalcidian 
Zancleans, as does the use of the Ionic name MEEEENION (as opposed to the Doric version 
MEEEANION which would have been used by the Peloponnesians) on coinage until about 460, 
even though most, if not all the (Ionian) Samians were expelled during Anaxilas' refoundation. 
The leniency shown by the Samians to the Zancleans after their conquest may simply be a 
matter of morality, in particular disgust at the actions of Hippocrates, but it is tempting to see it 
also as a matter of strengthening their own position, for the 300 handed over to them were the 
major figures in Zancle at the time - i. e. wealthy, or perhaps even as a gesture made by those 
Samians in charge towards their fellow aristocrats41. Dunbabin suggests that these original 
Zancleans may have been allowed to retain citizenship, which may explain why they retained a 
degree of influence even after the expulsion of the Samians42. 
For our purposes, probably the most significant question when considering this 
particular episode of Zancle's history is the role played by Cadmus, son of Scythes, perhaps the 
same Scythes as the Coan sub-tyrant of Zancle, during the earlier period of Geloan domination 
down to the appearance of the Samian refugees. Cadmus became the leader of the Samian- 
dominated city after giving up his tyranny over Cos and restoring power to the people, thus it is 
not surprising that he is portrayed by Herodotus as an honourable man later trusted by Gelon to 
take charge of mediation with Persia43. It is thought to be likely that Cadmus was originally put 
in charge of the Cale Acte enterprise, a settlement which Herodotus says was proposed by the 
Zancleans (i. e. Scythes - hence the choice of oikist) to the Ionians around the time of Lade44, but 
was probably instigated by Hippocrates in order to provide a base from which to attack the 
native Sicels. We know of no other candidate who could possibly have been oikist, and perhaps 
the family ties with Scythes in Zancle would have ensured a ready source of help if it was 
39 Hdt. VI. 23. 
40 Paus. IV. 2.10. 
41 Hdt. VI. 23. 
42 Dunbabin (1948) 300. 
43 Hdt. VII. 163-4. It is interesting that Scythes himself makes his way to Persia, and is also held in great 
esteem, this time by the court of Darius, Hdt. VI. 24. 
44 Hdt. VI. 22-3. 
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needed by either tyrant. It therefore does not seem so surprising that Cadmus gave up his 
tyranny in Cos, which by then was little more than a `puppet'-tyranny, being supported by the 
ruling Persians, when considering his option of leading a colonial expedition, and the prospect 
of receiving a hero-cult after his death. 
The most obvious problem with the idea that Cadmus was leader of the Samians is that 
he would have stolen Zancle from his own father, hardly an example of filial devotion we would 
expect from a man worthy of such praise from Herodotus. The biggest cause of confusion is 
whether one reads the passage concerned as containing icapä or µerä, regarding his actual 
association with the Samians. Dunbabin and Macan are in agreement that the passage should be 
read as µs2ä, meaning that he was indeed the leader of the Samians, but perhaps reached Sicily 
in advance and therefore was not directly responsible for the Samians' actions at Zancle, who 
had in fact betrayed their would-be oikisf 5. The support given by Cadmus to Gelon later 
certainly suggests some anti-Anaxilas feeling on his part, and it may be that Cadmus was aware 
of how Anaxilas had led the Samians astray, although this could also have been due to the 
expulsion of the Samians following the refoundation of Zancle by that tyrant. 
There is no evidence indicating any sort of claim to refoundation by Cadmus or the 
Samians themselves, although their presence was felt at Zancle for a mere five years. Like the 
settlement of Camarina by Hippocrates, it was certainly a significant event that may have 
resembled such a description. This idea is reinforced by numismatic evidence from the five 
years of occupation, where the appearance of the lion's scalp on the obverse and a Samian 
galley on the reverse indicate Samian domination of the city46. It is also believed that the 
appearance of one of the first five letters of the Greek alphabet often found on the reverse 
represent each of the five years of Samian presence47. This short period is partly to blame for 
the lack of details we have on how the city operated, but it does seem as if Anaxilas' plot did not 
succeed - why else would he expel the Samians from Zancle, if they co-operated with Rhegium 
as would have been his original intention? The links Cadmus had with the Deinomenids later 
45 Dunbabin (1948) 392, Macan (1908) 230. 
46 See Head (1911) 152ff. There are differences, for example the Zanclean coins depict an actual lion's 
head whereas in Samos we find a lion's scalp, with no eyes, from the Samian Heraion, and the Samian 
galley does not commonly appear until the fourth century - Head (1911) 602ff., Robinson (1946) 15. 
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suggest that Zancle remained under mostly Geloan influence following the Samians' arrival, 
thanks mostly to Hippocrates' choice to let them stay in the city rather than help Scythes. 
The refoundation of Anaxilas at around 490-89, which had started with the expulsion of 
the Samian contingent in Zancle, is probably the first example of a deliberate resettlement 
together with a change in the city's name, in the history of Sicily. Our main source for this 
episode is Thucydides, who tells us of the three stages of the operation: 
va'rapov S' cdito jv nrö Eaµiwv xai iXXcav 'Iwvcov Exmittovcty, of Mý6o1)c 
(p£üyovTES npoaeßaXov EtueX'ta, ttobq U DxgiouS 'Avai; IXas `Pilyivwv ivpavvos 
ob itoAX 1 tcpov E4cO by ic Trly n6Xty cc tÖs i; u t iKTCov äv0pc itwv 
oixißas Msaar vily ärtö tfic Ecn rov Tö äpxaiov irwrpi6o; ävtwvöµaaEv. 
Thuc. VL4.5-6 
This took the form of expelling the Samians, next to repopulate Zancle with people of 
differing origins, and finally to rename the city Messana48 after Anaxilas' own homeland. 
Anaxilas' reasons for carrying out the first stage are quite clear - the Samians did not co-operate 
with him, leaving Rhegium in a similar state as before49. The repopulation of the city which 
naturally follows, in particular the origins of the new inhabitants, is of significance because it 
seems typical of the way many colonial enterprises were undertaken in that invitations to join in 
the enterprise do not seem to be restricted to any particular group of people, unlike other 
contemporary Sicilian moves e. g. Dorians (as at Aetna) or Ionians (Cale Acte). It may be that 
Anaxilas' experiences with the Samians at Zancle deterred him from restricting invitations to a 
particular group, where loyalties would more likely be split between the mother-city of the 
colony, and that of the colonists themselves, whereas the main unifying force in a more 
heterogenous state would more likely be the oikist50. Therefore the inhabitants would identify 
themselves more as citizens of their new home, rather than retaining their old identity and ties of 
loyalty as perhaps the Samians did as refugees, the coinage of Messang being a good indicator 
of this. Conforming to the norms of colonisation would have given the enterprise a sense of 
'" See Robinson (1946) 13-20. These also appear later on Samian coins themselves, see BMC (Ionia) 358, 
no's 92ff. 
8 Or more precisely for this particular time, Messene, if we take account of the numismatic evidence 
discussed above, but I shall only use the name Messana as a matter of consistency, unless a point is to be 
made about the change of dialect in the name. 
49 Dunbabin (1948) 395. 
50 See McGlew (1993) 23 for discussion of heterogeneity in colonies, e. g. Heracleia, Thasos. 
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validity, as far as identifying Messana as a brand new colony was concerned, a theme we shall 
examine at length when discussing Hieron at Aetna. 
If we are to use our experience gained with the brevity of Thucydides' dealings with 
such matters51, it is possible to consider other possibilities when looking at the question of 
Messana's heterogeneity. It is useful to remember that Thucydides is one of two sources that 
tells us of the complete expulsion of the original Zancleans from their city, as he does in the case 
of Camarina in the late 550's, and again in doing so he is at odds with the other evidence except 
Aristotle: 
ZayKXaiot SE Eapiovs vnoöEi 6[ 1cvo Ei; e71Eßov afToI 
Arist. Pol. 1303a35-6 
If we are to believe Thucydides, we must assume that many Zancleans returned after the 
Samians' expulsion, at the invitation of Anaxilas. One could take the view that Thucydides' 
statement of heterogeneity is actually an effort to support his view of all Zancleans being 
expelled by the Samians earlier, therefore also explaining the reappearance of the name Zancle 
after Anaxilaid rule. However I do not think that the numbers of Zancleans remaining would 
have been sufficient to rename the city as Zancle without an earlier input of old Zancleans or 
other Chalcidians, or even to explain the usage of the Ionian name Messene without there being 
a substantial Ionian contingent in that city, in addition to the Messenian (Peloponnesian) 
population also present. Therefore I agree with Thucydides' account of a broad invitation to all, 
or at least differing kinds, of Greeks, while maintaining the belief that some Zancleans remained 
after the Samian conquest. 
The Messenian contingent in the refounded city are said by Pausanias to have existed 
after they and Anaxilas had defeated the Zancleans themselves, and had them expelled: 
TötE S£ ToÜs ZayKXaiovs 5 TE 'Avagixas vcx aIv ävTavayoµEVovs £ViKTT6£ Kai 
of M£66tjvtot µäxß ztEýf " ZayKXaiot SE K Lt yfly TE vrcö M£ßatlviwv xai 
vavaiv äµa eK BaXäc c iic ünö 'Pljyivwv 2to? topxovµEVOt, Kai äXtaKOµEVOu 
6( iCYIV TjSTJ TOÜ 'r£Lxovs, bä TE ßwgAVS OE(iýV KaL lrpÖS 'r& iEp& Ka'a(pE1byoD6tV. 
'AvaýiXaS jEV oüv Tots ME(: Fcn viols 1C(XpEKE%El)ETO Toüs TE iKETEi)OVTac 
ZayKXaiwV ä7[oKTEivEwV KaI Tots X0t7[ovs yvvatýly öµoÜ Kai ICataiv 
6V5panO8ißa66at " Föpyos SE Kai MävTt. Xos napiitoüvTO 'Ava%iXav µij a(päS, 
i)nö 6vyy£vc; ýv ävSpcwv itetrovOö'as ävößta, öµota aütoüs £S ävOpchzcouS 
`EXXilvas äVayxäcat Spähar. µeT& SE ToüTO f Si Toils ZayKXaiov; 
ävi6Ta6av airs TQIV ßwµ(i)v Kai öpxovS SövTE; Kai aüTOI itap EK£ivwv 
51 See above 141 ff. 
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XaßövTaS wxrlßav ä upöispot Kotvlj' övoµa SE Tlj ltöXEt JtE2ýAsaav ME6CY lV11V 
&vt Z6c7KXrls KaXei69at. Taüta SE uni, tins öXDJurtä os ettpä Otl tip; Evä'nl 
xai FHKoa'rfj , 
flv Xiovtq AäKCOV 'th Sgüispov EViKa, MiXTt6C6oiu 7tap"AOilvaiots 
äpxovtcoc. 
Paus. IV. 23.8-10 
As I have said already, the account bears a striking resemblance to Herodotus' account 
of Samian dealings with Zancle, but we may be free to assume that a portion of Messenians 
were resident there following the refoundation, although the details concerning the expulsion of 
the Zancleans seem unlikely. Evidence supporting this idea comes in the mention of a failed 
helot uprising in Messenia around 490/8952, which possibly led to a ready source of refugee- 
colonists following the revolt, just as the Samians were five years earlier. 
AO. Aiaxpw; yovv ilµvvavTO aütov;, w KXEtvia. Tö S' aiaxpöv XEyco of ws 
oü vtx(wvtE; 'YE of TÖTE Kai Kwr& yljv Kai KaTä OäXaTTav Ka%äS vevtKT Kaat 
µäxas " äX Xä6 cprlµt aiaxpöv ToT 8ivat, TöSE U70), 'tö irp6 tov µEv Exeivwv 
'rwv itöXgwv rptwv ovacov µiav imEp tifi 1XX66os äµvvat, Tw U Svo xaxcös 
oürrwS Eivat StECpBapµEVa, ware A gEv Kai AaK£Saiµova 61 EK6)X )EV e1caµvvety 
aüTp, icoXEµoüaa airrj Ka'r& Kpä-roS, i S' av irpwTE4ovaa Ev 'roIS Töle xpövotc 
'roil itspi tiriv StavoJn v 
Pl. Laws 692d 
'EpETptKT v of 6Tpatt(wtat Toi) tätt5os. öö %Äyos, Ei 'C' 61110f c E{TE Kai öiq 
ÖUp1KET0, Toi Te & Xoug "EX; ýivas Kai Sid Kai 'A9rJvaiovs E4Eit? TTSV, Kai 
TtpEaßevojEvolS aüTois lc(XvTaxöae ßorlOeiv oüSeis fjOeXev ICI AV ye 
AaKe6at tovicov' oÜTot 6 i)7U6 TE Toi) irpäg Meacn vijv ÖVTOS tote itoXE11ou 
Kai Ei Stj Tt SteKd)? )sV &X2, o avTOÜS-ob yäp ißµsv X, EyöµevovüaTEpot 6' oüv 
äcpiKovTO 'tu; Ev MapaOwvt µäxtls yevop vtlS µtä ýµ£poc. 
P1. Lmvs 698e 
However, the only source we have for this uprising, the Lmvs of Plato, is problematic. 
While Taylor acknowledges some sort of Spartan-Messenian conflict around the time of 
Marathon (despite the lack of any other evidence), he nevertheless admits that the facts are 
likely to be exaggerated in the Spartans' favour53. Others also recognise the possibility of an 
uprising, but Plato's reputation for poor historical ability is a major problem54. It is still a 
possibility however, especially when considering Anaxilas' own Messenian background55, that 
the refoundation may have been planned as a result of the uprising in the Peloponnese, knowing 
that many Messenians would prefer to flee rather than risk capture or death if the revolt against 
52 Pl. Laws 692d, 698e. 
53 Taylor (1934) 74,81. 
54 England (1921) 18, Wallace (1954) 32. Wallace's recognition of a Messenian uprising is based heavily 
on the evidence concerning Zancle/Messene. 
55 Thuc. IV. 6.4. 
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the Spartans were to fail. A comparison with the Cale Acte enterprise of Hippocrates is 
therefore quite easily made, and if a second wave of Messenian immigrants were to come to 
Sicily after the fall of Ithome in 46056, this would certainly make their contingent one of the 
largest in Sicilian Messene, and could therefore be the reason for the Doricisation of the name, 
with local coinage now bearing MEEEANION as opposed to MEEEENION57. No other 
participants in the colony are mentioned by our sources, but we should not think that Messana 
consisted solely of Messenians, old Zancleans and possibly other Chalcidians. It does seem 
clear though that the objective of gaining control over the straits of Messina worked, as not only 
is this attested in numismatic evidence, in particular the appearance of the mule-cart, celebrating 
Anaxilas' victory at Olympia in 480 on (Sicilian) Messenian coinage, but also in the fact that the 
renaming from Messana back to Zancle occurred soon after the end of the Anaxilaid dynasty58. 
As I noted earlier, the heterogeneity at Messana may have helped validate Anaxilas' 
population changes as a true colony, as would the change of name. But the most important 
information we need concerning this question is whether there had existed a sort of hero-cult 
after the tyrant's death. The period between Anaxilas' death in 476 and the end of the Anaxilaid 
dynasty in 461 would have been more than enough time to organise a cult, but again no such 
thing is recorded in our sources. The problem with finding evidence of a founder cult where the 
hero celebrated is a tyrant, is that following the fall of the tyranny the cult would immediately be 
discontinued, and evidence of it erased59. Acts such as digging up bones of a tyrant and moving 
them elsewhere are common and sometimes recorded, but in this case we simply have no 
information 60 
. 
The refoundation of Zancle by Anaxilas is also significant for another reason that has 
hardly been recognised, probably in part due to the prominence of the earlier Samian episode, 
but mostly because it provides an example of a rare phenomenon realised only in 1991. An 
article by A. J. Graham published that year examined a public inscription found in Teos in Asia 
56 Thuc. I. 103. 
57 Dunbabin (1948) 398-9. 
58 Diod. Sic. XI. 76.5. 
59 See McGlew (1993) 24,132,182, also see chapters 1 and 5. 
60 The remains of both Hieron and the Cypselids of Corinth seem to have suffered exhumation, Strabo 
6.2.3. See also McGlew (1993) ch. 1 and 4. 
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Minor, which had clarified an obscure sentence in Pindar's Second Paean61. To be brief, it was 
then understood to refer to the refoundation of Teos by Abdera, which itself was a Teian colony. 
Graham names more possible examples of a colony re-settling its mother city, at Miletus and 
Eretria after the Persian Wars (while admitting there was no evidence, they are put forward as 
possibilities) and at Sybaris in the fifth century, this time with evidence too doubtful to be 
certain62. In the case of Zancle, we seem to have enough evidence to support the idea of a 
refoundation, it is named as such by Thucydides, and the change of name from Zancle to 
Messana is certain, as is the almost complete change in population. In Strabo we have an 
account of the foundation of Rhegium, and there we find that the founder (and therefore the 
mother-city) was Zanclean63. This is disputable, for there are other possible founders named in 
other sources, but according to Malkin, the most widely recognised is Antimnestos of Zancle64. 
I will not discuss further the question of Rhegium's founder, but I do think that Anaxilas' 
refoundation of Zancle has a strong case for being another example of a refoundation of a 
mother-city. 
The refoundation of Zancle certainly differs from that of Camarina in many respects, for 
instance the change of name seems to introduce a personal aspect to the affair, but on the whole 
we still seem to be dealing with a reinforcement, especially when considering the lack of a 
founder-cult or other efforts to identify Messana as a different city from Zancle. However it is 
in the next case, the refoundation of Catana by Hieron, that we encounter just that. 
Catana/Aetna 
The refoundation of Catana by Hieron in 476 BC is by far the best known case of its 
kind, and for many reasons. The first reason is the coverage given by the poet Pindar, 
particularly in his first Pythian Ode celebrating Hieron's victory in the chariot race in Delphi in 
470, a poem which has been the subject of much discussion. In addition we have fragments of 
the lost Aitnaiai of Aeschylus, and the poems of Bacchylides and Simonides, all three of whom 
had visited Sicily at some point during Hieron's rule in Syracuse. Another important source is 
61 Graham (1991) 176-8, see Graham (1992) 44-73 for a fuller report. 
62 Graham (1992) 69-70. 
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the coinage minted in celebration of Aetna's foundation, which is of great value not only 
because of the high quality often associated with Greek-Sicilian coinage, but also because it 
seems to have been a favoured medium for propaganda purposes. There is also the sheer scale 
of the operation, not only in the number of colonists and the size of the land allotments, but also 
in the numbers shifted to Leontini. Finally there is the seemingly complete lack of scruples 
displayed by the tyrant himself, not only concerning the displaced populations, but also the 
Leontines who were made to suffer severe overpopulation in their city in the name of Hieron's 
agenda of self-advancement. 
This episode has, as I have already mentioned, received much attention from scholars, 
but much of what has been written has concentrated mainly on the propaganda produced to 
legitimise the foundation65. The issue of the city's (and its founder's) promotion will also be 
examined, but for the first part we will concentrate on the events of the foundation itself, in a 
similar manner to the earlier examples discussed above. The fullest account of the foundation 
we have in the sources is that of Diodorus Siculus. 
`IEpcov SE 'roils T£ Naýiovs xai 'robs Ka'ravaious eK Twv ir6?, ECov ävac f aas, 
i6iOVS OLKTjTOpas 6CitE6TEtX£V, EK l. l£V II£XO TOVVhCYOV 7CEVTaK16x1Ä, tOVS 
äOpOiaaS, EK S£ E'OpaKOlX &V xol) TO TOÜTOt15 1tp000Eis Kal tiiv HIEV 
Ka'rävnv µctwv6µa6£v AtTvrly,, chv a xc pav ob µövov Tijv KaTavaiav, 
äß, Xä Kai itoX? v tiij; öµöpov 7tpoßO£is KaTEK? povxtlß£, µvpiovs trXiip6)aa5 
of topaq.... Toils SE Nai; iouq xai Toi; KaTavaiovs iK Twv itatpi&Dv 
6LVa6T(XOEVTaS [L£T( K16EV Eig 'Toi )q Kal ltcth TG)v £y o piwv 
7tpoc taýE KaTOUK£LV Týv nAty. 
Diod. Sic. XI. 49.1-2 
There seems to be no episode preceding the events at Catana mentioned by Diodorus to 
prepare us for Hieron's actions, making the refoundation seem far more sudden and unplanned 
that it must have been in reality. Although the frequent movement of focus from one part of the 
Mediterranean to another which is found in Diodorus' history can sometimes make events seem 
more spontaneous than they actually are, there is no real switch of location here from the 
preceding episode, where we hear of Hieron's dealings with Theron immediately beforehand. 
This need not necessarily represent a change in the source used but rather a typical example of 
how episodic Diodorus' Bibliotheke can be. The account given tells us that after expelling the 
63 Strabo VI. 257. 
64 Malkin (1987) 31-41. 
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Catanaeans and Naxians from their land and moving them to Leontini, Hieron replaced them 
with 5,000 settlers from the Peloponnese and the same number of Syracusans. We also hear that 
land outside Catana was included into the new settlement, and divided equally between the 
settlers. The reasons given for this act were that Hieron might have a force ready if he needed 
it, and also to receive honours after death, as founder both in name and duties carried out. 
There are many points open for discussion here, even before we look at Pindar's first 
Pythian Ode, and it seems appropriate to start with the expulsion of the inhabitants of Catana 
and Naxos. The first thing that strikes one when reading the passage is that their movement is 
clearly forced, as is their settlement at Leontini. There seems to be little or no regard for the 
welfare of the Catanaeans or indeed the Leontines, or even concern that such a move would 
cause great unrest and resentment that could lead to an Ionian uprising dangerously close to the 
capital at Syracuse. We can guess that Hieron must have felt comfortable enough despite this, 
and that Leontini's close proximity to the capital ensured easy control, otherwise he surely 
would not have made the move in the first place. There is no evidence indicating an Ionian 
uprising during this time. We will look further into the Ionian question when we consider 
Hieron's motives, along with the inhabitants of Aetna itself, but it is also noticeable that those 
who joined in the enterprise, or at least their origin, were picked by Hieron himself. This is in 
conflict with the view that the leaders of colonial enterprises allowed a more heterogenous 
settlement to develop than one would expect to find in Greece itself, because participation was 
open to all (or at least most) Greeks66, whereas in this case we find in Diodorus that the 
population was deliberately split between Syracusans and Peloponnesians. We are given a little 
more detail in a scholion to Pindar's first Pythian Ode, where we find that there were also 
settlers from Gela and Megara Hyblaeab7. It is possible that many of these were Geloans or 
Megarians who had already been moved to Syracuse under Gelon, especially when one realises 
that Megara had apparently been completely depopulated in 483, according to Herodotus68. In 
addition to this, the identity of the 5,000 Peloponnesians must also be put into question, 
especially in consideration of the strong military motive behind the enterprise. The invitation of 
65 Dougherty (1993) 83-98; also see the following chapter on propaganda and self-presentation, 181 ff. 
66 See above, 144ff. 
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settlers from the Peloponnese has become a familiar theme in this chapter, and once again 
thoughts turn to the probability that the settlers at Aetna were intended as mercenaries, being 
rewarded with plots of land in the rich Eastern plain. The benefits of such an arrangement have 
already been discussed, both in the section on Camarina and the previous chapter on 
mercenaries69. We have already found, when discussing Camarina, that a large number of 
Arcadian mercenaries in particular were to be found on the island70, and if this is again the case 
with Hieron's own forces, then the presence of Arcadians (i. e. non-Dorians) in this new city 
would therefore indicate a more heterogenous city than that which Diodorus describes, a factor 
which we will consider again when we look at Pindar and his attempts to glorify Aetna. 
Following the events at Himera in 480, where the Carthaginians and their allies 
(including Anaxilas of Rhegium, amongst others) were heavily defeated, terms were made 
which effectively ruled the Carthaginians out as a threat to the Deinomenid dynasty, or indeed to 
anyone in Sicily until much later on in the century. 
tapaysvoµs vcov yäp icp6q aüT6v Eic Tij Kapxrl36voc 'rCov änF-ßtaXgEvcov 
itp£ß3Ewv xai µ£'rä Saxpücov SEo t vwv 6CvOpwnivco5 avtoIS XpýßauOat, 
6uvsx(bpnß8 'Env Eipnvnv, E1tp6ci; a co SE lEap' avT66v T6 cg c6v TC6xEµov 
yEyev p vaq 6an6cva;, äpyupiov StßxiXta T&Xavra, Kai Svo vaoiu 
npoa rai; EV oiKo6oµi16at, Ka9' oüs ESEL T&S 6vv8rlxac, 6CvaT£6ývat. 
Diod. Sic. XI. 26.2 
This would have seriously undermined the strength of the tyranny at Rhegium; in 
particular, it would have been particularly difficult to maintain a hold on Messana, the 
importance of which we have already discussed. 476 was also the year of Anaxilas' death, and 
whether he was already gone, or was ailing, this would also have had a huge impact on the 
stability of the dynasty. It is after considering these events that we find the importance of direct 
control over the territory of Naxos 71. Removing Naxos would clear the way for the advance 
north to Messana, and perhaps also provide a friendly harbour from which to attack72, just as he 
would have used Aetna as an infantry base. The consideration of Naxos' depopulation will be 
discussed further later in this chapter. 
67 Schol. Pind. Pyth 1.62 (120)b. 
68 Hdt. VI1.156. 
69 See above, 143. 
70 CAH VI 150, also Guarducci (1953), (1959-60). 
71 See the foreign policy chapter above, 72ff.. 
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The reasons for the refoundation of Catana are, fortunately, spelt out very clearly by 
Diodorus. 
Tonto S' £npcx c cmelb8cov äµa µev Exety ßo1 Ostav EToiµijv 6c4t6Xoyov npös 
, r& Entovßas xpcias, äµa ft xa't ýK 'tu ; ysvol tvrl; µvpt6cv6pou ir6Xccos 
Ttµäs i etv hpcwtxäS. 
Diod. Sic. XI. 49.2 
The first reason, to provide a base for loyal soldiers who could be used for campaigning, 
or in the event of attack against Syracuse, while the second reason is that Hieron founded Aetna 
as a means of being remembered as a hero after his death73. We can also examine the question 
of why Hieron chose Catana as the site of his new settlement in the first place, rather than, for 
example, Leontini or Gela, for it does seem that Messana would almost certainly have been 
Hieron's ultimate target for expansion, and Catana, being far closer to Messana, would be an 
obvious place from which to base an attack74. 
As for the second motive, this is the first case of refoundation in Sicily where we have 
evidence, and abundant evidence at that, of personal ambition playing a primary role. Much of 
the evidence we have comes in the form of propaganda, which we shall look at in the'next 
chapter, but if we are to stay with the historical account of Diodorus for the moment, we find 
some evidence of Hieron's success in establishing his own hero-cult. In the account of the 
tyrant's death in 467, Diodorus informs us that Hieron was indeed accorded a cult as founder of 
the city: 
Is paov S' 6 Twv E1)paxo6iwv ßarnXci S ETEXsin Ev Ev 'rf Kathvp, Kai tiiµwv 
lipwtKwv ETUxsv, wS &v KTi(Tt fl 'Eyovd) Tý; 1t6XEws. o rros hay oüv äpýas 
ET11 evöexa Kat UtC Ti V ßaßtX. siav Opa61)ßoüXc, r4 äöEX pi, 8; ijp?; E 
Evpaxoaiwv Evtavtöv Eva. 
Diod. Sic. XI. 66.4 
It is implied in Diodorus' account that Aetna continued to exist in the historian's own 
time, i. e. the first century BC. We find that the city of Aetna is actually relocated to Inessa 
following the original Catanaeans' seizure of their homeland, and given the continuation of 
Aetna's name and identity up until Diodorus' time, it also seems possible that Hieron was still 
72 See earlier chapter on foreign policy for Hieron's ambitions for Messana, 72ff.; and also for the 
potential uses of the harbour at Naxos. 
" These military motives have already been discussed in the foreign policy chapter above, 72ff. 
74 See chapter two, 73ff. on Catana's ideal site for a military base. 
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remembered as its founder four hundred years later75. In Aetna's case it seems that the identity 
of the polis was more fixed upon the citizens themselves, and on its founder, rather than the 
geographical location of the city, perhaps not surprising considering Aetna was, quite simply, 
Catana with a fresh population make-up. 
Ö(jla SE TOVTOI; 1[pwrto EVOLS LOVKETLOS IIEV 6 T(ÄV ELKE? 6V TiygicbV, xa?, £nw5 
Ex(ov Tolg ti v K(xthviiv otKobat St& 'r vÖ (palpEcnv cf q TG)v ELKE%G v x(ilpas, 
E6TpÖCTEWYEV E1C at)TOVS. 6gOi(OG SE K(A TCOV EI)paKOai(oV 6TpaT£v66CVT(AV E7t 
Thv KaTäviiv, oüTOt JEV Kotvp KaTEKX11povx1ßav Thv xwpav Kai Tob 
KatotK16eEVTas 'Ü(p "IEpcovos Toi Suvky cou EiroX£j10uv - ÖCVTLTaxOEvt(ov 6E T()V 
£V Tf Kathv im! ? cupOEvto v li%£Loat }t6) at;, o itot ft vE E1CE60V EK TTIS 
KaTävijc, Kal. Tv viv o'uc av Aitvily EKtiaavto, 1Cp6 ToiTOV KaXoujthv jv 
"Ivi aav, of S' E4 äpxýs EK rr G KaTävrjs 6vtCs 6KOµiaaV2o noXXw xpövcp 
, Chv natpIöa. 
Diod. Sic. XI. 76.3 
There is no evidence to the contrary, but the survival of the tyrant's cult is subject to the 
same dangers as any other founder cult, i. e. dominated by the fickle political interests of anyone 
who happened to control the city at any given time. It is not unheard of for a city's founder to 
be replaced by another because circumstances demand it, probably the main reason for the 
existence of several different foundation legends in the cases of several cities for example 
Rhegium76, or even in an attempt by another city to establish a claim on the city in question. 
Any problems which a ruler of Aetna may have had with the identity of the founder would have 
been magnified by this particular founder's other role as tyrant. 
Hieron seems to have played a very active role in the refoundation of Catana, if the 
account given by Diodorus is true. Here we find Hieron taking complete control over affairs in 
the new city: in addition to the choice of colonists mentioned above, the tyrant also chooses the 
new name for the settlement, and perhaps more importantly, it is Hieron who we find dividing 
and distributing the land equally amongst the 10,000 settlers77. We would normally expect such 
duties as this to be passed on to a subordinate, perhaps even the new king of Aetna, 
Deinomenes, but Hieron, realising the significance of land distribution in foundation legend, 
75 There is no evidence that the relocation of the city of Aetna to the site of Inessa had any impact on 
Hieron's hero cult, as may be expected. Although it is not mentioned by Diodorus, Hieron was likely to 
have been buried in the Aetnaean/Catanaean agora as `founder' of Aetna, so there is a problem regarding 
the Catanaeans return to their home city in 461 BC and, in particular, the fate of Hieron's remains 
afterwards. It is not inconceivable that the remains were exhumed and shifted, along with the city itself, 
to Inessa, but there is simply no evidence to affirm the idea. It is highly unlikely that the bones of Hieron 
remained in the Catanaean agora, a burial spot reserved for the founder alone. 
76 Malkin (1987) 31-41. 
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chose to take responsibility himself. In order to be remembered as the founder of the new city, 
the tyrant needed to carry out the necessary duties (including land distribution) so as to fulfil this 
role, otherwise it could be argued that he was not the founder at all, but simply the leader of the 
mother-city. The identity of the founder could easily become challenged, especially for political 
reasons78. Difficulties were often realised where more than one figure is given responsibility 
according to the foundation legend, or even where there is more than one founder mentioned, for 
example in the legends of Gela or Camarina79. So by taking an active role as founder, in 
combination with his position as tyrant of Syracuse, Hieron made his position virtually 
indisputable. It is difficult to imagine Hieron's identity as founder being seriously challenged 
considering the wealth of propaganda material that has survived even to our own time. 
Pindar's first Pythian Ode is the other major piece of evidence used in discussion of 
Hieron's Aetna, and seems to be the favoured source of many who have dealt with the subject in 
recent times. In fact, this ode is also a favourite of those studying Pindar and epinician poetry in 
general, since the occasion of victory celebration in Sicily, along with the grand descriptions of 
Mount Etna, the new city of Aetna, and of course its founder, make this poem one of Pindar's 
finest. Firstly we must continue examining the nature of the foundation itself, along with that of 
the city, in consideration of this poetic evidence in addition to Diodorus' history, for even aside 
from the propagandistic aspects which dominate the poem, there is much factual information to 
be gained from the city's description. 
Probably the most useful passage in this ode starts with the mention of the new king 
Deinomenes, Hieron's son, continuing down to the references to Himera and Cumae in the 
context of a prayer to Zeus. 
Moißa, Kai the A£tvoJEV£t K£Xatijßat 
1tIA£6 got notväv T£9pinncov 
xäpµa S' ovK äXXötptov vtKwpopia itaT£po5. 
äy' E1t£ur AiTvas ßaßtXCt c iXtov £4£vptoµ£v ü Lvov 
Tw iöXty K£Ivav A£oS tä rq 6vv eX£v8£pia 
`YXXIöos aTäoµas `Mpwv Ev vöµots E- 
KTtaaE " OE? ovit SE IIaµcplAov 
Kai. µäv 'HpaK%£t8dXV EKYOVOt 
öxOatq vzto Taiiygtou vaiovtcS ai- 
" Diod. Sic. X1.49.1. 
78 McGlew (1993) 20-2. 
79 Thuc. VI. 5.3. 
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d µEVEty TmOgoliaty Ev Aiytµtoü 
Awpteis. £axov S"AJr KXaS Ö%ßtot 
rltv8688v öpviJEVOt, XsuxolttXcOV 
Tvv&apt6äv P(Ab8ol; ot 
yEitOVcs, wV KXEOS äv9gacv aixµäs. 
Zeü TEXei, atc 8E iotaütav 'Aj va ltap' &Swp 
aiaav & TO-ts Kai (3aatX. eüaty 8taxpi- 
vaty gv%tov ), öyov ävOpwtwv. 
aüv tot 2iv KEV äyritiip ävtjp, 
viw c' s ntteXX6gEVOs, Säµov yEpai- 
pwv rp6mot aüµcpwvov ES fjavxiav. 
Maaoµat vEvaov, Kpoviwv, fjµspov 
Ö(ppa Kati oixov ö (Doivtý ö Tvpaa 
vwv ti 6Xa?, a c6G Exil, vav- 
aiaTovov üßpty i&wv Täv itpö Kvµag, 
oia Evpaxoai wv äpxw SaµaaOEVTES 7t&Oov, 
tKVnöpcnv äno vawv o acpty iv itöv- 
Tw 136C7E9' äXtxiav, 
`Ek?, ' ýZ E? i wv ßapEias Sou? iag. 
Pind. Pyth. 1.58-75 
The reference to Deinomenes is significant as it raises questions concerning the 
constitution at Aetna, the position of Hieron in relation to Deinomenes, and the existence of 
kingship in Greek colonies. The strangeness of this reference to Deinomenes as (3aatXe1bs is 
that it is extremely rare to find a Greek colony ruled by a king (the Battiads of Cyrene being the 
only obvious example), especially in Sicily, where oligarchies and tyrannies dominate. The 
Deinomenid tyrants themselves never seemed to have used the title of king; in fact, in instances 
where one would expect the tyrants to tell others of their position, they decline to do so, simply 
naming themselves along with their city, for example Hieron's dedications to Olympia 
80 following his successful expedition to Cumae. 
`Iäpwv ö Ostv%tEwos 
Kai. Toi Evpax66lot 
, rin Di Tuppavwv ätrö Küµas. 
Meiggs and Lewis 29, SEG xxxiii 328 (Olympia V 249.3) 
While this appearance of ßactXgü; is a surprise in itself, it is the consequences of 
Pindar's mention of kingship at Aetna that make it even more interesting. For example, the first 
thing that strikes one when reading the first Pythian Ode is that it is addressed to `Hieron of 
Aetna', and since Deinomenes is king of that city, logically Hieron himself would become his 
own son's subject. It is of course ludicrous to come to this conclusion; there is simply no way 
that Hieron, as tyrant of Syracuse which rules over Aetna, would regard himself as subject to his 
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own son. There are two points to be made here, firstly that the name `Hieron of Aetna' would 
be another example of the interchangeability of Greek identity (originally Geloan, then 
Syracusan and Aetnaean at the same time), as is the earlier reference to Praxiteles the Arcadian 
mercenary (Mantinean, Syracusan and Camarinaean)81.. Secondly, and more importantly 
concerning the question of the Aetnaean constitution, it is quite obvious that Deinomenes would 
have been the second-in-command in the city and his father would have exercised real control, 
with Aetna still coming under the control of the Syracusan empire. 
There is in fact a hint in the poem that suggests a more familiar arrangement - that 
Deinomenes was one of the sub-tyrants installed to govern a city in the large Syracusan 
empire82. Here we find that Hieron is named as the `ruler who instructs his son' (6vv 'rot riv 
xev äyrttfp ävnp, ui c' E1n2EXX6µsvoq) perhaps letting it slip that Hieron enjoys real control 
over Aetna whereas Deinomenes is still learning for the future. This system is certainly not 
strange; for example, after Gelon shifted the centre of power from Gela to Syracuse, Hieron 
(Gelon's brother) was put in charge of the old capital, under Gelon's supervision, whereas 
Thrasybulus (a younger brother, Hieron's successor) took over at Gela after Hieron's accession 
to the tyranny. We have also seen non-family members installed, for example Scythes at 
Zancle. In the light of these examples, it seems likely that although Deinomenes' official title is 
`king', a more accurate description would be `sub-tyrant'. It seems appropriate at this point to 
refer back to a point made concerning the nature of colonial enterprises83, in particular the form 
of government employed in the new settlement, and the influence of the mother city's own 
constitution and involvement in the enterprise. As in cases where the colonies are founded on 
the order of tyrants, in particular those set up by the Cypselids and Peisistratids, the influence of 
the tyrant is very strong, setting up family members as leaders and with the colony's loyalty 
intended to remain with the tyrant. In other words they are examples of imperial colonies, with 
the aim of extending the tyrant's authority overseas or, in this case, overland. The case of 
Aetna, apart from the fact that Hieron himself acted as founder, is almost exactly the same. 
80 Diod. Sic. XI. 51.1-2; see also chapter five on propaganda, 188-9ff. 
S' Olympia, V, 389 if., Pace (1927) 41, also see above 1434ff. 
82 Pind. Pyth. 1.69-70. 
83 See above, 137 (Graham (1964) 29-39). 
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Although Catana was already under Syracusan control, a new government was formed at the 
new settlement that could easily, and ultimately, be controlled by Hieron himself. 
Another useful section of the first Pythian Ode is sandwiched between the two that have 
been considered above, and concerns in particular the theme of Doricisation in that part of 
Sicily84. This is a theme that has been of interest to many historians considering this period of 
history on the island, particularly AsheriSS. The reason for this is not only the celebration of the 
Doricisation of Catana in Pindar, but also the concentration of the Chalcidians of Catana and 
Naxos together with those of Leontini, which made that city the only one in the Syracusan 
empire with a significant (or perhaps any) Ionian population. The emphasis on Doricisation in 
these few lines of Pindar makes it clear that the refoundation was meant to be seen as a 
statement of Dorian supremacy and right to rule in Sicily, carried over from mainland Greece to 
the Greek West86. However, it is misleading to presume that the move was fired by nothing but 
discrimination, for Pindar also gives very clear reasons for the Dorians' right to control in Sicily, 
this being the precedent set by the Heraclids. The presence of the Dorians in Greece, 
particularly the Peloponnese, is explained in Greek legend as being the result of conquest, as the 
Dorians were the vehicle by which the sons of Heracles - the Heraclidae - exercised their divine 
right to rule, inherited from their heroic ancestor. This was the right the kings at Sparta used to 
legitimise their own rule, as members of that family. Burton takes the view that the new 
foundation by Hieron was seen by the poet as `a fresh outpost of the Dorian way of life'87, and 
this view is endorsed by Dougherty, although she sees it in the wider context of Greek order 
over barbarianism. It is with discussion of ancestral rights to rule in Sicily that we now find 
ourselves focussing on propaganda produced after the foundation itself, in particular that 
contained within the first Pythian Ode. 
This passage in the First Pythian Ode seems to imply that while the Heraclidae had 
enjoyed great success in Greece itself, the same work had to be carried out in Sicily. It is 
therefore thought by Dougherty to mean that Hieron had inherited responsibility from the 
Heraclids, thus Hieron was obliged to refound Catana, since it was his duty as a Dorian to do so. 
84 Pind. Pyth. 1.62-6. 
85 Asheri (1988) 150-2. 
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By founding Aetna `under the laws of Hyllos' rule'88, the tyrant was continuing the tradition by 
building a major new Doric centre, and the installation of Deinomenes as king (under the rights 
of the Heraclids) may be seen to imitate the ways of another great Doric kingdom - Sparta. The 
Heraclid right to rule in Sicily was not a new or original idea of Hieron; in Herodotus we find a 
mention of Dorieus, the Spartan prince who, disgusted with his half-brother Cleomenes' 
accession to the throne, departs to Sicily in order to found a city on Mt. Eryx, which Heracles 
had visited in his travels89. The attempt failed, but we hear about Dorieus again through Gelon's 
reply to the Greek embassy, shortly before the Persian invasion90. 
It seems that this ode of Pindar was composed to confirm the divine backing necessary 
for continued prosperity at Aetna, and this is revealed to us through the poet's mention of sailors 
taking a fair breeze as a good omen: 
vavaupopI tots S' ävöpäat nptTa xäpts 
£S it ov äpxotEvots itopitaiov EXOEIv 
ovpov"£otKk(X yäp 
Kai Tc? einä ycptepov vöaTov n XFiv, ö SE Mpg 
Taü2ats Ern avvTUxiatc 66av cp£pst 
Xotnöv £aasaOat aTECpävotai v<tv> iirrcot5 Te x?, uTäv 
Kai aüv ei pchvots Oaa, iatq övvµacTäv. 
Pind. Pyth. 1.33-8 
The announcement of Hieron's victory at Delphi, and in particular, of the city of Aetna, 
could be interpreted in a similar manner. Although Apollo is not mentioned here, it may have 
been considered crucial to gain his support in particular. The significance of Apollo's role in 
city foundation is clear enough as we have seen, despite the doubtfulness surrounding the 
necessity of visiting his oracle, through the cult of Apollo Archegetes at Naxos, a unifying cult 
for all Greeks in Sicily. It seems quite appropriate therefore, that the occasion of the 
announcement of Aetna's foundation should have been the Pythian Games in honour of Apollo, 
a stroke of luck which certainly would not have done any harm to Hieron's cause, or indeed to 
that of the city, but whether or not it was a pre-planned propaganda exercise remains to be seen. 
86 See Dougherty (1993) 93ff., also Kirsten (1941) 58-71. 
g' Burton (1962) 91. 
88 Pind. Pyth. 1.62. 
9 Hdt. V. 43. On Dorieus in Sicily, see Malkin (1994) 203-18. 
90 Hdt. VI1.158. 
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Although the First Pythian Ode is certainly the grandest piece of propaganda that has 
survived to us, it is not the only celebratory literature we know existed at the time. Aeschylus 
was another poet we know spent time in Sicily at this time, and we know from surviving 
fragments that he composed a tragedy called the Ailnaiai91,. apparently intended as an omen of 
good luck. According to Macrobius92, the play is about the rape of Thalia, a young Sicilian girl, 
by Zeus. The pregnant Thalia is hidden underground until she later appears holding her twin 
sons, known as the Palici. The Palici were native Sicilian gods, whose ancient cult was placed 
near the hot springs of Mt. Etna93, and by incorporating the Palici into Greek myth, Aeschylus is 
said by Dougherty to be legitimising Greek presence in Sicily94. This was done by showing 
Greek presence on the island to be continuous since the birth of the Palici in a bygone age. The 
emergence of the Palici from underground is then said to be foretelling the reappearance of the 
Greeks at Mt. Etna later on - in particular the foundation of the city that bore the volcano's 
name. In the First Pythian Ode, Pindar seems to take Aeschylus' ideas one step further. Instead 
of portraying the foundation of Aetna simply as a symbol of Greek precedence over barbarian 
land, we are given the image of Zeus' victory over Typhon, in other words the foundation of 
Aetna, supported by Zeus, has not only defeated the barbarians but the forces of chaos 
associated with them, through Typhon95: 
öaaa S£ µtß teCpiki e Zei s, äti ovtat ßoäv 
IIhEpi&cov äiovTa, y&V is Kai itöv- 
Tov KaT äµatRäKeTOV, 
öS i ev aiv& TapTäp(p xEirrat, Otwv icoX ttoq, 
Tvpchs EKaTOVTaxäpaVO " Töv ltoTE 
KtXiKtov OpEyisv lco?, vwvvµov ävTpov " vvv 'ye µäv 
Tai 6' vnEp Küµas äXtepKEeS ÖXAat 
YUKEMa 'i aüTOÜ MtE Et 
cTEpva A, axväEvTa " xüwv S' oüpavia ßuvE et, 
vtcp6&6d Ai tva, täveteS xt6vo5 öýeias TtOýva 
Täs EpEÜyov'rat tEv utX not n pös äyvö'ra'rat 
k µvxwv itayai " 1totaµoi S' äj tpat6ty 
µ&v zrpox£ovit pöov Kanvov 
ai0wv' " äX? ' Ev öpcpvataty ttETpas 
(pOiVta a KuXtv6oµgva cpk6 ES ßaBEi- 
av cpEpet 1t6v'rou nXäxa 6üv naTäycp. 
KEivo S"AcpaißTOto Kpouvoüs EpncTÖv 
91 Aeschylus fr. 24-33 (Mette); fr. 6-10 (Radt). 
92 Aesch. fr. 27a (Mette). 
93 Diod. Sic. XI. 89. 
94 Dougherty (1993) 89-90. 
95 Dougherty (1993) 93-4. 
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S£tvoTäTOVs ävanEpmt " TEpag ji v 
Oavµäßtov irpoatSEaOat, 
8avµa SE Kai tap£övTwv äxov6at, 
oiov Aitvas EV µEXaµcpvXXotS SES£Tat KopucpatS 
Kai t£Sw, 6Tpwµv6c SE xapäß6o1d äit(Xv V&)- 
TOV 7tOTLK£KXLFLEVOV KEVTEI. 
Pind. Pyth. 1.13-28 
In addition to literary celebrations, which include a fragment of Pindar's which links 
founders to civilisation and everlasting fame, while also providing a pun on Hieron's own name: 
IEPS2NI 
Evves ö Tot X£70), 
ýaOewv iEpwv £ltwvvgc 
ztä'rEp, K'Cl6'Cop AL'CvaS 
vojth eßat yäp Ev ExvOats ä?, &Tat atpa2wv, 
bg äµa?; ocpöprl rov oixov oü it itaTat, 
äKXEn; <S'> 9ßa. 
Pind. fr. 105ab (Snell) 
and another of Simonides which again refers to Greek control of Etna96: 
h S£ AiTVrj EtKa? Aas Epos än6 Ai'rv ; Tic Oüpavoü Kai r'fjs, ci cprißty 
'A%. Kt[to; Ev 'rth 7LEpl EtKEÄ, las. Eigowi8i1; SE A'ttvljv (plj(A KpLVat 
"HcpatßTOV Kai Otj t tpav REP! This xciipac £piaavTas. 
sch. Theocr. i 65-6 (Simonides PMG fr. 552) 
the coinage of Aetna also contains many clues into how Hieron chose to promote his 
new city. Once again it is Dougherty who provides the most insight into this particular medium 
used by the tyrant. The first point that must be made even before we consider the coinage itself, 
is the effectiveness in using coinage to convey a message. Of all the media used for propaganda 
purposes, coinage is perhaps the most effective, for it is used by all citizens, every day, 
especially in view of the common opinion held that the issue of ancient coinage was of at least 
as much political importance as economic. The coin in question, a silver Attic standard 
tetradrachm (a higher denomination that may not have been accessible to everybody)97, displays 
on its reverse the enthroned Zeus with a perched eagle - in other words a visual form of Pindar's 
description of the god in his First Pythian Ode. 
96 Pind. fr. 105a, b; Simonides - Pb1G fr. 552. 9' Head (1911) 114-5, Hill (1906) 43-5. The Attic weight standard was universal amongst the Greek cities 
of Sicily from around the mid-sixth century until well into the Classical Period, see Head (1911) 115ff. 
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Figure 6- Zeus Aetnaeus. Si. ver, , tic (Reverse), c. 476-61 C. Brussels, Coin Cabinet of the Royai' J 
, _r . Copied ugherty (1993) 87. 
iI a" e5 
° (1993) 
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xai Töv aix taTäv KEpavvöv 6j3EVV1Ets 
aieväov nupös. 656Et S' ävä c Kä- 
nTw Otös aiE'rös, wxEi- 
av IETEpvy' äµcpoTEpcwOEv xaXäýats, 
äpxöc 01COv6)v, KEXatvwnty S' Eni of vE#Xav 
äyxvXw KpaTi, ya, £cpäpwv ä6ü KXät- 
Opov, xaTExgvac" ö SE Kv6)ß6cov 
üypöv vw rov aicopsi, TEaIS 
ptnaißt KaraaxötEVOS. 
Pind. Pyth. 1.5-10 
Dougherty notes that the artist's aim must therefore be the same, the message is of 
kingship, sovereignty and absolute power98, and this is reinforced when other details are taken 
into account, such as the staff and thunderbolt held by the god, and the name AITNAIOE, an 
epithet of Zeus, the patron deity of Aetna. Other details point to local Sicilian characteristics, 
such as the scarab and Silenus on the obverse99, and while Dougherty includes these in the 
Pindaric theme, there does also seem to be a connection with Aeschylus' preference for 
Hellenising the native Sicilian features and incorporating them into the Greek world. Finally, 
continuing with the visual material we have, there is a neck amphora from Paestum, now lost, 
but dated to 330-10 BC, which portrays the rape of Thalia - possibly a scene from the 
Aitnaiai10°. Here we have a scene similar to that of the play, in that Zeus takes Thalia for 
himself just as Hieron takes the land at Aetna. This is also indicative of the strong political and 
cultural influence of Sicily in Italy1°'. 
As I said earlier, the inclusion of Naxos in Hieron's plans may seem a fairly minor 
detail at first, but I feel it is possible that it may have played a part not only in Hieron's military 
and ethnic policies, but could also legitimate the Syracusans' (and more precisely, his own) 
claim to Greek Sicily. Naxos enjoyed a fairly privileged position as the oldest Greek colony in 
Sicily, and with this position firmly established in the minds of the Greek Sicilians, the positions 
of the next oldest colonies were often disputed, particularly between Syracuse and the 
Naxian/Chalcidian sub-colonies of Catana and Leontini. However, it is worth noting that if 
Naxos' existence was ever to be discontinued, then the next oldest colony could make a 
98 Dougherty (1993) 86. 
99 The scarabs in the region of Mt. Etna were of enormous size (sch. Ar. Peace 73) and Silenus also 
appears in earlier Catanaean coinage, see Head (1911) 131, probably because of his links with Dionysus, 
who is also a common occurrence on the Greek coinage of Sicily, e. g. in nearby Naxos - Head (1911) 
159-61. 
100 Kossatz-Deissmann (1978) 36. 
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legitimate claim to precedence on the island. It is possible that Hieron had this in mind, 
although there is no mention of such a motive in our sources, or any indicators, such as a move 
of the cult of Apollo Archegetes to Syracuse. 
One question that may be asked in consideration of this evidence, is whether Hieron did 
entertain the ideas of Doricisation or of Greek order in foreign lands in his mind at the time of 
the refoundation of Catana. Of course, there is no sure way of determining the truth behind 
Hieron's actions, and as has been pointed out by Malkin, the account of Diodorus shows the 
event from the point of view of those around him, rather than Hieron's own102. His self- 
aggrandisement, especially considering his position of trying to emulate his popular brother, 
certainly does seem to imply that he may have considered the Doricisation of his empire. 
However, there are cases to be made against the idea that Hieron had Doricisation or even 
Hellenisation in mind. The existence of non-Dorian mercenaries from Arcadia (as mentioned 
earlier) certainly does not support the idea that Hieron was trying to build a great new Doric 
centre, and on the point of Hellenisation it is also the case that Catana was already a Greek city, 
not a Sicel one. However these may not have been of enough importance as to prevent Hieron 
from gaining as much propaganda material as possible from this episode. 
Considering how much evidence has survived to this day of Hieron's promotion of the 
city of Aetna, and in spite of the difficulties experienced by the Aetnaeans themselves soon after 
the fall of the Deinomenids, it is fairly safe for us to judge Hieron's efforts at self- 
aggrandisement as successful. This judgement is based not only on the continuation of the city's 
name for at least four centuries, but also on the consideration of Hieron's position as tyrant. 
Gaining a reputation such as that of a founder, and enjoying such a reputation long after death, 
would normally have been difficult enough, but even more so for a tyrant who would normally 
be the subject of future vilification. 
101 Also see the foreign policy chapter above, 76 
102 Malkin (1987) 238. 
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Himera 
®fpcov SE µe2ä rv `IJEpaicwv acpayily öpwv Trly nö?, ty oi. Klliöpcwv SsogEv, lv, 
CYAMd Kißev sic 't(XiTrly Toüs TE Owpteis Kai rCov ä), Xcov Tobg ßouXoµEvous 
£Io), tToyp6upilasv. o itot µi v oüv µE2 &X?. i Xwv KaXws no?, ttcuÖµsvoi 
Ste'r£XEaav 9't11 TIEVT xov'ra xai 6Kt6b " Tots SE of G n6Xsco;; ünö KapX1 ovIo v 
XetpwOsIc riS Kai Kataß1CacpEi61lc,, 8t4µctvEV äoixritos µexpt Tci v Ka9' rlµäs 
Katpwv. 
Diod. Sic. XI. 49.3-4 
Immediately following the Aetna episode in Diodorus, we find yet another example of 
refoundation by the tyrants in Late Archaic Sicily, that of Himera by Theron of Acragas. It is 
notable, though not of great importance, that although it is the fourth instance of its kind, no 
single dynasty of tyrants carried out more than one refoundation itself (for although there is a 
degree of continuity between Hippocrates and Gelon, there is no family link, and more 
importantly Gelon usurped the tyranny from Hippocrates' sons around 491/0103). What it does 
indicate is that the idea of refounding cities and its benefits had obviously spread across the 
various tyrannies in the vicinity. The account given by Diodorus implies, though never actually 
stating that it was the case, that Theron had refounded Himera mainly in emulation of Hieron, an 
idea that seems to permeate through modern scholarship too1°4. That the refoundation occurred 
in the same year as Hieron's may be considered proof enough, and it is also the case that Theron 
would have known about Hieron's plans long before they were put into practice. 
The refoundation itself was a result of the city losing many of its inhabitants, who were 
put to death after complaining to Hieron about their treatment in the hands of Thrasydaeus, the 
son of Theron. Those Himeraeans involved were under the mistaken impression that Hieron 
was still on bad terms with the Acragantine tyrant, and they offered the city of Himera itself to 
Hieron in return for help105. The Himeraeans' confidence in Hieron was betrayed, Theron was 
informed, and many were arrested and executed. The actions of both Hieron and Theron make 
the reader think back to Herodotus' story about the Zancleans treatment at the hands of 
Hippocrates, as discussed earlier, but it is difficult to tell whether the Himeraeans posed a threat 
to Theron, Thrasydaeus or to Acragas itself. Considering the situation Himera was in at that 
103 Hdt. VII. 155. 
104 E. g. Asheri (1992) 151. 
105 This followed the protection given by Theron to Hieron's brother Polyzelus, whom he tried to send on 
a potentially disastrous campaign to aid Sybaris against Croton - Diod. Sic. X1.48.3-5; see also the 
chapter on foreign policy, 76ff. 
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time and concerns Theron may have had for it (see the next paragraph), it seems unlikely that 
there was any real threat to Theron, or that lie would have wanted to destroy it, rather that the 
tyrant decided to make an example of some of the leading Himeraeans who may have confided 
in Hieron. 
Theron's concerns over Himera are dominated by the fact that it had lost much of its 
population, but perhaps this may not only have been due to the revolt in 476. A look at events in 
the city four years earlier, during the Carthaginian invasion of 480 BC, tells us that Himera was 
the first target of Punic machinations, and suffered heavily at the hands of a huge infantry force 
(300,000 infantry, if Diodorus' figures are to be believed106). We are told that the citizens were 
routed before they sent for help from Gelon at Syracuse. 
'r v &W IV äyopäv KOgi Etv. aütös SE Toi; äpi6TOVs Twv 6TpatitwTwv 
6tvaXa(3wv ýKcv b Ei ti'v itöXty, xai Twv `Igcpaicov cobG irncýtövras 
'rpcyräµsvos Kai noXXoüs ävEX, wv xate tXýýaTO Tot; Ev tf nAct. 5t6 Kai 
Oýpwv ö 'AKpayavrivwv Suväains, Exwv 8üvaµty ixavily Kai napacpvXätiTwv 
'rijv `Iµýpav, cpo 3 OEis a Oüs &1t rrEtXcv sic Täs Evpaxoi sac, äý by röv 
I'aX. wva ßoi Osiv tihv Taxi6itly. 
Diod. Sic. XI. 20.5 
Therefore it is likely that the city was suffering from underpopulation even before the 
revolt four years later. Theron may also have had it in mind to settle certain people that would 
ensure loyalty to the tyrant and his own city, for example mercenaries or veterans awaiting 
rewards for service, as Hippocrates and Hieron had probably done themselves. This was 
especially important now that the Himeraeans had revolted against Theron's own son, 
Thrasydaeus. 
Although its mention immediately following the events at Catana certainly does imply 
that it was meant to be more than a reinforcement of a subject city, it is not explicitly stated by 
Diodorus (our only literary source) that Theron's re-settlement was a refoundation. The 
evidence, or lack of it, and the circumstances tell us that maybe Theron did not mean it to act as 
a rival to Aetna. Therefore it is difficult to judge Theron's intentions, but the other previous 
examples of refoundation (Camarina and Zancle) can hardly be considered major enterprises 
dominated by egocentric ambition in themselves either. 
106 Diod. Sic. XI. 1.5. 
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Reporting on excavations conducted at the site of the ancient city in the 1970s, 
Bonacasa notes a `revolution' in the city planning, datable to the first quarter of the fifth century 
BC, i. e. the period concluding in Theron's refoundation in 476107. Not only was there noticeable 
enlargement of the city, but also it seems that the orientation of the city plan changed with it, so 
it became parallel to the coastline, running along the hill slope. Bonacasa does not attribute this 
change in city planning to Theron, but it is made clear that changes were made at this time - in 
particular the expansion of the city into the plain of Buonfornello is believed to be the tyrant's 
work. This expansion of the city may indicate certain ambitions for the city of Himera; perhaps 
the re-settlement of the city was simply not enough and Theron wished to strengthen his hold on 
that area (close to the Punic settlements of Soloeis and Panormus, and also the pro-Punic native 
Elymians). The current situation, as already mentioned when discussing Aetna, with the 
Carthaginians weakened after the battle of Himera, left the Punic cities and allies (the Elymians, 
Rhegium and Selinus) vulnerable and they may have become a target for Acragantine 
expansion, or the situation may simply have given Theron a chance to build up his defences. 
This does only remain an idea, and a similar one to that given when discussing Hieron's 
activities at Catana and Naxos, but it is possible, especially with Theron and Hieron now on 
friendly terms. There are no recorded instances of attacks on the Punic cities at this time, but 
defensive measures for the vulnerable Himera may have been considered necessary. It is easy to 
say with hindsight that there was no chance of further attacks by the Carthaginians on the Greek 
cities during Theron's reign, but we cannot know for sure the degree of fear for safety felt by the 
Greeks at the time, especially those based near the Punic cities. We must remember that the 
threat Evas always there, even if it was not an immediate one in the 470's, just as the Persians 
posed a constant threat to the Greeks even following their failures at Salamis and Plataea. 
Noticeable in the same report is Bonacasa's description of Theron's actions in Himera 
as a `Doric recolonisation"°8. Thucydides' statement of Himera being a Dorian city certainly 
backs up this idea109, but it is made clear in Diodorus' account, that it was not only Dorians who 
were invited to settle the area but other Greeks too. This may have been intended to contrast 
107 Bonacasa (1976) 42-5 1. 
103 Ibid., 44 
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with the new Dorian centre built at Aetna, but it was possible that in reality the two were similar 
- in other words both had minority groups, for example Arcadians at Aetna, but the majority 
were Dorians. Therefore it is possible to call both cities `Dorian', for it is quite naive to assume 
that even cities in Greece proper were totally homogeneous, for example Sicyon which was 
predominantly Dorian but also had a pre-Dorian minority, famously championed by the 
Orthagorid tyrant Cleisthenes a century earlier' 10. 
One feature that makes Theron's `new' settlement different from Hieron's is that while 
Aetna, under pressure from the native Catanaeans, struggled with its own existence soon after 
the Deinomenid dynasty had ended, Himera flourished until it was destroyed by the 
Carthaginians in 409 BC". The absence of internal (or indeed external) conflict following 476 
BC indicates that Theron had settled new inhabitants along with old ones with much success - it 
is not indicative of any ill-feeling towards Theron or the new settlers - despite the presumably 
violent circumstances surrounding the events of 476 BC, and also the factor of a tyrant's 
involvement' 12. The case of Himera therefore seems more like a routine reinforcement that a 
refoundation, with far sounder reasoning behind it than the propaganda exercise carried out by 
Hieron. 
Conclusion 
Having studied the main cases of refoundation in Sicily at this time, a number of 
significant issues have been raised. Firstly it has become clear to us that the tyrants had different 
motives in mind in carrying out these acts of mass-resettlement. In the cases of Camarina and 
the Cale Acte enterprise, both of which were instigated by Hippocrates, there is clearly a 
military motive, in the first case to provide a buffer zone between Gela and the Syracusans, and 
in the second, the planned conquest of the native Sicels. In the cases involving Anaxilas, his 
quarrels with the Zancleans may seem more personal' 13, as may the renaming of Zancle as 
Messana, after his own homeland. However, it seems that the city of Rhegium itself must have 
109 Thuc. VII. 58. 
110 Hdt. V. 67-8. 
111 Diod. Sic. XIII. 62. 
112 Diodorus tells us that Theron was in fact very popular, unlike his son Thrasydaeus - Diod. Sic. XI. 53.2. 
113 Paus. IV. 23.6-7. 
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been the primary cause for Anaxilas' interest in Zancle, since without its help Rhegium would 
struggle to sustain itself, but co-operation between the two cities would make both extremely 
prosperous. Of course we cannot deny that the thought of wealth must have appealed to 
Anaxilas, but his own position would be at stake if he were. not to act on the Rhegians' behalf. 
Thirdly, while it is possible to make a case for military motives behind Hieron's foundation of 
Aetna, it is clear that the tyrant's reasons were almost entirely, overwhelmingly in fact, personal 
and political. Hieron's wish to emulate his older brother led him to go to extremes in order to 
gain fame after death. Finally, we find that Theron's refoundation of Himera, despite first 
seeming like a propaganda exercise in emulation of Hieron (mainly because of its being placed 
immediately after the Aetna episode in Diodorus' work), it was most likely a reinforcement of a 
vulnerable subject-city, and a new military base similar to Hippocrates' Camarina. 
In consideration of the question posed in the introduction, that of adherence to the ways 
of earlier colonial enterprises, we do find a lot of effort was made by Hieron to legitimise his 
foundation, probably fearing disapproval and non-recognition as a founder, so he went to great 
lengths to make sure that colonial traditions, especially concerning the role of the founder 
himself, were adhered to. This is also evident in the celebratory literature, where divine support 
in particular is stressed. In the other three cases, we find some traditional aspects of colonisation 
surviving, for example an open-mindedness when it comes to the settlers' nationality, but we 
usually find that this is due to an awareness of the difficulties otherwise encountered. On the 
whole however, the three other cases of refoundation do not show much of a regard for tradition, 
for example a founder cult is not established in any case. This would naturally lead one to 
consider whether the tyrants (apart from Hieron) actually regarded their work as refoundation at 
all, or if it is just the imagination of the ancient authors at play and these cases were meant as 
reinforcements. 
So how does one account for the sudden appearance of refounded cities in Sicily at this 
time? It may be possible that the case of Aetna has simply made the refounding of subject cities 
appear more significant and a common occurrence in early fifth-century Sicily, whereas in fact 
the cases of Camarina and Himera could be considered quite unspectacular and, in any case, 
better described as reinforcements than refoundations. What is also likely is that the events at 
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Camarina had opened the floodgates as far as possibilities were concerned, for at least in the 
first three cases, the refoundations were undertaken on a larger scale each time, from mere 
reinforcement at Camarina, through larger immigrations of settlers and a change of name at 
Zancle, to a completely new city at Aetna. In other words, the events at Camarina had raised an 
awareness in Sicily of the benefits of shifting populations around, as well as the comparative 
ease of doing so in Sicily/Southern Italy, and the tyrants become more daring in their plans. 
Aetna's prominence as perhaps the most famous city-foundation in Greek history makes 
it seem an obvious model of a typical refoundation, but in fact it seems as if Aetna is an outlier 
as far as Archaic refoundations are concerned, although the political and military climate of the 
period may have linked it closely to the refoundation of Himera by Theron. Although the 
foundation of Aetna had some other advantages, it was above all a propaganda exercise. 
Perhaps the most valuable lesson learned here is not to assume that the most prominent example 
of a particular practice is necessarily the most typical, in other words, Aetna must be considered 
wholly unusual of the way the Sicilian tyrants refounded cities rather than as a typical example. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
TYRANNY AND SELF-PRESENTATION 
This chapter is a study of the methods used to represent the Deinomenids, through the 
poetry and histories written by others, and also how the tyrants presented themselves. This 
issue has been the subject of more scholarship than any other aspect of the dynasty, and is 
potentially big enough to warrant far more than the single chapter I am including in this thesis. 
It is therefore my aim to give an account of the main questions that have been raised in this area, 
how these have been tackled by various scholars and to give an impression of how much we can 
know. The evidence to be studied, whether direct or comparative, does seem to be of a greater 
volume than that studied in the previous two chapters, and includes a number of the odes of 
Pindar and Bacchylides, the histories of Herodotus and Diodor us Siculus, and of course the 
tyrants' dedications at the Panhellenic sanctuaries at Olympia and Delphi. There are a number 
of different aspects to this subject, which will be considered; firstly, the commissioning of 
famous poets by the tyrants in Greece, which will involve, comparative study, and next the 
efforts made by these poets to promote their patron's position. This is followed by a look at 
how competition at the Panhellenic games themselves could be considered a political exercise, 
and finally a look at the use of titles by historians and poets, and then the tyrants themselves, in 
order to find whether there were any in use during the time of the dynasty. 
Before starting, it is necessary first to consider the evidence itself, as even though it is 
basically the same as has been used earlier, we must be aware of factors such as the audience, in 
addition to the usual reasons for writing and of course any bias. The political leanings of the 
historians Herodotus and Diodorus have already been considered in chapter one, and while in 
the case of Herodotus there seem to be mixed messages concerning his attitude towards tyranny, 
Diodorus is usually simply dismissed as never expressing his own opinion and therefore not of 
great worth'. As we shall see, however, Diodorus is at least quite consistent in his use of titles 
and does not seem to write with strong bias as far as the tyrants are concerned. The poets Pindar 
and Bacchylides are, in my opinion, far more potentially dangerous and should be treated with 
1 See chapter one above, 30. 
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great care when used to reconstruct history. Their works are of course influenced by the wishes 
of their patron, so in studying the tyrants' self-presentation they are of great use, although there 
is obvious difficulty in how much input the patron would have had, and whether certain details 
were ever intended to be highlighted by the patron himself. In many of Pindar's and 
Bacchylides' odes (perhaps including those for the Sicilians) there may have been little or no 
input by the patron, depending on how intellectually able the patron actually was, and also on 
other factors such as the distance between patron and poet at the time of the poem's 
composition. We must therefore be careful not to readily attribute certain ideas in the poetry to 
the tyrants' own wishes rather than putting them down to the poets themselves. This problem is 
virtually non-existent in the case of dedications left at Olympia or Delphi - these are extremely 
simple, especially in comparison to an epinician ode, with no need for artistic skill, and one 
cannot imagine a dedicatory inscription that is contrary to the tyrant's wishes. 
The problem of the audience for whom the poems and dedications were meant is one 
that will figure greatly. The epinician ode was traditionally performed twice - once at the 
sanctuary following the victory, and again on the athlete's return to his city. This means two 
audiences, the so-called `Panhellenic elite' at the sanctuary, and the athlete's fellow citizens, 
regardless of social standing, and here we will therefore find themes discussed in the context of 
epinician poetry to be intended for both, or either, audiences2. The medium of dedicatory 
inscriptions is different, in that they will only be viewed by visitors to the Panhellenic 
sanctuaries, many of whom would be of high birth and from the many other Greek cities in the 
Mediterranean; therefore one would expect these inscriptions to be aimed solely at those who 
are forming an opinion of the dedicator from outside, again, including the `Panhellenic elite'. 
Tyrants and Poets 
Attempts were made to legitimise Hieron's rule in Pindar's Odes, which were originally 
performed to celebrate his victories in the Panhellenic Games at Olympia and Delphi, and one 
which is often singled out is his victory in the Pythian chariot race in 470, celebrated by 
2 See Lefl: owitz (1995) and Morgan (1993). 
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Pindar's First Pythian Ode3. That is not to say that other odes of Pindar, and also of 
Bacchylides, are not of use. 
However, it is necessary first of all to consider the fact that Pindar, together with 
Bacchylides, Aeschylus and Simonides, was invited over to Sicily and patronised by Hieron4. 
Even in comparison to the poets who had been recruited by tyrants who had preceded Hieron, 
these were particularly prominent figures in Greek literary circles. Previous tyrants who we 
know had certainly commissioned poets before the Deinomenids are Polycrates of Samos and 
Hipparchus of Athens. In Samos we find the poets Ibycus and Anacreon, but the poetry 
immediately seems different to that found in Sicily. According to Himerius5, Anacreon was 
first employed by Polycrates to satisfy his son's love of music; the tyrant's son was also named 
Polycrates and was perhaps a sub-tyrant at Rhodes, and while the younger Polycrates does seem 
to have been praised much in Anacreon's poetry, it does seem to be in an erotic rather than a 
political or military contextb, and it was also noted that the vast majority of the poems were 
secular, rather than involving the gods or sacred festivals, such as the Panhellenic games'. 
Bowra notes that Anacreon's poems involving Polycrates have an `air of artificiality' about 
them, perhaps implying that the poet was under some pressure to produce songs even if he was 
not feeling particularly inspired by the tyrant himself, although he may have had a close 
relationship with the elder Polycrates of Samos if Herodotus' story is true8. Ibycus seems to 
have been employed at Samos for the same reasons, as Bowra notes an `unashamedly secular 
air'9 present in his poems. The most famous of his works comes from the Oxyrhynchus Papyri, 
and although it is not attributed to Ibycus, it is considered very likely indeed to be his1°. It 
seems from what survives that it was written in honour of Polycrates the younger, being 
3 Many of Pindar's Odes are dedicated to the Greeks of Sicily, 15 out of 46 as opposed to no Paeans, for 
example, and of these O1. I, and Pyth. I, II, and III are dedicated to Hieron, in addition to OL VI (Hagesias 
of Stymphalos) which alludes to him, and Nem. I and IX, which are dedicated to Chromios, who was 
probably a prominent figure in Aetna, which refer to his adopted city. 
'' Aeschylus' Aitnaiai has already been the subject of discussion in the previous chapter, 165ff. 
5 Oration 29.22ff. Himerius Evas a Bithynian rhetorician of the fourth century AD. 
6 Himerius Oration 28. Virtually all this poetry is lost, and aside from a few fragments which refer to 
enemies and lovers of the younger Polycrates, our only sources of information on Anacreon's poems in 
Samos are of a much later date. The story of Smerdies, a lover of Polycrates who has his hair cut off by 
the tyrant, is well attested in the ancient sources: Stobaeus Ecl. 4.21, Athenaeus Deipn. 12.540e, Aelian 
VH 9.4. see Anacreon fr. 46d, 47d (POxy. 22.2322). 
Sch. Pind. lsth. 11.1. 
8 Bowra (1961) 277. Herodotus refers to Anacreon as reclining with the tyrant shortly before Polycrates' 
murder - 111.13 1.1. 9 Bowra (1961) 251. 
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compared in beauty to the legendary prince Troilus. Again, according to Bowra, the poet seems 
particularly uninspired and unimpressed by Polycrates and his love interests, and we find that 
Ibycus and Anacreon were often treated as a like pair in antiquitylI. 
Also commissioning poets were the Peisistratids in Athens, who likewise, according to 
some sources, employed Anacreon following Polycrates' death, and also Simonides long before 
he left for Sicily, although there is little of his work which can positively be ascribed to this 
period 12. Hipparchus in particular invited these poets over, apparently with the same desire for 
erotic poetry as the younger Polycrates13, but all that survives is an epitaph for the daughter of 
Hippias, which is ascribed to the poet by Aristotle and recorded by Thucydides, where she is 
congratulated for not committing hubris, as might normally be expected of tyrants (and 
presumably their families)14. Unusually, aside from a commentary fragment which, for some 
reason, refers to Peisistratos as a siren, the only other poem attributed to Simonides at this time 
is a couplet praising the Tyrannicides, inscribed on the base of the famous group by Critius and 
Nesiotes of 477 BC'5. This attribution is not entirely reliable, many inscriptions were later said 
to be by the poet even if they were not, and it also seems strange that the Athenians should have 
chosen an associate of the Peisistratids to celebrate their death. Other poets invited to Athens, 
or thought to have been friends of the Peisistratids, included Orpheus of Croton, who apparently 
lived with Peisistratos himself, Onomacritus of Athens, the collector of oracles who was not 
patronised but was a close friend who even followed the Peisistratids to Susa, and Lasus of 
Hermione, who was said to have organised competitions and performances in Athens, but 
perhaps more importantly is credited with being the first to write on the subject of musicology 16. 
There is little to suggest that these poets were commissioned to bring praise to the Peisistratids, 
or even in some cases that they were commissioned at all, for example Onomacritus seems to 
10 Ibid. 250. POxy 15.1790, Ibycus I (PMMG). 
11 Ibycus 1.41-8, Bowra 256. Athenaeus Deip. 1250e, Aelian VH 9.4, Philostratus Ep. 8.1, also all talk 
about Polycrates and his private life. Arist. Thesen. 159-63 pairs the two poets together under Polycrates' 
patronage. 
12 Aelian VH 8.2 says both poets spent time at Athens, also ps. Plato Hipparchus 228b (Anacreon), 228c 
(Simonides). 
13 Atli. Pol. 18, Thuc. VI. 54.2. 
"Simonides epigram 85 (Diehl), Ar. Rhet. 1367b19, Thuc. V1.59.3. 
15 Simonides fr. 76 (Diehl). 
16 Orpheus of Croton - FGrH 697 fr. 9 (Asclepiades of Myrlea), Onomacritus of Athens - Hdt. VII. 6.3, 
Lasus of Hermione - Arist. Vesp. 14 10-1 (where he is said to be in competition with Simonides), Suda 2. 
139 (A(xaoq). 
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have been a friend who happened to write poetry, and according to Slings, all except 
Onomacritus had contacts with prominent Athenians even after the Peisistratids' fall (perhaps 
explaining the unlikely attribution of the Tyrannicides inscription to Simonides)'7. It is 
Osborne's view that there was no attempted monopoly on lyric poets by the Peisistratids, who 
rather wished to create a cultural atmosphere in the city8. 1 
One thing that strikes one about the tyrants before the Deinomenids, or at least those of 
whom we are fairly well informed, is that they did not seem to feel the need to justify their rule 
to their subjects through poetic means, although in the case of Polycrates perhaps his major 
public works could be a substitute. The reasons for this may be simple, for example Polycrates 
did not actually succeed anyone, taking control himself, and his military achievements certainly 
proved he was a strong leader and therefore he was under little pressure to prove himself as 
Hieron was. In the case of the Peisistratids, the tyranny seems to have had fairly strong public 
support, as can be seen even in the later years of Hippias' reign (it was the Alcmaeonidae with 
their Spartan allies who ended the tyranny in 510, and even then there is no sign of popular 
support for Hippias' ejection1) and the general prosperity enjoyed in Athens at the time. This is 
in sharp contrast to the pressure Hieron would have been under to prove himself following his 
famous brother's death, and the unpopularity of the dynasty which manifested itself following 
Hieron's own death20. 
Homeric Kingship 
In her article on Deinomenid self-presentation, Harrell devotes much space to the 
allusions to Homeric kingship in Pindar's Odes, which seem to be an attempt to legitimise the 
tyranny by making it seem more traditional, and therefore with a kind of precedent in Homer's 
kings21. In addition to this, the suggestions are also made that Hieron's rule was beneficial to 
17 Slings (2000) 65. 
18 Osborne (1996) 285. 
19 Andrewes (1956) 113. 
20 Thrasybulus' (Hieron's younger brother and successor) was overthrown in 467-6 BC, although it is 
difficult to tell how much of the decline of the Deinomenid dynasty recorded by Diodorus (XI. 67.7) was 
part of a motif rather than based on actual fact. There was also a revolt following the death of 
Hippocrates (c. 491 BC), who may also have become unpopular due to his over-working of the citizen 
army- Hdt. VII. 154, see also above chapters on foreign policy and mercenaries, 117ff. 
21 Harrell (2002) 444-6. 
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his subjects, through the inclusion of such qualities as eintomia and hesychia, and also the 
impression is given that Hieron's power came from, and was supported by, Zeus himself, 
Aside from the usage of actual titles in Pindar, we shall first examine the usage of 
Homeric symbols of power and traditional qualities attributed to Homeric rule. The first 
imagery that Harrell considers is the reference to a OvgtaTeiov ... OK&n'rov 
in the First 
Olympian Ode22, which is wielded by Hieron in Sicily. This is in reference to the sceptre that 
one finds so often in Homer's epics, accompanied by the adjective 6E11tctciov which means it is 
rightfully held by the tyrant. The sceptre itself is the subject of a paper by Easterling, who notes 
the use of the sceptre in `solemn verbal interchange' and thus the importance of order in such 
meetings as we find in the Iliad, and Finley makes the important connection between order and 
themfs23. Gerber, in his commentary to Olympian One, notes that Zeus' gift of the sceptre to 
Hieron gives the tyrant a role reserved only for kings, the dispensation of thenristes, or divine 
ordinances and precedents24, whereas Mondi sees the sceptre as a kind of manifestation of the 
power of Zeus' main weapon, the thunderbolt. This interpretation leads Mondi to conclude that 
the bearer of the sceptre must also receive tute from others, as Zeus does, or otherwise face 
punishment25. Harrell's own opinion seems to be that despite the uncertainty on what the 
function of the sceptre actually was, the point to be made was that it was an object strongly 
reminiscent of Homeric kingship, authority and divinely backed rule, in particular the debating 
in the first book of Homer's Iliad26. The association with therms is also strongly emphasised in 
most scholarship on the subject27, but probably the most important is that of Detienne and 
Vernant, who consider the impact of the marriage between Zeus and Themis herself-'. The 
marriage followed that between Zeus and Metis, which together with the second marriage 
ensure the permanence of Zeus' rule on Olympus, for just as Metis intervenes in the balances of 
22 Pind. Ol. I. 12 - celebrating his victory in the single horse race in 476 BC. 23 Easterling (1989) 105-7, Finley (1978) 112. 
24 Gerber (1982) 33. 
25 Mondi (1980) 211-2. This conclusion is reached in consideration of the Thersites episode in the Iliad 
(2.211-77), where he is punished for withholding Agamemnon's right to time by demanding that the 
Greeks return home. Even though the Greeks are in favour of returning, they do not openly agree with 
Thersites because, according to Mondi, they do not want to argue against Agamemnon's right to geras (a 
gift of honour, taken from booty), just as they would not want to argue against Zeus' same right. 
26 Homer Iliad 1.53 ff. Harrell (2002) 441-2. See Easterling (1989) 104-21 for more work on the sceptre 
in Homer. 
27 The most useful study of divine justice is H. Lloyd-Jones, The Justice of Zeus (Berkeley, 1971). 
28 Detienne and Versant (1991) 107-8. 
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power (as she did during Zeus' usurping of the throne of Cronus) and judges the future in terms 
of what can be done to achieve a successful result, the marriage to Themis represented 
permanence and stability, and thus ensured that the situation on Olympus simply could not 
change. 
Regarding the first Pythian Ode, it follows that with Zeus as the patron deity and Hieron 
the founder of Aetna, the city is also assured a permanent and successful future29. It must be 
noted at this point that Bacchylides also refers to Zeus as being the source of Hieron's power, 
with the tyrant being honoured as the one to rule over more Greeks than any other30. As Harrell 
concludes, the reference to Oquc TSiov ... axältTov would remind those 
in Sicily that Hieron's 
rule not only derived from Zeus, but as will also be seen with mentions of dike and ewromia, his 
rule resembled Zeus' rule on Mount Olympus31. Dike (Justice) and Eunomia (Good Order) 
were two of the three Horai, born to Zeus and Themis, who represented the nature of Zeus' 
rule32, and again here we find references to these not only in Pindar, but also Bacchylides, where 
dike as a feature of Hieron's rule features even more strongly: 
(ppEVa S' EüO1b6ix[o]V 
&rp£µ' äµna1b6as µsptµväv 
öei p' <&y'> äOpilßov vöw- 
Bacch. 5.6-8 
Whereas Pindar actually asks of Hieron, as a duty expected of monarchs: 
vwµa &K(A(p 7t1&) 6'rpaT6v 
Pind. Pytli. 1.86 
As Harrell says33, these immediately remind the reader of typical Homeric and Hesiodic 
kingship, in particular the image of the decisive and just king in the Theogony34, where this 
ability is granted by the Muses. However, the term which Harrell feels is most explicitly used 
of Hieron in Pindar is the reference to eunomia: 
äy' EnctT AiTvas ßaßtXEt cpiXtov ý2; cip(gtEv bgvov- 
29 The representation of Zeus as the patron deity is present not only in Pindar (Pythian One), but also 
other media, for example the issues of coinage where we find a depiction of Zeus, the sceptre and the 
resting eagle as described at the beginning of the Ode (Pyth. 1.5-10). This and the other media used in 
celebrating the foundation are discussed by Dougherty (1993) 85-94. 
30 Bacch. 3.11-2. 
31 Harrell (2002) 442. 
32 The third of the Horai (according to Hesiod's genealogy), perhaps appropriately not found in Pindar 
Pyth. I, was Eirene (Peace). See Stafford (2000) 45-74 (Themis) 173-198 (Eirene). 
33 Harrell (2002) 443-4. 
34 Hesiod Th. 84-6. 
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Tw icöXty KEivav OEoSg&TCO ßvv EXsuO£pia 
`YXXi6oS 6T6coµaS `IEpwv ev v6gots £- 
KTi6aE" O Xovu Se IIaµcpüXov 
im! µäv `HpaKXEt6äv £xyovot 
6XOatc into TaüyErou vaiovTBS ai- 
EI gEv$iv tcOgoiaty iv Aiytgtoü 
Ocoptc c. 
Pind. Pyth. 1.60-5 
While there is an opinion that this is referring directly to the general state of affairs in 
Sparta, as a result of the Lycurgan constitution 35, another opinion is that this does not 
necessarily have to be the case, as Ostwald makes the point that etniomia is a political condition 
relevant to any state in Greece and not just Sparta. Harrell confirms this point by finding a 
connection between the appearance of eunomia (as the daughter of Themis) with the 
6EµtaTE ov... axämtOV36, and therefore showing that Pindar is not necessarily making a 
connection between Aetna's new constitution and Sparta's more established case. Through 
reference to the rF8µoii (ordinances) of Aegimius referred to in line 165, we are also given the 
impression that Aetna was to be a city ruled by law, as opposed to one ruled over by a tyrant, as 
they are described by Ostwald as a regulation imposed by an external authority, in this case 
Aegimius, one of the ancestors of the Dorian race37. This, as Pindar puts it, is the case in Dorian 
cities all over the Greek world, and is another step towards making Hieron's position (in this 
case solely in Aetna) more acceptable to others. 
One more quality associated with Hieron's rule, this time the daughter of Dike herself, 
is hesychia (quiet)38: 
6üv Tot Tiv xEV äyriThp ävýp, 
viii T £1CLTEXX6gEVOs, Säµov yEpai- 
pwv Tpänot 6iuµcpwvov ES -j6uxiav. 
Pind. Pyth. 1.69-70 
Again, as Harrell notes, the harmony brought by Hieron is dual - both the internal 
situation between ruler and ruled, and the external situation, with no foreign enemies 
threatening Aetna39. The internal situation is brought about by what Pindar calls the distribution 
35 Kirsten (1941) 63-7. 
36 Ostwald(1969)75-80, Harrell (2002) 444-5. Reference is also made by Harrell here to Pind. Nem. 
IX. 30-2, which emphasises that lawfulness already existed in the new city of Aetna. 
37 Ostwald (1969) 13-9, (1973) 680-1. 
38 Pind. Pyth. V1I1.1-4. 
39 Harrell (2002) 446-7, also Burton (1962) 175-6 on the issue of the duality of the hesychia. 
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of honours to the people - `Säµov yspaipwv'. This is reminiscent of the actions of Zeus 
immediately after his defeat of Typhon and accession to Olympia's throne: 
8i Pa T6T GJTpUVOV ßa6lX£vEl1EV f 6CV6(66E1v 
rain; cppaSµoaüvrlßty 'OXvµnttov Evpvotca Zfiv 
äOaväTwv" ö SE ToIaty £ü StE& csaaTO rtp&q. 
Hesiod Th. 883-5 
Therefore Hieron, in Pindar's view, is using Olympus itself as a prototype for his own 
city, by dividing and sharing honours in order to gain authority, as Zeus does. The 
redistribution of Honours on Olympus, according to Clay, was at the very core of the beginnings 
of the Olympian order, and this was shown through four of the Homeric Hymns, where the 
permanent order was disrupted by certain events, for example the birth of Apollo or Hermes, 
then restored by the distribution of honours to them40. 
As for external affairs, Hieron, along with his family, is even credited with the freeing 
of all Greeks from foreign rule, amongst other things: 
Xi66o11at veOßov, Kpovicov, figEpov 
ö(ppa Kati OIKOV ö (Doivtý ö Tup6a- 
vwv T äXa? 'aTÖs £xp, vau- 
aißTovov vßpty i& by 'räv itpö KI tas, 
oia Evpaxoai ov äpxw 5aµa60EVTes 7T&Oov, 
cbKUnöpcov änö vawv o a(pty Ev tcöv- 
Tw ß6ca, s0' äXtKiav, 
`EXX6c8' Ei Oi cov ß(xpeiaS 8oi)Mocq äpEo tat 
ßäp pEv EaXaµivoc 'AOavaicwv xäpty 
µtß06v, £v EtäpTa 8' än6> Täv ttpö KtOatpCo- 
vo; µaxäv, 
Tata Mf E of xäµov äyKD?. tot; ot, 
7 Iap<ä> SE T&v Eüuöpov äx'äv 
`Iµhpa 1taiScacty i Lvov AetvopEveo; 'rE? '. aatq, 
'röv £Sei; avt äµ(p' äpct , lroXEµ. 
iwv 6Cv8pwv xaµöv'rcov. 
Pind. Pyth. 1.71-80 
What is most striking about the theme of hesychia following a defeat of external threats, 
is the analogy which is made with Zeus' defeat of Typhon at the beginning of the Ode, where 
Typhon is said to be on the same side as the Phoenicians and the Etruscans41. The point is also 
made by both Dickie and Lloyd-Jones, that Hesychia herself is an opponent of Typhon (and 
therefore Hieron's enemies) as is Dike, for as long as a city has an atmosphere of restraint and 
quiet, any transgression of this quiet (a hubris) is therefore a transgression of both hesychia and 
10 Clay (1989) 15, referring to the hymns to Demeter (11), Apollo (III), Hermes (IV) and Aphrodite (V). 
See also Detienne and Vernant (1991) 107-9. 
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dike42. One final point to be made here is that Hieron again finds himself carrying out the duties 
of a Homeric king in his bringing of hesychia to Aetna itself, by fulfilling the role of a military 
commander, as he is named as such in line 73 of the First Pythian Ode 43 
The attempts to make Hieron's reign seem more legitimate did not stop at comparisons 
to epic rulers, elaborate as they were. Although his entry and victories in the Panhellenic 
Games partly contributed towards greater recognition in the Greek world, his location outside of 
Greece proper, as well as his position in Sicily itself, would have alienated him from the greater 
Greek community, in particular the aristocracy. While the discussion has so far been dominated 
by Hieron's wish to justify his rule in the eyes of the Sicilians, we must now examine how he 
tried to gain acceptance from the Panhellenic elite, in particular, one imagines, to give the 
impression that he was a legitimate ruler and not a despot, especially in post-Persian Wars 
Greece. This will be examined in the context of Pindar's Odes, but also much of the discussion 
will focus on how the Deinomenids wished to represent themselves in the Panhellenic 
sanctuaries, through the medium of dedications, and also their participation in the games 
themselves. 
Competition at Games 
As we have often seen throughout antiquity in general, it is not unusual to find 
prominent political figures such as Hieron appearing and even competing at the Panhellenic 
Games; other famous examples include Alexander I of Macedon at Olympia in 476, Alcibiades 
at Olympia in 416 and of course Nero44. It is also very well known that victory at such games 
could bring great benefits to that citizen, for example the erection of statues, and in some cases 
even hero cults following the victor's death45. It would therefore seem, even without exploring 
the subject too deeply, that a victory at a Panhellenic games would be greatly beneficial to 
anyone seeking political influence or simply recognition, not only in one's own city-state but 
also in the Greek world as a whole. 
41 Pind. Pyth. 1.15-28. See Lefkowitz (1976) 119-20, Dougherty(1993)94, Burton(] 962) 104-6 and 
Trumpf (1958) on this issue. 
42 Dickie (1984) 93-4,8 and Lloyd-Jones (1971) 49-50. A similar contrast is found in Pythian Eight. 
43 See Carlier (1984) 165-72 and Yamagata (1997) 11. 
4; Alexander I- Justin 7.2.14; Alcibiades - Thuc. 6.16.1-2; Nero - Suet. Nero 21-4. 45 For an example of this see Currie (2002), who examines the case of Euthymus of Locri. 
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While it is also generally recognised that the games at Olympia were the most highly 
regarded, certain individual events were also given more prominence. The stadion race, being 
the only event held at every Olympic games since the first in 776 BC, was so significant that 
each Olympiad (a standard measurement of time in antiquity46) was given the name of the 
victor, just as in Athens a single year was named after the archon of the city. Other events were 
also viewed as opportunities to show off one's wealth, for example entering a team in a chariot 
race was a greater exhibition of monetary resources than an entry in a single horse race or more 
still the mule race. On the other hand, entries in the race in armour could be seen as a proud 
expression of hoplite status, although this could perhaps vary depending on how important 
hoplite warfare was in a given city. As we shall see, however, there could be even more read 
into the act of entering a chariot team into a major games than merely a show of wealth. 
Before looking at how chariot racing was viewed in general it is necessary to examine 
first how much political influence could be attained through a victory at the games, as the effect 
would be noticeably greater than merely competing, regardless of the event entered. In Athens 
we have details of how many privileges were enjoyed by a crown-games victor: firstly sitesis, 
the right to dine at the Prytaneion at public expense for life (also awarded to victorious generals, 
and the descendants of the Tyrannicides) and also prohedria which allowed the victor to enjoy a 
leading place in both processions and the viewing of festivals in the city47. As OKell points out, 
the latter would simply increase visibility and recognition amongst citizens, while the former 
privilege could result in greater contact with the archons and other prominent citizens, allowing 
for a greater, and more direct, input into political affairs48. In addition, the victor was allowed to 
enter the city in a chariot through a breach in the city wall, otherwise reserved for successful 
generals49. Although we have few details on how victors were received in Greek cities other 
46 For a good example of the use of Olympiads for dating, see the method employed by Diodorus Siculus, 
who includes the name of the stadion winner at Olympia for dating the relevant years, as well as the 
names of Athenian archon and Roman consuls, e. g. XI. 1.2 - "Eit äpxovto; yäp 'AOývtlat KccUt0ou 
'P(Oltalot KUTE6T716aV iWCTOu; Zn6ptov K& tov Kal I-1P6KXov Ollrpyivtov TpiK06TOV, ijxOri SE Kal 
nap' '11Ä, £1M; 'O%ugnthhS 1if11itril itp6; Tals E38ojtip ovta, KaO' fly EvtKa 6T6(8tov 'AcrrWo; 
EhpaK66to;.... '. 
47 See the Prytaneion decree (IG 12 78,112 77,11 131) of 426/5 BC, which gives us this information, and 
Thompson (1979) who argues that the decree simply confirms such privileges that already existed in the 
city, and introduces new benefits to hippie victors, allowing for the expense of keeping horses. See also 
Xenophanes fr. 2 DK, Plato Apology 36d. 
48 OKell (2003) 65. 
49 Kurke (1998) 141. 
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than Athens, it is likely that in most cases they would receive similar treatment. However, the 
fact that Athens was a comparatively large and wealthy state would naturally mean more victors 
and more prominent citizens in general, all competing for influence amongst a large populace. 
One can also imagine the influence that would be held by a victor from a far smaller state, for 
example Epharmostus of Opous in Eastern Locris, who became a victor in all four crown games 
- aperiodonikes - when he won the wrestling at Olympia in 46850. 
Competing in the hippic events of a major games, aside from the point that it is an 
obvious method of showing off one's wealth, is also reckoned by Davies to have been a tool of 
expressing an interest in furthering a political career51. The example of Alcibiades is the best 
known, where he enters seven chariots into the race at Olympia in 416, and finishes first, second 
and fourth. This is used as a means to gain political support in order to gain command of the 
Sicilian Expedition, where it is explicitly mentioned as a means of gaining honour52. It is also 
noticed by Golden that Alcibiades' initial success came when he was around thirty years of age 
and therefore eligible for the office of strategos, which he gained in the elections the following 
year53. While I agree that such victories would undoubtedly be rewarded with political 
influence, and might be a precursor to such a career, I do not think that hippie victories 
themselves necessarily brought any more prestige than athletic victories. However, the very 
nature of hippie events could easily lead to an assumption that this was the case. One factor of 
course is the high profile of the hippie events, due simply to the sheer excitement generated by 
chariot races, but more importantly it may be expected that most, if not all competitors in a 
chariot race would be politically influential to start with, or at least with greater potential for 
future influence. It surely cannot be disputed that the wealthy were more politically active and 
influential, and were more likely to hold major offices, than the poorer citizens, even in 
democratic Athens. It is also the case that it is a much easier way of achieving a major victory 
(providing one has the money to be able to afford horses) than in an athletic event. Entering a 
chariot did not necessarily require any actual input other than owning the horses and chariot, 
and then paying for the transport and other costs of the equipment, horses and of course the 
so This victory was celebrated by Pindar in his Ninth Olympian Ode. A victorious athlete's political 
potential is discussed by Kyle (1987) 155ff. 
1 Davies (1971) 369-70. 
52 Thuc. V1.16.1-2. 
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charioteer himself. This meant an easy means for the wealthy to compete and win in major 
games without even having to attend in person. Also, only in a hippie event was it possible to 
enter more than once in a competition, and while Alcibiades may well have been the first to 
enter seven teams into one race, he was very probably not the first to enter more than one. The 
arguments that support the theory that hippie victories may have been more prestigious still tend 
to focus on the victory itself, rather than on the use of horses, and in actual fact there is little to 
differentiate hippie from athletic victories, other than the fact that it is, by its very nature, bound 
to involve the more politically influential because of the costs involved. 
For a man in Hieron's position, it is obvious that a victory in the games could not 
improve on his standing as autocrat over most of Eastern Sicily, aside from gaining heroic or 
even divine status. Even comparing Hieron's victory at Delphi to Alcibiades' own exploits at 
Olympia (and possible ambitions at Athens) is difficult even though both are ultimately aiming 
for public acceptance or support. While Hieron's social standing was not upwardly-mobile, it 
certainly was extremely vulnerable, so the victories (or at least his entry into the games) were 
probably useful as further attempts at legitimising his rule in Syracuse in the eyes of his 
subjects. The epinician odes performed54 may have been the primary means of achieving this, 
as well as the prestige gained from being a victor. It is also suggested by OKell that a victory in 
the chariot race could compensate for a lack of ancestry, noting the case of Teisias in 416, 
where he gave money to buy a team to Alcibiades in Argos, who claimed the team was his own, 
and therefore also the victory that followed55. This seems to have been intended as a political 
act by Teisias, adding prestige to himself and his family, but this would not have helped Hieron 
in his very different quest for legitimacy as a sole ruler. 
The Deinomenids and the Greek world 
Even though the epinician odes were performed at the sanctuaries, it seems that they 
were more concerned with the tyrants' position in Sicily itself, in an attempt not only to make 
53 Golden (1997) 334. 
5; Although his victory at Delphi was the most famous, he also enjoyed success at Olympia. 
55 OKell (2003) 70, Dem. 21.147, Plut. Alc. 16. 
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the tyrant's rule more palatable, but also to justify it in general. We shall now move on to how 
the Deinomenids actually represented themselves, and how others actually saw the position they 
held. The use of titles by the historians and poets who wrote about them, Diodorus, Herodotus 
and Pindar, will be considered, then to follow we will study the dedications left by the 
Deinomenids at the Panhellenic sanctuaries. It is only through the study of dedications that we 
can get a clear picture of how the tyrants wanted to be represented in the wider Greek world. 
But as has been said already, the Deinomenids also found a need to appear acceptable in the 
eyes of the Panhellenic aristocracy, and to start off we will return to Pindar's First Pythian Ode 
to find how this was done. 
The reason for returning briefly to the poem is that Hieron appears to be likened to 
Croesus, the king of Lydia, who is depicted in sharp contrast to the infamous Phalaris of 
Acragas. 
Co (piXE, KEpSE6ty EvTpanE- 
Xots" o teo ppoTov avxiµa Söi; as 
otov änotxoµevwv 6cv6p6)v Siattav µavv£t 
Kai XoyiotS Kai äotSoIS. oü cpOivEt Kpoi- 
aov (ptXöcpp(wv äpsth. 
Töv a "ravpq) X(AK q xainlpa vtlXEa vöov 
Exep& (I)äXapty ieo'r xt iravTä cpäu , 
oüSE vtv cpöpµtyy£S vmopöcptat Kotvaviav 
µa?, 9ax6cv 7tai&wv öäpotßt S£xov'at. 
Pind. Pyth. 1.92-98 
One may first see this simply as associating Hieron with a near-legendary king, just as 
he is compared to those of epic through usage of Homeric and Hesiodic symbols and attributes 
of their rule. However, the reasons behind the comparison here are very different. We find in 
Croesus a non-Greek king who was participating in the traditional Greek practice of gift- 
exchange amongst the various aristocracies, for example Solon is welcomed as a guest during 
his travels56. As Kurke describes him, he is a fantasy figure in a sort of cult celebrating 
habrosyne, e. g. luxury and splendour, where the king is enjoying extraordinary wealth together 
with almost unlimited power57. In other words, we have an example of an ideal where enjoying 
vast amounts of wealth was looked upon with admiration as opposed to jealousy. Therefore by 
associating himself with this cult of habrosyne, Hieron himself could be looked upon by the 
$6 Hdt. I. 29-34. 
57 Kurke (1999) 134-7. 
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Panhellenic elite in near-equal terms even to Croesus. There are also other points that can also 
be made here about why Croesus was an ideal figure for Hieron to identify himself with, the 
first being his participation in the tradition of gift-exchange -a true sign of aristocracy in 
Greece and one which Hieron would have wanted to emphasise tremendously. As Segal puts it, 
one aim of Pindar while writing for patrons such as Hieron or Arcesilas of Cyrene was to 
promote such ideas of aristocratic values in order to legitimise their prominent position in 
society58. 
Another point why Croesus was used in this way was his nationality, as even though he 
was not actually a Greek, being a Lydian residing on the fringes of the Greek world, he was 
Hellenised and still readily participated as a Greek aristocrat would, for example in gift- 
exchange and guest-friendship, and therefore was accepted into the realm of the aristocracy of 
Greece itself. The Deinomenids were of course Greek, but they were also, like Croesus, on the 
fringes of the Greek world in Sicily, and thus one would expect Hieron to find it more difficult 
in typical Greek-aristocratic activity, especially due to his position as tyrant which may have 
been seen as unsavoury in many cities, notably Athens, Sparta and Corinth, which had all 
expressed very strong anti-tyranny sentiments59. The reference to Croesus would therefore 
remind the Panhellenic elite to look beyond Greece proper to find men worthy of their 
acquaintance. Finally there is the point that Hieron is a tyrant, a position surrounded by 
questionable and suspicious ways and means. This problem is tackled by Pindar by contrasting 
Croesus, who has now become likened to Hieron, to Phalaris of Acragas. Kurke sees more than 
just the one obvious contrast (between good and bad) being made in this passage60. While the 
first is seen as generous, the other is abnormally savage, the first is a constitutional king, and the 
other an unconstitutional tyrant, one is associated with gold (his wealth and generosity), the 
other with bronze (the hollow bull statue in which the tyrant's victims were roasted to death). 
This last contrast may even be in reference to the `golden' and `brazen' ages of man described 
in Hesiod61. It therefore seems in consideration of Pindar's aims in writing the ode, that 
Croesus, being rich, powerful, generous, and of course on the fringes of the Greek world, was 
58 Segal (1986) 124-5. 
59 It is also interesting, though probably coincidental, that the Greek word tyrannos was of Lydian origin. 
60 Kurke (1999) 135. 
61 Hesiod Works and Days, 109ff. (the age of gold), 139ff. (the age of bronze). 
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the perfect man to compare to Hieron in order to achieve success. In Bacchylides' Third Ode, 
there seems to be a similar attempt to associate Hieron with the Panhellenic elite: 
XäµztEt S' t itö µapµapvyais ö xpvßös, 
üynSat&ä%Twv rptn68wv aTaO vTwv 
thpotOE vaov, c60t gýyt[a2]ov äXßoq 
(Doipov zrapä KaaTa? iaS [p]EE6potc 
AcXcpoi 81Enovßt. 
Bacch. 3.17-21 
In this short excerpt from the ode, Hieron's wealth is praised in a much more straight- 
forward fashion, and here also is mentioned the tyrant's generosity, not only in the form of 
xenia to other men, but also in his many dedications to the gods. In other words he is as 
wealthy as Croesus, but also just as pious and as generous to all. Hieron's wealth, we can 
assume, has come from the same source as his immense power, as Bacchylides claims, from the 
gods themselves62. 
Basileus, Tvrannos, Oikistes 
The study of the Deinomenids' use of titles is one that has generated much debate, in 
fact probably no other subject concerning these tyrants has become so widely known. It has 
huge consequences for the study of political philosophy in a fairly unclear period, particularly 
with general attitudes towards both tyranny and kingship. Here I wish to examine how the 
tyrants were represented, both by themselves and by their contemporaries, and differing stances 
taken on the subject. 
Firstly I will continue with studying Pindar's Odes, and the representations made within 
them, before going on to examine the evidence for the Deinomenids' own preferences. The 
most controversial feature of Pindar's Odes (at least when considering the Deinomenids) is his 
use of the term basiletrs63 in describing both Hieron and his son Deinomenes, who may have 
been a sub-tyrant of Aetna, of the Scythes-type64. There is little comparative material in Pindar 
to consider: the only other individual referred to as basileus is Arkesilas IV of Cyrene, who was 
62 Bacch. 3.9-16. 
63 Hieron - Ol. 1.23, Pyth. 111.70, Deinomenes - Pyth. 1.60. 6' See the chapter on Refoundations, regarding the Samian episode at Zancle for Scythes, and the 
refoundation of. Aetna on Deinomenes' likely position in the new city. 
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known to have been a hereditary king65, and the only other instance of a Deinomenid being 
referred to as a king (aside from the inscription by Polyzelus found with the Charioteer of 
Delphi, to be discussed later66) is in Diodorus, following Gelon's victory at Himera: 
Ste Kai Tiffs 6piif ci maxwv, Tijv npoBupiav Twv aTpaTtwtrwv äcoöEýäµsvos, 
6vv' yayEv £KKXTI6lav, ? tpoc 'r C aS &ltavtas Ö itav'thv ger& TÜov ÖirXo v aÜrÖS 
SE oü µövov Twv ötrXwv yvµvös Eis Ttly EKKXrlaiav i XOEV, äXX& Kai xit ov Ev 
igaTiw npoaEXAwv änE?, oyk cLto gEv it pi itav r6q Toi ßiov Kai Twv 
1tE1tpayµEVwV aiTw irpoq Toils EvpaxoßiovS E(p' EKÖ c TQl 6E TG)v Ä, EyoIIEVCOV 
E to atvoµhvwv Twv 6XXwv, Kai AavµaCövTwv µäXtc to öTt yvµvöv EauT6V 
itapc6E56)KEt TO-IS ßovXoµevots aüröv ävEXEty, Toc oüiov ä1tetxE Tob [µIh] 
Tuxciv TtµwpiaS wS Tüpavvos, cxiaTE µtä cpwvj ttävtas änoKaXEiv EiEpyETtly 
Kai 6wTTjpa Kai ßaat%£a. 
Diod. Sic. XI. 26.5-6 
In his translation of Diodorus, Oldfather argues that Gelon was in fact officially 
proclaimed king by the assembly of soldiers, therefore meaning that a contrast was made 
between (unconstitutional) tyranny and the (constitutional) position which Gelon now held67. 
Dunbabin disagrees, saying that the fact that basileus immediately follows two honorific titles, 
euergetes and soter68, implies that basileus too is meant as an honorific title69. However, the 
central argument against the idea of a constitutional kingship under Gelon (also therefore held 
by Hieron and Thrasybulus), is that the tyrants never refer to themselves as basileus in surviving 
inscriptions70, and this seems to be the standard position to be held. The argument that Pindar is 
using basileus because of the possible negative connotations associated with tyra mos runs into 
problems when Pindar uses the latter term quite comfortably, and even in a positive light in 
65 Pyth. IV. 2, V. 15. See Chamoux (1953), Carlier (1984) 474-6, and Drews (1983) 121-8 on the 
Cyrenean kings. 
66 See below 201. 
67 The Loeb edition of 1946, p. 195, n. 1. 
68 The two titles euergetes and soter are almost certainly a legacy of Diodorus' sources and are very 
unlikely to have actually been given to Gelon. Both titles were commonly used by Hellenistic kings, 
most famously the Ptolemies, so it seems likely that Diodorus' use of these titles is either derived from a 
Hellenistic source, or is indeed his own contribution, remembering that the time of his writing the 
Bibliotheke coincided with the end of the Ptolemaic dynasty (c. 60-30 BC). Rutter (1993) 176ff. opts for 
the latter theory, on the grounds that Timaeus is likely to have been the main source for Diodorus' 
Sicilian narrative, but in fact had died before the use of soter and euergetes became commonplace in the 
Hellenistic kingdoms. Also, the stereotyped image of Gelon as `good king' in the Hellenistic style is 
further evidence for post-Timaean influence, see Cairns (1989) 17-2 1. 
69 Dunbabin (1948) 426-7. Sacks (1990) points out Diodorus' own fascination with certain individuals' 
benefaction to society, as well as the attribution of honours to these individuals such as Gelon - see 61- 
82. What is also made clear is Diodorus' tendency to exaggerate on these issues, in particular deification 
(73ff. - the example is given of the `deification' of Q. Mucius Scaevola (XXXVII. 6) which is not 
recorded in the surviving decrees - OGIS 437-9) . 
Given Diodorus' admiration for Gelon above others it 
is probably wise to treat the attribution of such titles with caution. 
70 Again, with the exception of Polyzelus and the Charioteer inscription. 
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another of the odes to Hieron71. Harrell argues that the fact that he is called basileus by Pindar 
is to continue with the allusions to Homeric kingship - in other words what would be the point 
in trying to convince everyone that his rule is divinely ordained and likened to that of 
Agamemnon if he does not even refer to Hieron with the title of a typically Homeric leader, i. e. 
a king? 72 Using tyrannos in Pythian One or Olympian One73 would defeat the point of 
promoting the Homeric idea, regardless of whether tyrannos had any negative connotations. It 
therefore logically follows that two conclusions can be made: firstly, there is no negative 
background to using lyrannos, at least at this time, and the word can also be used 
interchangeably with basileus when describing a sole ruler, and secondly, the cases in which 
Pindar uses basileus alone are those where he is promoting the idea of a Homeric kingship in 
fifth-century Sicily. Whether the Deinomenids did consider themselves as basileis rather than 
tyrannoi is therefore still to be determined, although I think the evidence so far indicates that 
there was no preference and certainly no title that caused them displeasure74. 
The strongest case that has yet been made in favour of the Deinomenids using basileus 
as an official title is that of Oost. His argument is, firstly, that there is little difference in 
meaning (at least this early in Greek history) between basileus and tyrannos, noting Isocrates' 
loose usage of the two without meaning to offend, and also the change in Pheidon of Argos' 
position from basileus to ryranvtos75. Therefore, Oost says, we cannot rule out the use of 
basileus by the Deinomenids even if they were regularly referred to as tyrannoi. However, 
there are immediately flaws in this argument, in that, firstly, the change in the position of 
Pheidon from basileus to tyrannos does indeed indicate a difference between the two, in order 
for such a change to be identified, and secondly there is no evidence that the Deinomenids 
referred to themselves as tyrannoi either. Oost goes on to describe how Herodotus, Diodorus 
and Pindar are all immediately dismissed when describing Gelon, Hieron or Thrasybulus as 
71 Pind. Pyth. 111.85. 
72 Harrell (2002) 441. It must however also be noted that at no point in any of the odes addressed to 
Hieron does Pindar use the term anax/wanax, which would certainly bolster the idea that Pindar is 
alluding to Homeric kingship. 
73 These are the two odes where the idea of Hieron's promotion to a Homeric-style king seem to be 
expressed most strongly. 
74 Pythian Three, where he calls Hieron a tyrannos and basileus within fifteen lines of each other (111.70, 
85) indicates a lack of real preference. Displeasure with either can be ruled out as he is referred to as 
each in more than one ode, and it is likely that a problem with one title would have almost certainly meant 
the title was not used again, or even having the title edited out in severe cases. 
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basileus76. Although this is a point of much worth, the fact is that even if one does not 
immediately discount the sources who describe various Deinomenids as basileus, it does not 
follow that the Deinomenids themselves used the title. If one was to take this stance, one would 
encounter difficulties because Pindar uses both titles, but it cannot follow that the Deinomenids 
officially used both. In the case of Herodotus, Gelon is also referred to as tyrannos, but since 
there are no references to the period after Himera, we cannot tell if Herodotus regarded Gelon as 
king. Diodorus uses basilezis consistently to describe the Deinomenids after Himera, until the 
reign of Thrasybulus becomes more tyrannical in our own sense, where tyrannos is used 
thereafter77. It does therefore seem that we are at the mercy of our sources - we are getting 
mixed signals either because of a blurred line of distinction between basileus and tyrannos, or, 
in the case of Diodorus, because titles are distributed as the author seems to deem fit. The 
problem therefore still remains, and is complicated by Diodorus' claim that Gelon was made 
basileus by the assembly of soldiers78. One could easily read further into this statement by 
saying that the office must have been hereditary, therefore all who succeeded Gelon would also 
have been basileis, and they are described as such by Diodorus79. So why is Thrasybulus then 
described as a tyrannos, and clearly with a negative intent? The answer must be that Diodorus 
is describing Thrasybulus as regards his manner of rule, and not his official constitutional 
position. Could this mean Diodorus is assuming a sort of moral aspect as being essential for a 
monarch to be a basileus as opposed to a tyrannos? 
One other title that almost certainly would have figured in Hieron's plans for gaining 
acceptance, whether at home in Sicily or abroad, is oikistes80. The main reasons for this were 
firstly that founding a city would be the ultimate legitimisation of one's rule over it, but also 
because it ensured that Hieron would be remembered after death in Aetna at least, even if his 
name was vilified in other parts, as it was. The first point is especially important in the context 
'S Oost (1976) 224-5, Isoc. 2.1,4,35-6, Ar. Pol. 1310b25-7. 
76 Oost (1976) 227. for Hieron as basileus in Pindar, see above, n. 39; Herodotus - (Gelon) - VII. 161,159 
(Oost claims that Hdt. is claiming Gelon as basileutatos, even though it is clearly in contrast to 
Agamemnon, not in comparison); Diodorus - (Gelon) - X1.23.3., 38.2,3,7, (Hieron) - X1.38.3,7,48.3 
(along with Theron of Acragas), (Thrasybulus) - XI. 66.4,67.1,68.7. " Diod. Sic. XI. 67.6ff. 
78 Diod. Sic. X1.26.5-6. 
79 See above, n. 49. 
80 See the chapter on city refoundation; also Dougherty (1993) 83-98, Malkin (1987) 237-40 on the 
importance of the title of oikistes and the Deinomenids. 
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of legitimisation in the eyes of the Greek world, because the city of Aetna (where Hieron is 
proclaimed by Pindar to be from) is the one place where Hieron is, strictly speaking, more than 
a tyrant and with an undisputable place in the new city's brief history81. The second point is 
only really of relevance when considered in the context of propaganda aimed at the Sicilians 
themselves, rather than the whole Greek world, but this seems to be just as important to Hieron 
if we consider one of Pindar's hyporchemata. 
EvvES ö -Tot x9y(O, 
ca6E0)v i£pwv EnwvutE 
1t&tEp, KtIctop ALTvas' 
vogOE6at yäp Ev Exv8ats &Xäiai. GTpaTChv, 
ös 6µaýoy6prltOV OIKOV oü 7te1caTat, 
äKXgils <S'> 913a. 
Pind. fr. l05ab (Snell) 
This poem celebrates the immortal fame enjoyed by a founder, through cult. While the 
first half seems to concentrate on how Hieron was always destined to enjoy such fame, in 
reference to the word-play on Hieron's name, the second gives an example of an opposite case 
of the Scythian nomad who enjoys neither fame nor association with any centre of population82. 
That Hieron was indeed worshipped at Aetna after his death is attested by Diodorus83, and thus 
we can see how the tyrant wanted to be seen as a typical aristocrat, an Homeric style king and a 
founder all in one. It must also be noted that of all the cases of refoundation in Sicily during the 
time of the Deinomenids and of Cleandrus and Hippocrates, Hieron's is the only one where we 
have specific evidence indicating a wish to be known as oikistes, although the others are often 
termed foundations or refoundations by ancient and modern authors alike. 
Dedications 
Finally, we are going to consider the dedications left at the Panhellenic sanctuaries to 
discover how the Deinomenids described themselves. It has been long known that the 
Deinomenids never referred to themselves as tyrannos, basileus or any other title, political or 
military, in inscriptions, although Polyzalus' Charioteer, which was later amended, announced 
$' Pindar names Hieron as oikistes in Pyth. 1.31, and Hieron's intention to be known as such is mentioned 
in Diodorus' account of the foundation - X1.49.2. 82 Dougherty (1993) 97-8. 
83 Diod. Sic. X1.66.4. 
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that he had `ruled (&väaßov) over Gela'84. However, Harrell notes that the dedications do not 
necessarily reflect actual titles held by the Deinomenids; rather they reflect how the tyrants 
wanted to be perceived by the rest of the Greek world, in particular the aristocracy85, and we 
have already looked at an example of this from the `Croesus' passage from Pythian One86. In 
these cases, the standard protocol for dedicating monuments at Olympia or Delphi was to be 
named as a private citizen would be, with reference to name, patronymic and home city, and this 
was strictly adhered to by the Deinomenids, aside from the Charioteer inscription. This also 
applied to the coinage under the dynasty, where there is not a single use of any kind of title, 
only the name of the city, and this was for similar reasons as the dedications, that coinage was 
likely to travel large distances into other parts of the Greek world, where they will inevitably be 
noticed by the public at large, particularly by the aristocracy. Finley states that this was due to a 
certain stigma connected with the word tyrannos, especially following the threat of Persian 
despotism that had only recently been defeated87. The Deinomenids were also now the only 
Greek tyrants to speak of at the time, and thus were isolated in that respect. 
In studying the monuments of Olympia and Delphi, as opposed to the odes of Pindar 
and Bacchylides, we find the earliest evidence lies with Gelon's victory in the chariot race of 
488 in Olympia. We have no information about this event other than a report from Pausanias, 
who records the inscription on the monument which survives today, albeit with the inscription 
in a poor state88. 
Tä SE eS rä äpµa Tä r xwvoS oü xaTä TaüTä So äýEty Eµoi TE napi6TaTo 
Kai Toil npöTEpov ij Eyw Tä ýS aü'rö eipllKÖßty, of I'eXwvo; Toi Ev EtK£; ýia 
Tvpavvf aavtÖ; cpa6ty äväOrlµa Eivat Tö äpµa. Etiypaµµ(x JEV Std EaTty 
aüTG) F' Xwva i6LvogEvovs äva6ctvat FEXWOv, Kai ö xpövo; TovT(p Tq) 
F Xwvl E6Tl TTjg vLKljs TpiT11 tpös Täs ý3 O tf1KOVTa öývµýtäSas I'Eýwv S£ 
Ö EtKEXias Tupavvrjßas Evpaxoüßas gayev `YßplXI ov ji v 'AOijvrty 
äpXOVtOG, SEVTEpco SE 9TFI Tiffs SEVTEpas Kai £ßßo111lKo6Tn5 ö? tins os, AV 
TLatxp&u; Evixa KpotwvläTils ßtäStov. Sf? a ovv cis Evpaxoüatov'jSi Kai 
ov I'sXcüov ävayopsiusty aüTÖV EµeXXEV" &U& yap iSLwTmls Etll äv Tts 6 
racov Ottos, laTpo; Te öµwvüµov Tw Tupävvup Kai aüte; ö tcovvµo;. 
FXavKias u Aiylviittjs Tö TE &pµa Kai ATÜ) 'r F Xcwvt E1LOi1j6fi Tijv ciKöva. 
Pates. 6.9.4-5 
84 Andrewes (1963) 25,135, Dunbabin (1948) 427. The Charioteer of Delphi inscription - CEG 397, see 
below 201 ff. 
85 Harrell (2002) 450. Also noted is the perception of entering hippie events as political acts (Raschke 
(1988) 38-41, Kurke (1991) 172-80) as discussed above, 188. 
86 Pind. Pyth. 1.89-98, see above 189. 
7 Finley (1979) 56. 
88 S! G3 33, Pausanias 6.9.4-5. This is discussed by Eckstein (1969) 54-60. 
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The simplicity of the inscription in fact becomes an issue in Pausanias' description, 
although his `correction' is based on historical inaccuracy (he fails to realise that in 488 BC, 
Gelon was not yet in control of Syracuse, therefore the inscription is correct); this mistake 
would not have been possible if the inscription had not been in the style of a private citizen, so 
therefore it is indistinguishable from a standard dedication at Olympia89. 
It has become apparent over the course of this thesis that Gelon was hardly in need of 
propaganda at all, at least in comparison to Hieron90. Gelon's military achievements, both in the 
conquest of Syracuse and the defeat of the Carthaginians at Himera, together with Diodorus' 
description of him as `humane and gentle' in contrast to the image we get of Hieron as `greedy 
and violent' certainly give this impression91. Not surprisingly, Hieron, who according to Kurke 
was in fact the opposite of the aristocratic ideals that he was desperate to be seen to have92, was 
in far greater need of positive propaganda than his brother. However, even though we have a 
greater number of inscriptions ascribed to Hieron (and they do become more elaborate, although 
this seems to be the norm anyway according to Steiner9) we still find no references at all to any 
titles or any hints that Hieron is even a ruler. Harrell makes special reference to a posthumous 
dedication made by Deinomenes in place of Hieron, in honour of his victories at Olympia94: 
66v noT£ VI d aas, Z£v 'OXvµm£, ß£µvöv äywva 
T£Apücttw J1 V &Ital;, ltOUVOKEX1tt SE SLS, 
Scapa `IEpwv Tä8£ Got Exapi66aTO" zcais S' ävs 8r1K£ 
A£tvoµ£vrs itaTpö; pva pct EvpaKoaiou 
Paus. 8.42.995 
Although it is clearly more elaborate, it does not make any references to the political 
situation, with Harrell even noting that Hieron is representing his city rather than leading it96. It 
is also made clear that this is a dedication by Hieron, as promised before his death, rather than 
89 Harrell (2002) 451. 
90 See above chapters on refoundations 174. 
91 Diod. Sic. XI. 67.2-3,4. 
92 Kurke (1999) 133-4. 
93 See Steiner (1993) 168 and (1994) 93, who notes the increasing elaboration in fifth century 
inscriptions. The point that we have more inscriptions from Hieron's reign than from under the other 
Deinomenids is not necessarily significant, as it seems only some have survived to us from the total 
number at the time. 
94 Harrell (2002) 452. 
95 SIG' 35E, see Ebert (1972) 71-3, no. 17. 
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by Deinomenes, who is also named with no title. In Delphi we find much the same thing, for 
example the remains of a huge tripod offering, this being two surviving bases with inscriptions, 
one of which names Gelon, but this could very well be the offering made by the Deinomenid 
family following Himera97: 
brlµi f'EXwv', 'IEpwva, Ilo?, v4rlXov, OpaaüpouXov, 7taI8(XS AetvogEvm)q 'robq 
Tpiiro&as 6E11evat, 06(pßapa vuxrlaavTas eOvrl, toXXijv SE irapaßxciv ßüµµaxov 
"Ei XTIaty xEip' es ýX 9cpii1v. 
sch. Pind. Pyth. I. 152 
Again, the style is elaborate but still there are no references to titles, or for that matter 
the Syracusans themselves (although this could be because it is only dedicated on behalf of the 
Deinomenids). Harrell feels that the broadcasting of Gelon's achievement was done in a 
different way, through the huge offering celebrating a famous event (though this is not actually 
mentioned, it would have been well known) but also its placing opposite the Plataea offering of 
the same year, along the Sacred Way98. One immediately thinks back to Pindar's inclusion of 
Hieron's victory at Cumae in the same breath as Plataea and Salamis99. Another inscription 
found from a military context is that on a set of three helmets found at Olympia. These were 
dedicated following the victory at Cumae in 474, by Hieron, who this time states his name and 
father, and then includes the Syracusans as also responsible for the spoils given to Zeus from 
Italy. 
`Iäpcov 6 Actvoµhvcos 
Kal 'vol rDopaK66tot 
'rin M. Tvppavwv ättö KüµaS. 
Meiggs and Leivis 29, SEG xxxiii 328 (Olympia V 249.3) 
The main points to be made here are firstly that there is again no title, but according to 
Harrell there is a sort of hierarchy, with Hieron on the first line on the inscription and the 
Syracusans on the second100. I myself feel that this is due simply to the size of the dedication, as 
the inscription as a whole can be seen from a single angle, rather than having the writing 
96 Harrell (2002) 452. 
97 The inscription is now attributed to Simonides (fr. 106 Diehl, 141 Bergk., 170 Edmonds). Diodorus 
mentions the context of the dedication itself as being that of the aftermath of Himera - Diod. Sic. XI. 26.7 98 Harrell (2002) 454; Meiggs and Lewis (1988) no. 27 (Plataea), 28 (Himera). The positioning of the 
dedications may simply be a coincidence, and it is also unknown which was placed first, but it is believed 
by some that there was some sort of competition between the two dedications, Gauthier (1966) 14, 
Meiggs and Lewis (1988) 61, Laroche (1989) 196, Krumeich (1991) 60-1. 
99 Pind. Pyth. 1.71-80, see Gauthier (1966) 8-11. 
100 Harrell (2002) 453. 
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stretched around the helmet and therefore requiring handling in order to read in full, which may 
not have been possible for a visitor to Olympia. Another fairly simple explanation could be that 
the inscription is metrical1° , 
but the main point should be that the credit for the victory is still 
seen as being shared between the tyrant and his people, in contrast to the view shared by Pindar, 
where Hieron single-handedly saves the whole of Greece, by his victory in Cumae102. 
So where does all this fit in with the idea of `Panhellenic protocol' discussed above? 
The main point to be made is that it was standard practice amongst victors (whether in war or 
athletics) to share their success with their polls, rather than claim the victory for oneself. This 
would normally bring great benefits to the individual of course, just as in Athens, where all city 
benefactors (eüspyEtcts), including Panhellenic victors and successful generals, were allowed 
certain privileges103. Kurke describes the nature of this in the context of iuegaloprepeia, which 
can be roughly translated as lavish expenditure by wealthy individuals104. While this first of all 
seems to have been a mostly private affair, involving the practice of gift-exchange amongst the 
elite in Greece, it had also become a very public matter during the Archaic Age, whereas later 
still in Athens it had become a duty for the very wealthy to provide ships, horses, choruses for 
drama festivals, and so on, to the extent we find described in Xenophon's Oeconomicus'os 
Victories were also viewed as public benefaction, and therefore also a type of rnegaloprepeia, 
especially it seems, victory in hippie events which would have involved far greater expenditure 
than standard athletic events, and therefore also would still be restricted to the very wealthy in 
society. Megaloprepeia through city benefaction would therefore have been a standard feature 
of aristocratic life at this time, so it would have been important for the Deinomenids to be 
consistent with it in order to fit in with the Panhellenic elite, whether through victory in war or 
at the games. 
As Harrell notes, sticking with the traditions concerning megaloprepeia and also others 
of the various aristocracies of Greece may have at least assuaged some of the stigma that would 
101 See Meiggs and Lewis (1969) 62, the inscription is thought to be two choriambic dimeters followed by 
a paroemiac. 
10 Pind. Pyth. 1.73. 
103 Xenophanes fr. 2 DK, Plato Apol. 36d. 
104 Kurke (1991) ch. 7 -'Adorning the city'. 105 Xen. Oec. 11.8. 
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naturally have come with being a tyrant 106. At this time when the very freedom of the Greeks 
had been put under threat by Persian invasion, therefore resulting in a distaste for autocracy in 
general and a new sense of wanting to protect Greek values and their way of life, it was 
critically important to the Deinomenids that they should not destroy the aristocratic traditions 
concerning self-presentation at the Panhellenic sanctuaries, but continue them, as they did107. 
While attempts to mix in with the Panhellenic aristocracy would certainly make sense to 
us, given the tyrants' isolated position both geographically and politically speaking, is it 
consistent with the way other autocratic rulers in this period represented themselves to others? 
To be brief 08 it seems that these protocols were roughly adhered to, even though there is a case 
where the patronymic and city are left out in a dedication made to Zeus at Olympia, probably by 
Miltiades the Younger of the Chersonese, and although the circumstances of the dedication are 
unknown, the dedication itself is a helmet and therefore is probably from a military context' 09. 
MtXitäöE; ävE[O]axev [ T]öt Ai. 
IG 13 1472 
In another case, probably dedicated by his uncle, Miltiades the Elder, the city itself was 
given precedence in the inscription, but reference is clearly made to the leader of the military 
campaign, Miltiades, however this hardly seems to be a case of the general claiming victory for 
himself 10. 
Zvi µ' äyaXp' ävi Orlxav 'OX-ognic0 EK xcpovi o-o rCtXo; 0,6vteS 'Apä rov" 
En< pXE 6E Mt?, Ttährls acpiv. 
Paus. 6.19.6 
Hipparchus the Peisistratid is also credited with an inscription which omits his city, 
found at the Ptoion in Boeotia. While this is not a Panhellenic sanctuary, it did have a fairly 
high profile, and the inscription's attribution is fairly unreliable, but we find once again that 
there is no political office mentioned. 
h1LTCitapxOc ÖCV£BE[K£V 110 rHEL6L6]Tp6CTO. 
IG I3 1470 
106 Harrell (2002) 455. 
107 The degree of distaste for autocracy in Greece is the subject of part of an article by Ferrill (1978) 394- 
8. 
108 This has already been considered in more detail by Harrell (2002) 456-7. 
'09 See Kunze (1956) 69-71, Gauer (1968) 22-3. 
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However, it is noted by Oost that the actual use of titles in media such as inscriptions 
and coins is very rare, even in the Hellenistic age where actual kingship and therefore the use of 
basileus as a title was quite common, and therefore we cannot assume that there was no official 
title used by the Deinomenids just from this evidence". It seems that as far as presenting 
oneself to the rest of the Greek world was concerned, the tyrants and Hieron in particular 
preferred to hint at the legitimacy of their position in Syracuse, while the position itself was 
usually kept at a distance. 
The only recorded instance of a Deinomenid referring to himself as a ruler in an 
inscription is found in the dedication now known as the Delphi Charioteer, dedicated by 
Polyzelus (who was made tyrant of Gela by Hieron112) following a chariot victory at Delphi in 
either 478 or 474' 13. While at first the inscription appears to read: 
II]o?, gaxöS µ' äv£6jx[E(v) 
This turns out to be a later amendment, whereas the original inscription which can still 
be partly seen says 
[µväµa IIoXvgaA. [tE r]Exag 6Cv9[9]sKE[v] ä[v]äaß[ov] 
This is suggested to have been amended when the Sicilian cities turned to democracy 
following Thrasybulus' banishment in 466114, and therefore can be seen as an effort to bestow 
honour upon the city of Gela, over which Polyzelus ruled. This may be seen as a mistake on 
Polyzelus' part (although perhaps not an honest mistake) in that he confused the image of 
traditional Homeric kingship as expressed in Pindar, with the image of a private citizen 
supposed to be portrayed on dedications. In Harrell's words, Polyzelus simply "got it 
wrong" 115 
110 This is ascribed by his nephew, Miltiades the Younger, also tyrant of the Chersonese, by Pausanias 
(6.19.6). See Berve (1937) 39, Blumenthal (1937) 476, Bengtson (1939) 13-4. 
'" Oost (1.976). 
112 The position of tyrant at Gela was held by Hieron himself before the death of Gelon in 478. 
113 CEG 397. See Wade-Gery (1933) 101-4, Ebert (1972) 60-3, Jeffery (1990) 266-7. 
114 See Chamoux (1955) 26-31, Jeffery (1990) 266. 
115 Harrell (2002) 458-61. 
202 
FigureS- The Ar 1_ 
.: ig ca 
Museum catalogue no. 3484) 
Conclusion 
There are so many facets of this subject that it is difficult to generalise about them, as 
well as the usual problem of generalisation about the tyrants. The evidence is however 
cý, ae by one tyrant in particular - Hieron - through his use of dedications but especial y 
the epinician poets (as well as the recruitment of others such as Simonues and Aechylus ). This 
commissioning of famous poets from all over Greece s not :.: c ... 
in itself, but what makes it 
different to the other exampies involy ng tyrants is that they seem to have been brought to S ciiy 
for the purpose of propaganda. This propaganda came in the form of attempting to i;, I: se 
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Hieron's reign in front of a large, Panhellenic audience. This audience would also have viewed 
his famous victory in the chariot race in Delphi in 470, and also at Olympia beforehand. 
However, I think that it was the victory itself, and not so much the event that he competed in, 
that provided further propaganda-fodder, even though there are many cases of politically 
significant individuals competing in and winning hippie events. It is due to the fact that these 
events allow for easy participation and therefore victory that they became vehicles for political 
advancement. The matter of the propaganda produced by the poets is a complex one, as while it 
seems clear that there is usage of references to Homeric kingship, we cannot tell how much this 
actually figured in the tyrant's intentions. A possible clue is the use of ä[v]äßa[ov] in the 
Delphi Charioteer inscription by Polyzelus, a typically Homeric term, perhaps indicative of real 
Deinomenid intentions in that field. 
The use of titles by the Deinomenids is even more problematic. There is no mention of 
a title in the surviving dedications at Olympia and Delphi, but this need not necessarily meant 
the absence of titles being used altogether, the omission is simply part of the tyrants' attempt to 
fit in with the Panhellenic elite, and to simply follow precedents set many years before. The 
literary sources, having been reviewed, do seem to indicate the official use of the title basileus, 
although this cannot be proven until we have stronger evidence. The use of the term in 
Diodorus may be indicative of a change in attitude by the author when, in describing the reign 
of Thrasybulus, it is replaced by tyrannos. The fact he uses basileus without exception 
beforehand (even in description of Thrasybulus), and does not use it to describe the 
contemporary tyrants of Rhegium and Acragas, only means that Diodorus wants to show 
consistency on the matter of the Deinomenids' apparent kingship. 
Before Hieron's reign there is little evidence to be considered, even taking into account 
evidence written after that time. Of Cleandrus and Hippocrates we hear nothing in terms of 
propaganda, and the only evidence of titles we find comes in Herodotus' narrative' 16. This 
absence can be explained when compared with the situations of their Deinomenid successors. 
Gelon did not recruit poets, as far as we know, but we do have dedications made by him in the 
traditional style. This could simply be a wish to be consistent with other dedications, or part of 
116 Referred to as tyrannoi - Hdt. 154-5. 
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a plan to associate himself with aristocrats in Greece proper - something which would have had 
more to do with Sicily's distance from Greece than perhaps an attempt at legitimisation. Gelon 
had no reason to legitimise his reign in the view of his subjects, at least after Himera (although 
this does not mean that Himera itself was not open to exploitation), and thus had no need to 
promote himself in an extravagant fashion. Hieron, on the other hand, had to live up to his 
brother's achievements and popularity, an almost impossible task. He also would have felt 
pressured to prove that his dynasty was worth continuing after Gelon, and that his reign was 
beneficial to his subjects, hence the propaganda. It is more or less accepted that despite the 
efforts of himself and his band of poets, he ultimately failed because he clearly was not the 
leader he said he was, and was not remembered as such by others following his death. From 
what we know of Thrasybulus, there is nothing to be said of any similar efforts. If we return to 
Cleandrus and Hippocrates, the main reason why we hear nothing in terms of propaganda was 
that there was no need for it. Although we have no positive evidence for confirmation, it is 
probable that Cleandrus became tyrant either because of popular unrest, or the possible threat of 
Sicel disruption"7. He did not need to legitimise his role in Gela because he enjoyed his 
position for a good reason. Hippocrates spent much of his time campaigning, and although the 
indications are that he was by no means popular118, this was how he legitimised his own rule - 
through military achievement and possibly force. We see much the same with the reign of 
Gelon, although despite the military conquests in Sicily itself, we have no evidence of 
dedications made, possibly because none have survived to us. It may again be the case that 
when studying Sicily before Gelon, we are very much at the mercy of our sources. 
117 See previous chapter on mercenaries for a discussion of the pre-tyranny period in Gela, and the city's 
problems. 
18 Hdt. VII. 155. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE AFTERMATH OF TYRANNY AND THE DEINOMENIDS' 
LATER INFLUENCE 
The Deinomenid era is clearly a significant one in the context of early Sicilian history, 
and one would reasonably expect that to be evident in the aftermath of the tyranny as well as 
during it. Many of the episodes studied so far were on a grand scale, for example the mass 
movement of peoples numbering in the thousands, relations with Carthage, a Mediterranean 
superpower with whom a battle was fought that was compared with the Persian invasion of 
Greece itself, and the propaganda produced for celebrations of the Panhellenic games. While it 
is impossible to fully explore the influence the Deinomenids would have had on later events, at 
least within the confines of a single chapter, it is worth looking at some events or processes that 
have either gained greater attention from scholarship, or are more closely linked to the issues 
discussed in previous chapters. For this purpose there will be four aspects of the following 
hundred years to be considered: first, the effect of the tyranny on the political situation in fifth 
century Syracuse, wherein lies probably the biggest question of all, that of whether they were to 
blame for the ultimate failure of the democratic government. Following this, the situation at 
Carthage will be examined, focusing in particular on whether their defeat at Himera was as 
influential as our sources, particularly Diodorus, make it out to be. Next a common theme 
throughout both these eras will be considered, in this case the use of mercenaries, particularly 
whether their later use can be attributed to Deinomenid influence, and finally the question of 
whether Dionysius was concerned about constitutional legitimacy will be tackled, bearing in 
mind that the question is equally valid concerning the Deinomenids. The main aim in this 
chapter is to explore the ways in which the Deinomenids did influence later events in Sicily, 
and to examine cases where this claim could realistically be disputed. 
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Syracuse after the Deinomenids 
As the empire built under Hippocrates and the Deinomenids had fragmented, following 
the expulsion of Thrasybulus in 466, there is simply not enough space here to go into much 
detail about how each of its constituent parts had been affected by the break-up, not to mention 
those cities formerly governed from Acragas, so the focus here will be on Syracuse itself. 
However, it is not too inaccurate to say that all the cities previously ruled from Syracuse had 
immediately turned to democracy as they gained independence, and those formerly ruled from 
Acragas were more than ready to help Syracuse itself as it was finally getting rid of the 
tyranny'. However, difficult as it was for the Syracusans and indeed the whole of Sicily to be 
rid of tyranny, the legacy left by the Deinomenids was to prove just as destructive in itself, and 
amounted to far more than the bad taste left by Thrasybulus' gross misrule. In fact it was the 
various policies of the preceding tyrants, Hippocrates, Gelon and Hieron, which did the most 
damage to later attempts at peace and social harmony in Syracuse and other cities in Sicily. 
While the other Greek cities seemed ready to forgive Syracuse for its past empire building, it 
was the way in which the tyrants had built this empire that was the problem, particularly 
through the use of mercenaries. As we have found in previous chapters, mercenaries were 
hired in their thousands at the time, and many were rewarded with Syracusan citizenship or 
land elsewhere in Sicily, in lieu of pay, and often at the expense of the tyrants' subjects, the 
founding of Aetna on the site of Catana in 476 being the prime example2. Aside from those 
citizens of Sicilian Megara and Euboea who were sold into slavery, many were shifted around 
to other cities, such as the Catanaeans and Naxians to Leontini, the wealthy Megarians and 
Euboeans, and also citizens of Camarina and Gela to Syracuse itself, and this was often a result 
of either the settlement of mercenaries or of general military policy3. It is not surprising 
therefore that when Thrasybulus was expelled, these people wanted their cities back. In cases 
such as Catana the problem could be solved by forcing Hieron's settled mercenaries from the 
city, action which would also have the support of Leontini, whose city would no longer be 
1 Democracy in Sicily - Diod. Sic. XI. 76.4ff.; Aid at Syracuse - Diod. Sic. XI. 68.1 ff. This collective 
effort in liberating Sicily as a whole from tyranny is noted by Berger (1992) 37. 
2 Diod. Sic. XI. 49 - see also above chapter on refoundations 154. 3 Megara, Euboea, Camarina, Gela - Hdt. VI1.156; Catana, Naxos - Diod. Sic. XI. 49.2. 
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bursting at the seams once the Catanaeans returned home. This was done, and the ex- 
mercenaries re-settled themselves at nearby Inessa. Diodorus' description of these events 
seems quite straightforward, particularly the expulsion of the Aetnaeans, in which the original 
Catanaeans were supported not only by Syracuse but also by the Sicels under Ducetius4, but in 
his account the troubles in Syracuse itself are made out to be more complicated. We can 
assume that some of those settled had returned to their respective cities, but for some this may 
not have been possible; for example, we never hear of Megara Hyblaea or Euboea actually 
existing following these cities' forced evacuation, and it may be presumed that they no longer 
existed at ally. Of course the mercenaries presented the biggest problem of all, being highly 
trained fighters as well as being actual citizens of Syracuse, and Diodorus records a number of 
7,000 surviving down to the fall of the tyrannyb. The establishment of democracy after 
Thrasybulus was accompanied by an exclusion of all `nerv' citizens, established under Gelon, 
from magisterial posts, though presumably they had some democratic rights preserved as there 
is no indication of further exclusion at this point. However, this was enough to encourage the 
`new' citizens to occupy both Ortygia and part of the mainland, resulting in a siege, followed 
by defeat for the ex-mercenaries. These were settled, along with other ex-mercenaries but for 
reasons not stated by Diodorus, in Messenia7. 
Berger sees the reduction of rights afforded to the `new' citizens as a deliberate attempt 
to be rid of them altogether, which is not an implausible interpretation considering the angst 
and tension which must have been present8. Such extreme circumstances must have been 
present in order to explain the `bizarre coalition' between the Garnoroi, the demos and even the 
Killyrioi, according to Bergei-9, and although we are sometimes given the impression that the 
main concern at this time in Syracuse was the establishment of democracy, there is certainly an 
element of social revolution as well as political, such as the redistribution of lands not only in 
4 Diod. Sic. XI. 76.3. 
5 Dunbabin (1948) 416-9. 
6 Diod. Sic. X!. 72.3. 
7 Diod. Sic. XI. 72.2-73,76. 
8 Berger (1992) 3 6-8. 
9 Berger (1992) 38. 
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Syracuse but in much of Sicily10. This probably goes to explain the fate of those `nerv' citizens 
in Syracuse who were not ex-mercenaries and were trusted by the `old' citizens to a greater 
extent, being victims of the tyranny as well as being far less dangerous, militarily and 
politically, than the mercenaries who actually benefited . 
from the tyrants". The coalition 
mentioned above can only be explained by differing expectations amongst the Gamoroi and the 
demos. The demos may well have expected the establishment of a full democracy as a result of 
the fall of the tyranny, as was meant to have happened following the expulsion of the Ganioroi 
in 485, and expected to follow the other cities in Sicily. However the Ganioroi themselves 
were probably entertaining different ideas. The Gamoroi may be considered to be another 
party that actually gained advantage from the tyranny, with their re-establishment in the city 
under Gelon12. It is probably even the influence of the Gamoroi themselves which leads to the 
distinction between the `old' and `nerv' citizens in Syracuse, as it reflects the same kind of 
social structure existent in the city before the tyranny, with the Gamoroi being the descendents 
of the original settlers led by Corinth in the 81h century, and later immigrants forming the rest of 
the demos 13. It also seems likely that the Gamoroi would have been in favour of restoring the 
form of government existent before they were expelled in 485, and this is a preliminary 
problem posed in the arguments for the existence of a real Athenian-style democracy from 466 
onwards. 
The early evidence for the new regime does not tell us much about how radical a 
democracy it really was, but there is reason to believe that despite Diodorus' own use of the 
word SrlµoxpaTia (which will be discussed at another point in this chapter - p. 213), Syracuse 
was not quite a democracy following the expulsion of Thrasybulus. Although there is mention 
of an assembly, it would be dangerous to assume that this represented a cross-section of the 
citizens of Syracuse - if this were the case, then how was the law excluding `nerv' citizens 
10 Diod. Sic. XI. 86.3. 
11 Although Asheri (1992) 165-6, seems to collect this group of `new' citizens together with the settled 
mercenaries as those who had benefitted from the tyranny, my own personal opinion is that being forced 
to move to Syracuse and having your home city destroyed does not count as favourable, although it may 
seem so in comparison to the fate suffered by those Megarians and Euboeans who were not settled in 
Syracuse. 
12 Hdt. VII. 155. 
13 This is another point raised by Berger (1992) 38. 
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from magisterial posts passed so easily, if they were represented in the assembly? What is 
likely is that the Gamoroi assumed power in 466, especially considering the fact that they 
suffered more than most under Thrasybulus and therefore would have wanted a quick end to 
the tyranny - in contrast to their treatment earlier on in the fifth century14. The state of affairs 
in Syracuse was not dissimilar to Athens at the same point, as those who had been ultimately 
responsible for the expulsion of the Peisistratids from Athens, the previously exiled 
Alemaeonids, had been returned to power in 510, although this was actually the result of 
Cleisthenes' policy of bringing democratic government to the city'5. Later on, in 454 BC, we 
have further evidence that the political situation in Syracuse was not quite democratic. 
Tuv&apiörls yap its robvoµa, Opa ovs Kai. r6Xµrls y> gcwv ävOpcwnos, Tö µEv 
itpwtov zto? XOi) Twv nsvIjiwv &VCX. µßav£, Kai ßwµaTO1tO1 V 'roi)TOUs Eaut6 
np6G cupocvvi5a EToiµouc Enoict Sopuy6povs. 
Diod. Sic. XI. 86.4 
The attempt at tyranny by Tyndarides clearly could not have happened if the Syracusan 
demos were satisfied with their role in government, as it seems to be a fairly textbook attempt 
at tyranny. What is even more indicative of the situation in Syracuse is what follows soon 
after, when Tyndarides is arrested and condemned to death. 
C 1tayOpEVOl) SE £ts to 5£61.1(j)tflptOV Oi ltoXl)COpTIAEVTES ÜMC a'ÜTOÜ 6vveaTpÖ((P110av 
Kai TO-IG änäyovßt tag x£ipas E7th p£pov. 'rapaxf g6 y£voµtVr1S Kata 'div iröA. ty, 
auv£aTpäcprlYav of xapth6Tatot Täwv ztoXt'r v, Kcd robg v£coT£pi avras 
6uvapn6taavT£S äµa r Co äv£i?, ov. 
Diod. Sic. XI. 86.5 
The appearance of these xaptEc tarot (a clearly loaded term in favour of these people) 
seems to indicate the intervention of better, educated and more respectable citizens, in other 
words the aristocracy of Syracuse were busy defending their right to rule the city in the face of 
an uprising of the poorer citizen body. Diodorus immediately adds to this by mentioning that 
there were other attempts at tyranny, not just indicating unrest or a small group's greed for 
power, but more likely mass disenchantment with the Ga noroi. Following this, we have one 
of the most significant episodes in the short sixty-year interlude between tyrannies, the 
introduction of petalism. 
14 See Diod. Sic. X1.67.5ff. for details of Thrasybulus' rule, which seem to show such a reverse in 
Deinomenid policy towards the wealthier citizens of Syracuse. 
's Ath. Pol. 20. 
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napä yäp 'Aollvaiols £Ka6Tov TWv lioA trv 95£t ypä(pEty Eis Ö6Tpco ov roi vojux 
TA SoKoüvTos µä; ýt6Ta Svva60at TupavvEiv Tüwv itoXvTC3v, ltapä SE Toil 
Tvpaxoaiotg Eis 1LETaXov £Xaias yp6(gE68at Töv Suva'CCUTaTOV T(wv 7[oXtTcov, 
5taptOµ118EVtowv SE Tcöv i£Tä2, cov Töv 1tX£i6Ta itTaXa AaßövTa cpEÜy£ty 
tEVTa£Tfi xpövov. Toütw yäp TG) Tpöncw St£Xäµßavov TanE1v6)6Ety rä cppovnµaTa 
Twv %Ei6Tov ißxuövTCwv F -V Tats naTpiat" KaOÖXou yäp ov 7tovr1pias KoXäaEtg 
E; ýäµßavov ltapä Twv stapavoµovvT(Ov, ä)ý)Lä SuväµEwc, Kai avgA6£rog 'r v 
äv6pwv i noiouv Tan£ivaoßty. of iEv ovv 'AOTivaiot ToOto Tä ygvog T? g 
voµoe£aiag wvöµaßav ärrö Toi) auµßEß11KÖTOg ö6Tpaxt6µöv, of SE EupaKöatot 
n£TaXtaµöv. 
Diod. Sic. XI. 87.1-2 
In the Athenian system, according to Aristotle, the Assembly had chosen which person 
had been most likely to aspire to tyranny, and had him exiled for ten years 16. This was not a 
measure to punish the `offender' but rather to warn against those who exerted too much 
influence. A possible problem in the interpretation of this passage is that since the Syracusans 
had introduced a measure already being used in the democracy in Athens, perhaps in direct 
imitation', then the Syracusans must necessarily have introduced it for precisely the same 
reason, i. e. not only protecting the state from tyranny, but protecting the democratic state from 
tyranny. This is exactly the assumption made by Robinson in his article where he puts forward 
the case for democracy in Syracuse at this early time18. The very nature of tyranny, a measure 
resorted to by the masses as a sign of discontent, means that it is as least as much, if not more, 
of a threat to an oligarchic government than to a democratic one. Tyranny itself usually came 
about as a kind of `populist tool', at least up to a point, just as Robinson says about ostracism. 
Therefore the fact that petalism was introduced in Syracuse is certainly not proof that Syracuse 
was democratic. Rutter also opposes the idea that petalism necessarily meant democracy, 
looking at the background of its introduction, i. e. Tyndarides' attempt at tyranny, he concludes 
that it clearly was not a populist measure19. One feature of Robinson's argument is that any 
participation of the aristocracy in public life is suppressed in favour of showing the regime to 
be a democratic one, on the basis that they are not explicitly mentioned in the accounts of 
16 Alh. Pol. 22.8,43.5. Interestingly, Diodorus himself states that the period of exile was five years, as in 
Syracuse (XI. 55.2), but there is some evidence that Athens had changed from ten to five later on 
(Philochorus FGrH 328 F30). 
17 See Berger (1989) 305-6. 
18 Robinson (2003) 140-50. 
19 Rutter (2000) 147-8. 
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government in post-tyranny Syracuse20. If this is the case, then one is left wondering about the 
identity of the XapteßraTot mentioned earlier. This argument also seems to misunderstand the 
powerful role played by the aristocracy in public life in the city, at least down to the end of the 
tyranny, and one can hardly expect the Gamoroi to have stayed quiet while the demos stole 
power for themselves, when they had held power in the city as recently as 485. Berger defends 
the idea that the aristocracy retained much influence in Syracuse following the fall of the 
Deinomenids, believing that because Syracuse was a smaller city than Athens, then it would 
have been easier for the aristocracy to influence political life, and so they were therefore more 
powerful in the city following the events of 466 BC21. 
Further evidence cited by Berger in favour of aristocratic influence is in the almost 
immediate repealing of the petalism law22, when it was realised who exactly would suffer 
because of it. In his view the introduction of petalism in Syracuse was a risky venture that had 
backfired, and the damage done by the withdrawal of the xapiEata'tot from public life is 
explicitly displayed in Diodorus' account. 
ovToc SE ö vö}Los Stelictvc icapä j&v Toil 'A9rlvaiois elti Tto? v xpövov, ltapä 
SE roic Evpaxooiots K(X'[EküOrl raxü Stä rouxi), mS tiiväs aitIas. rcov µcyiaTwv 
ävSpcov cpvyaSEVOµEvwv of xaptE6TaTot 'rüüv itoXt'r v icai Svväµsvot Stä'rij; 
i iaS äpET% noXXä zwv Kotvihv E1ravopOoüv äq ic'ravto T&&v Srl toaiwv irpäi; ewv, 
xai 516 Töv änö 'Toi vöµov (pößov i6t0)TevOVTES E ETEX. ovv, EMIL hllEvot SE 'r% 
iSias oüaiac dc Tpucpf v &nEK? Lvov, of SE novi pötatot 'rwv itoXt'rwv Kai tr xl 
Stacp>rpovtes Ecppövitýov rcov STjµoaicov xai 'rä nXi Orl ltpös Tapaxtjv xai 
VEwTeptßµöv ltpoETpeltovTO. 
Diod. Sic. XI. 87.3-5 
Here we find the same xapt&yTcvrot who had earlier defended the city from the 
followers of Tyndarides, being punished by the measure that they had helped to introduce 
themselves, and the city is once again at the mercy of those who are unfit to have such an 
influence, i. e. the poorer elements of society who lacked the education and government skills of 
the xaptE atot. Rutter therefore finds it incredible that the petalism law could have been 
20 Robinson (2003) 143. 
21 Berger (1989) 305-6. Berger also believes the reference to a politeia (see n. 26 below) in Syracuse (Ar. 
Pol. 1304 a27) is further evidence of greater aristocratic influence than in Athens, as is the difference in 
the length of exile under the petalism law (five years rather than ten), perhaps indicating some early 
awareness that the aristocracy would be worst affected - 306. 22 Berger (1989) 306. 
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repealed if the city was not being dominated by the xapteatatot23. It is even possible that the 
use of the term xaptEaTatot is simply an effort by Diodorus to hide the fact that these are the 
Gamoroi themselves, and perhaps the use of the term Gamoroi was discontinued so that it 
would no longer bring back memories of the unpopular oligarchy, whose removal led to the 
establishment of tyranny in Syracuse24. However, what is more likely is that with the 
chronological gap between Diodorus and the fifth century BC, such terminology was a legacy 
of his sources and indeed the term Garnoroi may even have been unfamiliar to Diodorus. 
Even at this early stage of the `democratic' period at Syracuse, we have found several 
important issues of concern to the citizens, and virtually all of these problems can be attributed 
to the legacy of Deinomenid rule in one way or another. The displaced `nerv' citizens, not only 
in Syracuse but all over Sicily, had created havoc on the island, with a great number of these 
people moving back to their original homes, either of their own free will or through force, or to 
the `mercenary colony' in Messenia. But while this problem had eventually been resolved in 
time, there were deeper issues and confusions evident in Syracuse. We seem to find the exact 
reversal of the normal case of affairs following a tyranny, in that the aristocracy, whether they 
were still called the Gamoroi or not, seem to have returned to being the ruling party, at least to 
a large extent. This meant that conditions suited a return to tyranny rather than an aversion to 
it, as was normally the case, for example in Corinth, which therefore explains the many further 
attempts at tyranny later on. The reasons why the Gamoroi seem to have returned to power are 
twofold: firstly the policies of Gelon and Hieron had actually strengthened their position in 
Syracuse rather than weakening it, since they were the only members of the population who 
seem to have actually been trusted, and these tyrants preferred to play to the city's strengths by 
opting to favour the wealthy rather than bothering themselves with the poor, thereby helping to 
fund the vast mercenary army. Secondly, the Gamoroi were likely to have gained confidence 
following Thrasybulus' expulsion, as since that particular regime had reversed the traditional 
Deinomenid policy and actually targeted the wealthy, it is very likely that the revolution of 466 
23 Rutter (2000) 148. 
24 Sacks (1990) 167 argues against the idea that Diodorus was totally anti-democratic, but does 
acknowledge that he was himself wealthy and tended to point out instances where the democratic 
constitution had failed because of its erratic nature. 
213 
was led by the wealthy themselves, therefore giving them confidence as they probably felt as if 
it was they who had saved Syracuse from tyranny, and that it was they who should occupy the 
power vacuum left afterwards. So, rather than a fresh, new, publicly-minded government 
taking office at Syracuse, it was rather the status quo which had won a victory, despite its 
defeat in 485. 
As the fifth century progressed, we do find that the government in Syracuse becomes 
more democratic, regardless of whether it was called a SrIµoxpavria by sources such as 
Diodorus in reference to the time preceding petalism25. The use of Srlµoxpatia by Diodorus is 
shown by Rutter to be a standardised term, applying it to describe post-tyranny governments in 
general, and this is said to be for two reasons26. Firstly, the range of sources used by Diodorus 
is likely to bring many different descriptions of such governments, simply because his sources 
represent a wide range of differing ideas on what constituted democracy, and of course many 
sources would have represented different points of view simply because of the time in which 
they were writing. Diodorus would therefore be forced into making generalisations on such 
matters, as brevity would be an important issue for such a long work as his. Secondly, there is 
Diodorus' own time, the first century BC, in which such matters may simply not have been 
considered as important as they were in, say, Timaeus' time. A simple contrast between 
tyranny and a more constitutional government may have been considered sufficient for 
Diodorus' audience, many of whom were certainly not busy writing articles on post- 
Deinomenid government. 
There are some ways in which the government at Syracuse may be shown to be more 
democratic, rather than being under the complete control of the aristocracy, but much of the 
evidence presented in modern scholarship tends to concentrate on negative incidents, and 
perhaps this is due to the attitudes of the various sources towards the demos. The harsh 
25 Diod. Sic. X1.72.2. 
26 Rutter (2000) 144-5. In the same article there are also arguments concerning Aristotle's own usage of 
terms such as Srlµoxpatia and noXt reia, both of which are used to describe the situation in Syracuse. 
The usage of these words tends to depend on the point being made by Aristotle, and perhaps are used in 
order to give the reader a general example rather than a precise one, which may not be available to him. 
Stjgoxpatia and -noXtteia are good and bad forms respectively of the rule by many (1290al3-19), of 
which there are four variants altogether. noXvrcia is also used to describe a government that is a kind of 
mixture between democracy and oligarchy (1295a25-1296b12). See Lintott (2000) 152-66. 
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punishment of the Athenian captives in 413 is a typical example, where public anger simply 
overrides any suggestions for more lenient treatment by the moderates2'. Of course this is 
much later than the Tyndarides episode, so it is difficult to say how much of it was due to 
reforms between 454 and 412, the year of Diocles' reforms28. The prosecution of the generals 
Phayllus and Bolkon in 453 and 451 respectively has also been used by Robinson to defend the 
idea of populist attitudes in Syracuse and therefore democracy at this early time29. While I do 
not think that the prosecution of generals alone is strong enough evidence to support the 
argument30, it does suggest the rise of demagogy in Syracuse, as the petalism episode perhaps 
also does when Diodorus describes the unsavoury characters replacing the xapi tarot (see 
above). Asheri also mentions the campaigns of Phayllus and Bolkon, but this time the focus is 
on the fact that they were carried out at all31. This interest in foreign affairs is quite typical of 
the way maritime democracies operate, and this is the first real example of such an interest in 
Syracuse since the Deinomenid age. In fact, Berger tells us that Syracuse had actually adopted 
the tyrant's foreign policy and had continued it for another 40 years afterwards 32. However, 
while it is possible that the interest taken in the Tyrrhenian Sea may be significant, as it had 
been a favourite occupation of Hieron's, the concern about the Sicels is probably not that 
special for two reasons. First there is the fact that Ducetius was leading them during their great 
revival, and they were considered a major threat to the Sicilian Greeks at the time, and 
secondly, dealing with the Sicels had been a major issue since the city's foundation. One only 
has to consider the treatment of local Sicels, the Killyrioi, by Syracuse since the earliest times 
to realise that intervention in the interior was nothing new. It is probably still significant that 
27 Diod. Sic. XIII. 19.4-6,33. 
28 The reforms of Diocles, according to Caven (1990) 25, transformed the constitution of Syracuse from 
a politeia to a democracy. The only details we have on these reforms come from Diodorus (XIII. 34.6), 
and involve the selection of magistrates by lot, and the number of generals being raised from three to ten. 
These seem to be in direct imitation of the Athenian system in the fifth century, and are significantly 
democratic in nature. 
29 Diod. Sic XI. 88 (Phayllus), 91 (Bolkon). Robinson (2003) 144-5. 
'o This point is made by the `Old Oligarch' (ps. Xenophon, AO. IIo2.1.3-9,13-14,11.9-10,17-20), 
although this particular source is known for its dislike for democracy, hence the author's adopted name. 
31 Asheri (1992) 166: 
32 Berger (1992) 39. 
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Syracuse was taking such action, but it may say more about the city itself than the tyrants who 
had ruled it33 
Whether or not the government at Syracuse can really be described as a democracy 
before Diocles' reforms, the point at which it can very definitely be termed as such, the main 
point that stands out amongst others is that in the end, it failed anyway. It had failed in minor 
ways, such as in the case of petalism. But broadly speaking, popular government was brought 
to an end for many reasons. Demagogy, the Athenian expedition and the threat of Carthage 
were the most significant of these and the last of the three will be discussed more fully in the 
next section, but it was the populist politics in Syracuse (like in Athens itself) which had almost 
led to utter disaster, and had really exposed the potential failings of mass rule. Examples of 
this include the unwillingness by the demagogues (led by Athenagoras) to believe the report of 
an impending invasion in 415, an argument which turns out to be an attack on Hermocrates, 
accusing him of making up the story to cause alarm and take control of the city for himself, 
rather than an attempt to prove the rumours wrong34. The failure to act decisively during the 
expedition was the result of demagogy such as this, and as it turned out, it had put the city in 
great danger. We have also already seen how the government had made rash decisions in the 
name of appeasing the public above, with the prosecution of failed generals, and it may have 
appeared to many that this system of government simply did not work. 
Caven makes an attempt to bring together other possible reasons for the ultimate failure 
of democracy (or polity) in Syracuse by providing a stark contrast with Athens, which, with 
few exceptions (most notably the Sicilian Expedition) was very successful during the fifth 
century35. The main message is that Athens made the most of democracy because conditions 
suited it, and despite also discovering the pitfalls of such a government, like demagogy, its 
benefits mainly outweighed the faults. Syracuse on the other hand only seems to have seen the 
negative side of democracy - but why? 
33 Sjögvist (1973) 36-48 discusses this at length, focusing on the Doric colonies as a whole, in particular 
Syracuse and Gela, but also into the fifth century - 49-60. 33 Thuc. V1.33-41. 
35 Caven (1990) 9-15. 
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It seems the first difference was social, in that the population of Syracuse was divided 
not only by the quite temporary `old' versus `nerv' citizen problem, but mainly between the 
Gamoroi and the other citizens, which was far more deep-rooted and had came to a head with 
the coup of 485. The gap between Gelon's reinstatement of the Gamoroi and the expulsion of 
Thrasybulus was 19 years, less than a generation, so the troubled past was still a comparatively 
recent memory. This was made worse by the powerful position in which the Gamoroi were left 
in 466, as mentioned earlier, so class-conflict was still very much on the agenda in fifth-century 
Syracuse. Caven points out that Athens had had a major advantage in this respect, as not only 
the whole city, but also most of Greece had united against Persia. The city's plight as it was 
occupied by Xerxes' force was a rallying point for the citizens, and this encouraged an even 
greater sense of nationhood than had already existed before at Athens, which was a far more 
stable and established settlement in comparison to Syracuse, especially since Athens' power 
was reinforced by its empire later on. Of course Syracuse itself had Himera, and there may 
have been a perceived threat that Syracuse could be put under Carthaginian rule - but the 
victory always seemed to belong to Gelon himself, rather than to the Syracusans, highlighting 
the belief that tyrants were more effective militarily than democratic governments. Further 
comparisons also clarify the real differences between the wars against Persia and Carthage, and 
the main one is the composition of the forces. A good proportion of Gelon's forces were surely 
mercenary, and of course there is also the large cavalry force of 5,000 reported by Diodorus, 
supplied by the wealthier Syracusans36. Contrast this with the fleet of Athenian ships that won 
at Salamis, which were almost entirely manned by the the! es, the poorest of the citizen classes, 
so that the city simply had to recognise the contribution made by the poor, making democracy 
far more palatable to Athenian tastes. Of course the further contribution made by the Athenian 
navy in the fifth century is well documented. 
Aside from the social factors, the rule of the Deinomenids had also helped fuel this 
failure by their very memory. The fear of tyranny arising again was certainly felt by the 
Gamoroi, as can be shown by the petalism episode, but it must also have been the case that the 
demos themselves were nervous. As has been said, while in normal cases a tyrant may rise 
36 Diod. Sic. XI. 21.1. See also the above chapter on mercenaries, 119. 
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with public aid, the demos would have been wary of a new kind of tyrant - those who openly 
sided with the aristocracy rather than against it, and this could be a reason for the fear of 
tyranny amongst the masses, exploited by the demagogues as the state became more 
democratic later on, despite the apparent demand for tyranny in the mid-5`h century. The 
Deinomenids' contribution towards the (temporary) downfall of democracy in Syracuse can 
therefore be shown to be more than simply social factors; they had cast a political shadow over 
the city that lasted at least until Dionysius' day. 
Carthage in the Fifth Century 
One of the main circumstances behind the rise to power of Dionysius at the end of the 
fifth century is the sudden reappearance of Carthage in Greek affairs. As Asheri notes, there is 
an impression given in our sources that Carthage had withdrawn itself from activity in the 
Mediterranean following the Himera campaign of 480, perhaps only having influence in the 
Punic cities of Sicily37. We know that there were still trade links with the Greeks, especially 
with Acragas38, but the closest we have to Punic activity in our main sources before the 
Athenian expedition is a conflict between Lilybaeum (the Punic colony) and Segesta over land, 
but this is all Diodorus actually tells us, apart from the heavy losses on both sides39. 
Archaeological evidence can be used to shed more light on the matter: for example, there is 
numismatic evidence that the Elymians, who were for a long time Carthage's allies in Sicily, 
were being Hellenised in the fifth century40, and further evidence may even suggest that 
Carthage was in a state of poverty during this time41. This would appear to suggest that 
Carthage simply wanted to stay out of trouble as a result of their embarrassment at the hands of 
Gelon, resulting in less activity in the Mediterranean - and therefore we have a straightforward 
case of lasting Deinomenid influence in the region. But the complete picture is not given in 
37 Asheri (1994) 127ff. and also CAH IV. See also Hans (1983) on Carthage's ties with the Sicilian 
cities. 
38 See Kraay (1976) 226 on the use of Spanish silver in Acragantine coinage, Jenkins (1974) 24-5 on 
Carthaginian coins overstruck by Acragas. 
39 Diod. Sic. XI. 86.2. See CAHV 159 n. 10. 
40 Head (1887) 164-6. 
41 Picard and Picard (1968) 87 tell us that the tombs of the fifth century in Carthage were so insignificant 
that during their excavation it was not even realised that they were tombs at all! 
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sources such as Diodorus; instead, we find a reference to Carthage under the rule of Hanno in 
the works of Dio Chrysostom. 
Kapxrl6oviou5 Se "Avvwv pEv ävti Tvpiwv EnoiilaE Aij3vas, Kai Ai13ü1ly 
KaTOtK£iv ävtl (DotviKrls 
Dio Chrysostom Orat. XXV. 7 
This gives us an important clue regarding what the Carthaginians were actually doing 
during this time, and our suspicions are confirmed by a single line of Justin's epitome of 
Pompeius Trogus. 
Itaque et Mauris bellum inlatum et adversus Numidas pugnatum et Afri 
conpulsi stipendium urbis conditae Karthaginiensibus remittere. 
Justin Epitome XIX. 2.4 
Instead of being active in the Mediterranean itself, the Carthaginians looked closer to 
home, and began to take control of the region of North Africa surrounding Carthage itself, 
which comprised much of modern Tunisia. Carthage had been a mere tenant in the area for so 
long, apparently paying tribute to the local Numidians since the city's foundation, but this had 
now come to an end under Hanno. Activity in Africa is confirmed by archaeological evidence 
recorded by Picard, in the form of storage jars found in newly acquired lands42. The Dio 
Chrysostom passage itself also tells us that the Carthaginians were carrying on as normal in the 
Mediterranean, and in fact were getting even richer than they had done before. This is 
confirmed by Thucydides, who records Hermocrates of Syracuse as saying: 
SvvaTOt ft Eibi g&Xtata Twv vüv, ßo& iiO£vTES" Xpvaöv yäp Kai äpyvpov 
itX£LaTOV KEKT11VVXI, ÖeEV Ö TE 116XEgOg Kcd 'C&X%a Ei)1COpcl. 
Thuc. VI. 34 
During this time the Carthaginians also embarked on one of the more adventurous 
episodes in their history. In Avienus' Ora Maritima, dated to the fourth century AD, there are 
references to earlier-Greek sources mentioning the voyage of Himilco to the British Isles 
around 450 BC43. This is almost certainly an attempt to get to the source of the tin route, as the 
metal trade was the most central component of the Carthaginians' activities44. A far better 
documented example of this era of exploration comes in an unusual form, Hanno's Periplus, a 
42 C. Picard (1965) 21-2. G. Ch. Picard (1966) illustrates the probable extent of the Carthaginian 
conquest of African land in map 2, p. 79, although it is estimated as the absolute borders are unknown. 
43 Avienus Ora Alaritima 114-34,406-15. 
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Greek version of an originally Punic text, and this is not only an important work because of the 
content, but also because it is the only substantial piece of Punic literature that has survived to 
this day, albeit with some changes by the Greek who recorded it45. The Periplus is king 
Hanno's own account of his voyage around the West coast of Africa, and although the work 
itself is controversial given its manner of preservation, it is very interesting indeed, and also 
can be considered evidence for extensive Carthaginian activity in the second half of the fifth 
century. There is really no reason to believe that the expedition did not take place, unless the 
Periplus was a complete fake46. The Carthaginians would have been perfectly capable of the 
journey itself, especially when one considers the quite convincing evidence that the 
Phoenicians had already circumnavigated Africa on the orders of the Pharaoh Necho, around 
600 BC47. It seems that the main reason for Hanno's expedition was again, apart from the 
stated reason of a colonial enterprise, the search for metals, in this case gold. This was not a 
new idea, however, as Herodotus records Carthaginian activity in West Africa before Hanno, 
but it does provide a strong clue as to why they were so interested in it. 
AEyo'U6l SE Kal T6c5E KapXil66v ot, Eivat 2ijS Atßütls xwpöv 're Kai ävOp6novs 
co Eý'HpaKXEWV 6TtjX£wv KaTotKTIgvo'US, £S ToiS £nthhv ÖCnLKo)VTat Kai 
E4EXwvtal r& cpopTia, 6EVTES ai rx enE4t q Itap& 'd v KvµaTwyf v, Eaßäv'ES ES 
Tä nXoia ti b(pEty Kanvöv" 'robs S' Entxwpiouc i6opEVovs r6v Kanvöv iEvat Enl 
TTjv 96cXaßßav Kai EnEtTa ävTI Tcov (QopTiwv XP 't v Tt9EVat Kai E4avaxwpEEty 
npöacw 6cn6 Twv cpopTiwv" Toüs Se KapxtlSoviovc £KßävTaS cKEnTEcOai, Kai ijv 
[I LV (paivtlTai 6cpl & to; 6 xpvaös Twv cpopTiwv, ävEXöJEvot äna?, Xäac ovTat, 
Ijv SE µh 64t0;, Eai36CvTES öniaw ES Tä t? oia KaTEaTat, of SE npo6EXO6VTEs 
&XXov np6q ciwv E6t1Kav xpv66v, eg oü äv ltEiOcwat. 'AStKEEIV SE oüSETEpotS 
oiTE yap avroi; Tot xpvaoü 6CnTEa9al npiv äv apt äntawOp Tp äýirl Tcov 
cpopTiwv, oüti ýKEivovs Twv cpopTiwv ämTEcOat np6TEpov ij aüTOi r6 xpix iov 
Xä(3wst. 
Hdt. IV. 196 
'" Moscati (1968) 181. See Aubet (1987) on the metals trade in the Western Mediterranean, also the 
above chapter on foreign policy, 85. 
15 See G. Ch. Picard (1982) 175-80. 
46 Germain (1957) 205-48, believes the document to be a forgery. 
4' Hdt. IV. 42. What makes this passage so interesting is that while Herodotus is ready to believe this 
story, he is sceptical about their tale of having the sun to their right, i. e. to the North, while passing the 
southernmost point of Africa (the circumnavigation was clockwise, starting from the Red Sea). Of 
course this little addition to the story, which seems to have been added for the sake of completeness by 
the author despite believing it to be untrue, has turned out to be excitingly accurate and almost confirms 
the story as true. There is also the additional point that the voyage would have been difficult for the 
Phoenicians to fake, as there was no Suez Canal, and the only conceivable way in which they could have 
fooled Necho was by travelling overland across Egypt in secret - very difficult and dangerous 
considering Egypt's harsh desert environment, and the fact that it was Necho's own kingdom! See 
Mauny (1955) for the view that no ancient explorer could have travelled further than Cape Juby - or at 
least made the northward, return trip past that point, and also Mauny (1978) for a general consideration 
of the failure to make lasting links with West Africa. 
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This passage is valuable not only because it explains the Phoenicians' interest in Africa 
beyond the Straits of Gibraltar, but also tells us about how business was done with the Africans 
themselves, in this case a method known as `silent barter'48. The evidence we have for the 
second half of the fifth century seems to indicate increased activity in the metals trade, not only 
meaning increased wealth but also, through the acquisition of tin from Spain and (probably 
indirectly) Britain, Carthage was producing large amounts of bronze. Could this indicate the 
production of armour and weapons in Carthage, or is this simply part of the trade in metals 
discussed earlier? 
By the time Carthage attacked cities in Sicily in 410/9, Carthage had a new king in 
Hannibal, grandson of the Hamilcar who died at Himera, and who was already elderly when he 
came to the throne, probably between 415 and 41049. Hannibal is described by Diodorus as a 
hater of Greeks, and desperate to atone for the embarrassment to both Carthage and his own 
family at the hands of Gelon50. However, this may simply be an attempt by Diodorus to 
explain the almost irrational destruction of Himera itself later on, as well as an attempt to blame 
the Punic Wars with Syracuse ultimately on Carthage51. Just as the Himera campaign was the 
result of the actions of the allies of Carthage and Syracuse, it was another conflict between 
Selinus (now aligned with Syracuse) and Segesta that had started Carthaginian aggressions in 
Sicily, although it seems Carthage was initially reluctant to be at war with Syracuse itself. 
ö S' oüv 'Avvi as, 6V Rev Kai. cpüaet µt6Wiiv, öµoü SE t&S 'rwv itpoyövawv 
ättµtas StopO ba(xaOat ßoi)Mjtevos, E6ite 6s St' Eavto tt Kaia6KSV6cßat 
xpýatµov tf Itwrpi t. OCCtpwv oüv Tots Es), tvovvtiovS oüK äpKovtCvovs tiý 
napaxcopnß$t 'Ci äµcptCFPIj cYiµov xwpas, npCapEts 6C7tC6TEtXE pEt& Twv 
Aiy£a'taiwv ltpös Evpaxoc iovs, EitttpCltGJV ai Ci-t 'd v KpI6tV roI rci V, 'rw µCv 
?. yc1 itpounotoüµEvo; Sticatonpayciv, tfi S' &XIjOEia VoµiýwV eK Toü µtj 
48 Law (1978) 137. There is also the account of Pseudo-Scylax, Periplus 112, which describes the 
process in greater detail, and includes more on the materials traded and the Africans themselves, but 
unfortunately there is no mention of gold, or for that matter any metals at all. There is a possibility that 
the two accounts describe different parts of Western Africa, Ps. -Scylax mentions the island of Cerne, 
whereas there is no indication of this in Herodotus. Law suggests that the Phoenician informants used by 
Ps. -Scylax simply didn't want to share too much information on the subject of precious metals - 138-9 49 Picard and Picard (1968) 101. 
50 Diod. Sic. XIII. 5-6. 
51 Of course it is likely that Diodorus' own view of the Carthaginians was heavily influenced by 
contemporary Roman attitudes towards them, and this becomes more apparent in his narrative of Rome's 
own struggles with the Carthaginians. For example see his account of the Senatorial debate on the 
proposed treaty with Carthage following the Second Punic War (XXVII. 18) which likens the 
Carthaginians to wild beasts. 
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ßoüa, Ea9at 'Toi) EeXtvovvtiovs StaxptOf vat µiß 6vµµaxýCFF-tv aürois Toi)g 
EDpaxoc iovs. 
Diod. Sic. XIII. 43.6 
This passage does indicate confusion over why the Carthaginians invaded; it simply 
does not make sense to blame the conflict solely on Hannibal's desire for revenge, and then to 
say that Carthage wanted to avoid conflict with Syracuse. As the details given seem to imply 
the latter, it seems that maybe the battle of Himera in 480 played less on the minds of the 
Carthaginians than Diodorus would like to think, although its memory probably still inspired 
the destruction of Himera itself after Hannibal had dealt with Selinus52. 
The effects of the Himera campaign on Carthage may not be as straightforward as our 
sources may want us to think. It is certainly not the case that the Carthaginians had withdrawn 
from external affairs as a result, as Diodorus seems to imply, as such an action would have had 
a devastating effect on the city's well-being. Importantly, trade would have continued, not only 
with West Africa but also with the Greeks themselves, particularly Acragas. Carthage's 
position as a trading city with only a small amount of agricultural land meant that it had to 
continue trading, but also had to intervene with force if for instance a trade route was blocked 
by pirates. It was perhaps the realisation of the city's precarious position that had made it 
expand its territory in Africa itself, so that it could become more self-sufficient, important in 
times of crisis. As it turns out, trading activity actually increased amongst the Carthaginians 
during this time, and efforts were made to expand the trading routes into Northern Europe as 
well as West Africa. The direct effect of Himera on the Carthaginians' Greek policy may not 
be as clear; efforts seem to have been made to avoid conflict with Syracuse, despite Hannibal's 
apparent want for revenge, so it may have been the case that the embarrassment of 480 was still 
a source of fear in Carthage. However, with the defeat of Selinus and destruction of Himera, 
Carthage was likely to have had its confidence renewed, resulting in the prolonged but mostly 
inconclusive struggle against Dionysius. 
52 Diod. Sic. XIII. 62. 
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Mercenaries 
The extensive use of mercenaries by Dionysius is well documented, particularly early 
in his career, but we should not make the mistake of simply assuming that this was a direct 
legacy of the Deinomenid era, although both the Deinomenids and Dionysius enjoyed a huge 
amount of success with their professional armies. As mentioned in an earlier chapter, 
circumstances in Greece itself had changed dramatically during the course of the fifth century; 
in particular, the lengthy Peloponnesian 'vvar had disastrous consequences for many Greeks who 
had returned to their farms only to find they were useless as a result of neglect53. Further to 
this, the war had meant that battles were fought differently, mainly because of the need for 
specialisation allowing a particular army to adapt to circumstances. But as we have also seen 
in earlier chapters, circumstances were often different in Sicily compared with Greece. 
One episode which has been discussed above, involving Tyndarides, is interesting 
because it seems like a classic case of a popular attempt at tyranny: 
Tuv&apiögs yap Etq robvoµa, Opäaovs Kai 'r6Xju; yEµwv ävOpwrtos, E6 gEv 
1EpwTOV noXX. oüs T6)v ltEV ltwv 6Cv8xäµ13avs, Kai awµwronouwv ToüTOVS Eavt«« 
np6g rupavvi& E'roiµovs Enoi t 5opvcp6pov5. 
Diod. Sic. XI. 86.4 
The appearance of a bodyguard of course harks back to the days of Peisistratos in 
Athens, and although they are not mercenary but citizen troops, it is a private force employed 
only by Tyndarides, reminiscent of Hippocrates' own bodyguard in the 490's BC. We can 
expect that the `many other' attempts at tyranny that occurred in Syracuse at this time were of a 
similar nature to this one. The use of a private force was, at least in Sicily, almost established 
as the best way to gain power, as it was also the same method used by the Deinomenids to 
maintain it. Hermocrates also used a private force in his attempt to return to Syracuse around 
410/9, although this time the force was a mercenary one, and this was still before the end of the 
Peloponnesian war54. It seems that in Sicily at least the use of personal armies was common 
enough following the fall of the Deinomenids, although this may be due to the political 
53 See the mercenaries chapter above, 101-2. 
54 Xen. Hell. 1.1.31, Diod. Sic. X111.63. This particular force was paid for by his friend Pharnabazus, but 
there is no indication of the nationality of the troops in either source. 
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circumstances during the aftermath, seen in the frequency of attempted tyrannies, rather than 
attempted emulation of the tyrants before themss 
During Dionysius' reign, a number of circumstances led to his employment of 
mercenaries, but Parke sees the problems before Dionysius' time as well as during the first part 
of his reign as the major factors56. While the invasions of both Athens and Carthage played 
their part, Parke also sees the appearance of mercenaries as well as tyrants as a result of the 
`disturbed condition' of Sicily, and this is in particular reference to the political situation in 
Syracuse following the Deinomenids. The appearance of a military-style tyrant of Dionysius' 
calibre is also a massive factor in itself, but there are other reasons during the course of his 
reign that will also be discussed. 
It seems that when Dionysius was a general early on he had used citizen troops, but had 
started paying for a professional army after meeting the Laconian Dexippus in 40657, paying 
them out of the proceeds of sold land, previously confiscated at Gela. Soon after this 
Dionysius was made strategos autok ator, and while campaigning at Leontini was given a 
bodyguard of 600 following an attempt on his life, which then grew to 1,00058. It was on 
Dionysius' return to Syracuse, still in 406, that he set himself up as a military dictator, and 
based himself on the island of Ortygia. 
Probably the most significant episodes are the revolts against Dionysius' rule, the first 
of which came in 405, involving only the Syracusan cavalry who, seeing that Dionysius had not 
only set himself up as tyrant on the premise of defeating the Carthaginians, but had also failed, 
having lost both Acragas and Gela to the enemy, concluded that it was time for Syracuse to be 
liberated59. This was unsuccessful, and those involved were banished or killed, and as it 
became clearer to the hoplites what was happening in Syracuse, they also rebelled in 404. 
Joined by the cavalry who had been exiled to Aetna, and also by a Corinthian force, the 
5s It is also worth noting that there were similar cases of private armies in Central Italy, the best known 
being that of Attus Clausus, the Sabine leader who moved to Rome with his 5,000 clientes in 504 BC 
(Livy 4.3-4); Cn. Marcius Coriolanus who had joined the Volscians against Rome (Dion. Hal. 7.21.3); 
and the Fabii clan's own clientes and sodales (companions) against Veii in 479 (Dion. Hal. 9.15.3). See 
also Cornell (1995) 143ff. 
56 Parke (1933) 63. 
57 Diod. Sic. X111.93.2. 
58 Diod. Sic. XIII. 96. I ff., Ar. Pol. 1286b40. 
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Syracusans had blockaded Dionysius in Ortygia, in what was the lowest point in the tyrant's 
career60. Dionysius was granted an escape from the island, but simply returned to attack the 
city, as well as sending Campanian cavalry from a garrison into Syracuse in order to break the 
siege and take the island themselves. Another 300 mercenaries were also enlisted from the 
Peloponnese61. Following this victory, Dionysius paid the Campanians, who had previously 
served Carthage in the invasion of 410/9, and let them go, being wary of them, while recruiting 
more Campanians and also more Greeks from the mainland62. This was the great turning point 
in Dionysius' military career. Knowing he could not trust the citizens of Syracuse, whether 
hoplite or cavalry class, he disarmed them, and there is only one instance in which we know the 
citizens were re-armed for campaigning; Caven suggests that this passage is in reference to 
Dionysius' campaigns against the Chalcidian cities to the north of Sicily, although Polyaenus 
made it clear that the arms were returned when the citizens had finished with them63. The 
extent to which Dionysius could not trust his own subjects is illustrated by an incident in 392, 
when the Carthaginians were at nearby Agyrium, a clear threat to Syracuse itself. 
Mäywv 6' Ev isoX. £ tic xwpoc 6TpaionE86wv, xa% 'TG )V &vayxaiwv MEh &Ei 
µä%?, ov ytv6gEvos, oü geTpicw hXa'cToüTo" Kai yap of rt£pi r6v "Ayvpty t; 
xcwpas £t tgtpot xa6EaTwtES £v'taiq EvE6pats itXEov&tovv xai 'räq äyop&S 
Twv noXEµicov äcprlpoüvto. X8y6vTwv SE Tcov Evpaxociwv 6t6c JI&XI xpiv8ty 
ws tiäxta'ra Tä ltp&yµa2a, Otovüctog rlvavtitofTo XEywv xwpis xtvSüv(j)v r 
xpövw Kai TIj ßnävet xa'ay0api c aOat Tons ßapßäpoDS ecp' oi5 
itapopyta6£vTEs of Evpaxößtot xa'r Xttov T6v Otovü6tov. 
Diod. Sic. XIV. 96.1-2 
This passage shows how little the Syracusans cared for Dionysius by this time, and it 
was now obvious that the only troops that could be trusted by Dionysius were those who were 
dependent on him for payment. Although we have been given the impression that the citizens 
had their armour taken away, it is possible that in operations against the Carthaginians, 
Dionysius may have considered the threat posed to be significant enough that the Greeks in 
Sicily would rally behind him. However it seems that even this was not enough to justify 
tyranny to the Syracusans any more, so they simply deserted him. Parke points out that later in 
59 Diod. Sic. XIII. 112ff., Plut. Dion 3.1. Also Caven (1990) 73-4. 
60 Diod. Sic. XIV. 7.6-8.6. 
61 Diod. Sic. XIV. 9.1-4, Polyaen. V. 8.2. 
62 Diod. Sic. XIV. 9.8-9, Polybius V1I. 2. New recruits - Diod. Sic. XIV. 10.4, XV. 3. 63 Polyaen. V. 2.14. Caven (1990) 86. 
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his career, Dionysius can hardly be described as a military tyrant any more, as campaigns were 
rare64. In order to explain this, Parke puts forward a possible shortage of money available to 
the tyrant, as this had happened to him before: for example at one point he is forced to settle his 
mercenaries at Leontini due to lack of funds65. What may also have been a factor was the 
situation with the citizens, as if Dionysius could not trust them then a shortage of mercenaries 
would mean even fewer troops available for campaigning - assuming some mercenaries were 
left behind to keep the citizens in check. 
It therefore seems that there were other reasons for Dionysius' dependence on 
mercenaries apart from it simply being fashionable amongst fourth century autocrats66, or even 
it being a phenomenon peculiar to Sicily, a legacy of the Deinomenids. It is however 
interesting that Dionysius managed to alienate his own subjects in a manner similar to how the 
Deinomenids alienated the demos themselves, although not to such extremes. 
Self-representation 
This is probably the most difficult aspect of the reign of Dionysius to compare with the 
Deinomenids, given the lack of certainty and the various strong views expressed, both in 
ancient and modern writing. There is also a problem in that the attitudes towards tyranny and 
kingship were subject to change, both over time and space. An individual writer's own 
personal experience with tyranny, whether positive or negative, may not always be interpreted 
as being representative of his own society as a whole, and less still of a society which is not his 
own. In the previous chapter, the point has been made that we cannot know with any certainty 
whether the Deinomenids officially used the title basileus, as the only evidence that can be 
used to be sure is that produced by the regime itself. This would most naturally come in the 
form of inscriptions or coinage, but as Oost points out, this was simply not done during the 
Deinomenids' time, and was not common even in Hellenistic times, where there is far greater 
6' Parke (1933) 72. 
65 Diod. Sic. XIV. 78. Also at Tauromenium - Polyaen. V. 2.1, Diod. Sic. XIV. 96, Adranum - Diod. Sic. 
XI V. 37.5. 
66 See Austin (1994) 540. Aeneas Tacticus even assumes that fourth century city-states in Greece would 
make use of mercenaries, but also that they would maintain a citizen army - Poliorc. 10.7,18-9; 12-3; 
22.29. 
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evidence for kingship67. Oost goes on to criticise various scholars who assume the lack of 
titular use in documentary evidence to mean that the Deinomenids did not use titles, and for 
dismissing other evidence for kingship such as Pindar, Herodotus and Diodorus. However, 
there are flaws in Oost's argument, for example his failure to address the possibility of the 
Deinomenids using the title tyrannos, also used by Pindar, Herodotus and Diodorus and said to 
be interchangeable with basileus by Oost himself 8. Oost also makes the unsafe assumption 
that because the Deinomenids "commonly used the title of king, some degree of a priori 
likelihood is created that the second tyrant dynasty at Syracuse followed its predecessor's 
examplei69. The evidence for Deinomenid kingship is hardly common, as we have seen in the 
previous chapter, but whether the evidence was more common or simply non-existent it is 
wrong to simply assume that Dionysius wanted the same for himself as the Deinomenids had. 
Evidence for kingship amongst the Dionysian tyrants is perhaps stronger than that for 
the Deinomenids, although some argue to the contrary and the same old problems are again 
encountered. For example, Caven uses the lack of titles in inscriptions as positive evidence for 
the lack of any kind of official title, despite surely being aware of Oost's warning about this 
kind of evidence, made fourteen years earlier70. In Caven's rather short discussion of 
Dionysius' use of titles, we find the very kind of scholarship that seems to be the subject of 
Oost's article. There is little by way of discussion of the sources available to us, and it relies 
almost wholly on the nature of Dionysius' character which Caven has tried to reconstruct. The 
main point made here is that Dionysius almost certainly did not use an official title in Syracuse, 
as firstly he would not have wanted to irritate the demos and secondly because the pragmatic 
Dionysius would have not thought it necessary, as it would not add to his real power in the city. 
Regarding the tyrant's standing amongst other Greeks, Caven again mentions Dionysius' 
realism, deciding that since both he and the Greeks abroad knew Syracuse was under a military 
dictatorship, there was no point in convincing them otherwise, together with the lack of 
67 Oost (1976) 225. 
68 Ibid. 224-5. 
69 Ibid. 232. 
70 Caven (1990) 156. 
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epigraphic evidence mentioned above71. This is despite the story of Dionysius' entry at the 
games at Olympia in 388, covered by Diodorus and said to be such an attempt at gaining 
Panhellenic acceptance, mentioned by Caven only twelve pages earlier72. While we should 
keep in mind factors such as Dionysius' apparent character, this should not be allowed to 
overrule any more direct evidence on his use of titles or intended image abroad. 
One point that does seem to be accepted by both Oost and Caven is that very early in 
Dionysius' reign, from around 405, he held the title of strategos autokrator73. This was an 
elected office secured after Dionysius had successfully removed the previous generals, a result 
of the threat posed by the Carthaginians, but it is strikingly similar to the (unofficial) position 
held by the Deinomends many years earlier, and in particular it would have been reminiscent of 
Gelon at Himera. The main question is how long Dionysius held this office for, as although, as 
a title, it most effectively describes the nature of his reign, i. e. as a military dictator, there is no 
evidence to suggest it lasted until his death in 368, although it was later used by Dion74. As it 
turns out, the end-date for Dionysius' use of this particular title is dependent on whether and 
when he started using another, whether it was basileus, archon or something else. 
The most significant evidence for the use of basileus is found in a speech of pseudo- 
Lysias: 
En£iTa SE Kai SüOxXrJx£ it6X£i5 icoXX&. Ev TIj äzcoSriµi. a, EiK£kiav, 'ITaXiav, 
II£Xonövvilaov, 0£TTakiav, EX 2, i c tov rov, 'Iwviav, Kültpov" ßa61XEac itoXXoiv 
x£KOXäK£vK£V, w äv gvy' V1ITat, 1CX7 V Toi) Evpaxoßiov Alovvxiov. oütos SE fi 
1CäVTwV E'ÜT1)x£6T(XT6; EaTLV 4 ? L%£L6Tov yv6)ti. j 6la(pEpet 'C(Äv äX%, wv, ö5 µövos 
Twv ßvyy£voµevcov 'AvaoKiöfl oüK El; rinat Ord im, ävSpäg Totoüzov, ös TEXVI1v 
T(XüT1IV £x£t, Toi); h ev ExOpovs g-gsEv not£iv xaxöv, Tofu; 8E cpiXoi Sö TL äv 
SüvrlTai. KaKöv. 
ps. -Lysias Against Andocides 6-7 
71 Caven (1990) 156-7. 
72 This was Dionysius' most significant propaganda exercise, but rather than making the journey to 
Olympia himself, his brother Thearides was sent along with sacred envoys to carry out sacrifices in 
Dionysius' name, as well as rhapsodes to sing his praises, magnificent pavilions for display and four- 
horse chariots for the competitions themselves. However this seems to have been a massive failure in 
virtually every way, with his own songs ridiculed by the audience, his chariots crashing and the pavilions 
attacked. Even the sacred envoys were shipwrecked on the return home to Sicily, providing Dionysius' 
enemies, both present and future, with plenty of material with which to ridicule the tyrant (Diod. Sic. 
XIV. 109). It seems that the orator Lysias may also have played some part in this, speaking publicly 
against the tyrant, accusing him of being an enemy of Greek liberty, inciting the crowds to attack the 
pavilion set up as well as to stop the sacred envoys going about their business. Finally Lysias urges the 
Greeks to come together to liberate the whole of Sicily and depose Dionysius (Lysias 33). Caven (1990) 
on Dionysius and Olympia- 144-5. 
" Diod. Sic. X11l. 94.5-6. Oost (1976) 234, Caven (1990) 156. 
74 Plut. Dion 48. 
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This speech names Dionysius as one of a group of kings whom Andocides had tried to 
flatter, although in this particular case he was unsuccessful75. It may seem that in the eyes of 
the Athenians at least, Dionysius was basileus of Syracuse, but of course this evidence may not 
truly reflect contemporary attitudes that well, given the inflammatory purpose of the speech. 
Athens provides more compelling evidence for the recognition of Dionysius as basileus in three 
inscriptions, all found in Athens itself76. The first is dated to around 394/3, twelve years into 
Dionysius' rule, and seems to be an attempt to gain his support at the expense of Sparta, who 
was Dionysius' main ally for much of his reign. 
£rt' EvßokMSo äpxovtoc Eiti cng II[avSto]- 
vi6os EKtr; 1tputavcu6cn; vacat 
rat IIXätcty Ntxoxäpo; (D?, vEi)[S £ypa]- 
µµäTEVE. 
98oýsv tijt [io? S1t" Ktvnaias aiig" 7c[Epi. wv 'Av]- 
8po66EVrls XEyEt enatveaat Au[o]v[üßtov to]- 
[v EtK]Aia; äpx[o]vt[a] Kai AniTivily c6[v ä&X]- 
[cpö]v c6v Atov[v]6[io xa]i OEapI v zö[v äSEX(pO]- 
[v] Töv Atovva[io xai IIoXI ]ýEVOV T[öv xnSc tfj- 
[v E6v Atovvaio ---------- -] 
Rhodes and Osborne no. 10 (IG 111 18) 
Lawton claims that the inscription takes the form of an official alliance, but this is 
rejected by Rhodes and Osborne who see it as little more than a decree honouring Dionysius 
and his family". What seems to be the most important feature is the addressing of Dionysius 
as archon, though not just of Syracuse, but of all Sicily, and this, according to Lewis, is his 
preferred title, as he continues to be addressed as such in the two further inscriptions, dated to 
369/8 and 368/778. By 369, Athens had at last gained Dionysius' favour through its own 
alliance with Sparta, in the face of Theban dominance in Greece, and the second inscription 
celebrates this by awarding Dionysius and his sons Athenian citizenship, as well as crowns79. 
The third records an alliance between Athens and Dionysius, including a promise of help in 
case of attack, and a non-aggression pact. What is interesting here is that it is only an alliance 
75 This speech is usually dated to the first few years of the 4t' century, i. e. at an early stage of Dionysius' 
rule in Syracuse. 
76 Rhodes and Osborne (2003) nos. 10,33,34. 
" Lawton (1995) 90-1, Rhodes and Osborne (2003) 48-51, no. 10. 
78 Lewis (1994) 136-8. 
79 As Henry (1983) points out, the crowns were not awarded in recognition of royalty, but rather 
benefaction to Athens - 22-8,34-6. 
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with Dionysius himself; it may be possible that Syracuse had allied itself with Athens at 
another time, but it is almost as if Dionysius was somehow unrepresentative of the city itself, 
and this certainly seems to be the case when we look at the composition of Dionysius' armed 
forces later on80. What seems interesting from the point of view of titular use, is the mention of 
Dionysius' descendants, which has been interpreted by Oost as strong evidence for kingship81. 
While this certainly seems convincing, as it gives the impression of a stable, long-term, and 
most importantly, constitutional government, it may simply be connected to the last point 
which suggests that Dionysius was quite unrepresentative of the city itself, and also to the fact 
that it was simply worth more to the Athenians to be allied to Dionysius himself than with 
Syracuse. 
Other sources may appear to support Oost's theory, in particular Polybius, who 
recognizes Dionysius, as well as Agathocles, as a king, despite his dislike for tyranny, as well 
as other minor sources which associate him with various regalia such as diadems and the 
wearing of purple robes82. Another important source is of course Diodorus Siculus, who never 
refers to Dionysius as basileus, but does mention his burial adjacent to the `royal gates', 
perhaps suggesting the Deinomenids' own kingship as well as that of Dionysius83. It is clear 
that Diodorus does not agree with Dionysius' method of rule (again, consistent with Diodorus' 
attitudes to Thrasybulus, see previous chapter p. 194), saying that he had enslaved Sicily, but 
this comment tells us much more than the historian's dislike for him when taken into context. 
ob y&p Si1tcou9sv 6?; 16)6at TtS äv itapaß&) Xety itovü6tov tw 1taXatw FWovt. 
Exgivos µi v yäp µE2ä Tf; i i(Xg äpETis, µs26ttwv Evpaxo6iwv xai Twv äX. Xwv 
Etx8XtwTwv rlX$ )O puuaE Ti V XIK6 iav äIEaaav, 6 S' Ev ExsvoEpia itapaXaj36)v 
26s nActs Twv µav äUwv 6crca66)v xvpiovs xEItoirlxs Toüs ztoXEgiovs, aä265 
SE irly 1taTpi&a KaTaSE SoüXwTat. 
Diod. Sic. XIV. 66.1 
This is part of a speech of Theodorus attacking Dionysius in 396/5, which we may 
reasonably expect to mean that it is mostly fictitious, and an opportunity for Diodorus (or rather 
80 Caven (1990) proposes that Ortygia itself was the different entity to Syracuse, 156-9,183-5, and this is 
also consistent with the fact that Dionysius' mercenaries took up residence with him on the island. 
81 Oost (1976) 234. 
82 Polybius 15.35.4, which is dismissed by Walbank (1967) 495 and Berve (1967) p. 653, to Oost's 
annoyance. Bato of Sinope, FGrH 268 F4 (Livy 24.5.4), again dismissed by Berve (1967) p. 653; Duris, 
FGrH 76 F 14. 
83 Diod. Sic. XV. 74.5. 
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his source - Timaeus? 
84) to express his disapproval. Caven actually attributes the entire 
episode, including the Syracusans' military success (without Dionysius, who was away with his 
fleet) at their harbour, and the following debate at the assembly, to the invention of Diodorus or 
a source85. At the debate Theodorus proposes the removal of Dionysius from power, as the 
Syracusans were now clearly capable of defending themselves and there was no need for a 
militaristic autocrat. It is here, at last, where the question of the Deinomenids' influence on 
history following their fall can be most directly tackled, as Theodorus contrasts Dionysius with 
Gelon himself. 
Oost uses this episode as further evidence of Dionysius' kingship in Syracuse, saying 
that the statement `You cannot compare Dionysius to Gelon' is evidence that comparisons ivere 
made, perhaps at that time, and that this was what Dionysius wanted86. There are serious flaws 
in this argument, in that we cannot argue that the comparison refers to Dionysius' right to be 
recognised as a king, because the context refers only to their military achievements and the 
manner of their rule, not their constitutional position in Syracuse or Sicily. Secondly, there is 
no evidence to suggest that Dionysius ever wanted to be recognised as basileus; this is simply 
an assumption on Oost's part, based on the idea that all politicians are not only hungry for 
absolute power, but also want public acceptance and constitutional legitimacy to go with it. 
While this is a nice idea, the assumption made is quite unsafe in itself, and Oost relies on his 
own readers' probable mistrust in politicians in order to carry his message through. 
When this passage is considered more fully, it seems that the best honour that could 
possibly be bestowed upon a Syracusan autocrat was not being made basileus, despite all the 
debate on whether Dionysius was, was not, or even wanted to be one, but rather comparison 
with Gelon. While this honour does not actually bear Gelon's name, in the same way as the 
names Caesar and Augustus were used in the Roman Empire, and even up to modern times in 
Germany and Russia, it does seem to have been of a similar kind. Gelon was the leader par 
excellence in Sicily, and following Himera, if Diodorus is to be believed, lie was not only 
S; Stroheker (1958) 210 n. 98 believes this speech is `pure Timaeus'. 
85 Caven (1990) 115-6. 
86 Oost (1976) 234-5. 
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granted the title of basileus but also euergetes and sorer - benefactor and saviour 
S7. Even if 
Dionysius was accepted as basileus in Syracuse and also archon of Sicily, the speech of 
Theodorus makes it clear that he could never claim to be its saviour as Gelon was. It does 
seem to be this that is being alluded to in the text, where Theodorus refers to the freeing of 
Sicily from the Carthaginians at Himera, and perhaps Oost has misunderstood the fill meaning 
of Dionysius' being compared to Gelon. A constitutional office could be held by an unsuitable 
ruler, just as Hieron and Thrasybulus had apparently inherited the royal position from Gelon, 
but it was achievements such as Gelon's at Himera which would have provided inspiration in 
men to try and emulate them, particularly for a military leader such as Dionysius. It was 
Gelon, above all, that Dionysius would have been compared with, as he had set the benchmark 
with the Himera campaign. 
Conclusion 
It seems that of all the ways in which the Pantarids and the Deinomenids had helped 
shape future events in Sicily in the century following their fall, it was the victory gained by 
Gelon following Himera which provided the biggest influence, both in the eyes of the Sicilian 
Greeks and also the Carthaginians. Dionysius' manner of rule, and his ultimate aims, both 
seem to want to match Gelon's heroics, or perhaps even surpass them by ridding Sicily of the 
Phoenicians for good, although there is more room for doubt on this particular point. The king 
of Carthage itself, Hannibal, is believed by Diodorus to have started the wars in Sicily in 
revenge for his grandfather's defeat and death at Himera. Even future tyrants/kings in Syracuse 
adopt the names of Deinomenid leaders, such as Hieron II. Of course there were also points of 
negative influence in Sicily, particularly the revulsion held by many cities, including Syracuse, 
for tyranny, indicated by developments such as the introduction of petalism. However, this 
issue has turned out to be far more complex than simply anti-tyranny sentiment in general. We 
have found that this would have been restricted mostly to the Gamor"oi early on, and the threat 
of tyranny was ever present, but this was due to the nature of the Deinomenid dynasty, which 
had left the political situation in much the same state as shortly before Gelon had arrived in 
87 Diod. Sic. XI. 26.6. 
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Syracuse in 485. Amongst other points in this chapter, we have also learned of how the tyrants 
of the early fifth century seemed to have anticipated more common happenings in Sicily and 
even the Greek world much later on, such as the mass employment and mass settlement of 
mercenaries. We must be careful not to assume in these cases that the Pantarids and 
Deinomenids actually influenced future decisions, which seem to have been more due to 
contemporary issues such as mass poverty of soldiers following the end of the Peloponnesian 
War, the diversification of warfare, and, of course, lots of money available to those who knew 
where to find it. However it does seem likely, given the continued use of mercenaries in Sicily 
during the fifth century BC, and the future reappearance of mass population movement, that the 
Pantarid and Deinomenid tyrants were the trendsetters. 
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CONCLUSION 
Over the course of this thesis we have considered aspects of the Pantarid and 
Deinomenid dynasties that have contributed greatly to our understanding of them. On the 
whole, it has been shown why these two dynasties warrant more scholarly attention than they 
have been given so far, in particular because there are many points that mark them out as 
different from other tyrants of the Archaic age in Greece. 
Returning to the beginning of this thesis, the aim of the first chapter was to put the 
story of the tyrants into the context of the sources that inform us. However, our main source, 
Diodorus Siculus, is highly problematic and it has been necessary to dedicate much space to 
discussing his work. Perhaps the most important point that has been raised here is that the 
attitudes that have prevailed in Diodoran studies have perhaps shaped the course of the 
scholarship more than the Bibliotheke itself. Some of those who have tried to solve the 
question of Diodorus' sources seem to have been more concerned with that historian's 
reputation than the evidence that was actually available to them, leading them to make 
dangerous assumptions (without solid grounds) and then circular arguments. It is important for 
the sake of Diodoran studies that these serious and fundamental methodological flaws are 
shown up for what they really are, so they do not hold any further influence in the future. 
Diodorus' own work is still a problem, of course, but the first chapter has gone some 
way to finding out how to identify where the historian has gone wrong, both in terms of 
methodology and of course in how Diodorus' aims in writing have affected his historical 
accuracy. His use of sources is mostly uncritical, though it seems untrue that Diodorus actually 
took sections of Ephorus and Timaeus to form his own work, an accusation levelled at him by 
Laqueur'. One point that seems to have been arrived at in the course of the first chapter is that 
the idea of identifying where Diodorus used one source, as opposed to another, is a big problem 
in itself, but the task of actually identifying which source he is using is, at times, utterly futile. 
Book Eleven, with which we are concerned for the purposes of this thesis, seems to be one of 
those times, with no mention of either Ephorus or Timaeus in the book. Only the idea that 
1 See above, 47ff. 
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Carthage enjoyed an alliance with the Persians can really be attributed to a source, Ephorus, 
and this in turn defeats the idea that Timaeus was Diodorus' one source for Western affairs. On 
the other hand, it is not as if Diodoran studies as a whole is just one big unresolvable problem. 
We have identified points at which the historian is indeed using his own opinion (despite efforts 
to prove that even his aims were taken from Ephorus' work), and while Diodorus' concern for 
moral issues does damage the Bibliotheke's historical accuracy, we are better equipped to deal 
with problems in the text with this in mind. 
Some effort has also been made here to understand the contributions made by two other 
historians, Herodotus and Thucydides. While it is the case that coverage of Western Greek 
history itself is hardly immense from these authors, it is quite unfair to expect otherwise, with 
the focus of their respective works being largely unconcerned with events in the West. Also, in 
the case of Herodotus, in trying to discern whether there is bias towards/against tyrants, it 
seems that while Herodotus was not frightened to use stereotypes, this did not mean that he did 
not also appreciate that tyrants were individuals, some more deserving of praise than others. 
Appreciation of the sources available to us is crucially important to our understanding 
of the tyrants in Sicily, especially given the problematic nature of the historians involved. Now 
that we know what sort of agenda Diodorus had in writing his Bibliotheke, as well as those of 
his sources, we are better equipped to understand and tackle the various problems to be 
encountered when examining what they say about the tyrants. 
The main discussion of the tyranny itself started with the second chapter, where their 
foreign policy was the focus of attention. The first part concentrated on the tyrants' relations 
with other Greeks, in particular those in Sicily and Italy that were ruled by other tyrants. There 
seem to be two points on this subject of great significance, the first being the central role of the 
straits of Messina in the policy making of the tyrants of Gela and Syracuse. Even aside from 
events that directly involve Zancle, Rhegium or both, such as the intervention of Hieron at 
Rhegium following the death of Anaxilas, we find episodes such as the foundation of Aetna in 
476 that could certainly be interpreted as moves towards regaining the city of Zancle. The Cale 
Acte enterprise, which was almost certainly an idea of Hippocrates', seems to be further 
evidence of such a policy. The second main point to emerge from this section is the 
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interdependence between the tyrants of Gela/Syracuse and Acragas. This does, from time to 
time, appear explicitly in our sources with numerous examples, most notably Theron's cry for 
help at Himera in 480, but it is on the occasion of Theron's death that we realise how critical it 
was for tyrants to be supported by similar allies. The attack on Syracuse by Thrasydaeus, 
Theron's successor, shows how fragile the alliance between the Deinomenids and the 
Emmenids was, and this is another possible reason for Hieron's turning his attention to the sons 
of Anaxilas in Rhegium later in his reign. 
As for the tyrants' relations with Carthage, we have come to one very clear conclusion 
regarding the Himera campaign of 480, that rather than being a result of Carthaginian 
aggression against the Greeks of Sicily, aiming to annex the island as part of a Carthaginian 
empire, it was, in fact the aggression of Theron that was the source of the conflict. We can be 
almost certain that it was Theron's capture of Himera that brought the two main protagonists, 
Carthage (ally of Terillus, deposed tyrant of Himera) and Gelon (Theron's main ally) into a 
confrontation that has been distorted into the Western front of the Greeks' struggle against 
Persia. However, we have also seen in later chapters how this episode caught the imagination 
of the Greeks in the West, transforming Gelon into an icon, the saviour of Greece, regardless of 
the true circumstances of his victory at Himera. 
The third chapter concentrated on the military aspects of the tyrants' foreign policy 
and, more precisely, on the use of mercenaries. Again, there are a few points that stand out and 
show why the tyrants of Gela and Syracuse were unique in the Greek world. The most obvious 
point is the dependence shown on mercenaries, at least from Gelon's reign onwards, which is 
clearly indicated by the immense numbers of mercenaries recruited and then settled for 
payment. At times, this dependence was extreme, and never more so than at the very end of the 
Deinomenid dynasty, when Thrasybulus was only able to rely on mercenaries for his own 
safety. 
Even more striking than this unusual over-dependence on mercenaries, are the reasons 
behind it. From an early stage in the tyranny, it was realised that although popular revolts were 
the best way for an aspiring tyrant to come to power, that was not necessarily the case for a 
tyrant hoping to maintain it. Instead, possibly from Hippocrates' final years onwards, efforts 
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were made by the tyrants to ingratiate themselves with the aristocracy of Gela, and as Gelon 
extended the empire towards Syracuse, the same was done with the aristocracies of various 
other cities such as Megara Hyblaea. Ultimately, Gelon gained the support of the Syracusan 
Gamoroi by reinstating them following a popular revolt in the city in 485, and with generous 
funds, was able to recruit mercenary forces instead of relying on the fragile, if even existent, 
loyalty of the masses. Ingeniously, the mercenaries were settled in Sicily as a permanent and 
reliable means of payment, ensuring the tyrant's dependence on them would not be 
compromised by unpredictability in the loyalty stakes. This enabled the tyrants to make use of 
many thousands of mercenaries during a time when such practice was very rare indeed, and had 
previously been mainly restricted to bodyguards. This kind of policy played a huge part in 
destabilising the region following the end of the Deinomenid dynasty, as we have found out in 
the final chapter, with many cities having to forcibly remove those settled there by the tyrants, 
but also, unusually, the balance of power was still with the aristocracy following the fall of the 
tyranny, and the demos was still effectively excluded. 
The refounding of cities in Sicily, which often involved the settling of mercenaries, is 
an even more unusual feature of this time in Sicily. There is no real precedent for these events, 
especially for the refoundation of Catana as Aetna, which stands alone as a virtually unique 
occurrence because of its sheer ambition and grandeur. It seems that the first incident at 
Camarina served to raise awareness of the possible advantages of mass-population movement, 
and the ease of doing so in Sicily as opposed to the many problems that one would confront on 
the Greek mainland. However, we have also found that of the four examples of `refoundation' 
in Sicily, three do not really fit that description at all. Only the refoundation of Catana seems to 
be carried out with the aim of creating a brand new city, with an identity distinct in virtually 
every way from the older settlement, the other three being far more like reinforcements to 
already existing cities. 
In the cases of Camarina and Himera there are no known attempts at establishing any 
new institutions, for example a founder cult, and in neither case is any section of the population 
removed immediately beforehand, although Himera did suffer from severe under-population 
due to several incidents in the recent past. Both Camarina and Himera were in strategically 
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significant locations, and it is likely that they were reinforced in order to counter possible 
threats from Syracuse and the Carthaginians respectively. Zancle also occupied an extremely 
important strategic point, both militarily and economically, and perhaps suffered some 
population loss amongst its established population, in addition to the expulsion of the Samians, 
but the renaming of the city as Messene/Messana adds an extra dimension to Anaxilas' 
refoundation. However, there is still no real evidence to suggest it was regarded as a new city, 
although there was a substantial input of Messenian immigrants. Again, it seems likely that the 
intention was to reinforce Zancle in order to maintain control in the face of likely aggression 
from the Deinomenids. Although there were strategic motives for Hieron's refoundation of 
Catana, likely to be the aforementioned interest in Zancle/Messana, there is also clear evidence 
to suggest that it was one big propaganda exercise. Hieron wanted to be recognized as 
something other than a tyrant, and the establishment of his hero-cult in Aetna following his 
death is clearly indicative of his intention to be recognised as an oikist, a title that would stay 
with him regardless of whether he ruled effectively or not. The Aetna episode may indeed be 
the only real example of `refoundation' at this time, but without the precedents of Camarina and 
Zancle one wonders whether Hieron would have come up with the same idea, or if he did have 
the idea, whether it would have seemed feasible. Therefore, just as we have found with 
mercenary recruitment, the tyrants of Gela and Syracuse were simply ahead of their time when 
it came to the shifting of populations, and this is continued into later Sicilian history by leaders 
such as Dionysius I. 
Just as the subject of refoundations is dominated by the actions of Hieron, the tyrant 
has also been the subject of much of our evidence for Deinomenid propaganda. Very little 
survives from Hippocrates and Gelon, but there are very good reasons for this sudden outbreak 
of propaganda material. Hippocrates and Gelon simply did not need to legitimise their rule: 
Hippocrates, though perhaps not the most popular man in Gela at the time, brought military 
successes not only against other Greek cities but also against the Sicels who had been a thorn in 
the city's side since its foundation. Gelon was even less popular first of all, with his 
suppression of a popular revolt against Hipocrates' sons, but his victory at Himera transformed 
him into a hero, and he was known (however inaccurately) as the saviour of the Greeks in 
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Sicily. With little left to conquer, and living in the shadow of his brother, Hieron was forced to 
take measures in order to secure his position, and his commissioning of poets went a long way 
towards achieving this aim. Even though poets had frequently been hired by tyrants before, it 
seems as if they were recruited by Hieron specifically to send a message to his subjects, 
defending his position in Syracuse, and this was done mainly in conjunction with his actual 
achievements: the foundation of Aetna, various Olympic and Pythian victories, and his naval 
victory at Cumae. We have also found a favoured method of legitimisation, this being the 
description of Hieron's position and achievements, as well as his method of rule, in Homeric 
terms, even going so far as to imply that Hieron was put in place by Zeus himself, to bring 
peace and prosperity to his dominion. In other words, Hieron's rule was being assimilated with 
constitutional monarchy. 
On a similar matter, we have also examined the tyrants' use of titles, as well as those 
used by our sources. Almost surprisingly, given the efforts made by Hieron to justify his 
position, there are simply no claims on behalf of the tyrants themselves to kingship in Gela or 
Syracuse, or even acknowledgement of their position as ruler, with the exception of Polyzelus' 
inscription on the base of the Charioteer of Delphi. However, this seems to be a conscious 
effort to ingratiate themselves with the so-called `Panhellenic elite' at Olympia and Delphi, 
who would no doubt have frowned on open displays of power, particularly over fellow Greeks, 
post-Persian invasion. A different matter altogether is how the tyrants were treated later on, 
particularly by historians. In fact, the term basileus is used fairly consistently by Diodorus to 
describe the Deinomenids (and only the Deinomenids, not their popular ally, Theron), 
especially following Himera, the only main exceptions being his description of when 
Thrasybulus' rule descends into ugliness, where Diodorus' moral duties come into play. Even 
Herodotus uses the term basileus in the story of the Greek embassy to Gelon, but there still 
seems to be room for doubt over why he uses it. On existing evidence, it seems that the 
Deinomenids' kingship cannot be proven either way until more evidence comes to light. 
The issue of titular use also had a strong impact on the final chapter, as it is an equally 
contentious subject when considering the Dionysian tyrants. We can probably rule out the 
theory that `the Deinomenids used basileus, so therefore the Dionysians must also have', 
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especially as it has not been proven in the case of the Deinomenids, and apart from hints at a 
hereditary system of power in Syracuse under Dionysius, and also references to kingly regalia, 
there is no solid evidence suggesting that is the case. While it is uncertain that the Dionysians 
used any title, aside from the early use of strategos autokrator, it seems that the legacy of 
Gelon, and the likely desire to be associated with him in any way counted for more in Syracuse 
than constitutional legitimacy. 
Considering the battle of Himera was meant to be the greatest achievement by Gelon, 
or indeed any of the tyrants of Gela and Syracuse, it seems to have had surprisingly little effect 
on activity in Carthage. This is despite the impression we are given by our sources, who 
maintain that the defeat was so crushing that Carthage withdrew into itself for most of the 
remainder of the century. On the contrary, we find the territory of Carthage actually expanded 
during this time, to cover most of modern Tunisia, and of course further exploration in and 
around Africa. In this case, therefore, the tyrants of Sicily had much less impact than has 
usually been thought. The case of mercenary recruitment may seem similar at first glance when 
one takes into account the sudden surge in professional forces following the Peloponnesian 
War. However, two points make this subject worthy of further exploration. The first is that 
mercenary and bodyguard use actually continues throughout the fifth century, during the 
democratic age, so it seems likely that the extensive use of mercenaries by the Deinomenids 
served as some sort of influence after their fall. Secondly, Dionysius himself shows a similar 
degree of dependency on mercenaries as the Deinomenids. This is especially important as the 
two dynasties' manner of rule was also very similar: to recap, the Deinomenids and Dionysians 
were both heavily dependent on the support of the aristocracy rather than of the masses, hence 
their extensive use of mercenary infantry forces. 
The most important legacy of the Pantarid and Deinomenid tyrants, however, was their 
huge impact on the political life of Syracuse itself. This manifested itself in several ways 
throughout the fifth century BC, for example the strife caused by the mercenaries settled all 
over Eastern Sicily by the Deinomenids, especially when the populace tried to reclaim their 
respective cities from those who were settled by the tyrants. However, the most notable feature 
of the tyrants' legacy was found in Syracuse's confused attempts at trying to ensure that 
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tyranny did not return. While democracy was installed at Syracuse, at least according to our 
sources, it seems that the Gamor"oi actually retained much of their own influence. Measures 
meant to prevent tyranny recurring, such as petalism, backfired because it harmed the more 
influential classes to such a degree that it had to be repealed. In general, the attempt at 
democratic government failed miserably in Syracuse, and much of this was due to the fear of 
tyranny held by both Garnoroi and demos. 
Overall, the impact that the Pantarid and Deinomenid dynasties had on future events in 
Sicily cannot be over emphasised, and this is the primary reason why more attention should be 
given to them. The influence that they maintained in Sicilian, particularly Syracusan, politics 
over the course of the next century was so great that if it were not for the likes of Hippocrates 
and Gelon, then the course of Greek history could have been very different - for example the 
Carthaginians might not have invaded Sicily during the late fifth century BC. Democracy might 
have had a better chance of surviving in Syracuse had it not been for the empowerment of the 
Gamoroi under the Deinomenids, whereas in other cases tyranny enables the state to switch 
from aristocratic government to democracy. If the democracy was stable and the Carthaginians 
did not invade, then Dionysius, the most powerful and influential Greek in the first half of the 
fourth century, might never even have become tyrant. 
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